



TLS                                                             T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                     Nokia
Intended status: Standards Track                            T. Hollebeek
Expires: 17 July 2026                                           DigiCert
                                                                 J. Gray
                                                                 Entrust
                                                              S. Fluhrer
                                                           Cisco Systems
                                                         13 January 2026


                   Use of Composite ML-DSA in TLS 1.3
                   draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa-07

Abstract

   Compositing the post-quantum ML-DSA signature with traditional
   signature algorithms provides protection against potential breaks or
   critical bugs in ML-DSA or the ML-DSA implementation.  This document
   specifies how such a composite signature can be formed using ML-DSA
   with RSA-PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-PSS, ECDSA, Ed25519, and Ed448 to provide
   authentication in TLS 1.3.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 July 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.



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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  ML-DSA SignatureSchemes Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Signature Algorithm Restrictions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Selection Criteria for Composite Signature Algorithms . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Restricting Composite Signature Algorithms to the
           signature_algorithms_cert Extension . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current
   cryptographic systems.  Traditional cryptographic algorithms such as
   RSA, Diffie-Hellman, DSA, and their elliptic curve variants are
   vulnerable to quantum attacks.  During the transition to post-quantum
   cryptography (PQC), there is considerable uncertainty regarding the
   robustness of both existing and new cryptographic algorithms.  While
   we can no longer fully trust traditional cryptography, we also cannot
   immediately place complete trust in post-quantum replacements until
   they have undergone extensive scrutiny and real-world testing to
   uncover and rectify potential implementation flaws.

   Unlike previous migrations between cryptographic algorithms, the
   decision of when to migrate and which algorithms to adopt is far from
   straightforward.  Even after the migration period, it may be
   advantageous for an entity's cryptographic identity to incorporate
   multiple public-key algorithms to enhance security.

   Cautious implementers may opt to combine cryptographic algorithms in
   such a way that an attacker would need to break all of them
   simultaneously to compromise the protected data.  These mechanisms
   are referred to as Post-Quantum/Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrids
   [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology].




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   One practical way to implement a hybrid signature scheme is through a
   composite signature algorithm.  In this approach, the composite
   signature consists of two signature components, each produced by a
   different signature algorithm.  A composite key is treated as a
   single key that performs a single cryptographic operation such as key
   generation, signing and verification by using its internal sequence
   of component keys as if they form a single key.

   Certain jurisdictions are already recommending or mandating that PQC
   lattice schemes be used exclusively within a PQ/T hybrid framework.
   The use of composite schemes provides a straightforward
   implementation of hybrid solutions compatible with (and advocated by)
   some governments and cybersecurity agencies [BSI2021].

   ML-DSA [FIPS204] is a post-quantum signature scheme standardised by
   NIST.  It is a module-lattice based scheme.

   This memo specifies how a composite ML-DSA can be negotiated for
   authentication in TLS 1.3 via the "signature_algorithms" and
   "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.  Hybrid signatures provide
   additional safety by ensuring protection even if vulnerabilities are
   discovered in one of the constituent algorithms.  For deployments
   that cannot easily tweak configuration or effectively enable/disable
   algorithms, a composite signature combining PQC signature algorithm
   with a traditional signature algorithm offers the most viable
   solution.

   The rationale for this approach is based on the limitations of
   fallback strategies.  For example, if a traditional signature system
   is compromised, reverting to a PQC signature algorithm would prevent
   attackers from forging new signatures that are no longer accepted.
   However, such a fallback process leaves systems exposed until the
   transition to the PQC signature algorithm is complete, which can be
   slow in many environments.  In contrast, using hybrid signatures from
   the start mitigates this issue, offering robust protection and
   encouraging faster adoption of PQC.

   Further, zero-day vulnerabilities, where an exploit is discovered and
   used before the vulnerability is publicly disclosed, highlights this
   risk.  The time required to disclose such attacks and for
   organizations to reactively switch to alternative algorithms can
   leave systems critically exposed.  By the time a secure fallback is
   implemented, attackers may have already caused irreparable damage.
   Adopting hybrid signatures preemptively helps mitigate this window of
   vulnerability, ensuring resilience even in the face of unforeseen
   threats.





