



COSE                                                       H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft                                                     H-BRS
Intended status: Standards Track                          O. Steele, Ed.
Expires: 18 June 2026                                       Tradeverifyd
                                                              D. Ajitomi
                                                                 bibital
                                                            L. Lundblade
                                                     Security Theory LLC
                                                                M. Jones
                                                  Self-Issued Consulting
                                                        15 December 2025


Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and
                           Encryption (COSE)
                        draft-ietf-cose-hpke-19

Abstract

   This specification defines hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE) for
   use with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE).  HPKE offers a
   variant of public-key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a
   recipient public key.

   HPKE is a general encryption framework utilizing an asymmetric key
   encapsulation mechanism (KEM), a key derivation function (KDF), and
   an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm.

   This document defines the use of HPKE with COSE.  Authentication for
   HPKE in COSE is provided by COSE-native security mechanisms or by the
   pre-shared key authenticated variant of HPKE.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the CBOR Object Signing
   and Encryption Working Group mailing list (cose@ietf.org), which is
   archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/cose-wg/draft-ietf-cose-hpke.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  HPKE for COSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  HPKE Integrated Encryption Mode . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  HPKE Key Encryption Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Key Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Ciphersuite Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10



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     4.1.  COSE_Keys for COSE-HPKE Ciphersuites  . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     5.1.  COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption Mode  . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.2.  COSE HPKE Key Encryption Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.2.1.  COSE_Encrypt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  Key Representation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.3.1.  Public Key for HPKE-0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.3.2.  Private Key for HPKE-0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       5.3.3.  KEM Public Key for HPKE-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  COSE Algorithms Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.1.  HPKE-0  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.2.  HPKE-1  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.3.  HPKE-2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       7.1.4.  HPKE-3  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.5.  HPKE-4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.6.  HPKE-5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       7.1.7.  HPKE-6  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.1.8.  HPKE-7  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.1.9.  HPKE-0-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       7.1.10. HPKE-1-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       7.1.11. HPKE-2-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       7.1.12. HPKE-3-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       7.1.13. HPKE-4-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.1.14. HPKE-5-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       7.1.15. HPKE-6-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.1.16. HPKE-7-KE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     7.2.  COSE Header Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.2.1.  ek Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
       7.2.2.  psk_id Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix A.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28

1.  Introduction

   Hybrid public-key encryption (HPKE) [RFC9180] is a scheme that
   provides public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts given a
   recipient's public key.








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   This document defines the use of HPKE with COSE ([RFC9052],
   [RFC9053]) with the single-shot APIs defined in Section 6 of
   [RFC9180].  Multiple invocations of Open() / Seal() on the same
   context, as discussed in Section 9.7.1 of [RFC9180] are not
   supported.

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This specification uses the following abbreviations and terms:

   *  Content-encryption key (CEK), a term defined in CMS [RFC5652].

   *  Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) is defined in [RFC9180].

   *  pkR is the public key of the recipient, as defined in [RFC9180].

   *  skR is the private key of the recipient, as defined in [RFC9180].

   *  Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), see [RFC9180].

   *  Key Derivation Function (KDF), see [RFC9180].

   *  Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), see
      [RFC9180].

   *  Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), see [RFC9180].

3.  HPKE for COSE

3.1.  Overview

   This specification supports two modes of using HPKE in COSE, namely:

   *  HPKE Integrated Encryption mode, where HPKE is used to encrypt the
      plaintext.  This mode can only be used with a single recipient.
      Section 3.1.1 provides the details.

   *  HPKE Key Encryption mode, where HPKE is used to encrypt a content
      encryption key (CEK) and the CEK is subsequently used to encrypt
      the plaintext.  This mode supports multiple recipients.
      Section 3.1.2 provides the details.




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   Distinct algorithm identifiers are defined and registered that are
   specific to each COSE HPKE mode so that they are fully specified, as
   required by [RFC9864].

   In both cases, a new COSE header parameter called 'ek' is used to
   convey the content of the enc structure defined in the HPKE
   specification.  The enc value represents the serialized encapsulated
   public key.

   When used with HPKE, the 'ek' header parameter MUST be present in the
   unprotected header and MUST contain the encapsulated key, which is
   the output of the HPKE KEM.  The value of 'ek' MUST be a bstr.

