



Independent Submission                                        S. Project
Internet-Draft                    SAIHM (Sovereign AI Horizontal Memory)
Intended status: Informational                               18 May 2026
Expires: 19 November 2026


          The Sovereign AI Horizontal Memory (SAIHM) Protocol
                     draft-saihm-memory-protocol-00

Abstract

   This document defines the Sovereign AI Horizontal Memory (SAIHM)
   protocol, a memory layer for AI agents that supports post-quantum
   identity binding, public-chain audit anchoring, per-cell encryption
   with wallet-derived keys, revocable sharing contracts, and
   cryptographic right-to-erasure aligned with Article 17 of EU
   Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR).

   SAIHM is the memory-layer protocol companion to the Model Context
   Protocol (MCP).  MCP standardizes how AI agents reach tools and
   contextual data sources; SAIHM standardizes how AI agents persist,
   share, and erase memory across sessions, models, and vendors.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 November 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.







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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Cell shape  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Identity binding (ML-DSA-65)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Encryption envelope (HKDF chain)  . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Audit anchor (public chain) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.5.  Sharing contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.6.  Cryptographic erasure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Tool surface (MCP binding)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  saihm_remember  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  saihm_recall  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  saihm_forget  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  saihm_status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.5.  saihm_share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.6.  saihm_revoke_share  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.7.  saihm_governance_propose  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.8.  saihm_governance_vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Wire formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Receipt and audit semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Post-quantum identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.2.  Sovereign key custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.3.  Cryptographic erasure properties  . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.4.  Operator threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Privacy considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  GDPR Article 17 alignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Minimization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.3.  Audit log content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Reference deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction




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1.1.  Motivation

   The Model Context Protocol [MCP], donated to the Agentic AI
   Foundation [AAIF] under the Linux Foundation on 9 December 2025,
   defines how an AI agent reaches external tools and contextual data
   sources.  MCP solves the tool-access layer of the agent stack.  It
   does not standardize how an agent persists memory across sessions,
   models, or vendors.

   Production AI agents today rely on one of several non-portable
   approaches: a local file system, a vendor-specific session log, or a
   vector database.  None of these provides post-quantum identity
   binding, public-chain audit, cryptographic erasure aligned with
   Article 17 of GDPR [GDPR], or wallet-bound sovereignty that prevents
   an operator from reading cell content.

   This document specifies the Sovereign AI Horizontal Memory (SAIHM)
   protocol.  SAIHM is a memory-layer protocol that an MCP-capable agent
   may attach to gain durable, sovereign, revocably-shareable,
   cryptographically-erasable memory.  The protocol is operator-
   agnostic, vendor-agnostic, and chain-agnostic.  Where a public-chain
   audit anchor is named, it is named as a reference-deployment
   property, not as a protocol mandate.

1.2.  Scope

   This document defines:

   *  The cell shape (encrypted memory unit with canonical metadata).

   *  Identity binding using a post-quantum digital signature algorithm
      (ML-DSA-65, [FIPS204]).

   *  An encryption envelope deriving a per-cell DEK from the holder's
      wallet through a canonical HKDF chain [RFC5869].

   *  An audit anchor profile, with a reference deployment on a public
      chain.

   *  Sharing contracts (temporary, permanent, syndicate).

   *  Cryptographic erasure semantics (DEK destruction + tombstone +
      content-address blacklist) aligned with GDPR Article 17.

   *  An MCP binding consisting of eight canonical tools.

   This document does NOT define:




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   *  A specific blockchain (the protocol is chain-agnostic).

   *  Vector-database semantics (orthogonal).

   *  Agent runtime semantics (covered by MCP and runtime
      implementations).

1.3.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Holder:  the natural person, organization, or autonomous agent that
      owns the wallet seed bound to a SAIHM cell.

   Operator:  the entity providing storage, transport, and audit-anchor
      services to a holder.  The operator MUST NOT have access to
      plaintext cell content.

   Cell:  an encrypted memory unit, as defined in Section 2.1.

   Receipt:  a signed record of a SAIHM operation, anchored on a public
      chain.

   DEK:  Data Encryption Key. A per-cell symmetric key derived via HKDF
      from the holder's identity key.

   KEK:  Key Encryption Key version identifier.  A protocol-level
      counter that permits cryptographic agility through rotation
      without invalidating existing cells.

2.  Architecture

2.1.  Cell shape

   A SAIHM cell is the tuple:

  <cellId, holderId, kekVersion, tier, ciphertext, signature, timestamp>

   *  cellId: 32-byte content-addressable identifier derived from the
      ciphertext (SHA-256).

