



COSE                                                          A. R. Mott
Internet-Draft                                                  RustyKey
Intended status: Standards Track                           29 April 2026
Expires: 31 October 2026


 CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) and JSON Object Signing and
              Encryption (JOSE) Registrations for SQIsign
                       draft-mott-cose-sqisign-03

Abstract

   *NOTE: This document describes a signature scheme based on an
   algorithm currently under evaluation in the NIST Post-Quantum
   Cryptography standardization process.  Be aware that the underlying
   primitive may change as a result of that process.*

   This document specifies the algorithm encodings and representations
   for the SQIsign digital signature scheme within the CBOR Object
   Signing and Encryption (COSE) and JSON Object Signing and Encryption
   (JOSE) frameworks.

   SQIsign is an isogeny-based post-quantum signature scheme that
   provides exceptionally compact signature and public key sizes
   compared to lattice-based alternatives currently under NIST
   evaluation.

   The standardization of SQIsign will be helpful to address current
   infrastructure bottlenecks, specifically the FIDO2 CTAP2
   specification used by billions of in-service devices and browser
   installations.  Some deployments of CTAP2-based authenticators
   enforce limits near 1024 bytes for external key communication,
   depending on authenticator implementation, transport (USB/NFC/BLE)
   and message fragmentation support.  Some standardized post-quantum
   signature schemes with larger signature sizes may exceed the message
   size limits of constrained authenticators, transports or produce
   surprising and unwanted results further along the authentication
   ceremony.  SQIsign-L1, L2 and L5 signatures are small enough to
   enable delivery over constrained networks like 802.15.4.












Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   This document clarifies that SQIsign does not expose the auxiliary
   torsion-point information exploited in the SIDH/SIKE attacks.
   Consequently, the specific attack techniques of Castryck–Decru do not
   directly apply.  However, the scheme remains subject to ongoing
   cryptanalysis of isogeny-based constructions.  By establishing stable
   COSE and JOSE identifiers, this document ensures the interoperability
   required for the seamless integration of post-quantum security into
   high-density, bandwidth-constrained, and legacy-compatible hardware
   environments.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-mott-cose-sqisign/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the COSE Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:cose@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/cose/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/antonymott/quantum-resistant-rustykey.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 October 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.





Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.1.  Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       1.1.1.  Pressing Need for Smaller PQC Signatures  . . . . . .   5
       1.1.2.  Estimated Constrained Device Footprint  . . . . . . .   6
       1.1.3.  Pressing need: Limit or Stop 'Harvest now; decrypt
               later' Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.2.  Scope and Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     1.3.  Relationship to Other Work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     1.4.  Constrained Device Applicability  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Resistance to "Torsion Point" attack  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  SIKE Vulnerability (The "Torsion Point" Attack) of
           2022  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.2.  Why SQISign appears unaffected by the SIKE
           Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  SQIsign Algorithm Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Cryptographic Foundation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  Security Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Performance Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   5.  COSE Integration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.1.  SQIsign Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.2.  SQIsign Key Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.3.  SQIsign Key Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     5.4.  SQIsign-Specific Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.5.  COSE Key Format Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.5.1.  Public Key (COSE_Key) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.5.2.  Private Key (COSE_Key)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.6.  COSE Signature Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.6.1.  Protected Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.6.2.  Example COSE_Sign1 Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  JOSE Integration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.1.  JSON Web Signature (JWS) Algorithm Registration . . . . .  14
     6.2.  JSON Web Key (JWK) Representation . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.2.1.  Public Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       6.2.2.  Private Key Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.3.  JWK Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.3.1.  Public Key (JWK) Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


       6.3.2.  Private Key (JWK) Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.4.  JWS Compact Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.4.1.  Example JWS Protected Header  . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.4.2.  Complete JWS Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   7.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.1.  Signature and Key Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.2.  Randomness Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.3.  Side-Channel Protections  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.4.  Performance Trade-offs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.5.  Interoperability Testing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.1.  Algorithm Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.2.  Quantum Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.3.  Forward-Looking Quantum Risk: isogeny schemes vs lattice
           schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       8.3.1.  Quantum algorithms for isogeny path problems  . . . .  18
     8.4.  Current Cryptanalysis Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.5.  Implementation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       8.5.1.  Random Number Generation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       8.5.2.  Side-Channel Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       8.5.3.  Key Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.6.  Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.7.  Constrained Device Specific Risks . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     9.1.  Additions to Existing Registries  . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       9.1.1.  New COSE Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       9.1.2.  New COSE Key Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       9.1.3.  New COSE Key Type Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       9.1.4.  New JWS Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       9.1.5.  New JSON Web Key Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       9.1.6.  New JSON Web Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
   10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   Appendix A.  Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     A.1.  SQIsign-L1 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       A.1.1.  Example 1: Simple Message Signing . . . . . . . . . .  26
       A.1.2.  COSE_Sign1 Complete Example . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       A.1.3.  JWS Complete Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.2.  SQIsign-L3 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     A.3.  SQIsign-L5 Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix B.  Implementation Status  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     B.1.  Open Source Implementations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       B.1.1.  Reference Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


       B.1.2.  Rust Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     B.2.  Commercial Implementations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     B.3.  Interoperability Testing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   Appendix C.  Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     C.1.  Algorithm Identifier Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     C.2.  Key Type Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   Appendix D.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
     D.1.  draft-mott-cose-sqisign-03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29

1.  Introduction

   This document registers algorithm identifiers and key type parameters
   for SQIsign in COSE and JOSE.

1.1.  Background and Motivation

   Post-quantum cryptography readiness is critical for constrained
   devices.  As of 2026, while FIDO2/WebAuthn supports various COSE
   algorithms, some hardware authenticators and platform authenticators
   (like TPMs) have strict memory/storage constraints, effectively
   limiting public keys to 1024 bytes or less, hindering the adoption of
   large-key post-quantum algorithms.

