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Password-Authenticated Key (PAK) Diffie-Hellman Exchange

Abstract

This document proposes to add mutual authentication, based on a human-memorizable password, to the basic, unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The proposed algorithm is called the Password-Authenticated Key (PAK) exchange. PAK allows two parties to authenticate themselves while performing the Diffie-Hellman exchange.

The protocol is secure against all passive and active attacks. In particular, it does not allow either type of attacker to obtain any information that would enable an offline dictionary attack on the password. PAK provides Forward Secrecy.

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1. Introduction

PAK has the following advantages:

- It provides a secure, authenticated key-exchange protocol.
- It is secure against offline dictionary attacks when passwords are used.
- It ensures Forward Secrecy.
- It has been proven to be as secure as the Diffie-Hellman solution.

The PAK protocol ([BMP00], [MP05], [X.1035]) has been proven to be as secure as the Diffie-Hellman ([RFC2631], [DH76]) in the random oracle model [BR93]. That is, PAK retains its security when used with low-entropy passwords. Therefore, it can be seamlessly integrated into existing applications, requiring secure authentication based on such low-entropy shared secrets.

2. Conventions

- A is an identity of Alice.
- B is an identity of Bob.
- R_a is a secret random exponent selected by A.
- R_b is a secret random exponent selected by B.
- X_{ab} denotes a value (X presumably computed by A) as derived by B.
- Y_{ba} denotes a value (Y presumably computed by B) as derived by A.
- $A \bmod b$ denotes the least non-negative remainder when a is divided by b.
- $H_i(u)$ denotes an agreed-on function (e.g., based on SHA-1, SHA-256, etc.) computed over a string u; the various $H()$ act as independent random functions. $H_1(u)$ and $H_2(u)$ are the key derivation functions. $H_3(u)$, $H_4(u)$, and $H_5(u)$ are the hash functions.
- $s|t$ denotes concatenation of the strings s and t.
- $^{\wedge}$ denotes exponentiation.
- Multiplication, division, and exponentiation are performed over $(\mathbb{Z}_p)^*$; in other words:

- 1) $a*b$ always means $a*b \pmod{p}$.
- 2) a/b always means $a * x \pmod{p}$, where x is the multiplicative inverse of b modulo p .
- 3) a^b means $a^b \pmod{p}$.

3. Password-Authenticated Key Exchange

Diffie-Hellman key agreement requires that both the sender and recipient of a message create their own secret, random numbers and exchange the exponentiation of their respective numbers.

PAK has two parties, Alice (A) and Bob (B), sharing a secret password PW that satisfies the following conditions:

$$\begin{aligned} H1(A|B|PW) & \neq 0 \\ H2(A|B|PW) & \neq 0 \end{aligned}$$

The global Diffie-Hellman publicly known constants, a prime p and a generator g , are carefully selected so that:

1. A safe prime p is large enough to make the computation of discrete logarithms infeasible, and
2. Powers of g modulo p cover the entire range of $p-1$ integers from 1 to $p-1$. (References demonstrate working examples of selections).

Initially, Alice (A) selects a secret, random exponent R_a and computes g^{R_a} ; Bob (B) selects a secret, random exponent R_b and computes g^{R_b} . For efficiency purposes, short exponents could be used for R_a and R_b , provided they have a certain minimum size. Then:

A \rightarrow B: $\{A, X = H1(A|B|PW) * (g^{R_a})\}$
 (The above precondition on PW ensures that $X \neq 0$)

Bob

receives Q (presumably $Q = X$), verifies that $Q \neq 0$
 (if $Q = 0$, Bob aborts the procedure);
 divides Q by $H1(A|B|PW)$ to get X_{ab} , the recovered value of g^{R_a}

B --> A: $\{Y = H2(A|B|PW) * (g^{Rb}), S1 = H3(A|B|PW|Xab|g^{Rb}|(Xab)^{Rb})\}$
 (The above precondition on PW ensures that $Y \neq 0$)

Alice

verifies that $Y \neq 0$;
 divides Y by $H2(A|B|PW)$ to get Yba, the recovered value of g^{Rb} ,
 and computes $S1' = H3(A|B|PW|g^{Ra}|Yba|(Yba)^{Ra})$;
 authenticates Bob by checking whether $S1' = S1$;
 if authenticated, then sets key $K = H5(A|B|PW|g^{Ra}|Yba|(Yba)^{Ra})$

A --> B: $S2 = H4(A|B|PW|g^{Ra}|Yba|(Yba)^{Ra})$

Bob

Computes $S2' = H4(A|B|PW|Xab|g^{Rb}|(Xab)^{Rb})$ and
 authenticates Alice by checking whether $S2' = S2$;
 if authenticated, then sets $K = H5(A|B|PW|Xab|g^{Rb}|(Xab)^{Rb})$

If any of the above verifications fails, the protocol halts;
 otherwise, both parties have authenticated each other and established
 the key.

4. Selection of Parameters

This section provides guidance on selection of the PAK parameters.
 First, it addresses general considerations, then it reports on
 specific implementations.

4.1. General Considerations

In general implementations, the parameters must be selected to meet
 algorithm requirements of [BMP00].