   HPKE defines several authentication modes, as described in Table 1 of
   [RFC9180].  In COSE HPKE, only 'mode_base' and 'mode_psk' are
   supported.  The mode is 'mode_psk' if the 'psk_id' header parameter
   is present; otherwise, the mode defaults to 'mode_base'. 'mode_base'
   is described in Section 5.1.1 of [RFC9180], which only enables
   encryption to the holder of a given KEM private key. 'mode_psk' is
   described in Section 5.1.2 of [RFC9180], which authenticates using a
   pre-shared key.

3.1.1.  HPKE Integrated Encryption Mode

   This mode applies if the COSE_Encrypt0 structure uses a COSE-HPKE
   algorithm and has no recipient structure(s).

   Because COSE-HPKE supports header protection, if the 'alg' parameter
   is present, it MUST be included in the protected header and MUST be a
   COSE-HPKE algorithm.

   Although the use of the 'kid' parameter in COSE_Encrypt0 is
   discouraged by RFC 9052, this document RECOMMENDS the use of the
   'kid' parameter (or other parameters) to explicitly identify the
   static recipient public key used by the sender.  If the COSE_Encrypt0
   structure includes a 'kid' parameter, the recipient MAY use it to
   select the corresponding private key.

   When encrypting, the inputs to the HPKE Seal operation are set as
   follows:

   *  kem_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  pkR: The recipient public key, converted into an HPKE public key.

   *  kdf_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.





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   *  info: Defaults to the empty string; externally provided
      information MAY be used instead.

   *  aad: MUST contain the byte string for the authenticated data
      structure according to the steps defined in Section 5.3 of RFC
      9052.  For the Integrated Encryption mode the context string will
      be "Encrypt0".

   *  aead_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  pt: The raw message plaintext.

   The outputs are used as follows:

   *  enc: MUST be placed raw into the 'ek' (encapsulated key) parameter
      in the unprotected bucket.

   *  ct: MUST be used as layer ciphertext.  If not using detached
      content, this is directly placed as ciphertext in COSE_Encrypt0
      structure.  Otherwise, it is transported separately and the
      ciphertext field is nil.  See Section 5 of [RFC9052] for a
      description of detached payloads.

   If 'mode_psk' has been selected, then the 'psk_id' parameter MUST be
   present.  If 'mode_base' has been chosen, then the 'psk_id' parameter
   MUST NOT be present.

   When decrypting, the inputs to the HPKE Open operation are set as
   follows:

   *  kem_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  skR: The recipient private key, converted into an HPKE private
      key.

   *  kdf_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  aead_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  info: Defaults to the empty string; externally provided
      information MAY be used instead.

   *  aad: Defaults to the empty string; externally provided information
      MAY be used instead.

   *  enc: The contents of the layer 'ek' parameter.

   *  ct: The contents of the layer ciphertext.



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   The plaintext output is the raw message plaintext.

   The COSE_Encrypt0 MAY be tagged or untagged.

   An example is shown in Section 5.1.

3.1.2.  HPKE Key Encryption Mode

   This mode is selected if the COSE_recipient structure uses a COSE-
   HPKE algorithm.

   In this approach the following layers are involved:

   *  Layer 0 (corresponding to the COSE_Encrypt structure) contains the
      content (plaintext) encrypted with the CEK.  This ciphertext may
      be detached, and if not detached, then it is included in the
      COSE_Encrypt structure.

   *  Layer 1 (corresponding to a recipient structure) contains
      parameters needed for HPKE to generate a shared secret used to
      encrypt the CEK.  This layer conveys the encrypted CEK in the
      COSE_recipient structure using a COSE-HPKE algorithm.  The
      unprotected header MAY contain the kid parameter to identify the
      static recipient public key that the sender has been using with
      HPKE.

   This two-layer structure is used to encrypt content that can also be
   shared with multiple parties at the expense of a single additional
   encryption operation.  As stated above, the specification uses a CEK
   to encrypt the content at layer 0.

3.1.2.1.  Recipient Encryption

   This section defines the Recipient_structure, which is used in place
   of COSE_KDF_Context for COSE-HPKE recipients.  It MUST be used for
   COSE-HPKE recipients, as it provides integrity protection for
   recipient-protected header parameters.

   The Recipient_structure is modeled after the Enc_structure defined in
   [RFC9052], but is specific to COSE_recipient structures and MUST NOT
   be used with COSE_Encrypt.

   Furthermore, the use of COSE_KDF_Context is prohibited in COSE-HPKE;
   it MUST NOT be used.