1.1.1.  Pressing Need for Smaller PQC Signatures

   FN-DSA (Falcon) and ML-DSA (Dilithium) have larger signatures that
   may not fit in constrained environments.

   The fundamental differences between ML-DSA, FN-DSA, and SQIsign lie
   in their underlying hard mathematical problems, implementation
   complexity, and performance trade-offs.

   FN-DSA (Falcon, NIST alternative) uses NTRU lattices to achieve very
   small signatures and fast verification, but requires complex
   floating-point math.  Dilithium (NIST primary) is a balanced, high-
   efficiency lattice scheme using Module-LWE/SIS, easy to implement.

   SQIsign [SQIsign-Spec] [SQIsign-Analysis] is a non-lattice, isogeny-
   based scheme that offers the smallest signature sizes but suffers
   from significantly slower signature generation where even vI may take
   seconds to minutes, or longer with WASM implementations for browsers
   of particular relevance to signatures required for WebAuthn PassKeys
   [WebAuthn-PQC-Signature-size-constraints].  SQIsign is an isogeny-
   based digital signature scheme participating in NIST's Round 2
   Additional Digital Signature Schemes, not yet a NIST standard
   [NIST-Finalized-Standards].




Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   Speed comparison (approximate, implementation-dependent):

   *  *Signing:* SQIsign is 100x-1000x slower than ML-DSA

   *  *Verification:* SQIsign is 2x-10x slower than ML-DSA

   *  *Key Generation:* SQIsign is 50x-500x slower than ML-DSA

   _Note: Performance varies significantly based on parameter set and
   optimization level.  WASM implementations may be substantially
   slower._

   Table 1 compares representative parameter sets; note that these
   schemes are at different stages of standardization and evaluation.

   +=============+=================+================+==================+
   | Algorithm   | Public Key Size | Signature Size | PK + Sig         |
   |             |                 |                | < 1024?          |
   +=============+=================+================+==================+
   | ML-DSA-44   | 1,312 bytes     | 2,420 bytes    | ❌                |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+
   | ML-DSA-65   | 1,952 bytes     | 3,293 bytes    | ❌                |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+
   | ML-DSA-87   | 2,592 bytes     | 4,595 bytes    | ❌                |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+
   | FN-DSA-512  | 897 bytes       | 666 bytes      | ❌ (1,563         |
   |             |                 |                | total)           |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+
   | FN-DSA-1024 | 1,793 bytes     | 1,280 bytes    | ❌                |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+
   | SQIsign-L1  | 65 bytes        | 148 bytes      | ✅ (213           |
   |             |                 |                | total)           |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+
   | SQIsign-L3  | 97 bytes        | 224 bytes      | ✅ (321           |
   |             |                 |                | total)           |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+
   | SQIsign-L5  | 129 bytes       | 292 bytes      | ✅ (421           |
   |             |                 |                | total)           |
   +-------------+-----------------+----------------+------------------+

                                  Table 1

1.1.2.  Estimated Constrained Device Footprint

   The total addressable market for SQIsign in constrained devices is
   estimated at more than 6 billion units.





Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 6]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   *Total Addressable Market:* ~6.77 billion devices - Legacy Hardware
   Security Keys: 120-150 million - Constrained TPMs: ~1.1 billion
   - Browser Implementations: ~5 billion - Critical Infrastructure: ~300
   million - Other IoT: ~250 million

1.1.2.1.  Device Category Breakdown

1.1.2.1.1.  Legacy Hardware Security Keys: ~120 - 150 million

   *  Security keys in Service: ~120 - 150 million legacy keys in active
      circulation (Series 5 and older).  Some firmware introduced PQC
      readiness.  Some older keys cannot be updated to increase buffer
      sizes.

1.1.2.1.2.  Constrained TPMs and Platform Modules: ~1.1 billion

   Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) are integrated into PCs and servers,
   but their WebAuthn implementation often inherits protocol-level
   constraints.  Estimated ~2.5 billion active chips worldwide.
   Constrained Subset: We estimate ~1.1 billion of these are in older
   Windows 10/11 or Linux machines where the OS "virtual authenticator"
   or TPM driver still enforces the 1024-byte message default to
   maintain backward compatibility with external CTAP1/2 tools.

1.1.2.1.3.  Browser and Software Implementations: ~5 billion

   This category refers to the "User-Agent" layer that mediates between
   the web and the hardware.  Global Browser Agents: There are over 5
   billion active browser instances across mobile and desktop (Chrome,
   Safari, Edge, Firefox).  Legacy Protocols: Even on modern hardware,
   browsers often use the FIDO2 CTAP2 specification which, unless
   explicitly negotiated for larger messages, maintains a 1024-byte
   default for external key communication.

1.1.2.1.4.  Critical Infrastructure: ~300 Million includes Energy
            (electric, nuclear, oil, gas), Water & Wastewater,
            Transportation Systems, Communications, Government,
            Emergency Services, Healthcare and Financial Services

   Industrial/Government: Agencies like the U.S.  Department of Defense
   rely on high-security FIPS-certified keys that are notoriously slow
   to upgrade.  We estimate ~50 million "frozen" government keys.  IoT
   Security: Of the ~21 billion connected IoT devices in 2026, only a
   fraction use WebAuthn.  However, for those that do (smart locks,
   secure gateways), approximately 250 million are estimated to use
   older, non-upgradable secure elements limited to 1024-byte payloads.
   Recent government-level initiatives highlight the necessity to
   "...effectively deprecate the use of RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 7]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   elliptic curve cryptography (ECDH and ECDSA) when mandated."
   [CNSA-2], Page 4.

