



ANIMA                                                     T. Eckert, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                 Futurewei
Updates: draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm (if                          E. Dijk
         approved)                                     IoTconsultancy.nl
Intended status: Standards Track                            19 July 2025
Expires: 20 January 2026


                     BRSKI discovery and variations
                  draft-ietf-anima-brski-discovery-07

Abstract

   This document specifies how to make BRSKI communications
   autoconfiguring, extensible and resilient in the face of simultaneous
   use of different variations of the BRSKI protocol (BRSKI, BRSKI-AE,
   BRSKI-PRM, constrained BRSKI, stateless constrained BRSKI proxies).
   This document specifies a data model, IANA registry and BRSKI
   component procedures to achieve this.

   This document does not define any new discovery methods.  Instead,
   its data model allows to signal all current (and future) variations
   of the BRSKI family of protocols consistently via different existing
   network discovery mechanisms: DNS-SD, CoAP discovery (CORE-LF) and
   GRASP.  Additional/future discovery mechanisms can also be supported
   through the IANA registry.

   Automatic resiliency and load-sharing are enabled through the use of
   discovery mechanisms and the provisioning of multiple instances of
   BRSKI components such as registrars and Join Proxies.  This document
   specifies the procedures to support load-sharing and (fast) failover
   under failure and recovery of redundant components.

   Future proof deployments of BRSKI requires Join Proxies that
   automatically support any current and future BRSKI variation.  This
   document specifies the procedures how Join Proxies can support this
   through specific Join Proxy protocol behavior and the use of
   discovery mechanisms.

   The specification for discovery of pledges by their IDevID as
   introduced by BRSKI-PRM is refined in this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.





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Copyright Notice

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Table of Contents

   1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.1.  Challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       2.1.1.  Signaling BRSKI variation for responder selection.  .   7
       2.1.2.  Consistent support for variations across different
               discovery mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.1.3.  Variation agnostic support for Join Proxies . . . . .   8
     2.2.  Functional Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   3.  Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.1.  Data Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.1.  Roles and Services  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       3.1.2.  Service Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.1.3.  Variations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.1.4.  Variation Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.5.  Variation Type Choices  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       3.1.6.  Variation Strings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       3.1.7.  Contexts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       3.1.8.  Registry Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
         3.1.8.1.  Contexts Registry Table . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
         3.1.8.2.  Variation Type and Choices Registry Table . . . .  14



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         3.1.8.3.  Variations and Variation String Registry Table  .  15
       3.1.9.  Discussion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     3.2.  Redundant Discovery and Selection . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.2.1.  Responder Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       3.2.2.  Service Announcements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       3.2.3.  Responder Selection in Proxies  . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       3.2.4.  Protection against malicious service announcements  .  20
     3.3.  Join Proxies Support for Discovery and Variations . . . .  20
       3.3.1.  Join Proxy support for Variations . . . . . . . . . .  21
       3.3.2.  Registrar Operations Modes  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
         3.3.2.1.  Direct Connection Mode  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
         3.3.2.2.  Best Registrar Selection Mode . . . . . . . . . .  22
         3.3.2.3.  Proxy in Service Name Only Mode on Registrars . .  23
         3.3.2.4.  Proxy Mode Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       3.3.3.  Extensibility to non BRSKI services . . . . . . . . .  25
       3.3.4.  Scaling service discovery and selection . . . . . . .  25
     3.4.  Discoverable BRSKI Pledges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       3.4.1.  BRSKI-PLEDGE context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
       3.4.2.  Service Instance Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       3.4.3.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
       3.4.4.  WebPKI derived instance schema  . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     3.5.  Variation signaling and encoding rules for different
           discovery mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
       3.5.1.  DNS-SD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
         3.5.1.1.  Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
         3.5.1.2.  Variation String Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
         3.5.1.3.  Service Instance and Host Names . . . . . . . . .  34
         3.5.1.4.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       3.5.2.  GRASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
         3.5.2.1.  Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
         3.5.2.2.  Encoding and Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
       3.5.3.  CORE-LF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
         3.5.3.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
         3.5.3.2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
         3.5.3.3.  Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
         3.5.3.4.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
         3.5.3.5.  Resource Type Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .  47
   4.  IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     4.1.  Core Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
       4.1.1.  Resource Type Link Target Attribute Values  . . . . .  48
       4.1.2.  Target Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     4.2.  BRSKI Discovery Parameters Registry (section) . . . . . .  49
       4.2.1.  BRSKI Context Registry Table  . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
       4.2.2.  BRSKI Variation Type and Choices Registry Table . . .  52
       4.2.3.  BRSKI Variations and Variation Strings  . . . . . . .  54
     4.3.  Service Names Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     4.4.  BRSKI Well-Known URIs fixes (opportunistic) . . . . . . .  55
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56



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   6.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
     6.1.  Change log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   Appendix A.  Possible future variations . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
   Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65

1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document relies on the terminology defined in [BRSKI].  The
   following terms are described partly in addition.

   Context:  A set of Services for whom the same set of variations
      applies

   IP, IPv4, IPv6:  In this document, IP refers to (inclusively) IPv4 or
      IPv6.  If a statement applies to only one of the two versions,
      then the terms IPv4 or IPv6 are used.

   Initiator:  A host that is using an IP transport protocol to initiate
      a connection or transaction to another host called the responder.

   Initiator socket:  A socket consisting of an initiators IP address,
      protocol and protocol port number from which it initiates
      connections or transactions to a responder (typically UDP or TCP).

   Objective Name:  See Service Name.

   Resource Type:  See Service Name.

   Responder:  A host that is using an IP transport protocol to respond
      to transaction or connection requests from an Initiator.

   Responder socket:  A socket consisting of a responders IP address,
      protocol and protocol port number on which it responds to requests
      of the protocol (typically UDP or TCP).

   Role:  In this document, functionality of an entity in a variation of





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      BRSKI that can act as a responder and whose supported variations
      can be discovered.  BRSKI roles relevant in this document include
      Join Registrar, Join Proxy and pledge.  The IANA registry defined
      by this document allows to specify variations for any roles.  See
      also Context.

   Socket:  The combination of am IP address, an IP protocol that
      utilizes a port number (such as TCP or UDP) and a port number of
      that protocol.

   Service Name:  The name for (a subset of) the functionality/API
      provided by a discoverable responder socket.  This term is
      inherited from [DNS-SD] but unless otherwise specified also used
      in this document to apply to any other discovery functionality/
      API.  The terminology used by other mechanisms typically differs.
      For example, when [GRASP] is used to discover a responder socket
      for BRSKI, the Objective Name carries the equivalent to the
      service name.  In [CORE-LF], the Resource Type (rt=) carries the
      equivalent of the service name.

   Type:  See Variation Type.

   Variation:  A combination one one variation choice each for every
      variation type applicable to the context of one discoverable BRSKI
      communications.  For example, in the context of BRSKI, a variation
      is one choice for "mode", one choice for "enroll" and once choice
      for "vformat".

   Variation Type:  The name for one aspect of a protocol for which two
      or more choices exist (or may exist in the future), and where the
      choice can technically be combined orthogonal to other variation
      types.  This document defined the BRSKI variation types "mode",
      "enroll" and "vformat".

   Variation Type Choice:  The name for different values that a
      particular variation type may have.  For example, this document
      does defines the choices "rrm" and "prm" for the BRSKI variation
      "mode".

   ACP:  "An Autonomic Control Plane", [ACP].

   BRSKI:  "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure", [BRSKI].

   BRSKI-AE:  "Alternative Enrollment Protocols in [BRSKI]", [BRSKI-AE].

   BRSKI-PRM:  "[BRSKI] with Pledge in Responder Mode", [BRSKI-PRM].

   cBRSKI:  "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure



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      ([BRSKI])", [cBRSKI].

   COAP:  "The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", [COAP].

   CORE-LF:  "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format",
      [CORE-LF].

   cPROXY:  "Constrained Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols",
      [cPROXY].

   DNS-SD:  "DNS-Based Service Discovery", [DNS-SD].

   EST:  "Enrollment over Secure Transport", [EST].

   GRASP:  "GeneRic Autonomic Signaling Protocol", [GRASP].

   GRASP-DNSSD:  "DNS-SD Compatible Service Discovery in GeneRic
      Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)",
      [I-D.eckert-anima-grasp-dnssd].

   JWS-VOUCHER:  "JWS signed Voucher Artifacts for Bootstrapping
      Protocols", [JWS-VOUCHER].

   lwCMP:  "Lightweight Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile",
      [RFC9483].

   mDNS:  "multicast DNS", [mDNS].

   SCEP:  "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol", [RFC8894].

2.  Overview

2.1.  Challenges

   BRKI was designed to support multi-vendor deployments ideally with
   zero additional provisioning in the network just to support BRSKI.
   In recent years, multiple variations of the BRSKI protocol where
   specified, sich as [BRSKI-PRM], [BRSKI-AE], [cBRSKI] and [cPROXY];
   within these documents that are multiple options that need to be
   supported by all BRSKI entities involved in a BRSKI enrollment, such
   as pledge, proxy and registrar.

   1.  Assume for example a registrar from vendor A is deployed in an
       enterprise network or manufacturing plant to support a variety of
       pledges from an ecosystem of vendors all using the vendor A
       registrar, and a particular subset of BRSKI protocol variations.
       Later, it becomes necessary to also deploy various pledges from a
       different ecosystem.  Vendor B provides a registrar for this



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       ecosystem, but they do use some slight variation of BRSKI.  Now
       the proxies deployed through either the A or B ecosystem discover
       either registrars A or B and randomnly pick one.  And in case
       they pick the wrong registrar, enrollment for the pledge will
       fail because the proxy variation of BRSKI is not compatible with
       the variation(s) supported by the choosen registrar.

       Now the proxy implementations coming either from A or B start to
       fix up the issue by introducing some proprietary extension to
       only discover "their" type of registrar.  Now a pledge from the A
       ecosystem can only be enrolled behind an A proxy and a B pledge
       only behind a B proxy.  The network operator now falls into the
       next trap: It is not possible anymore to have networks where both
       A and B pledges can be enrolled, because it is physcially not
       possible or financially feasible to deploy both A and B proxies.
       Or if they are deployed, pledges would only randomnly pick the
       right pledge.