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   Recipient_structure = [
       context: "HPKE Recipient",
       next_layer_alg: int/tstr,
       recipient_protected_header: empty_or_serialize_map,
       recipient_extra_info: bstr
   ]

   *  "next_layer_alg" is the algorithm ID of the COSE layer for which
      the COSE_recipient is encrypting a key.  It is the algorithm that
      the key MUST be used with.  This value MUST match the alg
      parameter in the next lower COSE layer.  (This serves the same
      purpose as the alg ID in the COSE_KDF_Context.  It also mitigates
      attacks where the attacker manipulates the content-encryption
      algorithm identifier.  This attack has been demonstrated against
      CMS and the mitigation can be found in
      [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-cek-hkdf-sha256].

   *  "recipient_protected_header" contains the protected header
      parameters from the COSE_recipient CBOR-encoded deterministically
      with the "Core Deterministic Encoding Requirements", specified in
      Section 4.2.1 of [RFC8949].

   *  "recipient_extra_info" contains any additional context the
      application wishes to include in the key derivation via the HPKE
      info parameter.  If none, it is a zero-length string.

3.1.2.2.  COSE-HPKE Recipient Construction

   Because COSE-HPKE supports header protection, if the 'alg' parameter
   is present, it MUST be in the protected header parameters and MUST be
   a COSE-HPKE algorithm.

   The protected header MAY contain the kid parameter to identify the
   static recipient public key that the sender used.  Use of the 'kid'
   parameter is RECOMMENDED to explicitly identify the static recipient
   public key used by the sender.  Including it in the protected header
   parameters ensures that it is input into the key derivation function
   of HPKE.

   When encrypting, the inputs to the HPKE Seal operation are set as
   follows:

   *  kem_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  pkR: The recipient public key, converted into HPKE public key.

   *  kdf_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.




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   *  aead_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  info: Deterministic encoding of the Recipient_structure.

   *  aad: Defaults to the empty string; externally provided information
      MAY be used instead.

   *  pt: The raw key for the next layer down.

   The outputs are used as follows:

   *  enc: MUST be placed raw into the 'ek' (encapsulated key) parameter
      in the unprotected bucket.

   *  ct: MUST be placed raw in the ciphertext field in the
      COSE_recipient.

   When decrypting, the inputs to the HPKE Open operation are set as
   follows:

   *  kem_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  skR: The recipient private key, converted into HPKE private key.

   *  kdf_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  aead_id: Depends on the COSE-HPKE algorithm used.

   *  info: Deterministic encoding of the Recipient_structure.

   *  aad: Defaults to the empty string; externally provided information
      MAY be used instead.

   *  ct: The contents of the layer ciphertext field.

   The plaintext output is the raw key for the next layer down.

   It is not necessary to populate recipient_aad, as HPKE inherently
   mitigates the classes of attacks that COSE_KDF_Context, and SP800-56A
   are designed to address.  COSE-HPKE use cases may still utilize
   recipient_aad for other purposes as needed; however, it is generally
   intended for small values such as identifiers, contextual
   information, or secrets.  It is not designed for protecting large or
   bulk external data.

   Any bulk external data that requires protection should be handled at
   layer 0 using external_aad.




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   The COSE_recipient structure is computed for each recipient.

   When encrypting the content at layer 0, the instructions in
   Section 5.3 of [RFC9052] MUST be followed, including the calculation
   of the authenticated data structure.

   An example is shown in Section 5.2.

3.2.  Key Representation

   The COSE_Key with the existing key types can be used to represent KEM
   private or public keys.  When using a COSE_Key for COSE-HPKE, the
   following checks are made:

   *  If the "kty" field is "AKP", then the public and private keys
      SHALL be the raw HPKE public and private keys (respectively) for
      the KEM used by the algorithm.

   *  Otherwise, the key MUST be suitable for the KEM used by the
      algorithm.  In case the "kty" parameter is "EC2" or "OKP", this
      means the value of "crv" parameter is suitable.  The valid
      combinations of KEM, "kty" and "crv" for the algorithms defined in
      this document are shown in Figure 1.

   *  If the "key_ops" field is present, it MUST include only "derive
      bits" for the private key and MUST be empty for the public key.

   Examples of the COSE_Key for COSE-HPKE are shown in Section 5.3.

4.  Ciphersuite Registration

   A ciphersuite is a group of algorithms, often sharing component
   algorithms such as hash functions, targeting a security level.  A
   COSE-HPKE algorithm is composed of the following choices:

   *  COSE HPKE Mode

   *  KEM Algorithm

   *  KDF Algorithm

   *  AEAD Algorithm

   The "KEM", "KDF", and "AEAD" values are chosen from the HPKE IANA
   registry [HPKE-IANA].