1.1.3.  Pressing need: Limit or Stop 'Harvest now; decrypt later'
        Attacks

   Adversaries are collecting encrypted data today to decrypt when
   quantum computers become available.  The transition to post-quantum
   cryptography (PQC) is critical for ensuring long-term security of
   digital communications against adversaries equipped with large-scale
   quantum computers.  The National Institute of Standards and
   Technology (NIST) has been leading standardization efforts, having
   selected initial PQC algorithms and continuing to evaluate additional
   candidates.

   CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) [RFC9052] is specifically
   designed for constrained node networks and IoT environments where
   bandwidth, storage, and computational resources are limited.  The
   compact nature of SQIsign makes it an ideal candidate for COSE
   deployments.

1.2.  Scope and Status

   This document is published on the *Standards* track rather than
   Informational Track for the following reasons:

   1.  *Algorithm Maturity*: SQIsign is currently undergoing evaluation
       in NIST's on-ramp process

   2.  *Continued Cryptanalysis*: The algorithm has active ongoing
       review by the cryptographic research community, including the
       IRTF CFRG

   3.  *High anticipated demand*: This specification enables
       experimentation and early deployment to gather implementation
       experience

   *This document does not represent Working Group consensus on
   algorithm innovation.* The COSE and JOSE working groups focus on
   algorithm _integration_ and _encoding_, not cryptographic algorithm
   design.  The cryptographic properties of SQIsign are being evaluated
   through NIST's process and academic peer review.









Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 8]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


1.3.  Relationship to Other Work

   This document follows the precedent established by
   [I-D.ietf-cose-falcon] and [I-D.ietf-cose-dilithium] for integrating
   NIST PQC candidate algorithms into COSE and JOSE.  The structure and
   approach are intentionally aligned to provide consistency across
   post-quantum signature scheme integrations.

1.4.  Constrained Device Applicability

   SQIsign is particularly attractive for:

   *  *IoT sensors* with limited flash memory

   *  *Firmware updates* over low-bandwidth networks (LoRaWAN, NB-IoT)

   *  *Embedded certificates* in constrained devices

   *  *Blockchain and DLT* where transaction size affects fees

   *  *Satellite communications* with bandwidth constraints

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document uses the following terms:

   *  *PQC*: Post-Quantum Cryptography

   *  *COSE*: CBOR Object Signing and Encryption

   *  *JOSE*: JSON Object Signing and Encryption

   *  *JWS*: JSON Web Signature

   *  *JWK*: JSON Web Key

   *  *CBOR*: Concise Binary Object Representation [RFC7049]

   *  *ECDH*: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman

   *  *IANA*: Internet Assigned Numbers Authority




Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026                [Page 9]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


3.  Resistance to "Torsion Point" attack

3.1.  SIKE Vulnerability (The "Torsion Point" Attack) of 2022

   SIKE (Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation) was a key exchange,
   more specifically, a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM).  In the SIKE
   protocol, users had to share more than just the target elliptic
   curve.  To make the math work for key exchange, they shared the
   images of specific points (called torsion points) under the secret
   isogeny.

   *  The Info: If the secret isogeny is 𝜙, SIKE gave away 𝜙(𝑃) and 𝜙(𝑄)
      for specific basis points 𝑃 and 𝑄.

   *  The Break: In 2022, Castryck and Decru showed that this auxiliary
      information allowed an attacker to construct a higher-dimensional
      abelian variety linking the public data.  In this setting, the
      secret isogeny can be recovered efficiently using techniques based
      on Kani’s results on isogenies between products of elliptic
      curves.

   *  The Oversight: For years, cryptanalysts thought this extra info
      was harmless.  Related techniques existed in the algebraic
      geometry literature but had not previously been applied in this
      cryptographic context.

3.2.  Why SQISign appears unaffected by the SIKE Vulnerability

   SQIsign is a signature scheme in which the prover demonstrates
   knowledge of an isogeny through a zero-knowledge protocol.  Unlike
   SIDH/SIKE, it does not publish images of torsion basis points under
   secret isogenies, specifically:

   *  SIKE: key exchange with auxiliary structure leakage

   *  SQIsign: proof/verification of isogeny knowledge without
      publishing auxiliary isogeny action data

   The Castryck–Decru attack relies critically on this auxiliary
   torsion-point information to construct additional structure (e.g.,
   via abelian surfaces) that enables efficient recovery of the secret
   isogeny.  Because SQIsign does not provide such auxiliary data, these
   techniques do not directly apply.  Attacks would instead need to
   solve instances of the isogeny path problem or related problems in
   the endomorphism ring, for which no comparable shortcut is currently
   known.





Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 10]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


4.  SQIsign Algorithm Overview

4.1.  Cryptographic Foundation

   SQIsign is based on the hardness of finding isogenies between
   supersingular elliptic curves over finite fields.  The security
   assumption relies primarily on the difficulty of the *Isogeny Path
   Problem*

   Unlike lattice-based schemes, isogeny-based cryptography offers:

   *  *Smaller key and signature sizes*

   *  *Algebraic structure* based on elliptic curve isogenies

   *  *Different security assumptions* (diversification from lattice-
      based schemes)

4.2.  Security Levels

   SQIsign is defined with three parameter sets corresponding to NIST
   security levels:

    +===============+============+============+===========+===========+
    | Parameter Set | NIST Level | Public Key | Signature | Classical |
    |               |            |            |           | Sec       |
    +===============+============+============+===========+===========+
    | SQIsign-L1    | I          | 65 bytes   | 148 bytes | ~128 bits |
    +---------------+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+
    | SQIsign-L3    | III        | 97 bytes   | 224 bytes | ~192 bits |
    +---------------+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+
    | SQIsign-L5    | V          | 129 bytes  | 292 bytes | ~256 bits |
    +---------------+------------+------------+-----------+-----------+

                                  Table 2

4.3.  Performance Characteristics

   *  *Signing*: Computationally intensive (slower than lattice schemes)

   *  *Verification*: Moderate computational cost

   *  *Key Generation*: Intensive computation required

   *  *Size*: Exceptional efficiency: substantially smaller than many
      lattice-based alternatives at comparable security levels





Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 11]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   *Recommended Use Cases:* - Sign-once, verify-many scenarios
   (firmware, certificates) - Bandwidth-constrained environments -
   Storage-limited devices - Applications where signature/key size
   dominates performance considerations

5.  COSE Integration

   This section defines the identifiers for SQIsign in COSE [RFC8152].

5.1.  SQIsign Algorithms

   The algorithms defined in this document are:

   *  SQIsign-L1: SQIsign NIST Level I (suggested value -61)

   *  SQIsign-L3: SQIsign NIST Level III (suggested value -62)

   *  SQIsign-L5: SQIsign NIST Level V (suggested value -63)

   *Note:* The algorithm identifier values (-61, -62, -63) are requested
   from IANA upon working group adoption.  Early implementations may use
   temporary values from the Private Use range (-65000 to -65535) for
   experimentation.

5.2.  SQIsign Key Types

   A new key type is defined for SQIsign with the name "SQIsign".

5.3.  SQIsign Key Parameters

   SQIsign keys use the following COSE Key common parameters:

   +===============+============+===========+==========================+
   | Key Parameter | COSE Label | CBOR Type | Description              |
   +===============+============+===========+==========================+
   | kty           | 1          | int       | Key type: IETF           |
   |               |            |           | (SQIsign)                |
   +---------------+------------+-----------+--------------------------+
   | kid           | 2          | bstr      | Key ID (optional)        |
   +---------------+------------+-----------+--------------------------+
   | alg           | 3          | int       | Algorithm identifier     |
   |               |            |           | (-61, -62, or -63)       |
   +---------------+------------+-----------+--------------------------+
   | key_ops       | 4          | array     | Key operations           |
   |               |            |           | (sign, verify)           |
   +---------------+------------+-----------+--------------------------+

                                  Table 3



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 12]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


5.4.  SQIsign-Specific Key Parameters

        +===============+=======+===========+====================+
        | Key Parameter | Label | CBOR Type | Description        |
        +===============+=======+===========+====================+
        | pub           | -1    | bstr      | SQIsign public key |
        +---------------+-------+-----------+--------------------+
        | priv          | -2    | bstr      | SQIsign private    |
        |               |       |           | key (sensitive)    |
        +---------------+-------+-----------+--------------------+

                                 Table 4

5.5.  COSE Key Format Examples

   NOTE: SQIsign keys are structurally distinct and not representable as
   existing EC key types due to non-classical representation.

5.5.1.  Public Key (COSE_Key)

   cbor { 1: IETF, / kty: SQIsign / 3: -61, / alg: SQIsign-L1 / -1:
   h'[PUBLIC_KEY]' / pub: SQIsign public key bytes / }

5.5.2.  Private Key (COSE_Key)

   cbor { 1: IETF, / kty: SQIsign / 3: -61, / alg: SQIsign-L1 / -1:
   h'[PUBLIC_KEY]', / pub: SQIsign public key bytes / -2:
   h'[PRIVATE_KEY]' / priv: SQIsign private key bytes / }

5.6.  COSE Signature Format

   SQIsign signatures in COSE follow the standard COSE_Sign1 structure
   [RFC9052]:

   COSE_Sign1 = [ protected: bstr .cbor header_map, unprotected:
   header_map, payload: bstr / nil, signature: bstr ]

   The signature field contains the raw SQIsign signature bytes.

5.6.1.  Protected Headers

   The protected header MUST include:

   cbor { 1: -61 / alg: SQIsign-L1, -62 for L3, -63 for L5 / }







Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 13]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


5.6.2.  Example COSE_Sign1 Structure

   cbor 18( / COSE_Sign1 tag / [ h'A10139003C', / protected: {"alg":
   -61} / {}, / unprotected /
   h'546869732069732074686520636F6E74656E742E', / payload /
   h'[SQISIGN_SIGNATURE_BYTES]' / signature / ] )

6.  JOSE Integration

6.1.  JSON Web Signature (JWS) Algorithm Registration

   The following algorithm identifiers are registered for use in the JWS
   "alg" header parameter for JSON Web Signatures [RFC7515]:

      +================+==============+=============================+
      | Algorithm Name | Description  | Implementation Requirements |
      +================+==============+=============================+
      | SQIsign-L1     | SQIsign NIST | Optional                    |
      |                | Level I      |                             |
      +----------------+--------------+-----------------------------+
      | SQIsign-L3     | SQIsign NIST | Optional                    |
      |                | Level III    |                             |
      +----------------+--------------+-----------------------------+
      | SQIsign-L5     | SQIsign NIST | Optional                    |
      |                | Level V      |                             |
      +----------------+--------------+-----------------------------+

                                  Table 5

6.2.  JSON Web Key (JWK) Representation

   SQIsign keys are represented in JWK [RFC7517] format as follows:

6.2.1.  Public Key Parameters

          +===========+========+===============================+
          | Parameter | Type   | Description                   |
          +===========+========+===============================+
          | kty       | string | Key type: "SQIsign"           |
          +-----------+--------+-------------------------------+
          | alg       | string | Algorithm: "SQIsign-L1",      |
          |           |        | "SQIsign-L3", or "SQIsign-L5" |
          +-----------+--------+-------------------------------+
          | pub       | string | Base64url-encoded public key  |
          +-----------+--------+-------------------------------+
          | kid       | string | Key ID (optional)             |
          +-----------+--------+-------------------------------+
          | use       | string | Public key use: "sig"         |



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 14]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


          |           |        | (optional)                    |
          +-----------+--------+-------------------------------+
          | key_ops   | array  | Key operations: [verify]      |
          |           |        | (optional)                    |
          +-----------+--------+-------------------------------+

                                 Table 6

6.2.2.  Private Key Parameters

   Private keys include all public key parameters plus:

          +===========+========+===============================+
          | Parameter | Type   | Description                   |
          +===========+========+===============================+
          | priv      | string | Base64url-encoded private key |
          +-----------+--------+-------------------------------+

                                 Table 7

6.3.  JWK Examples

6.3.1.  Public Key (JWK) Example

   json { "kty": "SQIsign", "alg": "SQIsign-L1", "pub":
   "KxtQx8s8RcBEU67wr57K37fdPEztN4M8NUC_\ 5xZuqgMwkaeJhM94YHi_-
   2UsQllbnmm-W4XFSLm2hUwiMylrAh0", "kid": "2027-01-device-key", "use":
   "sig", "key_ops": ["verify"] }

6.3.2.  Private Key (JWK) Example

   json { "kty": "SQIsign", "alg": "SQIsign-L1", "pub":
   "KxtQx8s8RcBEU67wr57K37fdPEztN4M8NUC_\ 5xZuqgMwkaeJhM94YHi_-
   2UsQllbnmm-W4XFSLm2hUwiMylrAh0", "priv":
   "KxtQx8s8RcBEU67wr57K37fdPEztN4M8NUC_5xZuqgMwkaeJhM94YHi_\ -
   2UsQllbnmm-W4XFSLm2hUwiMylrAh1VwP9vNkBZH0Bjj2wc-\
   p7sUgQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAN68tviJbcCpQ84fh-4IJB4-\
   ____________________P38m3fKOhfhMspQU9GmA4CD5___\
   _______________________________________________\
   ___________wAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\ AAAAAAA5cP9aha40v-
   8mFd_bdAgpR93Ug2iPhu4_NxG97C7\ 8wBvVMGOrQTCli7NxrR2KlPZR1AC5VddGf4p-
   ZjCzrWfAJv\ xhEh4uOKXq1MmuS9TwZGuz1YIYMIguu1wqjdmfaQAfOmK2g\
   WWO3vcld5s7GR2AcrTv65ocK_pVUWY8eJDcQA", "kid": "2027-01-device-key",
   "use": "sig", "key_ops": ["sign"] }







Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 15]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


6.4.  JWS Compact Serialization

   A JWS using SQIsign follows the standard compact serialization:

   BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS
   Payload) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Signature)

6.4.1.  Example JWS Protected Header

   json { "alg": "SQIsign-L1", "typ": "JWT" }

   Base64url-encoded: eyJhbGciOiJTUUlzaWduLUwxIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0

6.4.2.  Complete JWS Example

   eyJhbGciOiJTUUlzaWduLUwxIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0 . [BASE64URL_PAYLOAD] .
   [BASE64URL_SQISIGN_SIGNATURE]

7.  Implementation Considerations

7.1.  Signature and Key Generation

   Implementations MUST follow the SQIsign specification [SQIsign-Spec]
   for:

   *  Key pair generation

   *  Signature generation

   *  Signature verification

7.2.  Randomness Requirements

   SQIsign signature generation requires high-quality randomness.
   Implementations MUST use a cryptographically secure random number
   generator (CSRNG) compliant with [RFC4086] or equivalent.

7.3.  Side-Channel Protections

   Implementations SHOULD implement protections against:

   *  Timing attacks

   *  Power analysis

   *  Fault injection attacks





Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 16]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   Particularly for constrained devices deployed in physically
   accessible environments.

7.4.  Performance Trade-offs

   Implementers should be aware:

   *  *Signing is computationally expensive*: Consider pre-signing or
      batch operations

   *  *Verification is moderate*: Suitable for resource-constrained
      verifiers

   *  *Size is exceptional*: Minimizes bandwidth and storage

7.5.  Interoperability Testing

   Early implementations SHOULD participate in interoperability testing
   to ensure:

   *  Consistent signature generation and verification

   *  Proper encoding in COSE and JOSE formats

   *  Cross-platform compatibility

8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Algorithm Security

   The security of SQIsign relies primarily on the hardness of finding
   isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves.

   These assumptions are *different from lattice-based schemes*,
   providing cryptographic diversity in the post-quantum landscape.

8.2.  Quantum Security

   SQIsign is designed to resist attacks by large-scale quantum
   computers.  The three parameter sets provide security equivalent to
   AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 against both classical and quantum
   adversaries.

8.3.  Forward-Looking Quantum Risk: isogeny schemes vs lattice schemes

   Isogeny schemes are not yet trusted in the same way as lattice
   schemes, this section is here to avoid even the appearance of tone
   drift toward endorsement of isogeny schemes.



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 17]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   No publicly known attacks applicable to the standardized parameter
   sets that recover full private keys under stated assumptions, but the
   field is evolving.  SQISign's security is based on hardness
   assumptions different from factoring/discrete log problems, leading
   to the expectation it will resist known quantum attacks using Shor's
   algorithm [Shor-Algorithm].  Ongoing research is exploring new types
   of quantum algorithms that could weaken certain underlying
   assumptions in isogeny-based cryptography.