   2.  Some use-case community wants to introduce a new variation
       aspect, such as introducing a new encoding method for the message
       exchanges or a different certificate enrollment protocol.  But
       now this aspect can be combined with any possible other aspect of
       BRSKI.  And without appropriate planning upfront this ends up in
       more chaos of ad-hoc definition every time some ecosystem prefers
       one specific variation of options.

   3.  As if variations where not difficult enough, networks may only
       support one specific autodiscovery protocol, and specific
       variations did not bother to define how their variation of BRSKI
       could be discovered by another discovery protocol mechanism.  So
       that variation then invents yet another one-off way to discover
       its variation in this new type of discover method in this now
       more important type of networks.

   The following sub-sections attempt to more formally describe the
   different challenges in a technically more precise language.

2.1.1.  Signaling BRSKI variation for responder selection.

   When an initiator uses a discovery mechanism such as [DNS-SD] to
   discover an instance of the service that it intends to connect to, it
   may discover more than one such instance.

   For example, BRSKI pledges want to discover Join Proxies or
   registrars.  In the presence of variations of the BRSKI mechanisms
   that impact interoperability, performance or security, not all
   discovered instances may support exactly what the initiator needs to
   achieve interoperability or they may not provide the best desired



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   metric.  To support choosing the best interoperable responder, the
   discovery mechanism needs to carry the necessary additional
   information beside the service name that indicates the service/role
   of the responder.

2.1.2.  Consistent support for variations across different discovery
        mechanisms.

   Different BRSKI deployments may prefer different discovery
   mechanisms, such as [DNS-SD], [GRASP], [CORE-LF] or others.  Any
   variation in discovery already defined for one discovery mechanism
   usually has to be re-specified individually for every other discovery
   mechanism.  This makes it often cumbersome to select the preferred
   discovery mechanism for a specific type of deployment, because such
   additional specification work can take a long time.  Indepedent
   specification of variations for different discovery mechanisms can
   also easily lead to inconsistencies and hence the inability to
   equally support all variations across all discovery mechanisms.

2.1.3.  Variation agnostic support for Join Proxies

   Pledges or Agents often need to connect to a registrar that supports
   the variation of BRSKI supported by the pledge or Agent via a Join
   Proxy.  The Join Proxy needs to discover registrars and the
   variations they support and then announce themselves to pledges or
   Agents accordingly so that when the pledge or Agent connects to the
   Proxy that it will connect it to the right registrar.

   This document defines variations so that Join Proxies can be
   implemented and operated agnostic of variations: When a Join Proxy
   supports one variation for a particular IP version and transport
   (TCP, UDP stateful/stateless), than it can support all current and
   future variations for the same IP version and transport without the
   need for Join Proxy software or configuration updates.

   To support agnostic implementations, variations can only differ in
   the payload of messages carried across those TCP/UDP connections, but
   not the transport mechanisms used.  New transport mechanisms can not
   be variations, but need to be so-called contexts.

   The choice of encoding of variations into different discovery methods
   also needs to ensure that it can be discovered by legacy Join Proxy
   implementations.

   Initial support for variations in proxies does create additional
   coding effort: When a pledge or Registrar-Agent connects to a Join
   Proxy with the need to use a specific variation on a registrar, then
   the Join Proxy needs to understand which variation that is, so that



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   it can connect the pledge or registrar to a registrar supporting that
   variation.  This requires that proxies create per-variation responder
   sockets.

2.2.  Functional Summary

   This document specifies a set of IANA registry tables for BRSKI.
   These tables allow to define the attributes for different registry
   mechanisms to announce and discover different BRSKI role responders
   as well as their variations.  Defining these via registry tables
   maximizes consistency across discovery mechanisms and eases support
   of variations across different discovery mechanisms.

   Using the discovery information specified through these tables, this
   document specifies details of selection and fail-over when
   discovering more than one interoperable and available responder,
   These procedures intend to provide resilience and scalability of
   BRSKI services not possible without dynamic discovery mechanisms.

   Finally, this document specifies procedures for Join Proxies to
   discover variations of registrars using any discovery mechanism,
   annnounce them to pledges - and connect a pledge accordingly to the
   right registrar based on the variation required by the pledge.  These
   procedures allow to introduce new variations of BRSKI without need to
   upgrade proxies.

3.  Specification

3.1.  Data Model

   BRSKI Discovery is about discovery of one or more instances of
   responders supporting a specific BRSKI role - and determining whether
   that responders variation of BRSKI protocol options is compatible
   with / desired by the connection initiator.  This section gives the
   conceptual overview of how this is achieved.

3.1.1.  Roles and Services

   In this document, a service is a specific functionality provided by a
   responder over a network socket using a particular
   transport/security/session stack (such as TCP, UDP, COAP, DTLS).

   In this document, a role is functionality performed by a BRSKI entity
   either as an initiator or responder.  [BRSKI] defines the roles of
   pledge, Join Proxy, registrar, MASA.  [BRSKI-PRM] adds the role
   Registrar-Agent.  Trust anchor is a dependent role required by BRSKI,
   provided through [EST] or other protocols in [BRSKI-AE].




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   A single entity may implement multiple roles such as registrars that
   also often implement the Join Proxy Role or pledges which change stop
   being a pledge after enrolment but often then become Join Proxies.
   Future BRSKI documents may introduce additional roles and many of the
   definitions in this document should be extensible to also support
   such additional roles.

   In this document a service is functionality performed as a result of
   a network connection from an initator to a responder.  The service is
   commonly named after the role name of the responder, such as Join
   Proxy, registrar or MASA.

3.1.2.  Service Names

   The role that a responder socket supports is indicated in each
   discovery mechanism through an appropriate signalling element.
   [DNS-SD] calls this signalling element the Service Name.  Due to the
   absence of another equally widely used term for this type of
   signalling element across arbitrary discovery mechanisms, this
   document also refers to the role signaling element as the service
   name, independent of the discovery mechanism.  IP Address, IP
   transport protocol and IP transport protocol port are not part of the
   Service name and signalled across discovery mechanisms specific
   signaling elements.

3.1.3.  Variations

   Variations in the BRSKI protocol such as the choice of encoding of
   messages or features could impact interoperability between initiator
   and responder.  Initiators need be able to discover and select
   responders based not only on the desired role, but also based on the
   best variation for the initiator.

   Variations of a role could be indicated by using a different Service
   Name for every variation, but that approach would have two challenges

   1.  Service Names in different discovery mechanisms are typically not
       hierarchical (e.g.: not "role.variation").  Relying only on
       Service Names would thus require the registration for every
       variation as a separate Service Name in a "flat" name space; and
       register them once for each discovery mechanism.  In addition,
       not all discovery mechanism registry rules may look favorably at
       the registration of Service Names for such protocol variations.

   2.  Whenever a new variation is introduced, all deployed BRSKI
       proxies would need to be configured to also proxy this new
       variation - because new Service Names for the same BRSKI role can
       be auto discovered by proxies (without additional protocol



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       mechanisms that would be more complex than the variations
       approach).  Most Join Proxies should be able to operate without
       configuration though.

   For these reasons, this document introduces the encoding of BRSKI
   (role) variations through a secondary signaling element in each
   discovery method, enabling proxies to transparently support any
   variation of BRSKI role connections for which they supports proxying.

   In addition, variations only need to be registered once in a BRSKI
   specific registry table introduced by this document, and not once for
   each current or future discovery method.

   A variation is hence specified as describing a combination of
   signaling choices that a BRSKI connection may use and that impacts
   interoperability between initiator and responder at the message
   exchange and encoding level.

3.1.4.  Variation Types

   Today, BRSKI connections can exchange vouchers in one out of multiple
   different encoding formats.  Independent of that option, the BRSKI
   connection may also use different commands (so called "Endpoints").
   Today, these are based on whether [BRSKI-PRM] is used or not.
   Finally, and also independent of those two options, the BRSKI
   connection may use one out of multiple different enrollment protocol
   options.

   This document calls these options "Variation Type", and the above
   three variation types are called "vformat" for the voucher format,
   "mode" for the Endpoints being used (such as PRM or not), and
   "enroll" for the enrollment protocol used.

3.1.5.  Variation Type Choices

   The actual choices for each of these variation types are hence called
   "Variation Type Choices": "prm" or "rrm" for the variation type
   "mode". "cmsj", "cose" or "jose" for the variation type "vformat".
   "est", "cmp" or "scep" for the variation type "enroll".

   "scep" is an example for the ability of the registration to reserve
   values: it is not adopted by any current BRSKI specification.









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3.1.6.  Variation Strings

   The string name of a variation is as a string concatenating a single
   variation type choice for every (necessary) variation type.  For
   example "rrm-cmsj-est" could be describing the protocol options used
   by a [BRSKI] connection pledge to registrar - potentially through a
   Join Proxy.  This string representation of a variation is called the
   variation string and it is consistently used for signalling across
   any discovery mechanisms.

   When in the future, additional variation types and choices are
   introduced, existing variation strings must not be changed to allow
   full backward compatibility with existing/deployed implementations.

   For example, when using BRSKI over UDP, today only COAPS is
   supported, but BRSKI UDP sockets could equally work with QUIC (which
   runs on top of UDP).  At that time, a new variation type of e.g.:
   "proto" could be introduced with variation type choices "coaps" and
   "quic".  For backward compatibility, "coaps" then needs to be defined
   to be the default for BRSKI over UDP, which means that existing
   variation strings such as "rrm-cmsj-est" imply the use of "coaps",
   whereas the use of QUIC would have to be indicated explicitly via
   "rrm-cmsj-est-quic".

   For variation strings to be semantically unambiguous, the variation
   type choices across all variation types have distinct names, and the
   order in which variation type choices are concatenated is the order
   in which variation types are defined in the according registry table.
   Hence new variation type choices have to be tail added to the
   registry table.

   Just because a variation name is composed from variation type choices
   does not mean that an unspecified variation of (random) variation
   type choices can work without new implementation or specification.
   Or even make sense.  This may be the case, or it may not.  This is
   also the reason why this document specifies a registry that
   explicitly enumerates all variations that are known to have
   sufficient specification and will work.