   *  holderId: 32-byte holder identity, derived from the holder's
      wallet seed (Section 2.2).




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   *  kekVersion: 32-bit unsigned integer identifying the KEK generation
      in force at write time.

   *  tier: short ASCII string naming the operator's storage tier (e.g.,
      "FILECOIN").

   *  ciphertext: cell payload encrypted with the per-cell DEK under an
      AEAD cipher.  AES-256-GCM is RECOMMENDED.

   *  signature: ML-DSA-65 signature over the concatenation (cellId ||
      holderId || kekVersion || timestamp).

   *  timestamp: write-time UTC seconds since the UNIX epoch.

2.2.  Identity binding (ML-DSA-65)

   Holder identity is derived from a wallet seed via the canonical HKDF
   chain:

   identityKey = HKDF(salt = "MPS-PQC-KEY-GEN-v1",
                      IKM  = walletSeed,
                      info = "MPS-AGENT-IDENTITY-v1",
                      L    = 64 bytes)

   identityKey is then used as the seed for ML-DSA-65 keypair generation
   per [FIPS204].  The public component is holderId; the private
   component MUST NOT leave the holder's machine.

   Every SAIHM operation MUST be authenticated by an ML-DSA-65 signature
   over the operation's canonical envelope.  Verification MUST follow
   [FIPS204] using the public holderId.

2.3.  Encryption envelope (HKDF chain)

   For each cell, the holder derives a per-cell DEK:

   DEK = HKDF(salt = KEK_v,
              IKM  = identityKey,
              info = cellNonce || "MPS-CELL-DEK-v1",
              L    = 32 bytes)

   where KEK_v is the current KEK generation and cellNonce is a per-cell
   16-byte random value.  The DEK is used directly with the AEAD cipher
   to encrypt the cell payload.







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   KEK rotation is versioned.  An operator MAY rotate the KEK under
   operator-defined policy; rotation does not invalidate existing cells
   because each cell carries its kekVersion.  Implementations MUST
   verify the kekVersion at read time and reject cells whose KEK has
   been revoked.

2.4.  Audit anchor (public chain)

   For each operation (write, read, share, revoke, erase) the protocol
   emits a receipt:

   <receiptId, cellId, operation, holderId, signature, timestamp>

   The receipt is anchored on a public chain offering transactional
   finality and public-record properties.  Anchoring MUST produce a
   chain-reachable identifier sufficient to reproduce the receipt
   independently.

   Reference deployment: COTI V2 mainnet, chain ID 2632500, block
   explorer https://mainnet.cotiscan.io.  Implementations MAY use any
   public chain offering equivalent finality and public-record
   properties.  The chain choice is a deployment decision; this protocol
   does not mandate one.

2.5.  Sharing contracts

   A holder MAY share a cell with a grantee through a signed sharing
   contract:

   <contractId, cellId, granteeId, mode, expiresAt, holderSignature>

   mode is one of:

   *  TEMPORARY: revocable; expiresAt MUST be no later than timestamp +
      86400 seconds (24 hours).

   *  PERMANENT: revocable; expiresAt MUST be the sentinel value 0 (no
      time bound).

   *  SYNDICATE: revocable; multi-grantee atomic; expiresAt MAY be 0 or
      a future time.

   Revocation is performed via a counter-signed contractRevocation
   anchored on chain.  Once anchored, the revocation takes effect
   immediately; subsequent recall attempts by the grantee MUST be
   rejected by the operator.





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2.6.  Cryptographic erasure

   The erase operation is atomic at the cryptographic layer:

   1.  The holder destroys the DEK for the target cell.

   2.  A tombstone is emitted, carrying cellId and a timestamp.

   3.  The cell's contentId is added to a public blacklist.

   4.  An audit receipt is anchored on chain.

   Because the operator never held the DEK (Section 2.3), the ciphertext
   at rest is computationally meaningless from the moment of DEK
   destruction.  Erasure is irreversible by the operator.

3.  Tool surface (MCP binding)

   SAIHM exposes the protocol entirely through the Model Context
   Protocol [MCP] using eight tools.  Each tool MUST authenticate the
   caller with an ML-DSA-65 signature (Section 2.2) over the tool's
   canonical request envelope.

   The tool surface is intentionally bounded at eight; protocol
   evolution proceeds through KEK rotation, governance vote, and
   parameter changes within the existing surface rather than by adding
   new tools.

3.1.  saihm_remember

   Signature: saihm_remember(content: string) -> cellId

   Encrypts content with a per-cell DEK, persists the ciphertext to the
   operator's storage tier, anchors a write receipt on chain, and
   returns the cellId.