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1.1.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.  These words may also appear in this
   document in lower case as plain English words, absent their normative
   meanings.

   This document is consistent with the terminology defined in
   [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology].  It defines composites as:

      _Composite Cryptographic Element_: A cryptographic element that
      incorporates multiple component cryptographic elements of the same
      type in a multi-algorithm scheme.

2.  ML-DSA SignatureSchemes Types

   As defined in [RFC8446], the SignatureScheme namespace is used for
   the negotiation of signature schemes for authentication via the
   "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.
   This document adds new SignatureSchemes types for the composite ML-
   DSA as follows.



























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enum {
  /* ECDSA-based Composite */
  mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 (TBD1),
  mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512 (TBD2),
  mldsa65_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 (TBD3),
  mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 (TBD4),

  /* EdDSA-based Composite */
  mldsa44_ed25519 (TBD5),
  mldsa65_ed25519 (TBD6),
  mldsa87_ed448 (TBD7),

  /* RSA-PKCS1-based Composite (for signature_algorithms_cert ONLY) */
  mldsa44_rsa2048_pkcs1_sha256 (TBD8),
  mldsa65_rsa3072_pkcs1_sha512 (TBD9),
  mldsa65_rsa4096_pkcs1_sha512 (TBD10),

  /* RSA-PSS-based Composite (for CertificateVerify and Certificates) */
  mldsa44_rsa2048_pss_pss_sha256 (TBD11),
  mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_pss_sha512 (TBD12),
  mldsa87_rsa3072_pss_pss_sha512 (TBD13),
  mldsa65_rsa4096_pss_pss_sha512 (TBD14),
  mldsa87_rsa4096_pss_pss_sha512 (TBD15)

} SignatureScheme;

   The SignatureScheme names defined in this document follow the TLS
   IANA naming convention.  In composite ML-DSA schemes, the trailing
   portion of the name corresponds to the traditional signature
   algorithm variant, including its associated hash function (for
   example, RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256).  The pre-hash function in the
   composite ML-DSA algorithm names defined in
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] is not used in the TLS name.  The
   explicit RSA key size (for example, RSA2048, RSA3072, or RSA4096) is
   included to uniquely identify the composite construction and to align
   with the composite algorithm definitions in
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs].  The hash function indicated in
   the name applies only to the traditional signature component; ML-DSA
   internally defines its own hashing as specified in [FIPS204].

   Each entry specifies a unique combination of an ML-DSA parameter set
   (ML-DSA-44, ML-DSA-65, or ML-DSA-87, as defined in [FIPS204]) and a
   traditional signature algorithm.  The mldsa* identifiers refer to the
   pure ML-DSA variants and MUST NOT be confused with prehashed variants
   (for example, HashML-DSA-44).






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   ML-DSA supports two signing modes: deterministic and hedged.  In the
   deterministic mode, the signature is derived solely from the message
   and the private key, without requiring fresh randomness at signing
   time.  While this eliminates dependence on an external random number
   generator (RNG), it may increase susceptibility to side-channel
   attacks, such as fault injection.  The hedged mode mitigates this
   risk by incorporating both fresh randomness generated at signing time
   and precomputed randomness embedded in the private key, thereby
   offering stronger protection against such attacks.  In the context of
   TLS, authentication signatures are computed over a signing input
   derived from the handshake transcript, making each signature input
   distinct for every session.  This property allows the use of either
   signing mode.  The hedged signing mode can be leveraged to provide
   protection against the side-channel attack.  The choice between
   deterministic and hedged modes does not affect interoperability, as
   the verification process is the same for both.  In both modes, the
   context parameter defined in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 of [FIPS204]
   MUST be set to the empty string.

   The signature in the CertificateVerify message MUST be computed as
   specified in Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446].