   For example, [BRSKI-PRM] is indicated through the variation type
   value "prm", but it may also requires enhancements to the enrolment
   protocol used, which is specified in the variation type "enroll",
   such as new endpoints in that protocol.  The required functional
   semantic implied by the "enroll" variation type value in variations
   with "prm" is thus a different one than in variations not using
   "prm".  And [BRSKI-PRM] does not necessarily sufficiently specify
   these enhancements for enrollment protocols that may not have been
   known or specified by the time [BRSKI-PRM] was written.



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3.1.7.  Contexts

   Variation strings are defined separately for every group of services
   for which the set of variation strings is or could be different or
   could have different semantics.  A group of services for which the
   same variation strings are defined is called a Context.

   Different list of variation strings are necessary when services have
   different variation types, different variation type values, different
   deployed variations or different defaults for the same variation type
   values and hence different variation strings.

   "tBRSKI" is the context covering [BRSKI] connections (which are using
   TCP, hence the "t") from pledge to Join Proxy or registrar and from
   Join Proxy to registrar connections.

   "cBRSKI" ("c"onstrained BRSKI) is the context covering [cBRSKI]
   connections (using UDP) from pledge to Join Proxy or registrar and
   from Join Proxy to registrar connections.

   "BRSKI-PLEDGE" is the context covering pledges using [BRSKI-PRM] for
   connections from Registrar-Agents to pledges.  It can equally cover
   in the future through variations the discovery of [BRSKI] pledges for
   connections to them for other purposes - by introduction of
   appropriate variation types and values for such additional purposes.

   This document does not define variations for different end-to-end
   encryption mechanisms.  However, the mechanisms described here can
   also be used to introduce backward incompatible new secure transport
   options.

   Also, this document does not introduce contexts for discovery of
   other BRSKI roles beyond those mentioned, such as discovery discovery
   of MASA by registrars.  However, the registries introduced by this
   document are defined such that those can be introduced later as well
   through additional registry entries and specifications.

3.1.8.  Registry Tables

   This document defines three IANA registry tables to register and
   document the parameters required for BRSKI discovery in an extensible
   fashion.  The following sections explain these registry tables.  The
   registry tables themselves are listed in the IANA considerations
   section, see Section 4.2.







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3.1.8.1.  Contexts Registry Table

   The IANA "BRSKI Variations Contexts" registry table, see Table 2, as
   defined by this document, defines which Service Names and signaling
   parameters (e.g.: UDP vs. TCP) in each supported discovery mechanism
   are used to discover which role for different BRSKI protocol options.

   In addition, the table specifies for each context the applicable
   variation types because these may differ by context (they do not
   differ yet with the registrations specified in this document though).

   The order in which variation types are specified in this table
   defines the order in which variation type values are concatenated to
   form variation strings.

3.1.8.2.  Variation Type and Choices Registry Table

   The IANA "BRSKI Variations and Variation Strings" registry table, see
   Table 3, as defined by this document, defines for each context and
   variation type the defined choices of that variation type and whether
   a particular choice is a default choice, in which case it does not
   need to be included in the variation strings for the context.

   This registry also registers the authoritative documentation defining
   the specific choices.  These specifications may differ for the same
   choice across different contexts, such as for "est" between BRSKI and
   cBRSKI.

   The "Context" column lists the BRSKI Context(s) to which this line
   applies.  If it is empty, then the same Context(s) apply as that of
   the last prior line with a non-empty Context column.

   The "Variation Type" column lists the BRSKI Variation Type to which
   this line applies.  If it is empty, then the same Variation Type
   applies as that of the last prior line with a non-empty Variation
   Type column.

   The "Variation Type Choice" column defines a Variation Type Choice
   for the current context.  All Variation Types and Variation Type
   Choices MUST be unique strings across all Variation Types so that
   variation strings are non-ambiguous.

   Variation Types and Variation Type Choices and MUST be strings from
   lowercase letters a-z and digits 0-9 and MUST start with a letter.
   The maximum length of a Variation Type Choice is 12 characters.






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   The "Reference" column specifies the primary documents which defines
   the Variation Type Choice use in the row.  Further references go into
   the Note(s) column.

   The "Dflt" Flag specifies a Variation Type Choice that is assumed to
   be the default Choice for the Context, such as "rrm" for the BRSKI
   context.  Such a Variation Type Choice is assumed to be supported by
   responders in discovery if discovery is performed without support of
   variations.  This applies of course only to responders which support
   such discovery.

   For example, [BRSKI] specifies the empty string "" as the objective-
   value in [GRASP] discovery.  Because "rrm", "est" and "cmsj" are
   default in the BRSKI context, discovery without indication of a
   variation can support exactly only this variation of "rrm" with "est"
   and "cmsj" in the BRSKI context.

   The "Dflt_" Flag specifies a Variation Type Choice that is only
   default in a subset of Discovery options in a context.  The Note(s)
   column has then to explain which subset this is.  Like for "Dflt",
   the signaling in this subset of Discovery options can then forego
   indication of the "Dflt_" Variation Type Choice.

   The "Rsvd" Flag specifies a Variation Type Choice for which no
   complete specification exist on how to use it within BRSKI (or more
   specifically the context), but which is assumed to be of potential
   implementation interest.  "Rsvd" Variation Type Choices MUST NOT be
   considered for the Discoverable Variations table.  They are
   documented primarily to reserve the Variation Type Choice string.

3.1.8.3.  Variations and Variation String Registry Table

   The IANA "BRSKI Variations and Variation Strings" registry table, see
   Table 4, as defined by this document, defines for every necessary
   context in the "Variation" column the variations which are known to
   be desired by implementations as a space separated sequence of
   variation type values, and as a "-" concatenated variation string in
   the "Variation String" column.  The space separated sequence does not
   take defaults into account, the variation string does.

   Variations may be identified through other "irregular" strings, such
   as "", which are not created from concatenation of varation type
   values, whenever necessary for backward compatibility.

   The "Context" column lists the BRSKI Context(s) to which a line
   applies.  If it is empty, then the same Context(s) apply as that of
   the last prior line with a non-empty Context column.




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   The "Reference" column lists the document(s) that specify the
   variation, if that variation is explicitly described.  If the
   variation is not described explicitly, but rather a combination of
   Variation Type Choices from more than one BRSKI related
   specification, then this has to be explained in the "Explanation /
   Notes" column.

3.1.9.  Discussion

   Variations as defined by this document only cover protocol options
   that proxies can transparently support so that the definition of
   variations allows to make proxies automatically extensible.

   Other responder selection criteria such as different responder
   priority or performance based selection (called weight in [DNS-SD])
   are not covered by the variation concept but can be used without
   change in conjunction with variations.  Some selection criteria may
   also only work with discovery mechanisms that rely on specific
   procedures.  Network distance to responder can for example only be
   well supported by discovery mechanisms that can support per-hop
   forwarding between initiator and responder, such as [GRASP].  Any of
   these criteria will work unchanged with the introduction of
   Variations.  Variations are simply one more selection criteria.

   Differences in the supported transport stack of a responder are
   typically included as a signaling element of the discovery method:
   Whether TCP or UDP or another IP transport protocol is used, and
   whether the responder uses IP or even another network layer protocol.

   In "sane" services where a change in transport spec does not imply a
   change in signalled messages and their semantics, gateways could
   transparently proxy from IP and vice versa or even between TCP and
   some other IP transport protocols such as SCTP.  However, this is out
   of scope of this specification.

   The procedures specified in [cPROXY] would allow not only to run a
   transport stack of COAP over DTLS, but equally any other transport
   stack over UDP, such as QUIC - without any changes to the Join Proxy
   implementation or configuration when following the procedures
   described in this document.  All that is needed would be to introduce
   appropriate registration entries for the registry tables specified in
   this document (e.g.: add new Variation Type for transport and choices
   such as "coaps" or "quic" ).








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3.2.  Redundant Discovery and Selection

   The following subsections describe requirements for resilient and
   scalable responder selection.  Resilience is supported by
   automatically selecting the currently best available responder.
   Scalability of simultaneous sessions is supported through
   distributing the connections from multiple initiators to different
   responders if so desired through operator configuration of the
   discovery methods parameters.

   At the time of this specification, the relevant initiators are BRSKI
   pledges, Join Proxies and Registrar-Agents, the relevant responders
   are Join Proxies and BRSKI Registrars.  Nevertheless, the rules
   defined in this document can equally apply to other BRSKI connections
   if and when discoverable and redundant services are desired and added
   to the registries created by this document.  For example discovery of
   MASA by BRSKI Registrars.

   Note that this specification does not mandate support for specific
   discovery methods in BRSKI implementations, because this is specific
   to the target deployment scenarios - hence the option to support
   different discovery methods.

   Note that while pledges are discoverable in the context of this
   documents technologies, this section and its subsections do not apply
   to discovery of pledges because there is no redundancy involved, and
   selection of pledges is also only by their ID and not by their
   supported variation.

3.2.1.  Responder Selection

   If more than one responder is discovered by an initiator, then the
   initiator SHOULD support to sequentially attempt to connect to each
   feasible responder exactly once until it successfully connects to
   one.  If it fails to connect to any feasible responder, the initiator
   SHOULD wait until at least 30 seconds have elapsed since the start of
   the last round and update its discoverable responder information from
   the discovery mechanism if that is not already happening
   automatically by the chosen discovery method before it restarts
   connection attempts.

   A responder is feasible if it supports one or more of the variations
   requested by the inititor.

   The order of responders to attempt connections to is derived from two
   criteria: preference and weight.





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   Preference order is foremost determined by the responders preference
   across the variations it supports.  Within the set of of responders
   with the same preference by the initiator because of their variation,
   the preference is further determined from discovery method specific
   preference parameters such as the "priority" parameter in DNS-SD, or
   possible future distance parameters in discovery mechanisms like
   GRASP.

   If a responder socket offers more than one variation supported by the
   initiator its preference order is calculated from the most preferred
   variation supported by it.