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   The HPKE mode is determined by the presence or absence of the
   'psk_id' parameter and is therefore not explicitly indicated in the
   ciphersuite.

   For a list of ciphersuite registrations, please see Section 7.  The
   following table summarizes the relationship between the ciphersuites
   registered in this document and the values registered in the HPKE
   IANA registry [HPKE-IANA].

   +-------------------+-----------------------+-------------------+
   | COSE-HPKE         | COSE HPKE Mode        |        HPKE       |
   | Ciphersuite Label |                       | KEM  | KDF | AEAD |
   +-------------------+-----------------------+------+-----+------+
   | HPKE-0            | Integrated Encryption | 0x10 | 0x1 | 0x1  |
   | HPKE-1            | Integrated Encryption | 0x11 | 0x2 | 0x2  |
   | HPKE-2            | Integrated Encryption | 0x12 | 0x3 | 0x2  |
   | HPKE-3            | Integrated Encryption | 0x20 | 0x1 | 0x1  |
   | HPKE-4            | Integrated Encryption | 0x20 | 0x1 | 0x3  |
   | HPKE-5            | Integrated Encryption | 0x21 | 0x3 | 0x2  |
   | HPKE-6            | Integrated Encryption | 0x21 | 0x3 | 0x3  |
   | HPKE-7            | Integrated Encryption | 0x10 | 0x1 | 0x2  |
   | HPKE-0-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x10 | 0x1 | 0x1  |
   | HPKE-1-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x11 | 0x2 | 0x2  |
   | HPKE-2-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x12 | 0x3 | 0x2  |
   | HPKE-3-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x20 | 0x1 | 0x1  |
   | HPKE-4-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x20 | 0x1 | 0x3  |
   | HPKE-5-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x21 | 0x3 | 0x2  |
   | HPKE-6-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x21 | 0x3 | 0x3  |
   | HPKE-7-KE         | Key Encryption        | 0x10 | 0x1 | 0x2  |
   +-------------------+-----------------------+------+-----+------+

   The following list maps the ciphersuite labels to their textual
   description.

   *  HPKE-0: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-SHA256) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-1: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(P-384, HKDF-SHA384) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA384 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-2: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(P-521, HKDF-SHA512) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-3: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-4: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.



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   *  HPKE-5: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(X448, HKDF-SHA512) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-6: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(X448, HKDF-SHA512) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

   *  HPKE-7: Integrated Encryption with DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-SHA256) KEM,
      HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-0: Key Encryption with DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-1: Key Encryption with DHKEM(P-384, HKDF-SHA384) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA384 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-2: Key Encryption with DHKEM(P-521, HKDF-SHA512) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-3: Key Encryption with DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-4: Key Encryption with DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA256 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

   *  HPKE-5: Key Encryption with DHKEM(X448, HKDF-SHA512) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  HPKE-6: Key Encryption with DHKEM(X448, HKDF-SHA512) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA512 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

   *  HPKE-7: Key Encryption with DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-
      SHA256 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   As the list indicates, the ciphersuite labels have been abbreviated
   at least to some extent to strike a balance between readability and
   length.

   The ciphersuite list above is a minimal starting point.  Additional
   ciphersuites can be registered into the already existing registry.
   For example, once post-quantum cryptographic algorithms have been
   standardized it might be beneficial to register ciphersuites for use
   with COSE-HPKE.  Additionally, ciphersuites utilizing the compact
   encoding of the public keys, as defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-dnhpke],
   may be standardized for use in constrained environments.

   As a guideline for ciphersuite submissions to the IANA COSE algorithm
   registry, the designated experts must only register combinations of
   (KEM, KDF, AEAD) triple that constitute valid combinations for use



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   with HPKE, the KDF used should (if possible) match one internally
   used by the KEM, and components should not be mixed between global
   and national standards.

4.1.  COSE_Keys for COSE-HPKE Ciphersuites

   The COSE-HPKE algorithm uniquely determines the KEM for which a
   COSE_Key is used.  The following mapping table shows the valid
   combinations of the KEM used, COSE_Key type, and its curve/key
   subtype.  This holds for COSE algorithms using either of the COSE
   HPKE modes (Integrated Encryption and Key Encryption).