   Organizations considering deployment should plan for long-term
   flexibility, including the ability to update or replace cryptographic
   algorithms as new information becomes available.

8.3.1.  Quantum algorithms for isogeny path problems

8.3.1.1.  Tani's algorithm

   Tani's algorithm [Tani-Algorithm] achieves (O(N^{1/3})\ query
   complexity for claw-finding / quantum walk problems instead of
   (O(N^{1/2})).  However, as analyzed by Jaques and Schanck
   [Jaques-Schanck-Cryptanalysis], practical implementation faces
   significant barriers:

   *  *Quantum RAM requirements:* Exponentially large qRAM with sub-
      nanosecond access

   *  *Parallelization limits:* Circuit depth constraints reduce
      theoretical speedup

   *  *Error correction overhead:* Physical qubit requirements may
      exceed 10^9 qubits

   These constraints suggest that even with fault-tolerant quantum
   computers, Tani-style attacks remain impractical for security
   parameters used in SQIsign-L3 and SQIsign-L5.

8.4.  Current Cryptanalysis Status

   As of this writing, SQIsign is undergoing active cryptanalytic
   review:

   *  *NIST Round 2 evaluation*: [NIST-Finalized-Standards]

   *  *Academic research*: Ongoing analysis of isogeny-based
      cryptography






Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 18]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   *  *Known attacks*: No attacks are currently known that recover
      private keys for the standardized parameter sets within their
      claimed security levels.  However, the scheme and its underlying
      assumptions remain under active study.

   *Implementers are advised*: - Monitor NIST announcements and updates
   - Follow academic literature on isogeny cryptanalysis - Be prepared
   to deprecate or update as cryptanalysis evolves

8.5.  Implementation Security

8.5.1.  Random Number Generation

   Poor randomness can completely compromise SQIsign security.
   Implementations MUST use robust CSRNGs, especially on constrained
   devices with limited entropy sources.

8.5.2.  Side-Channel Resistance

   Constrained devices may be physically accessible to attackers.
   Implementations SHOULD:

   *  Use constant-time algorithms where possible

   *  Implement countermeasures against DPA/SPA

   *  Consider fault attack mitigations

8.5.3.  Key Management

   *  Private keys MUST be protected with appropriate access controls

   *  Consider hardware security modules (HSMs) or secure elements for
      key storage

   *  Implement key rotation policies appropriate to the deployment

8.6.  Cryptographic Agility

   Organizations deploying SQIsign SHOULD:

   *  Maintain hybrid deployments with classical algorithms during
      transition

   *  Plan for algorithm migration if cryptanalysis reveals weaknesses

   *  Monitor NIST and IRTF guidance on PQC deployment




Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 19]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


8.7.  Constrained Device Specific Risks

   IoT devices face unique challenges:

   *  *Physical access*: Devices may be deployed in hostile environments

   *  *Limited update capability*: Firmware updates may be infrequent or
      impossible

   *  *Long deployment lifetimes*: Devices may operate for 10+ years

   Design systems with: - Defense in depth (multiple security layers) -
   Remote update capability when possible - Graceful degradation if
   algorithm is compromised

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  Additions to Existing Registries

   IANA is requested to add the following entries to the COSE and JOSE
   registries.  The following completed registration actions are
   provided as described in [RFC9053] and [RFC9054].

9.1.1.  New COSE Algorithms

   IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "COSE
   Algorithms" registry:

    +==========+=====+===========+==============+======+========+=====+
    |Name      |Value|Description| Capabilities |Change|Ref     |Rec'd|
    |          |     |           |              |Cont  |        |     |
    +==========+=====+===========+==============+======+========+=====+
    |SQIsign-L1|-61  |SQIsign    | kty          |IETF  |THIS-RFC|No   |
    |          |     |NIST L I   |              |      |        |     |
    +----------+-----+-----------+--------------+------+--------+-----+
    |SQIsign-L3|-62  |SQIsign    | kty          |IETF  |THIS-RFC|No   |
    |          |     |NIST L III |              |      |        |     |
    +----------+-----+-----------+--------------+------+--------+-----+
    |SQIsign-L5|-63  |SQIsign    | kty          |IETF  |THIS-RFC|No   |
    |          |     |NIST L V   |              |      |        |     |
    +----------+-----+-----------+--------------+------+--------+-----+

                                  Table 8

9.1.2.  New COSE Key Types

   IANA is requested to register the following entry in the "COSE Key
   Types" registry:



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 20]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   +=========+=======+=============+==============+========+==========+
   | Name    | Value | Description | Capabilities | Change | Ref      |
   |         |       |             |              | Cont   |          |
   +=========+=======+=============+==============+========+==========+
   | SQIsign | IETF  | SQIsign pub | sign, verify | IETF   | THIS-RFC |
   |         |       | key         |              |        |          |
   +---------+-------+-------------+--------------+--------+----------+

                                 Table 9

9.1.3.  New COSE Key Type Parameters

   IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "COSE Key
   Type Parameters" registry:

     +==========+======+=======+======+=========+========+===========+
     | Key Type | Name | Label | CBOR | Desc    | Change | Reference |
     |          |      |       | Type |         | Cont   |           |
     +==========+======+=======+======+=========+========+===========+
     | SQIsign  | pub  | -1    | bstr | Public  | IETF   | THIS-RFC  |
     |          |      |       |      | key     |        |           |
     +----------+------+-------+------+---------+--------+-----------+
     | SQIsign  | priv | -2    | bstr | Private | IETF   | THIS-RFC  |
     |          |      |       |      | key     |        |           |
     +----------+------+-------+------+---------+--------+-----------+