   Within a set of two or more responders with the same preference, the
   initiator MUST pick at random, especially after power-on or other
   reboot events.  This is to ensure that those events have the chance
   to overcome possible persistent problems when persistently choosing
   the same first responder.  If deployments desire reproducable and
   predictable ordering of connection attempts by initiators then they
   have to use the discovery specific mechanisms, such as a different
   priority" parameter for each responder in DNS-SD to create such a
   strict ordering across the different responder.

   Initiators SHOULD support to take discovery mechanism specific
   weighting into account when determining the order of responders with
   the same preference, such as the "weight" parameter in DNS-SD.

   Support for the so far described resilient selection of responders
   SHOULD support selection amongst at least 4 and no more than 10
   responders with one or more supported variation for each supported IP
   address family (v4 and/or v6).  If more responders are discovered for
   the preferred variation(s) of the initiator, then it SHOULD pick a
   random subset of those responder announcements to select from.

   4 Responders for a specific variation are a typical minimum
   resilience setup in a larger network setup, in which 2 responders
   serve as redundancy at the responder host level and the other 2
   responders provide redundancy against network connectivity failure to
   those first two responders.  Intra-DC and Inter-DC service redundany
   is a simple example of such a setup.

3.2.2.  Service Announcements

   Responder selection as described in Section 3.2.1 needs to deal with
   unresponsive responders because service announcements may be stale.
   This happens when service announcements only loosely track aliveness
   of a service process.





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   In typical implementations, service announcement may be activated
   when the service process starts, and stopped, when it stops.
   Problems such as a hanging (unresponsive) service process will not be
   reflected in the service announcement setup.  In addition, caching of
   service announcements, such as through the DNS TTL field are a
   further possible cause of assuming service aliveness that is not
   correct.  Only actual connection probing or other similar tracking
   can determine if a service responder is responsive to the level of
   accepting connections.

   Responders intended to be used in resilient deployments SHOULD
   therefore ensure that their service announcements are not active when
   the responder died or would have failed to successfully accept
   connection for 120 seconds or more.  This can be implemented for
   example by connection probing once every 30 seconds and withdrawing
   the service announcements when this fails or by other forms of
   tracking responsiveness of the responder functionality.

   The better service announcements indicate actual aliveness of the
   service instances, the faster service selection will be.  In
   addition, in large networks, backup/standby service instances can
   then be implemented by tracking primary service announcemements and
   activating the backup only when the primary ones fail.  Such dynamic
   backup can further reduce the overall load on the discovery mechanism
   system used and on initiators.

3.2.3.  Responder Selection in Proxies

   Unless amended by the requirements listed below, proxies SHOULD
   follow all the descripton from Section 3.2.1.  Note that the randomn
   selection of responders with the same preference also applies to
   stateful proxies and ensures load balancing (including weighting)
   across multiple simultaneously connecting pledges.

   Stateful proxies SHOULD optimize selection of responders for each
   variation across connections for multiple pledges instead of starting
   the sequence of responders to try from the highest precedence anew
   for every new connecting pledge - and repeatedly run into timeouts
   for each new connecting pledge when those primary responders time out
   on connection attempts because they are unresponsive or unreachable.
   Instead, after a responder first fails to connect, the Join Proxy
   SHOULD skip this responder in further connection attempts for other
   connecting pledges.

   Stateless proxies cannot learn unresponsiveness or unreachability of
   a responder through connection attempts.  Instead, they SHOULD
   perform a stateless responsiveness/reachability check for each
   responder that the Join Proxy is actively forwarding packets to from



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   one or more pledges.  If no packets are returned from such a
   responder over a period of more than 30 seconds, then the responder
   SHOULD be considered unreachable for at least 180 seconds.
   Unreachability signaling received in response to packets sent to the
   responder SHOULD trigger this unreachability status after it persists
   for 10 seconds.

   Load balancing as described in Section 3.2.1 is NOT RECOMMENDED for
   stateless proxies because per-pledge stateless load balancing may
   involve more processing complexity than feasible for proxies on
   constrained devices.  To avoid changing the selection of active
   responders when one responder becomes unresponsive, a "stable hash"
   approach would have to be used, such as described in [HRW98], which
   is used for example by [I-D.ietf-bess-evpn-fast-df-recovery].
   Supporting weights with stateless proxying is even more complex.
   Instead of load balancing, responders simply need to be designed to
   scale to the maximum amount of simultaneous initiator connections
   necessary when supporting stateless proxying mode.

3.2.4.  Protection against malicious service announcements

   Initiators including proxies SHOULD always pick the highest possible
   priority and weight parameters possible in the discovery mechanism
   used that allows to support the desired preference goals.  For
   example, any primary initiator should select the highest numerical
   values possible.

   This recommendation is intended as a protection against erroneous,
   but not malicious service announcements whenever the default
   priorities are lower than the maximum priority.  It can also serve as
   a weak protection against malicious announcements because with the
   selection rules required by this document, initiators still have the
   highest chance of picking the non-malicious announcement.

   While being weak, this recommendation can still be better than
   nothing against such malicious announcement.  These recommendations
   SHOULD be superseded by better recommendations for more narrowly
   scoped deployment scenarios.

3.3.  Join Proxies Support for Discovery and Variations











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3.3.1.  Join Proxy support for Variations

   A Join Proxy compliant with this specification MUST support
   announcing its Join Proxy responder socket(s) to which pledges can
   connect via at least one of the discovery methods included in the
   registry tables specified in this document.  The Join Proxy MUST
   announce the variation(s) supported on its responder socket(s)
   according to the registry table entries.

   A Join Proxy SHOULD support to pass packets for any variation for
   which it has discovered one or more registrar sockets supporting that
   variation without the need for the variation to be known at the time
   of implementation of the Join Proxy or configured on the Join Proxy.
   If a Join Proxy supports this requirements, this is called support
   for "arbitrary variations".  Supporting this requirement requires the
   Join Proxy to discover registrar(s) and their supported variation(s)
   via one or more of the discovery mechanisms included in the registry
   tables specified in this document.

   Arbitrary variations support allows to deploy proxies once and add
   pledges and registrars supporting new variations later - without
   upgrade or change of configuration of proxies.

3.3.2.  Registrar Operations Modes

   Proxies may use different approaches to connect to registrars.  The
   following subsections discuss the primary relevant options.

3.3.2.1.  Direct Connection Mode

   In one Join Proxy implementation option called "direct connections",
   the Join Proxy creates for every discovered registrar socket a
   separate Join Proxy responder socket.  It announces this socket with
   the same set of parameters as it did learn from the registrar's
   service announcement, except for the appropriate Join Proxy service
   name and socket parameters (IP address, port number).  When a pledge
   connects to that socket, the Join Proxy passes traffic for that
   pledge's connection to and from the respective registrar socket.

   When using the direct connections approach, the task of selecting the
   best registrar socket for a particular variation is left to pledges
   because they are exposed to at least the same number of service
   announcements from proxies as proxies see service announcements from
   registrars - and the pledge has to select the best available one from
   them.






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   To reduce the number of sockets that have to be announced by proxies
   when using direct connections and to also reduce the number of
   responder sockets that need to be maintained by a Join Proxy
   operating in this approach, these proxies SHOULD limit the number of
   registrar sockets they maps to between 4 and 10 best registrar
   sockets as described in Section 3.2.1 per variation.

3.3.2.2.  Best Registrar Selection Mode

   In the implementation mode "best registrar selection", the Join Proxy
   creates a separate responder socket for a set of all registrar
   sockets that it discovers and that announce support for the same set
   of variations.

   For pledges to discover the Join Proxy, the Join Proxy then announces
   this socket with the parameters of the best discovered registrar
   socket, replacing the service name and network parameter names with
   those for its Join Proxy responder socket as in the case of a direct
   connection.

   The Join Proxy then connects pledges to the best available registrar
   socket from that set when it receives a connection to that socket.

   When performing best registrar selection for that connection, the
   Join Proxy has to perform selection of the best availalable responder
   as described in Section 3.2.1.

   Using newly discovered responders in stateless proxies supporting
   best registrar selection must be done carefully.  Consider the common
   case that service announcements for a primary responder did stop due
   to network issues, now the Join Proxy starts to send packets to a
   secondary responder, and then the primary responder becomes reachable
   and the Join Proxy sees service announcements for it.  If the Join
   Proxy would now start to forward packets from pledges to this primary
   responder due to its higher precedence, then this could unnecessarily
   break ongoing connections from clients whose packets are currently
   forwarded to the lower preference Join Proxy.  Direct connection mode
   does not incur this problem, because the pledge can select another
   Join Proxy responder socket when it discovers the first one to be
   unresponsive or erroneous.

   Replacing a selected responder in a stateless Join Proxy with a
   better one SHOULD hence only be done if no packets have been
   exchanged between pleges and the current selected responder through
   the Join Proxy for more than 300 seconds.  This long timeout
   specifically intends to not break connections in which the registrar
   keeps the pledge waiting for an administrative response such as an
   operator performing a policy validation for enrollment.



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   In addition, stateful proxies implementing best registrar selection
   SHOULD optimize selection of registrar for each Join Proxy responder
   socket across connections for multiple pledges instead of starting
   the sequence of responders to try anew from the highest precedence
   registrar for every new connecting pledge - and repeatedly run into
   timeouts when one or more of the best registrar time out on
   connection attempts because they are unresponsive or unreachable.
   Instead, after a responder first fails to connect, the Join Proxy
   SHOULD skip this responder in further connection attempts for other
   connecting pledges and re-consider it only for new connection
   attempts after at least 60 seconds.

3.3.2.3.  Proxy in Service Name Only Mode on Registrars

   Registrars that implement support for connections from stateful
   proxies and/or from pledges may minimize their Join Proxy
   implementation work by only implementing the appropriate service name
   announcements for the same socket to support connections from both:
   announcements as a registrar for connections from proxies and
   announcements as a Join Proxy for connections from pledges.  No
   additional sockets or other Join Proxy specific packet processing
   code is required to support this.