   +---------------------+--------------+
   | HPKE KEM id         | COSE_Key     |
   |                     | kty | crv    |
   +---------------------+-----+--------+
   | 0x0010, 0x0013      | EC2 | P-256  |
   | 0x0011, 0x0014      | EC2 | P-384  |
   | 0x0012, 0x0015      | EC2 | P-521  |
   | 0x0020              | OKP | X25519 |
   | 0x0021              | OKP | X448   |
   +---------------------+-----+--------+

       Figure 1: COSE_Key Types and Curves for COSE-HPKE Ciphersuites

5.  Examples

   This section provides a set of examples that show all COSE message
   types (COSE_Encrypt0 and COSE_Encrypt) to which the COSE-HPKE can be
   applied, and also provides some examples of key representation for
   HPKE KEM.

   Each example of the COSE message includes the following information
   that can be used to check the interoperability of COSE-HPKE
   implementations:

   *  plaintext: Original data of the encrypted payload.

   *  external_aad: Externally supplied AAD.

   *  skR: A recipient private key.

   *  skE: An ephemeral sender private key paired with the encapsulated
      key.







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5.1.  COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption Mode

   This example assumes that a sender wants to communicate an encrypted
   payload to a single recipient in the most efficient way.

   An example of the HPKE Integrated Encryption Mode is shown in
   Figure 2.  Line breaks and comments have been inserted for better
   readability.

   This example uses the following:

   *  alg: HPKE-0

   *  plaintext: "This is the content."

   *  external_aad: "COSE-HPKE app"

   *  skR: h'57c92077664146e876760c9520d054aa93c3afb04e306705db609030850
      7b4d3'

   *  skE: h'42dd125eefc409c3b57366e721a40043fb5a58e346d51c133128a772371
      60218'

   16([
       / alg = HPKE-0 (Assumed: 35) /
       h'a1011823',
       {
           / kid /
           4: h'3031',
           / ek /
           -4: h'045df24272faf43849530db6be01f42708b3c3a9
                 df8e268513f0a996ed09ba7840894a3fb946cb28
                 23f609c59463093d8815a7400233b75ca8ecb177
                 54d241973e',
       },
       / encrypted plaintext /
       h'35aa3d98739289b83751125abe44e3b977e4b9abbf2c8cfaade
         b15f7681eef76df88f096',
   ])

                  Figure 2: COSE_Encrypt0 Example for HPKE

5.2.  COSE HPKE Key Encryption Mode

   In this example we assume that a sender wants to transmit a payload
   to two recipients using the HPKE Key Encryption mode.  Note that it
   is possible to send two single-layer payloads, although it will be
   less efficient.



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5.2.1.  COSE_Encrypt

   An example of key encryption using the COSE_Encrypt structure using
   HPKE is shown in Figure 3.  Line breaks and comments have been
   inserted for better readability.

   This example uses the following input parameters:

   *  Content encryption algorithm: AES-128-GCM

   *  plaintext: "This is the payload."

   *  kid:"alice"

   *  alg: HPKE-0-KE (assumed 46) - Key Encryption, DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-
      SHA256), KDF: HKDF-SHA256, AEAD: AES-128-GCM

   *  external_aad: "some externally provided aad"

   Alice uses the following NIST P-256 ECC keys.

   Private Key:

   0xaf, 0xf9, 0x07, 0xc9, 0x9f, 0x9a, 0xd3, 0xaa,
   0xe6, 0xc4, 0xcd, 0xf2, 0x11, 0x22, 0xbc, 0xe2,
   0xbd, 0x68, 0xb5, 0x28, 0x3e, 0x69, 0x07, 0x15,
   0x4a, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x84, 0x0f, 0xa2, 0x08, 0xcf

   Public Key:

   /* SEC Serialization of X and Y */
   0x04,

   /* X & Y */
   0x65, 0xed, 0xa5, 0xa1, 0x25, 0x77, 0xc2, 0xba,
   0xe8, 0x29, 0x43, 0x7f, 0xe3, 0x38, 0x70, 0x1a,
   0x10, 0xaa, 0xa3, 0x75, 0xe1, 0xbb, 0x5b, 0x5d,
   0xe1, 0x08, 0xde, 0x43, 0x9c, 0x08, 0x55, 0x1d,

   0x1e, 0x52, 0xed, 0x75, 0x70, 0x11, 0x63, 0xf7,
   0xf9, 0xe4, 0x0d, 0xdf, 0x9f, 0x34, 0x1b, 0x3d,
   0xc9, 0xba, 0x86, 0x0a, 0xf7, 0xe0, 0xca, 0x7c,
   0xa7, 0xe9, 0xee, 0xcd, 0x00, 0x84, 0xd1, 0x9c