   Pre-conditions: caller is the holder; the holder's wallet seed is
   locally available.

3.2.  saihm_recall

   Signature: saihm_recall(query?: string) -> cells[]

   Returns the cells the caller owns plus any cells they have been
   granted via active sharing contracts.  The optional query is a
   plaintext filter applied after decryption. query MUST NOT be
   transmitted to the operator.




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3.3.  saihm_forget

   Signature: saihm_forget(cellId: string) -> tombstone

   Performs cryptographic erasure of the named cell (Section 2.6).
   After saihm_forget returns success, the cell content MUST be
   computationally non-recoverable by any party, including the operator.

3.4.  saihm_status

   Signature: saihm_status() -> { prs, bfsi, shards, contracts,
   governance }

   Returns the holder's dashboard.  Fields:

   *  prs: Process Reliability Score, a normalized indicator (0..1) of
      operator performance against the protocol SLA.

   *  bfsi: Byzantine Fault Score Index, a normalized indicator (0..1)
      of operator integrity against the audit chain.

   *  shards: object describing distribution of the holder's cells by
      storage tier.

   *  contracts: list of active sharing contracts, with mode, granteeId,
      and expiresAt.

   *  governance: list of governance proposals in flight, with vote
      tallies.

3.5.  saihm_share

   Signature: saihm_share(cellId: string, granteeAgentId: string, mode:
   "TEMPORARY"|"PERMANENT"| "SYNDICATE") -> contractId

   Emits a signed sharing contract granting the grantee access to the
   named cell under the named mode (Section 2.5).

3.6.  saihm_revoke_share

   Signature: saihm_revoke_share(contractId: string) -> revocationId

   Emits a counter-signed contract revocation.  The grantee loses access
   at the moment the revocation is anchored on chain.







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3.7.  saihm_governance_propose

   Signature: saihm_governance_propose(scope: string, payload: object)
   -> propId

   Submits a governance proposal. scope is one of the protocol-defined
   governance scopes; payload is scope-specific.  The set of scopes is
   itself governance-mutable.

   The governance utility (gSAIHM) is operational governance for a
   specific reference deployment and is NOT part of the protocol layer.
   Implementations MAY substitute alternative governance mechanisms
   while preserving the tool signature.

3.8.  saihm_governance_vote

   Signature: saihm_governance_vote(propId: string, vote:
   "FOR"|"AGAINST"|"ABSTAIN") -> voteReceipt

   Casts a vote on a proposal.  Vote tallies MUST be reproducible from
   chain.

4.  Wire formats

   SAIHM uses Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949] for
   cell payloads and receipts, and JSON-RPC 2.0 over the MCP transport
   for tool calls.

   A canonical cell payload (CBOR diagnostic notation):

   {1: h'...cellId...',
    2: h'...holderId...',
    3: 1,
    4: "FILECOIN",
    5: h'...ciphertext...',
    6: h'...signature...',
    7: 1747526400}

   The integer keys correspond to fields defined in Section 2.1:
   1=cellId, 2=holderId, 3=kekVersion, 4=tier, 5=ciphertext,
   6=signature, 7=timestamp.

   A canonical receipt (CBOR diagnostic notation):








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   {1: h'...receiptId...',
    2: h'...cellId...',
    3: "REMEMBER",
    4: h'...holderId...',
    5: h'...signature...',
    6: 1747526400}

5.  Receipt and audit semantics

   For each tool call that mutates state (saihm_remember, saihm_forget,
   saihm_share, saihm_revoke_share, saihm_governance_propose,
   saihm_governance_vote), the operator MUST emit a receipt anchored on
   the audit chain.

   The receipt MUST include the operation type, the cellId (or
   contractId, or propId), the holderId, and the timestamp.

   The receipt MUST NOT include cell plaintext, the DEK, or the wallet
   seed.

   Receipts for erasure (saihm_forget) MUST also include the tombstone
   identifier and the contentId blacklist reference.

   Read-only tool calls (saihm_recall, saihm_status) MAY emit receipts
   under operator policy; receipts for read-only calls MUST NOT include
   cell plaintext.

6.  Security considerations

6.1.  Post-quantum identity

   ML-DSA-65 [FIPS204] is the protocol's authentication primitive.  ML-
   DSA-65 is a NIST-selected post-quantum digital signature algorithm in
   the FIPS-204 family.  An adversary with a cryptographically relevant
   quantum computer cannot forge SAIHM signatures.

   Implementations MUST use the FIPS-204 parameter set named ML-DSA-65.
   Implementations SHOULD include the kekVersion in every signed
   envelope so that key-rotation events are themselves signed.