                                  Table 10

9.1.4.  New JWS Algorithms

   IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "JSON Web
   Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry:



















Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 21]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   +============+==========+==========+======+==========+=============+
   | Algorithm  | Desc     | Impl Req |Change| Ref      | Recommended |
   | Name       |          |          |Cont  |          |             |
   +============+==========+==========+======+==========+=============+
   | SQIsign-L1 | SQIsign  | Optional |IETF  | THIS-RFC | No          |
   |            | NIST L I |          |      |          |             |
   +------------+----------+----------+------+----------+-------------+
   | SQIsign-L3 | SQIsign  | Optional |IETF  | THIS-RFC | No          |
   |            | NIST L   |          |      |          |             |
   |            | III      |          |      |          |             |
   +------------+----------+----------+------+----------+-------------+
   | SQIsign-L5 | SQIsign  | Optional |IETF  | THIS-RFC | No          |
   |            | NIST L V |          |      |          |             |
   +------------+----------+----------+------+----------+-------------+

                                 Table 11

9.1.5.  New JSON Web Key Types

   IANA is requested to register the following entry in the "JSON Web
   Key Types" registry:

   +===================+====================+=============+===========+
   | "kty" Param Value | Key Type Desc      | Change Cont | Reference |
   +===================+====================+=============+===========+
   | SQIsign           | SQIsign public key | IETF        | THIS-RFC  |
   +-------------------+--------------------+-------------+-----------+

                                 Table 12

9.1.6.  New JSON Web Key Parameters

   IANA is requested to register the following entries in the "JSON Web
   Key Parameters" registry:

    +============+=========+=====================+========+===========+
    | Param Name | Desc    | Used with "kty" Val | Change | Reference |
    |            |         |                     | Cont   |           |
    +============+=========+=====================+========+===========+
    | pub        | Public  | SQIsign             | IETF   | THIS-RFC  |
    |            | key     |                     |        |           |
    +------------+---------+---------------------+--------+-----------+
    | priv       | Private | SQIsign             | IETF   | THIS-RFC  |
    |            | key     |                     |        |           |
    +------------+---------+---------------------+--------+-----------+

                                  Table 13




Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 22]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


10.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank:

   *  Luca DeFeo for reviewing draft-00 and providing valuable feedback.
      Any remaining errors are solely the responsibility of the authors.

   *  The SQIsign design team for groundbreaking work on isogeny-based
      signatures

   *  The NIST PQC team for managing the standardization process

   *  The COSE and JOSE working groups for guidance on integration

   *  The IRTF Crypto Forum Research Group for ongoing cryptanalytic
      review

   *  Early implementers who provide valuable feedback

   This work builds upon the template established by
   [I-D.ietf-cose-falcon] and similar PQC integration efforts.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   _Populated automatically from metadata_

11.2.  Informative References

   _Populated automatically from metadata_

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 23]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   [RFC8152]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
              RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8152>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9052]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.

   [RFC9053]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,
              August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9053>.

   [RFC9054]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Hash Algorithms", RFC 9054, DOI 10.17487/RFC9054, August
              2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9054>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [CNSA-2]   National Security Agency, "Commercial National Security
              Algorithm Suite 2.0", May 2025,
              <https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/30/ 2003728741/-1/-
              1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS.PDF>.

   [I-D.ietf-cose-dilithium]
              Prorock, M. and O. Steele, "ML-DSA for JOSE and COSE",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-
              dilithium-11, 15 November 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
              dilithium-11>.

   [I-D.ietf-cose-falcon]
              Prorock, M., Steele, O., and H. Tschofenig, "FN-DSA for
              JOSE and COSE", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-cose-falcon-04, 15 March 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
              falcon-04>.

   [Jaques-Schanck-Cryptanalysis]
              Jaques, S. and J. M. Schanck, ""Quantum cryptanalysis in
              the RAM model: Claw-finding attacks on SIKE"", June 2019,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/
              archive/2019/103/20190619:191423>.




Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 24]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   [NIST-Finalized-Standards]
              NIST, ""NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum
              Encryption Standards"", August 2024,
              <https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/ nist-
              releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-
              standards>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4086>.

   [RFC7049]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
              October 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7049>.

   [Shor-Algorithm]
              Shor, P. W., ""Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime
              Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum
              Computer"", January 1996,
              <https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9508027>.

   [SQIsign-Analysis]
              IACR ePrint Archive, ""SQIsign: Compact Post-Quantum
              Signatures from Quaternions and Isogenies"", January 2021,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1240>.

   [SQIsign-Spec]
              SQIsign team, "SQIsign: Compact Post-Quantum Signatures
              from Quaternions and Isogenies (Round 2)", February 2025,
              <https://sqisign.org/spec/sqisign-20250205.pdf>.

   [Tani-Algorithm]
              Tani, S., "Claw Finding Algorithms Using Quantum Walk",
              August 2007, <https://arxiv.org/abs/0708.2584>.

   [WebAuthn-PQC-Signature-size-constraints]
              University of Quantum Science, "WebAuthn PQC Signature
              size constraints", April 2026,
              <https://www.npmjs.com/package/quantum-resistant-
              rustykey>.

Appendix A.  Test Vectors

A.1.  SQIsign-L1 Test Vectors






Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 25]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


A.1.1.  Example 1: Simple Message Signing

   The following test vector exhibits a SQIsign Level I signature over a
   short message.