   Registrars that implement support for connections from stateless
   proxies can share that implementation for connections from pledges by
   also implementing simple UDP<->JPY header conversion (see [cPROXY]).
   Nevertheless, they do need to do this via a separate socket and hence
   need to announce the two sockets separately: UDP for connections from
   pledges with the Join Proxy service name, and UDP with JPY header for
   connections from stateless proxies with the stateless registrar
   service name.

   Proxy functionality that is implemented as described here on
   registrars is called "proxy in service name only mode", because such
   an implementation cannot discover, select and fail over between
   different registrars.  Such proxies in name only therefore do not
   share requirements against discovering and selecting registrars
   described for the prior specified modes.

   Like other proxies, proxies in name only SHOULD nevertheless track
   aliveness of their registrar function and withdraw its service
   announcements (both as Join Proxy as well as as registrar) when it
   does not run, fails or becomes unresponsive.








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   Proxies in name only SHOULD default to the same discovery method
   priority and weight parameter as those configured for the registrar
   service announcements.  This is so that in the absence of separate
   proxies in the network selection of registrars co-located proxies
   would follow the same criteria as those used by proxies and which use
   the registrar service announcement parameters.

3.3.2.4.  Proxy Mode Discussion

   This document defines no requirements against the implementation mode
   for proxies.  Those are left for solution or deployment (profile)
   specifications.  Instead, this section discusses some considerations
   for those choices.

   The list of possible modes presented is exemplary and not meant to be
   exhaustive.  Other modes are equally able to support the
   requirements, such as mixtures of the described modes.  Likewise,
   introduction of new variations may not only work well via arbitrary
   variation support in proxies, but through explicit configuration of
   variations on proxies - this all depends on the target deployment
   environment.  The presented modes where choosen primarily as the ones
   providing most configuration free deployment options and for
   registrar implementations most simplicity in implementation.

   If a deployment has a larger number of service announcements and
   (extremely) constrained pledges, direct connection mode may be
   inappropriate because it shifts the burden of best available
   discovery and selection and onto the pledge.  If simultaneously
   proxies in such deployments can support more scalable complex
   implementations, then best registrar selection mode may be most
   appropriate.

   In environments, where all pledges are expected to become proxies
   after enrollment, implementers may simply want to implement the
   option for which both pledge and Join Proxy code together is easiest
   to implement.

   Even on registrars, proxy in service name only mode may not suffice
   deployment requirements or provide best redundancy.  For example, the
   co-located registrar may incur problems, not applicable to
   alternative registrars, such as for example Internet connectivity
   problems to MASAs when different registrars have different Internet
   connectivity.  If the registrar co-located Join Proxy is then still
   the only Join Proxy available to some candidate pledges, then this
   Join Proxy needs to be able to connect to an alternative registrar,
   which would not be possible if it was a proxy in service name only.





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   Likewise, proxy in service name only mode will disturb the
   introduction of new variations on pledges and other registrars in the
   network if the registrar node implementing proxy in service name only
   mode becomes a necessary Join Proxy for a pledge requiring a
   variation not supported by this registrar, but by another registrar
   that would only be reachable through this registrar node.  Therefore,
   Join Proxy in name only mode is best suited for node types not
   deployed on an edge of the network where a future variety of pledges
   may connect to, and those pledges will require the use of a Join
   Proxy.

3.3.3.  Extensibility to non BRSKI services

   Join Proxy implementations using the procedures described in this
   document can easily be reused for any other protocols beside BRSKI as
   long as they use TCP or UDP.  For this, it would simply be required
   that the Join Proxy can be configured with pairs of service names
   other than those used by tBRSKI/cBRSKI: A service name to discover,
   and a service name to use for the Join Proxy responder socket service
   announcements.

3.3.4.  Scaling service discovery and selection

   Discovering and selecting an available service instance can become a
   design challenge in large networks with many redundant service
   announcements.

   Consider for example the common case of allowing BRSKI registration
   in a network with many geographically spread out sites such as in
   enterprise, industrial or building construction environments.  During
   initial bringup of such sites, Internet connectivity may be non-
   existing, or intermittant, and hence one or more local registrar in
   each such site is higly desirable.  Such registrars may of course
   require private mobile network connectivity to MASA, or rely on out-
   of-band provisioning of vouchers.

   Later, when such a site does get a well working wide-area network
   connection, it may be more appropriate to use more centralized
   registrars, but a local registrar as a backup may be considered
   useful.  However, if the service announcements of such per-site
   decentralized registrars would be discoverable across the whole
   geographically spread out network, then this could introduce a
   potentially significant overhead to the service announce and
   discovery system when for example more than 100 registrar service
   announcments exist in the network, and pledges/proxies connect to
   them.





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   Such large number of redundant service announcements is typically
   highly undesirable, and appropriate configurations of service
   discovery mechanisms need to be used to avoid them.  For example, in
   GRASP, service announcements can be scoped to small hop counts,
   Anycast addressing can be used to make all decentralized registrars
   overload the same ip address, and hence make them all share the same
   service announcement.

3.4.  Discoverable BRSKI Pledges

3.4.1.  BRSKI-PLEDGE context

   BRSKI-PLEDGE is the context for discovery of pledges by nodes such as
   Registrar-Agents.  Pledges supporting [BRSKI-PRM] MUST support it.
   It may also be used by other variations of BRSKI outside of the PRM
   use case, for example for inventorizing pledges.

   Pledges supporting BRSKI-PLEDGE MUST support DNS-SD for discovery via
   mDNS, using link-local scope.  For DNS-SD discovery beyond link-local
   scope, pledges MAY support DNS-SD via [DNSSD-SRP], using automatic
   discovery of the SRP server and registering the below defined DNS-SD
   data with it.

   These DNS-SD requirements are defaults.  Specifications for specific
   deployment contexts such as specific type of radio mesh network
   solutions may need to specify their own requirements overriding or
   amending these requirements.

   Pledges MUST support to be discoverable via their DNS-SD service
   instance name.

   Pledges SHOULD support to be discoverable via DNS-SD browsing, so
   that Registrar-Agents can find unexpected pledges or can enumerate
   expected pleges more easily, especially in the presence of multiple
   different subnets and use of mDNS.  A pledge can also only be found
   by browsing if it is not possible for the owner to aquire serial-
   number information of a pledge by the time BRSKI-PRM needs it (to
   create a service instance name).

   When pledges are discoverable vis DNS-SD browsing, the "brski-
   registrar" PTR service name is a so-called shared resource record.
   When it is requested via mDNS (multicast), all pledges supporting
   BRSKI-PLEDGE and browsing will respond simultaneously, potentially
   creating congestion/contention.  To avoid this, [mDNS] specifies the
   following requirement: "each responder SHOULD delay its response by a
   random amount of time selected with uniform random distribution in
   the range 20-120 ms."




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   It is equally RECOMMENDED to apply the same random delay rule for
   answers to multicasted or flooded queries in other discovery
   mechanisms that have the same response burst problem - even when they
   do not specify such a mechanism, such as in GRASP.

   If browsing is not desired by a pledge, the pledge does simply not
   respond to queries for the "brski-registrar" service name in mDNS or
   other discovery mechanism queries for the equivalent service name, or
   does not register its PTR RR for this service name when using unicast
   DNS-SD via [DNSSD-SRP].  This does not affect operations for the
   service instance name.

   This specification does not introduce the procedures to discover
   pledges via CORE-LF or GRASP because it is unclear if there is
   currently demand for this, and because it can easily be added via
   additional specs and adding entries to the registry.  For CORE-LF,
   browsing of entries can be supported via CORE-RD ({RFC9176}}), with
   appropriate auto-discovery of the CORE-RD server.  For GRASP, this
   could be done via a method mapping DNS-SD into GRASP, such as
   [I-D.eckert-anima-grasp-dnssd], specifically to support browsing of
   pledge instance names.

3.4.2.  Service Instance Name

   The service instance name chosen by a BRSKI pledge MUST be composed
   from information which is

   *  Easily known by BRSKI operations, such as the operational
      personnel or software automation, specifically sales integration
      backend software.

   *  Available to the pledge software itself, for example by being
      encoded in some attribute of the IDevID.

   Typically, a customer will know the serial number of a product from
   sales information, or even from bar-code/QR-codes on the product
   itself.  If this serial number is used as the service instance name
   to discover a pledge from a Registrar-Agent, then this may
   potentially (but unlikely) lead to (duplicate) replies from two or
   more pledges having the same serial number, such as in the following
   cases:

   1.  A manufacturer has different product lines and re-uses serial-
       numbers across them.

   2.  Two different manufacturers re-use the same serial-number space.





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   If pledges enable browsing of their service instance name, they MAY
   support DNS-SD specified procedures to create unique service instance
   names when they discover such clashes, by appending a space and
   serial number, starting with 2 to the service instance name:
   "<service-instance-name> (2)", as described in [DNS-SD] Appendix D.

   Nevertheless, this approach to resolving conflicts is not desirable:

   *  If browsing of DNS-SD service instance name is not supported,
      Registrar-Agents would have to always (and mostly wrongly) guess
      that there is a clash and (mostly unnecessarily) search for
      "<service-instance-name> (2)".

   *  If a clash exists between pledges from the same manufacturer, and
      even if the Registrar-Agent then attempts to start enrolling all
      pledges with the same clashing service instance name, it may not
      have enough information to distinguish pledges other than by the
      randomn numbering.  This would happen especially if the IDevID
      from both devices (of different product type), had the same serial
      number, and the trust anchor certificate of both was the same
      (e.g. same root CA certificate), which is likely when they are
      from the same manufacturer.  Even if some other IDevID field was
      used to distinguish their device model, the Registrar-Agent would
      not be able to determine that difference without additional vendor
      specific programming.

   In result:

   *  Vendors MUST document a scheme how their pledges form a service
      instance name from information available to the customer of the
      pledge.

   *  These service instance names MUST be unique across all IDevID of
      the manufacturer that share the same trust anchor.

   The following mechanisms are recommended:

   *  Pledges SHOULD encode manufacturer unique product instance
      information in their subject name serialNumber.  [RFC5280] calls
      this the X520SerialNumber.