   As a result, the following COSE_Encrypt payload is created:






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   d8 60 84 43 a1 01 01 a1 05 50 7f 55 a2 6b 98 c0
   49 b4 28 a7 cf 25 9d c3 0e 54 58 23 3f ae 53 ee
   83 55 ee 40 4e 86 7c 00 74 f8 c3 8c 6d 13 6b 65
   bb 61 93 92 79 b4 38 48 c5 8c b6 a4 76 03 55 81
   83 4b a2 01 18 23 04 45 61 6c 69 63 65 a1 23 58
   41 04 fe 73 6d 1d 93 11 4d f6 11 3b c2 87 cd 8e
   63 67 e1 0a b4 78 d7 fe df ac a1 6e 12 6f f0 16
   d6 95 d5 f7 22 34 03 e3 99 60 75 55 bc cf b9 65
   17 5f 49 14 e0 47 73 f7 04 07 5b 46 58 bf 7a dd
   84 a3 58 20 55 12 c2 35 7d 4c b6 bd 23 8a 5f bc
   10 84 b6 c9 74 0a c2 41 1d 93 63 7a 51 e6 9d 51
   0b 4f ae f8

   Decoded, this hex-sequence has the following content:

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

     96([
          / alg = AES-128-GCM (1) /
          h'A10101',
          {
              / iv /
              5: h'33739C468ACB8EEC693C563EAEA12DD0'
          },
          / ciphertext /
          h'\
   1F3EE9966D5CEE016E49365CF366FD608F271FC3B5ABDD5253844EE38EE6ABB7F555\
                                                                    9A',
          [
              [
                  / alg = HPKE-0 (35), kid = 'alice' /
                  h'A20118230445616C696365',
                  {
                      / ek /
                      -4: h'\
   040506BE8D9C2AFE42D3330676A3F616BAE02F6779D962449F26759B8D1E8F4DF10C\
         9F344627DEB063EE1DDB4858A5E7605BD09ECEB409B037E6E61F44D1E946C1'
                  },
                  / ciphertext containing encrypted CEK /
                  h'\
       B11361397A19E9C155C3E0E8117B5E88155600E550DDE03DC834A46A182DE6F1'
              ]
          ]
      ])

                  Figure 3: COSE_Encrypt Example for HPKE





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   To offer authentication of the sender the payload in Figure 3 is
   signed with a COSE_Sign1 wrapper, which is outlined in Figure 4.  The
   payload in Figure 4 is meant to contain the content of Figure 3.

   Bob uses the following signature key to sign the COSE_Encrypt payload
   without any additional data.

   Private Key:

   0xd9, 0xb5, 0xe7, 0x1f, 0x77, 0x28, 0xbf, 0xe5,
   0x63, 0xa9, 0xdc, 0x93, 0x75, 0x62, 0x27, 0x7e,
   0x32, 0x7d, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x94, 0x80, 0xf3, 0xdc,
   0x92, 0x41, 0xe5, 0x74, 0x2a, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x89

   The output of the message is as follows:

   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   18([
          / alg = ES256 (-7) /
          h'A10126',
          {
             / kid = 'bob' /
             4: h'626F62'
          },
          / payload / h'\
   D8608443A10101A1055033739C468ACB8EEC693C563EAEA12DD058231F3EE9966D5C\
   EE016E49365CF366FD608F271FC3B5ABDD5253844EE38EE6ABB7F5559A81834BA201\
   18230445616C696365A1235841040506BE8D9C2AFE42D3330676A3F616BAE02F6779\
   D962449F26759B8D1E8F4DF10C9F344627DEB063EE1DDB4858A5E7605BD09ECEB409\
   B037E6E61F44D1E946C15820B11361397A19E9C155C3E0E8117B5E88155600E550DD\
                                               E03DC834A46A182DE6F1',
          / Signature /
          h'\
   7F9A83D1753E6FA8475A1250A786DA3E680265949A0AEE1984895A406E41AE8A2966\
           38CA64AE270C5317829BD3968EF76C42DF1566DADC9A68B06BA6ED376B8A'
     ])

                        Figure 4: COSE_Sign1 Example

5.3.  Key Representation

   Examples of private and public KEM key representation are shown
   below.