4.2. Over-the-Air Service Provisioning (OTASP) and Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Diffie-Hellman Parameters and Key Expansion Functions

[OTASP], [TIA683], and [WLAN] pre-set public parameters p and g to
 their "published" values. This is necessary to protect against an
 attacker sending bogus p and g values, tricking the legitimate user
 to engage in improper Diffie-Hellman exponentiation and leaking some
 information about the password.

According to [OTASP], [TIA683], and [WLAN], g shall be set to
 00001101, and p to the following 1024-bit prime number (most
 significant bit first):

```

0xFFFFFFFF 0xFFFFFFFF 0xC90FDAA2 0x2168C234 0xC4C6628B
0x80DC1CD1 0x29024E08 0x8A67CC74 0x020BBEA6 0x3B139B22
0x514A0879 0x8E3404DD 0xEF9519B3 0xCD3A431B 0x302B0A6D
0xF25F1437 0x4FE1356D 0x6D51C245 0xE485B576 0x625E7EC6
0xF44C42E9 0xA637ED6B 0x0BFF5CB6 0xF406B7ED 0xEE386BFB
0x5A899FA5 0xAE9F2411 0x7C4B1FE6 0x49286651 0xECE65381
0xFFFFFFFF 0xFFFFFFFF

```

In addition, if short exponents [MP05] are used for Diffie-Hellman parameters R_a and R_b , then they should have a minimum size of 384 bits. The independent, random functions H_1 and H_2 should each output 1152 bits, assuming prime p is 1024 bits long and session keys K are 128 bits long. H_3 , H_4 , and H_5 each output 128 bits. More information on instantiating random functions using hash functions can be found in [BR93]. We use the FIPS 180 SHA-1 hashing function [FIPS180] below to instantiate the random function as done in [WLAN]; however, SHA-256 can also be used:

$H_1(z)$:

```

SHA-1(1|1|z) mod  $2^{128}$  | SHA-1(1|2|z) mod  $2^{128}$  | ... |
| SHA-1(1|9|z) mod  $2^{128}$ 

```

$H_2(z)$:

```

SHA-1(2|1|z) mod  $2^{128}$  | SHA-1(2|2|z) mod  $2^{128}$  | ... |
| SHA-1(2|9|z) mod  $2^{128}$ 

```

```

H3(z): SHA-1(3|len(z)|z|z) mod  $2^{128}$ 
H4(z): SHA-1(4|len(z)|z|z) mod  $2^{128}$ 
H5(z): SHA-1(5|len(z)|z|z) mod  $2^{128}$ 

```

In order to create 1152 output bits for H_1 and H_2 , nine calls to SHA-1 are made and the 128 least significant bits of each output are used. The input payload of each call to SHA-1 consists of:

- 32 bits of function type, which for H_1 is set to 1 and for H_2 is set to 2;
- a 32-bit counter value, which is incremented from 1 to 9 for each call to SHA-1;
- the argument z [for $(A|B|PW)$].

The functions H_3 , H_4 , and H_5 require only one call to the SHA-1 hashing function and their respective payloads consist of:

- 32 bits of function type (e.g., 3 for H_3);
- a 32-bit value for the bit length of the argument z ;
- the actual argument repeated twice.

Finally, the 128 least significant bits of the output are used.

5. Security Considerations

Security considerations are as follows:

- Identifiers

Any protocol that uses PAK must specify a method for producing a single representation of identity strings.

- Shared secret

PAK involves the use of a shared secret. Protection of the shared values and managing (limiting) their exposure over time is essential and can be achieved using well-known security policies and measures. If a single secret is shared among more than two entities (e.g., Alice, Bob, and Mallory), then Mallory can represent himself as Alice to Bob without Bob being any the wiser.

- Selection of Diffie-Hellman parameters

The parameters p and g must be carefully selected in order not to compromise the shared secret. Only previously agreed-upon values for parameters p and g should be used in the PAK protocol. This is necessary to protect against an attacker sending bogus p and g values and thus tricking the other communicating party in an improper Diffie-Hellman exponentiation. Both parties also need to randomly select a new exponent each time the key-agreement protocol is executed. If both parties re-use the same values, then Forward Secrecy property is lost.

In addition, if short exponents R_a and R_b are used, then they should have a minimum size of 384 bits (assuming that 128-bit session keys are used). Historically, the developers, who strived for 128-bit security (and thus selected 256-bit exponents), added 128 bits to the exponents to ensure the security reduction proofs. This should explain how an "odd" length of 384 has been arrived at.

- Protection against attacks

a) There is a potential attack, the so-called discrete logarithm attack on the multiplicative group of congruencies modulo p , in which an adversary can construct a table of discrete logarithms to be used as a "dictionary". A sufficiently large prime, p , must be selected to protect against such an attack. A proper 1024-bit value for p and an appropriate value for g are published in [WLAN] and [TIA683]. For the moment, this is what has been implemented; however, a larger prime (i.e., one that

is 2048 bits long, or even larger) will definitely provide better protection. It is important to note that once this is done, the generator must be changed too, so this task must be approached with extreme care.

- b) An online password attack can be launched by an attacker by repeatedly guessing the password and attempting to authenticate. The implementers of PAK should consider employing mechanisms (such as lockouts) for preventing such attacks.

- Recommendations on H() functions

The independent, random functions H1 and H2 should output 1152 bits each, assuming prime p is 1024 bits long and session keys K are 128 bits long. The random functions H3, H4, and H5 should output 128 bits.

An example of secure implementation of PAK is provided in [Plan9].

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