   *  Pledges SHOULD make this serialNumber information consistent with
      easily accessible product instance information when in physical
      possession of the pledge, such as product type code and serial
      number on bar-code/QR-code to enable [BRSKI-PRM] discovery without
      additional backend sales integration.  Note that discovery alone
      does not allow for enrollment (so it does not introduce a security
      risk by itself)!



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   *  Pledges SHOULD construct their service instance name by
      concatenating their X520SerialNumber with a domain name that is
      used by the manufacturer and thus allows to disambiguate devices
      from different manufacturer using the same serialNumber scheme,
      and hence the likelihood of service instance name clashes if
      manufacturer names are not used.

   *  Pledges MAY re-use the service instance name as their host name in
      their AAAA or A RRs.

3.4.3.  Example

   This section discusses an example manufacturers approach using the
   recommendations from above.  Figure 1 shows the different data
   involved in DNS-SD records for a pledge from manufacturer "Example".




































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    1. Manufacturer published information:

      1.1 IDevID trust anchor certificate.

      1.2 IDevID X520 identification schema:
        Brand: Example
          O = example.com, serialNumber = "PID:Model-<PID> SN:<SN>"
          ; Explanation:
          ; SN = Serial Number, PID = Product Identifier
          ; O = Organization

      1.3 DNS-SD Instance Schema:
        <X520SerialNumer>.example.com

    2. Example Purchase Order Pledge Information
       Brand: Example, Model: 0815, Serial: WLDPC2117A99

    3. DNS-SD Instance string:
      "PID:Model-0815 SN:WLDPC2117A99.example.com"

    4. DNS-SD RR for the pledge (using mDNS, hand hence .local):
      ; PTR RR to support discovering the pledge through browsing,
      ; e.g. when the serial number is not known in advance
      _brski-pledge._tcp.local  IN PTR
        PID:Model-0815\\ SN:WLDPC2117A99\\.example\\.com._brski-pledge._tcp.local

      ; SRC and TXT RR for the service instance name
      PID:Model-0815\\ SN:WLDPC2117A99\\.example\\.com._brski-pledge._tcp.local
        IN SRV 1 1
        PID:Model-0815\\ SN:WLDPC2117A99\\.example\\.com.local
      PID:Model-0815\\ SN:WLDPC2117A99\\.example\\.com._brski-pledge._tcp.local
        IN TXT ""

      ; AAAA address resolution for the target host name
      PID:Model-0815\\ SN:WLDPC2117A99\\.example\\.com.local
        IN AAAA fda3:79a6:f6ee:0000::0200:0000:6400:00a1

    5. Example Pledge IDevID certificate information:
        ; Format as shown by e.g.: openssh
        Subject: serialNumber = "PID:Model-0815 SN:WLDPC2117A99",
         O = example.com, CN = Model-0815

               Figure 1: Example IDevID and DNS-SD data

   Using the information from the above Example picture, a Registrar-
   Agent implementation operates as follows.





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   1.  Initially, it is configured with the Manufacturer published
       information (1.), and as not shown it will likely have a list of
       such information for various brands of products.

   2.  After a pledge purchase and initial physical deployment, it is
       provided with the Purchase Order information for the pledge (2.),
       this order information tells it, that the Manufacturers Brand is
       "Example", that the pledge product Model <PID> is "0815" and its
       Serial Number <SN> "WLDPC2117A99".

   3.  It looks up the IDevID X520 identification schema for brand
       "Example" and uses the template value for the serialNumber field
       together with the pledge information values from (2.) for O,
       <PID> and <SN> to determine the DNS-SD Instance of the pledge
       (3.).  That instance is the concatenation of the X520
       serialNumber value of the pledge with the Organization domain
       name of the manufacturer.  With the Organization being a global
       DNS domain "example.com", including this in the Instance makes it
       unique across manufacturers.

   4.  It then uses standard DNS-SD via mDNS to find the pledge, using
       the DNS-SD Resource Records (RR) shown in 4.

   5.  Once it receives a response from the device claiming to be the
       pledge, it can use any appropriate authentication mechanism to
       validate ownership of the IDevID private key.  In [BRSKI-PRM]
       this is done through the initial TLS handshake in which it learns
       the presumed IDevID of the pledge.  When the signature in the
       IDevID matches the public key of the desired Manufacturer from
       (1.1), then it trusts that this pledge is from that manufacturer.
       When the O and serialNumber of the certificate match what it
       constructed from the <PID>/<SN> values from purchase information
       from (3.) then it also trusts that this is indeed the pledge it
       was looking for.

   Instead of using sales receipt information, the customer may also use
   scanned QR/Barcode or RF-Tag information from packaging after
   receiving shipments for example for step 2.  Scanning packaging
   information will likely will introduce additional complexity because
   the manufacturer name can often only be derived from information such
   as EAN-13 barcodes.

   The process steps may also be simpler if the customer can know the
   IDevID of the pledge through the purchase process instead of having
   to match the IDevID from sales receipt information (step 2).






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   The process steps may also become more complex.  The manufacturer may
   have multiple brands using the same trust anchor.  Or the
   manufacturer may have certificate chains and different production
   sub-companies may use different sub-CA certificates in the signing
   chain.  Or the serialNumber alone is not unique across the
   certificate chain, but further Subject fields of the certificate are
   required for a unique identification, such as the O)rganization
   field.  It could contain for example one out of multiple brand names
   that use simple numerical serialNumber formats and hence could
   collide.  None of such complexities are desirable for new designs,
   but they may be necessary to support BRSKI for existing products.

   For the described mechanism to work, the manufacturer does not
   necessarily have to own a domain name such as "example.com" in the
   example.  Owning a domain name and using it for the DNS-SD Instance
   Schema is just a simple way to ensure usage of a unique Instance
   Schema - if all manufacturers agree to use this approach.

   The RR used to discover the pledge by its serial number is the "IN
   SRV" RR.  The "IN PTR" RR is optional and allows for the pledge to be
   discovered with DNS-SD browsing, which is necessary if the pledges
   serial number information can not be known by the time the pledge
   needs to be enrolled by a Registar-Agent.

   The instance string is also re-used in the host name of the "IN SRV"
   RR and hence the domain name of the "IN AAAA" RR.  The is just an
   option, and the pledge can use whatever host name it wants.

3.4.4.  WebPKI derived instance schema

   There is currently no automated mechanism to avoid the configuration
   of manufacturer trust anchor certificates in BRSKI components that
   need to authenticate pledges.  However, the configuration of
   additional instance schemas for different manufacturer device names
   in BRSKI equipment could be avoided if it is deemed appropriate by
   vendors and operators of BRSKI-PLEDGE installations to rely on WebPKI
   trust anchors.

   The trust anchor certificate itself (or a sub-CA in the certificate
   chain) would then have to have a WebPKI trust anchor signature and a
   DNS Name that can easily be identified as being used for IDevID, such
   as "*.idevid.example.com".  And the implied schema for the instance
   string is then "<<X520SerialNumer>.DNS-name>", authenticating
   instance names of the format "<X520SerialNumer>.idevid.example.com>".

   Obtaining a WebPKI signature for their trust anchor for these
   wildcard domain names from a WebPKI trust anchor is the added effort
   for manufacturer of this scheme.



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3.5.  Variation signaling and encoding rules for different discovery
      mechanisms

3.5.1.  DNS-SD

3.5.1.1.  Signaling

   The following definitions apply to any instantiation of DNS-SD
   including DNS-SD via mDNS as defined in [DNS-SD], but also via
   unicast DNS, for example by registering the necessary DNS-SD Resource
   Records (RR) via [DNSSD-SRP].

   Because of the different options of how to run DNS-SD, the
   requirements in this document do not guarantee interoperability when
   using DNS-SD.  One side could use unicast DNS-SD, the other mDNS, and
   there may be no mapping between the two.  Therefore the
   recommendations in this document need to be amended with deployment
   specific specifications / requirements as to which signaling
   variation, such as mDNS or unicast DNS with SRP is to be supported
   between initiator and responder.  When using unicast DNS (with SRP),
   additional mechanisms are required to learn the IP address(es) of
   feasible DNS and SRP servers, and deployment may also need agreements
   for the (default) domain they want to use in unicast DNS.  Hence, a
   mandatory to implement (MTI) profile is not feasible because of the
   wide range of variations to deploy DNS-SD.

   In the absence of overriding deployment profile requirements,
   implementations are RECOMMENDED to support mDNS and MAY support
   [DNSSD-SRP] and fall back to mDNS if [DNSSD-SRP] fails to work, e.g.:
   it fails to discover SRP server and/or default domain.

3.5.1.2.  Variation String Encoding

   Variation Strings from the IANA registry Table 4 are encoded as DNS-
   SD Keys with a value of 1 in the DNS-SD service instances TXT RR
   using the shortened encoding of "key" instead of "key=1".  In result,
   the value of the TXT RR is a sequence of zero terminated strings,
   each one indicating a single supported variation type choice.

   A variation may have the option of being represented by the empty
   string "".  This is not allowed in the DNS-SD encoding, and instead
   the alternative variation string MUST always be used for DNS-SD.

   Variation strings in DNS-SD are case insensitive as required by DNS-
   SD.  It is RECOMMENDED to only announce lowercase variation strings
   in DNS-SD.





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   The use of variation strings can easily break the DNS-SD rule that
   they keys should be no more than 9 characters long.  This is
   justified by the absence of value fields to keep the total length of
   the TXT RR reasonably short.

3.5.1.3.  Service Instance and Host Names

   To be able to specify for each responder socket individually its
   supported variations as well as its selection criteria (priority
   weight), it needs to be represented in DNS-SD as a service instance
   name with an SRV and TXT RR.  In BRSKI-PLEDGE Section 3.4 the service
   instance name is significant as it is what a Registrar-Agent may need
   to discover, but in tBRSKI and cBRSKI it is merely an artefact of
   DNS-SD encoding: Unlike typical user-centric DNS-SD use-cases, there
   are no users that need to make sense of the meaning of the service
   instance name, for example to know, which printer to pick.  Only
   operators may need to look at them for troubleshooting.  The choice
   of instance name (the first component of a service instance name) is
   hence arbitrary.  The same is true for the host names used in the
   DNS-SD records for BRSKI.