6.2.  Sovereign key custody

   The wallet seed and the derived identity key MUST NOT leave the
   holder's machine.  The protocol does not provide key escrow.  A
   holder who loses the wallet seed loses access to their cells; the
   operator cannot recover access on behalf of the holder.





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   This is intentional.  The operator's inability to recover the wallet
   seed is the same property that prevents the operator from reading
   cell content.

6.3.  Cryptographic erasure properties

   Cryptographic erasure (Section 2.6) provides stronger evidence than
   logical (soft) deletion.  Because the DEK is destroyed at the holder
   side, ciphertext at rest is computationally meaningless to any party,
   including the operator.

   Backups and replicas store only ciphertext.  DEK destruction
   propagates erasure semantics to every copy of the ciphertext,
   anywhere, automatically.  An operator MUST NOT cache the DEK.

6.4.  Operator threat model

   The protocol assumes an honest-but-curious operator: the operator is
   expected to provide storage and transport honestly but MAY attempt to
   learn cell content.

   Against an honest-but-curious operator:

   *  Cell plaintext is never accessible to the operator (encryption-
      before-egress + per-cell DEK).

   *  Cell signatures are reproducible from public keys, so the operator
      cannot inject forged cells.

   *  Receipt validity is verifiable against the public chain, so the
      operator cannot rewrite the audit trail.

   Against a malicious operator (one that deviates from the protocol),
   additional measures (e.g., threshold-replicated storage, multi-chain
   receipt anchoring) may be advisable but are out of scope for this
   protocol layer.

7.  Privacy considerations

7.1.  GDPR Article 17 alignment

   The saihm_forget operation provides cryptographic-grade evidence of
   erasure aligned with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 [GDPR].
   The DEK is destroyed; a tombstone is published; the contentId is
   blacklisted; and a receipt is anchored on chain.






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   Article 17 requires erasure "without undue delay".  saihm_forget is
   atomic at the cryptographic layer; there is no operator-side deletion
   queue that could fail to drain.

7.2.  Minimization

   The audit log records cellId, holderId, operation, and timestamp.  It
   MUST NOT record cell plaintext, the DEK, or the wallet seed.  An
   auditor observing the chain learns when and by whom each operation
   was performed, but not the content of any cell.

7.3.  Audit log content

   Receipts anchored on chain are public.  Holders SHOULD treat the
   existence of a cell (cellId, holderId, timestamp) as publicly
   observable.  Where the existence of a record is itself sensitive,
   holders SHOULD use additional countermeasures outside the scope of
   this protocol (e.g., pseudonymous holder identities, batched-
   operation timing).

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS204]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
              Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", FIPS PUB 204,
              August 2024, <https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.






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   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [AAIF]     Linux Foundation, "Agentic AI Foundation", 9 December
              2025, <https://aaif.io/>.

   [EU-AI-ACT]
              European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU)
              2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
              13 June 2024 (Artificial Intelligence Act)", June 2024,
              <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.

   [GDPR]     European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU) 2016/679
              of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
              2016 (General Data Protection Regulation)", April 2016,
              <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj>.

   [ISO-27001]
              ISO/IEC, "ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information security
              management systems --- Requirements", October 2022.

   [ISO-42001]
              ISO/IEC, "ISO/IEC 42001:2023 Information technology ---
              Artificial intelligence --- Management system", December
              2023.

   [MCP]      Anthropic, "Model Context Protocol Specification", Donated
              to the Agentic AI Foundation under the Linux Foundation on
              9 December 2025, 25 November 2025,
              <https://modelcontextprotocol.io/>.

   [NIST-AI-RMF]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "AI Risk
              Management Framework 1.0", NIST AI 100-1, January 2023,
              <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-1.pdf>.

Appendix A.  Reference deployment

   The reference SAIHM deployment runs on the COTI V2 Helium mainnet
   (chain ID 2632500).  Protocol implementations MAY anchor receipts on
   any public chain offering equivalent transactional finality and
   public-record properties.  The chain choice is a deployment decision;
   the protocol does not mandate one.




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   The reference deployment publishes:

   *  npm reference implementation: @saihm/mcp-server (Apache 2.0).

   *  Block explorer for chain receipts: https://mainnet.cotiscan.io.

   *  Crosswalks to NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 42001, ISO/IEC 27001, EU AI
      Act, GDPR Article 17, and MCP at https://saihm.coti.global/
      standards.

Author's Address

   SAIHM Project
   SAIHM (Sovereign AI Horizontal Memory)
   Email: architect@saihm.coti.global
   URI:   https://saihm.coti.global/



































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