5.3.1.  Public Key for HPKE-0





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   {
       / kty = 'EC2' /
       1: 2,
       / kid = '01' /
       2: h'3031',
       / alg = HPKE-0 (Assumed: 35) /
       3: 35,
       / crv = 'P-256' /
       -1: 1,
       / x /
       -2: h'65eda5a12577c2bae829437fe338701a10aaa375
             e1bb5b5de108de439c08551d',
       / y /
       -3: h'1e52ed75701163f7f9e40ddf9f341b3dc9ba860af
             7e0ca7ca7e9eecd0084d19c'
   }

           Figure 5: Public Key Representation Example for HPKE-0

5.3.2.  Private Key for HPKE-0

   {
       / kty = 'EC2' /
       1: 2,
       / kid = '01' /
       2: h'3031',
       / alg = HPKE-0 (Assumed: 35) /
       3: 35,
       / key_ops = ['derive_bits'] /
       4: [8],
       / crv = 'P-256' /
       -1: 1,
       / x /
       -2: h'bac5b11cad8f99f9c72b05cf4b9e26d244dc189f7
             45228255a219a86d6a09eff',
       / y /
       -3: h'20138bf82dc1b6d562be0fa54ab7804a3a64b6d72
             ccfed6b6fb6ed28bbfc117e',
       / d /
       -4: h'57c92077664146e876760c9520d054aa93c3afb04
             e306705db6090308507b4d3',
   }

          Figure 6: Private Key Representation Example for HPKE-0

5.3.3.  KEM Public Key for HPKE-4





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   {
       / kty = 'OKP' /
       1: 1,
       / kid = '11' /
       2: h'3131',
       / alg = HPKE-4 (Assumed: 42) /
       3: 42,
       / crv = 'X25519' /
       -1: 4,
       / x /
       -2: h'cb7c09ab7b973c77a808ee05b9bbd373b55c06eaa
             9bd4ad2bd4e9931b1c34c22',
   }

           Figure 7: Public Key Representation Example for HPKE-4

6.  Security Considerations

   This specification is based on HPKE and the security considerations
   of [RFC9180] are therefore applicable also to this specification.

   Both HPKE and HPKE COSE assume that the sender possesses the
   recipient's public key.  Therefore, some form of public key
   distribution mechanism is assumed to exist, but this is outside the
   scope of this document.

   HPKE relies on a source of randomness to be available on the device.
   Additionally, with the two layer structure the CEK is randomly
   generated and it MUST be ensured that the guidelines in [RFC8937] for
   random number generation are followed.

   HPKE in Base mode does not offer authentication as part of the HPKE
   KEM.  In this case COSE constructs like COSE_Sign, COSE_Sign1,
   COSE_Mac, or COSE_Mac0 can be used to add authentication.

   If COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0 is used with a detached ciphertext
   then the subsequently applied integrity protection via COSE_Sign,
   COSE_Sign1, COSE_Mac, or COSE_Mac0 does not cover this detached
   ciphertext.  Implementers MUST ensure that the detached ciphertext
   also experiences integrity protection.  This is, for example, the
   case when an AEAD cipher is used to produce the detached ciphertext
   but may not be guaranteed by non-AEAD ciphers.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests IANA to add new values to the 'COSE
   Algorithms' and to the 'COSE Header Parameters' registries.




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7.1.  COSE Algorithms Registry

7.1.1.  HPKE-0

   *  Name: HPKE-0

   *  Value: TBD1 (Assumed: 35)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(P-256,
      HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.2.  HPKE-1

   *  Name: HPKE-1

   *  Value: TBD3 (Assumed: 37)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(P-384,
      HKDF-SHA384) KEM, HKDF-SHA384 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.3.  HPKE-2

   *  Name: HPKE-2

   *  Value: TBD5 (Assumed: 39)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(P-521,
      HKDF-SHA512) KEM, HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG



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   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.4.  HPKE-3

   *  Name: HPKE-3

   *  Value: TBD7 (Assumed: 41)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(X25519,
      HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.5.  HPKE-4

   *  Name: HPKE-4

   *  Value: TBD8 (Assumed: 42)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(X25519,
      HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.6.  HPKE-5

   *  Name: HPKE-5

   *  Value: TBD9 (Assumed: 43)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(X448,
      HKDF-SHA512) KEM, HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]



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   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.7.  HPKE-6

   *  Name: HPKE-6

   *  Value: TBD10 (Assumed: 44)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(X448,
      HKDF-SHA512) KEM, HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.8.  HPKE-7

   *  Name: HPKE-7

   *  Value: TBD13 (Assumed: 45)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Integrated Encryption using DHKEM(P-256,
      HKDF-SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.9.  HPKE-0-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-0-KE

   *  Value: TBD14 (Assumed: 46)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-
      SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.