   Registrars SHOULD support automatic generation of their service
   instance name for their DNS-SD operation to avoid additional need for
   operator configurations.  Registrars SHOULD likewise support the
   configuration of such a name - if the operator so desires to support
   operational troubleshooting.

   If the host on which the registrar is running already has a DNS host
   name for the IP addresses used by the registrar and for the desired
   DNS method (mDNS = .local, unicast DNS = default domain), then the
   registar SHOULD be able to use that host name as the target domain
   name in the SRV RR.  This requirement avoids the unnecessary addition
   of DNS A/AAAA RRs because of the registrar, when useable RRs already
   exist.

   If such a DNS RR does not exist, but a DNS host name for a different
   DNS method, or a different set of addresses than used by the
   registrar, then the registrar MAY be able to use a target domain name
   derived from that primary domain name by appending a unique name
   element.  This requirement exist to avoid the creation of
   unnecessarily inconsistent host names.

   If no DNS host name exists, the registrar MUST be able to
   automatically create a DNS host name and the A and/or AAAA RRs for
   the address(es) used by the registrar for use in the SRV RR target
   field.  This requirement exists to ensure that operators are not
   unnecessarily required to configure a host name on a system that does
   not need one - and none is required to run a registrar.



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   A registrar MAY use any unique identifiers of its host system as its
   instance name or host name.  This can avoid or at least minimize the
   need to automatically pick another name in case the chosen name is
   already taken by another system.  This for example would happen if a
   registrar tried to use an instance component such as "registrar" and
   there is already another registrar.  Using a known unique identifier
   allows a registrar to raise an alert and claim an operational error
   with a high degree of confidence.

   MAC addresses are only unique when an application such as a registrar
   understands what hardware it is running on, and that the MAC address
   was assigned by registering its OUI with IEEE and that MAC addresses
   from the OUI were assigned uniquely.  This is for example not
   necessarily the case for IoT equipment or registrars running in a
   virtual context in the cloud.  IP addresses can be assumed to be
   unique (enough) when they have global scope or ULA.

   When registrar software does not know that no other registrar
   software or instance of the same software may run on the same host
   (for example when being packaged as an application), the registrar
   SHOULD not assume that a host unique name is actually unique, but
   instead disambiguate it by appending an additional name element to
   make it unique, such as a process number of the running process.

   Picking well-known or unique identifiers for registrar also helps
   operator to troubleshoot by often eliminating the need to also know
   the IP addresses associated with the name.

   Target host names need to follow the requirements for host names.  By
   those requirements, it is not permitted to use ":" in target host
   names, for example as part of MAC or IP address based host names.
   Instance names do not share these syntactical limitation.  For
   operational simplicity, instance names SHOULD be constructed in the
   same manner as target hostnames in an implementation.  For example by
   replacing ":" with "-".

   If the responder needs to indicate different sockets for different
   (set of) variations, for example, when operating as a Join Proxy,
   according to Section 3.3.1, then it needs to signal for each socket a
   separate service instance name with the appropriate port information
   in its SRV record and the supported variations for that socket in the
   TXT Record of that service instance name.  A responder MAY create the
   instance and host name for such different variation sockets by
   appending the variation string to the previously determined instance
   and host names.






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3.5.1.4.  Examples

   These example use OUI and IPv6 addresses reserved for documentation
   purposes.  Do not re-use these addresses in actual deployments

   # tBRSKI context
   _brski-registrar._tcp.local
                  IN PTR  0000-5e00-5314._brski-registrar._tcp.local
   0000-5e00-5314._brski-registrar._tcp.local
                  IN SRV  1 2 4555 0000-5e00-5314.local
   0000-5e00-5314._brski-registrar._tcp.local
                  IN TXT  "est-tls" "prm-jose" "cmp"

   # cBRSKI
   _brski-registrar._udp.local
                   IN PTR  0000-5e00-5314._brski-registrar._udp.local
   0000-5e00-5314._brski-registrar._udp.local
                   IN SRV  1 2 5684 0000-5e00-5314.local
   0000-5e00-5314._brski-registrar._udp.local
                   IN TXT  "rrm-cose"

   # Host name
   0000-5e00-5314.local
                  IN AAAA  2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314

       Figure 2: DNS-SD for single registrar supporting tBRSKI/cBRSKI
                                 variations

   In example Figure 2, a registrar on a router, that is using mDNS for
   being discovered supports tBRSKI with "rrm" and "prm" modes across
   the same TCP socket port 4555, with "est" and "cmp".  This leads to
   the three supported and IANA registry defined variations "est-tls",
   "prm-jose", and "cmp".  For cBRSKI (UDP), it supports the only
   variation registered through this document, "rrm-cose".

   Such a registrar implementation might even support a combination of
   "prm" with "jose" and "cmp", but at the time of this specification,
   this exact interoperability aspects of such a combination have at the
   time of writing of this spec not been investigated and hence it is
   not listed in the IANA registry.  Nevertheless, this may happen
   later, so it is useful for registrar implementations to allow
   configuration of variations for its service announcements to allow
   operational modifications.

   This registrar implementation is running on a router that otherwise
   has no for a host name registered in DNS or DNS-SD, so it is using
   it's MAC-address as its target host name, "0000-5e00-5314.local", the
   same name is used in the registrar service instance names.  Running



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   on a router without modular software, the registrar knows that no
   other registrar instances can run on the same host and hence the name
   has no further disambiguating elements.

   Note also that there is never a need for two different service
   instance names between tBRSKI and cBRSKI, because they are
   distinguished bt the "_tcp" versus "_udp" component of the service
   instance name.

# tBRSKI registrar application
_brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
     IN PTR  noc-registrar-brski-37253._brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
noc-registrar-brski-37253._brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
     IN SRV  1 2 4555 noc-registrar.example.org
noc-registrar-brski-37253._brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
     IN TXT "est-tls" "cmp"

# cBRSKI registrar application
_brski-registrar._udp.example.org
     IN PTR  noc-registrar-cbrski-5376._brski-registrar._udp.example.org
noc-registrar-cbrski-5376._brski-registrar._udp.example.org
     IN SRV  1 2 7533 noc-registrar.example.org
noc-registrar-cbrski-5376._brski-registrar._udp.example.org
     IN TXT "rrm-cose"

# tBRSKI, PRM variation application
_brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
               IN PTR noc-registrar-prm-9735._brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
noc-registrar-prm-9735._brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
               IN SRV 1 2 17355 noc-registrar.example.org
noc-registrar-prm-9735._brski-registrar._tcp.example.org
               IN TXT "prm"

# Host name
noc-registrar.example.org
               IN AAAA  2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5333

     Figure 3: DNS-SD for a tBRSKI/cBRSKI registrar applications

   In the second example Figure 3, a server system in the NOC of
   customer with domain example.org is set up as the registrar for
   various BRSKI options.  It uses [DNSSD-SRP] to register its DNS-SD
   names into the example.org domain which it discovers as the default
   domain.  The host name of the server is set to noc-
   registrar.example.org.






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   The operator installs three separate registrar applications on this
   server.  One from a vendor whose pledges use tBRSKI, one from an
   integrator supporting pledges from various "IoT" vendors that use
   cBRSKI, and one from a manufacturer that has pledges using BRSKI-PRM.

   Each of the three applications operates the same way for discovery.
   It opens a socket for its registrar responder and notes the port
   number it receives.  It determines that SRP is usable, that the
   default domain is "example.org", and that the host name is noc-
   registrar.  It then forms a unique name from noc-registrar by
   appending some string abbreviation indicating its mode of operation
   ("brski", "cbrski", "prm"), and its numeric process identifier - just
   in case more than one instance of the same application can be
   started.  It then publishes its PTR, SRV and TXT DNS-RR, using these
   creates unique service instance names, the respective port number in
   the SRV RR and the variation(s) in the TXT RR.

3.5.2.  GRASP

3.5.2.1.  Signaling

   This document does not specify a mandatory to implement set of
   signaling options to guarantee interoperability of discovery between
   initiator and responders when using GRASP.  Like for the other
   discovery mechanisms, these requirements will have to come from other
   specifications that outline what in [GRASP] is called the "security
   and transport substrate" to be used for GRASP.

   [ACP] specifies one such "security and transport substrate", which is
   zero-touch deployable.  It is mandatory to support for initiators and
   responders implementing the so-called "Autonomic Network
   Infrastructure" (ANI).  DULL GRASP is used for link-local discovery
   of proxies, and the ACP is used to automatically and securely build
   the connectivity for multi-hop discovery of registrars by proxies.

3.5.2.2.  Encoding and Examples

   To announce protocol variations with [GRASP], the supported Variation
   is indicated in the objective-value field of the GRASP objective,
   using the method of forming the Variation string term in
   Section 3.1.8.3, and listed in the Variation String column of the
   Table 4 table.









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   If more than one Variation is supported, then multiple objectives
   have to be announced, each with a different objective-value, but the
   same location information if the different Variations can be
   supported across the same socket because they will all be connected
   to the same registrar.  Different sockets require different objective
   structures in GRASP anyhow.

   Compared to DNS-SD, the choice of encoding for GRASP optimizes for
   minimum parsing effort, whereas the DNS-SD encoding is optimized for
   most compact encoding given the limit for DNS-SD TXT records.

   [M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', 180000,
       [
        [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 255, ""],
         [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
          h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 4443]],

        [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 255, "prm"],
         [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
          h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 4443]],

        [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 255, "rrm"],
         [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
          h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 4684]]

        [["AN_Join_Registrar_rjp", 4, 255, "rrm"],
         [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
          h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 4686]]
       ]
   ]

    Figure 4: GRASP example for a BRSKI registrar supporting RRM and PRM

   Figure 4 is an example for a GRASP service announcement by a
   registrar in support of BRSKI with both "rrm" and "prm" supported on
   the same TCP port 4443 and for cBRSKI (COAP over DTLS) on UDP port
   4684 in stateful mode and port 4686 for stateless mode . The first
   variation for "rrm" uses an objective-value of "" for backward
   compatibility with [BRSKI] where it was introduced.  With cBRSKI
   introducing definitions for the use of GRASP only with this document,
   this special case is not proliferated, which is why "rrm" is used in
   the cBRSKI announcements.