   When a composite ML-DSA signature scheme defined in this document is
   negotiated, the TLS 1.3 CertificateVerify signing input constructed
   as specified in Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446] MUST be provided as the
   message input M to the Composite-ML-DSA.Sign function defined in
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs].  The composite signature
   construction then applies its domain separation, labeling, and pre-
   hash function as specified by the composite algorithm identifier.
   Any pre-hash function applied as part of the composite signature
   construction is determined by the composite algorithm identifier
   defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] and is independent of
   the TLS SignatureScheme name.

   The traditional signature algorithm and its associated parameters
   including the specific hash function are fully determined by the
   negotiated composite algorithm identifier (OID).  The Trad.Sign
   operation, as defined in [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs], MUST be
   performed using the hash function implicitly bound to that OID.

   Upon receipt of the CertificateVerify message, the peer MUST verify
   the signature by applying the corresponding Composite-ML-DSA.Verify
   function to the received signature and the locally constructed TLS
   1.3 CertificateVerify signing input, in accordance with
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs].






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   The corresponding end-entity certificate when negotiated MUST use the
   First AlgorithmID and Second AlgorithmID respectively as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs].

   The schemes defined in this document MUST NOT be used in TLS 1.2
   [RFC5246].  A peer that receives ServerKeyExchange or
   CertificateVerify message in a TLS 1.2 connection with schemes
   defined in this document MUST abort the connection with an
   illegal_parameter alert.

3.  Signature Algorithm Restrictions

   TLS 1.3 removed support for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 [RFC8017] in
   CertificateVerify messages, opting for RSASSA-PSS instead.
   Similarly, this document restricts the use of the composite signature
   algorithms mldsa44_rsa2048_pkcs1_sha256,
   mldsa65_rsa3072_pkcs1_sha512, and mldsa65_rsa4096_pkcs1_sha512
   algorithms to the "signature_algorithms_cert" extension.  These
   composite signature algorithms MUST NOT be used with the
   "signature_algorithms" extension.  These values refer solely to
   signatures which appear in certificates (see Section 4.4.2.2 of
   [RFC8446]) and are not defined for use in signed TLS handshake
   messages.

   A peer that receives a CertificateVerify message indicating the use
   of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm as one of the component signature
   algorithms MUST terminate the connection with a fatal
   illegal_parameter alert.

4.  Selection Criteria for Composite Signature Algorithms

   The composite signatures specified in the document are a restricted
   set of cryptographic pairs, chosen from the intersection of two
   sources:

   *  The composite algorithm combinations as recommended in
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs], which specify both PQC and
      traditional signature algorithms.

   *  The mandatory-to-support or recommended traditional signature
      algorithms listed in TLS 1.3.

   By limiting algorithm combinations to those defined in both
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] and TLS 1.3, this specification
   ensures that each pair:






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   *  Meets established security standards for composite signatures in a
      post-quantum context, as described in
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs].

   *  Is compatible with traditional digital signatures recommended in
      TLS 1.3, ensuring interoperability and ease of adoption within the
      TLS ecosystem.

   This conservative approach reduces the risk of selecting unsafe or
   incompatible configurations, promoting security by requiring only
   trusted and well-vetted pairs.  Future updates to this specification
   may introduce additional algorithm pairs as standards evolve, subject
   to similar vetting and inclusion criteria.

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations discussed in Section 11 of
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs] need to be taken into account.

   Ed25519 and Ed448 ensure SUF security, which may remain secure even
   if ML-DSA is broken, at least until CRQCs emerge.  Applications that
   prioritize SUF security may benefit from using them in composite with
   ML-DSA to mitigate risks if ML-DSA is eventually broken.

   TLS clients that support both post-quantum and traditional-only
   signature algorithms are vulnerable to downgrade attacks.  In such
   scenarios, an attacker with access to a CRQC could forge a
   traditional server certificate and impersonate the server.  If the
   client continues to accept traditional-only certificates for backward
   compatibility, it remains exposed to this risk.