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   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.10.  HPKE-1-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-1-KE

   *  Value: TBD15 (Assumed: 47)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(P-384, HKDF-
      SHA384) KEM, HKDF-SHA384 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.11.  HPKE-2-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-2-KE

   *  Value: TBD16 (Assumed: 48)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(P-521, HKDF-
      SHA512) KEM, HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.12.  HPKE-3-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-3-KE

   *  Value: TBD17 (Assumed: 49)




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   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-
      SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-128-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.13.  HPKE-4-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-4-KE

   *  Value: TBD18 (Assumed: 50)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-
      SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.14.  HPKE-5-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-5-KE

   *  Value: TBD19 (Assumed: 51)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(X448, HKDF-
      SHA512) KEM, HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes







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7.1.15.  HPKE-6-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-6-KE

   *  Value: TBD20 (Assumed: 52)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(X448, HKDF-
      SHA512) KEM, HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.1.16.  HPKE-7-KE

   *  Name: HPKE-7-KE

   *  Value: TBD21 (Assumed: 53)

   *  Description: COSE HPKE Key Encryption using DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-
      SHA256) KEM, HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and AES-256-GCM AEAD.

   *  Capabilities: [kty]

   *  Change Controller: IESG

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

   *  Recommended: Yes

7.2.  COSE Header Parameters

7.2.1.  ek Header Parameter

   *  Name: ek

   *  Label: TBD11 (Assumed: -4)

   *  Value type: bstr

   *  Value Registry: N/A

   *  Description: HPKE encapsulated key




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   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

7.2.2.  psk_id Header Parameter

   *  Name: psk_id

   *  Label: TBD12 (Assumed: -5)

   *  Value type: bstr

   *  Value Registry: N/A

   *  Description: A key identifier (kid) for the pre-shared key as
      defined in Section 5.1.2 of [RFC9180]

   *  Reference: [[TBD: This RFC]]

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8949]  Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
              Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949>.

   [RFC9052]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.

   [RFC9053]  Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053,
              August 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9053>.

   [RFC9180]  Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid
              Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,
              February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.




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8.2.  Informative References

   [HPKE-IANA]
              IANA, "Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) IANA Registry",
              October 2023,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/hpke/hpke.xhtml>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cms-cek-hkdf-sha256]
              Housley, R., "Encryption Key Derivation in the
              Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) using HKDF with SHA-
              256", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-
              cms-cek-hkdf-sha256-05, 19 September 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              cms-cek-hkdf-sha256-05>.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-dnhpke]
              Harkins, D., "Deterministic Nonce-less Hybrid Public Key
              Encryption", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-
              cfrg-dnhpke-07, 16 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
              dnhpke-07>.

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5652>.

   [RFC8937]  Cremers, C., Garratt, L., Smyshlyaev, S., Sullivan, N.,
              and C. Wood, "Randomness Improvements for Security
              Protocols", RFC 8937, DOI 10.17487/RFC8937, October 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8937>.

   [RFC9864]  Jones, M.B. and O. Steele, "Fully-Specified Algorithms for
              JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object
              Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9864,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9864, October 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9864>.

Appendix A.  Contributors

   We would like to thank the following individuals for their
   contributions to the design of embedding the HPKE output into the
   COSE structure following a long and lively mailing list discussion:

   *  Richard Barnes

   *  Ilari Liusvaara





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   Finally, we would like to thank Russ Housley and Brendan Moran for
   their contributions to the draft as co-authors of initial versions.

Appendix B.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank John Mattsson, Mike Prorock, Michael
   Richardson, Thomas Fossati, and Göran Selander for their
   contributions to the specification.

Authors' Addresses

   Hannes Tschofenig
   University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Sieg
   Germany
   Email: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net


   Orie Steele (editor)
   Tradeverifyd
   United States
   Email: orie@or13.io


   Daisuke Ajitomi
   bibital
   Japan
   Email: dajiaji@gmail.com


   Laurence Lundblade
   Security Theory LLC
   United States
   Email: lgl@securitytheory.com


   Michael B. Jones
   Self-Issued Consulting
   United States
   Email: michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
   URI:   https://self-issued.info/











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