   Message (hex): d81c4d8d734fcbfbeade3d3f8a039faa2a2c9957e835ad55b2 \
   2e75bf57bb556ac8 Message (ASCII): MsO=?*,W5U.uWUj

   Public Key (hex): 07CCD21425136F6E865E497D2D4D208F0054AD81372066E \
   817480787AAF7B2029550C89E892D618CE3230F23510BFBE68FCCDDAEA51DB1436 \
   B462ADFAF008A010B Public Key (Base64url):
   B8zSFCUTb26GXkl9LU0gjwBUrYE3IGboF0gHh6r3s \
   gKVUMieiS1hjOMjDyNRC_vmj8zdrqUdsUNrRirfrwCKAQs

   Signature (hex): 84228651f271b0f39f2f19f2e8718f31ed3365ac9e5cb303 \
   afe663d0cfc11f0455d891b0ca6c7e653f9ba2667730bb77befe1b1a3182840428 \
   4af8fd7baacc010001d974b5ca671ff65708d8b462a5a84a1443ee9b5fed721876 \
   7c9d85ceed04db0a69a2f6ec3be835b3b2624b9a0df68837ad00bcacc27d1ec806 \
   a44840267471d86eff3447018adb0a6551ee8322ab30010202 Signature
   (Base64url): hCKGUfJxsPOfLxny6HGPMe0zZayeXLMDr-Zj0M_BHw \ RV2JGwymx-
   ZT-bomZ3MLt3vv4bGjGChAQoSvj9e6rMAQAB2XS1ymcf9lcI2LRipahK \
   FEPum1_tchh2fJ2Fzu0E2wppovbsO-g1s7JiS5oN9og3rQC8rMJ9HsgGpEhAJnRx2G \
   7_NEcBitsKZVHugyKrMAECAg

A.1.2.  COSE_Sign1 Complete Example

   cbor 18( [ h'a10139003c', / protected: {"alg": -61} / {}, /
   unprotected /
   h'd81c4d8d734fcbfbeade3d3f8a039faa2a2c9957e835ad55b22e75bf57bb \
   556ac8', / payload /
   h'84228651f271b0f39f2f19f2e8718f31ed3365ac9e5cb303afe663d0cfc1 \
   1f0455d891b0ca6c7e653f9ba2667730bb77befe1b1a31828404284af8fd7b \
   aacc010001d974b5ca671ff65708d8b462a5a84a1443ee9b5fed7218767c9d \
   85ceed04db0a69a2f6ec3be835b3b2624b9a0df68837ad00bcacc27d1ec806 \
   a44840267471d86eff3447018adb0a6551ee8322ab30010202' ] )

A.1.3.  JWS Complete Example

   eyJhbGciOiJTUUlzaWduLUwxIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0 .
   2BxNjXNPy_vq3j0_igOfqiosmVfoNa1Vsi51v1e7VWrI .
   hCKGUfJxsPOfLxny6HGPMe0zZayeXLMDr-Zj0M_BHwRV2JGwymx-ZT-bomZ3MLt3vv \
   4bGjGChAQoSvj9e6rMAQAB2XS1ymcf9lcI2LRipahKFEPum1_tchh2fJ2Fzu0E2wpp \
   ovbsO-g1s7JiS5oN9og3rQC8rMJ9HsgGpEhAJnRx2G7_NEcBitsKZVHugyKrMAECAg

A.2.  SQIsign-L3 Test Vectors

   [PLACEHOLDER FOR L3 TEST VECTORS]




Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 26]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


A.3.  SQIsign-L5 Test Vectors

   [PLACEHOLDER FOR L5 TEST VECTORS]

Appendix B.  Implementation Status

   [RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication]

   This section records the status of known implementations at the time
   of writing.

B.1.  Open Source Implementations

B.1.1.  Reference Implementation

   *  *Organization*: SQIsign team

   *  *Repository*: https://github.com/SQISign/the-sqisign

   *  *Language*: C

   *  *License*: MIT

   *  *Status*: Active development

   *  *COSE/JOSE Support*: Not yet integrated

B.1.2.  Rust Implementation

   *  *Organization*: IETF - Community implementation

   *  *Repository*: IETF

   *  *Language*: Rust

   *  *License*: IETF

   *  *COSE Support*: Planned

   *  *Status*: Development

B.2.  Commercial Implementations

   [RFC EDITOR: To be populated as vendors implement]







Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 27]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


B.3.  Interoperability Testing

   *  *Test Suite Location*: IETF

   *  *Participating Organizations*: IETF

Appendix C.  Design Rationale

C.1.  Algorithm Identifier Selection

   The requested algorithm identifiers (-61, -62, -63) are:

   *  In the range designated for experimental/informational use

   *  Sequential for the three parameter sets

   *  Not conflicting with existing registrations

   *  Consistent with the approach used for other PQC algorithms

C.2.  Key Type Design

   The SQIsign key type is intentionally simple:

   *  Only two parameters (pub, priv) following minimalist design

   *  Binary encoding (bstr) for efficiency

   *  No algorithm-specific encoding—raw bytes from SQIsign spec

   This approach: - Minimizes CBOR encoding overhead (critical for
   constrained devices) - Simplifies implementation - Provides future
   flexibility for parameter set evolution

Appendix D.  Change Log

   [RFC Editor Note:** Please remove this section before publication]

D.1.  draft-mott-cose-sqisign-03

   *  Incorporated technical corrections and feedback from Luca De Feo
      on draft-00

   *  Updated the Abstract and Introduction to utilize more neutral,
      objective language

   *  Removed vendor-specific branding in favor of generic cryptographic
      terminology



Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 28]

Internet-Draft                cose-sqisign                    April 2026


   *  fixed various formatting issues

Author's Address

   Antony R. Mott
   RustyKey
   United States of America
   Email: antony@rustykey.io











































Mott                     Expires 31 October 2026               [Page 29]