   While broader deployment of composite or post-quantum certificates
   will reduce this exposure, clients remain vulnerable unless stricter
   authentication continuity policies are enforced.  A coordinated “flag
   day” in which all traditional-only certificates are simultaneously
   phased out is unlikely due to real-world deployment constraints.  The
   continuity mechanism defined in [I-D.sheffer-tls-pqc-continuity]
   addresses this deployment challenge by allowing clients to cache and
   enforce a server’s support for post-quantum or composite
   authentication, thereby preventing fallback to traditional-only
   authentication in subsequent connections.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests new entries to the TLS SignatureScheme
   registry, according to the procedures in Section 6 of [TLSIANA].





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   +=======+================================+=============+===========+
   | Value | Description                    | Recommended | Reference |
   +=======+================================+=============+===========+
   | TBD1  | mldsa44_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD2  | mldsa65_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha512 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD3  | mldsa65_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD4  | mldsa87_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha512 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD5  | mldsa44_ed25519                | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD6  | mldsa65_ed25519                | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD7  | mldsa87_ed448                  | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD8  | mldsa44_rsa2048_pkcs1_sha256   | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD9  | mldsa65_rsa3072_pkcs1_sha512   | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD10 | mldsa65_rsa4096_pkcs1_sha512   | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD11 | mldsa44_rsa2048_pss_pss_sha256 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD12 | mldsa65_rsa3072_pss_pss_sha512 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD13 | mldsa87_rsa3072_pss_pss_sha512 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD14 | mldsa65_rsa4096_pss_pss_sha512 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+
   | TBD15 | mldsa87_rsa4096_pss_pss_sha512 | N           | This      |
   |       |                                |             | document. |
   +-------+--------------------------------+-------------+-----------+



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                                 Table 1

6.1.  Restricting Composite Signature Algorithms to the
      signature_algorithms_cert Extension

   IANA is requested to add a footnote indicating that the
   mldsa44_rsa2048_pkcs1_sha256, mldsa65_rsa3072_pkcs1_sha512, and
   mldsa65_rsa4096_pkcs1_sha512 algorithms are defined exclusively for
   use with the signature_algorithms_cert extension and are not intended
   for use with the signature_algorithms extension.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs]
              Ounsworth, M., Gray, J., Pala, M., Klaußner, J., and S.
              Fluhrer, "Composite ML-DSA for use in X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-14, 7 January 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              pq-composite-sigs-14>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [TLSIANA]  Salowey, J. A. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for
              TLS and DTLS", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-tls-rfc8447bis-15, 21 July 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              rfc8447bis-15>.

7.2.  Informative References








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   [BSI2021]  Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), "Quantum-
              safe cryptography - fundamentals, current developments and
              recommendations", October 2021,
              <https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/
              Publications/Brochure/quantum-safe-cryptography.pdf>.

   [FIPS204]  "FIPS-204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature
              Standard", <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.204.pdf>.

   [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology]
              D, F., P, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for Post-Quantum
              Traditional Hybrid Schemes", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-06, 10
              January 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-06>.

   [I-D.sheffer-tls-pqc-continuity]
              Sheffer, Y. and T. Reddy.K, "PQC Continuity: Downgrade
              Protection for TLS Servers Migrating to PQC", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-sheffer-tls-pqc-
              continuity-00, 18 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-sheffer-tls-
              pqc-continuity-00>.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.

   [RFC8017]  Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017>.

Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Bas Westerbaan, Alicja Kario, Ilari Liusvaara, Dan Wing,
   Yaron Sheffer, Daniel Van Geest, Samuel Lee, and Sean Turner for the
   discussion and comments.

Authors' Addresses

   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Nokia
   Bangalore
   Karnataka
   India



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   Email: kondtir@gmail.com


   Timothy Hollebeek
   DigiCert
   Pittsburgh,
   United States of America
   Email: tim.hollebeek@digicert.com


   John Gray
   Entrust Limited
   2500 Solandt Road – Suite 100
   Ottawa, Ontario  K2K 3G5
   Canada
   Email: john.gray@entrust.com


   Scott Fluhrer
   Cisco Systems
   Email: sfluhrer@cisco.com






























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