   Note that one or more complete service instances (in the example 3)
   can be contained within a single GRASP message without the need for
   any equivalent to the Service Instance Name of the DNS-SD PTR RR or
   the Target name of the DNS-SD SRV RR.  DNS-SD requires them because
   its encoding is decomposed into different RR, but it also



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   intentionally introduces the Service Instance Name as an element for
   human interaction with selection (browsing and/or diagnostics of
   selection), something that the current GRASP objective-value encoding
   does not support.

   [M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', 180000,
      [
       [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 1, ""],
        [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
         h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 5553]],

       [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 1, "prm"],
        [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
         h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 5555]],

       [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 1, "rrm"],
        [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
         h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 5684]],

       [["AN_Join_Registrar_rjp", 4, 1, "rrm"],
        [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
         h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 5686]],
      ]
   ]

   Figure 5: GRASP example for a BRSKI Join Proxy supporting RRM and PRM

   Figure 5 shows a corresponding GRASP service announcement by a Join
   Proxy that did discover the registrar from Figure 4 and is now
   announcing the services that it can now proxy.  Whereas registrar
   announcements as in Figure 5 typically use TTL of 255 to be seen
   across the whole network, Join Proxy announcements are only intended
   to reach link local neighboring pledges and hence use a TTL of 1.

   The use of "" for "rrm" in BRSKI is again for backward compatibility
   with [BRSKI].  The absence of two announcements for cBRSKI is because
   there is no stateless mode from Join Proxy to pledge or Registrar-
   Agent.  Instead, the Join Proxy will have have to decide whether to
   connect to the registrar via stateful or stateless mode, but this
   decision is invisible on its GRASP announcements.

   Noteworthy too is the use of two different ports for "rrm" versus
   "prm".  As the Registrar did announce support for both variations on
   the same TCP port, the Join Proxy could have done the same, but by
   using different ports, the Join Proxy can choose independently which
   Registrar to connect "rrm" versus "prm" sessions to.  For example,
   another Registrar could announce itself for only "prm" and might be
   preferred by the Join Proxy.



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   [M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', 180000,
       [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 255, "",
        [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
        h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 4443],
        ["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 255, "",
        [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
        h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 4684]]
   ]

   [M_FLOOD, 42310815, h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', 180000,
       [["AN_Join_Registrar", 4, 255, "prm",
        [O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
        h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 44000]]
   ]

      Figure 6: GRASP example for a BRSKI Registrar supporting RRM and
                         PRM via separate processes

   In Figure 6, a separate application process supports "prm" and hence
   uses a separate socket with port number 44000 from "rrm", with port
   4443.  Assuming there is no shared GRASP implementation across the
   two separate process, such as a separate GRASP process, the
   announcements from both processes can not be merged into a single
   GRASP packet.  Instead, each one will send its own GRASP
   announcements separately.  This exampe primarily serves as a
   reminder, that it is necessary for receivers to support receiving
   multiple announcements from the same sender in GRASP not only within
   a single packet, but also when they arrive via separate packes.  To
   support implementation cases just as this one.

   For a more extensive, DNS-SD compatible encoding of the objective-
   value that also supports Service Instance Names, see
   [I-D.eckert-anima-grasp-dnssd].

3.5.3.  CORE-LF

3.5.3.1.  Overview

   "Web Linking", [RFC5988] defines a format, originally for use with
   HTTP headers, to link an HTTP document against other URIs.  Web
   linking is not a standalone method for discovery of services for use
   with HTTP.









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   Based on Web Linking, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
   Format", [CORE-LF] introduces a standalone method to discover
   resources, such as service instances.  CORE-LF was introduced
   primarily for use with [COAP] but it can equally be used for
   discovery of service instances that use HTTP or any other suitable
   (web transfer) protocols.  This makes CORE-LF an alternative to DNS-
   SD and GRASP for any of the BRSKI variations.

   In CORE-LF, an initiator may use (link-local) IPv6 multicast UDP
   packet to the COAP port (5683) to discover a possible responder for a
   requested resource.  The responder will reply with unicast UDP.  If
   the IPv6 address of a responder has been configured or is otherwise
   known to the initiator, it may instead of multicast equally query the
   parameters of the desired resource via unicast to the default COAP
   UDP or TCP port (5683).

   [RFC9176] defines a "Resource Directory" mechanism for CORE-LF which
   is abbreviated CORE-RD.  Initiators can learn the IPv6 address
   protocol (TCP or UDP) and port number of a CORE-RD server by some
   other mechanism (such as DNS-SD) and then use a unicast UDP or TCP
   COAP connection to the CORE-RD server to discover CORE-LF resources
   available on other systems.  Resource providers can likewise register
   their resources with the resource directory server using CORE-RD
   registration procedures.

   In summary, CORE-LF including CORE-RD is a mechanism for registration
   and discovery of resources and hence services which may be preferred
   in deployments over other options and can equally be applicable to
   register/discover any variation of BRSKI for any type of BRSKI
   service.

3.5.3.2.  Background

   [cBRSKI] specifies the use of CORE-LF as the reference method for
   pledges to discover registrars - in the absence of any proxies, to
   allow deployments of scenarios where no proxies are needed - and
   hence also where [cBRSKI] is not needed.  Because BRSKI is designed
   so that pledges can be agnostic of whether they connect to a
   registrar directly or via a Join Proxy, the resource/service that the
   pledge needs to discover is nevertheless called "(BRSKI) Join Proxy
   (for pleges)", and encoded in CORE-LF as the value "brski.jp" for the
   resource type attribute ("rt=resource-type") according to [CORE-LF].

   The following picture, Figure 7 shows the encoding and an example of
   this discovery. "ff02::fd" is the link-local scope address for "All
   Coap Nodes" in IPv6, as introduced in [RFC7390], which also defines
   IPv6 and site-scoped address options.




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Template:

REQ: GET coap://[All_Coap_Nodes_IP_multicast_addr]/.well-known/core?rt=brski.jp

RES: 2.05 Content
   <coaps://[Responder_IP_unicast_address]:join-port>; rt="brski.jp"

Example:

REQ: GET coap://[ff02::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=brski.jp

RES: 2.05 Content
   <coaps://[fe80::c78:e3c4:58a0:a4ad]:8485>;rt=brski.jp

      Figure 7: CORE-LF discovery of registrar/proxy by pledges

   [cPROXY] introduces the operations of a CoAP based Join Proxy both as
   a connection based Join Proxy as in [BRSKI] (only using UDP
   connections for COAPs instead of TCP for TLS as in [BRSKI]), but also
   as a new, stateless Join Proxy - to eliminate the need for
   potentially highly constrained Join Proxy nodes to keep connection
   state and avoid the complexity of protecting that state against
   attacks.  The new resource type "brski.rjp" is defined to support
   stateless Join Proxies to discover registrars and their UDP port
   number that support the stateless, so-called JPY protocol.

   The following picture, Figure 8 shows the encoding and an example of
   this discovery. [cPROXY] introduces the new scheme "coaps+jpy" for
   the packet header used by the stateless JPY" protocol.  The request
   in the template is assumed to be based on unicast, relying on another
   method to discover the IP address of the registrar first.  It could
   equally use COAP site-scoped IP multicast, but in general, the
   assumption is that registrar will not necessarily be link-local
   connected to proxies (this may be different in specific deployments).
   Even though the registrar IP address is hence known, the reply still
   needs to include this address again because in the [CORE-LF] link
   format, and [RFC3986], Section 3.2, the authority attribute can not
   include a port number unless it also includes the IP address.













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Template:

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski.jpy

RES: 2.05 Content
     <coaps+jpy://[Responder_IP_unicast_address]:join-port>;rt=brski.jpy

Example:

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski.jpy

RES: 2.05 Content
     <coaps+jpy://[2001:db8:0:abcd::52]:7633>;rt=brski.jpy

   Figure 8: CORE-LF discovery of registrars that support stateless
                       JPY protocll by proxies

3.5.3.3.  Specification

   This section specifies the use of CORE-LF for BRSKI variations.
   These specifications are backward compatible extensions to what is
   specified in [cBRSKI] and [cPROXY], except for noted exceptions,
   where the requirements are narrowed.  The following uses terms from
   the ABNF in section 2 of [CORE-LF] and from [RFC3986] (URI) for
   explanations and relies on the following template example, Figure 9.

   Template:

   REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski.*

   RES: 2.05 Content
        <scheme://[address]:port path-abempty>;\
          rt=brski-service(;var="brski-variation-string(s)");\
          pw="priority weight"

           Figure 9: Template for BRSKI discovery with variations

   BRSKI responder sockets are indicated in CORE-LF as a URI-Reference.
   The URI-Reference SHOULD be a URI with a scheme, the IP address of
   the responder socket and the port used by the responder.  It may
   optionally be followed by a non-empty path-abempty.










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   URL-references SHOULD not use a domain name instead of an address to
   allow responders to select a BRSKI responder without requiring DNS
   support.  Likewise, port and scheme MUST be included so that the
   information can be passed on to consumers without having to modify
   it.  When omitting this information, the full information can only be
   known in the context of the connections scheme and port through which
   it was retrieved.

   Note that these URL-Reference requirements are stronger than those
   from [cBRSKI] and [cPROXY] to make extensibility easier.

   BRSKI responder sockets MUST include a resource type field indicating
   a resource type value indicating a BRSKI service, indicated as
   "brski-service" in Figure 9.  This MUST be registered in the IANA
   "Resource Type Link Target Attribute Values" registry table, and also
   referenced in the "BRSKI Contexts" registry table Table 2.  A brski-
   service is a string without "." (single component string).

   Discovery of registrar sockets by stateful proxies uses the resource
   type "brski.rs".  This can be used in conjunction with any scheme:
   https:// for BRSKI and coaps:// for cBRSKI.  Stateless registrar
   sockets use the resource type "brski.rjpy".  This currently only
   support the coaps+jpy:// scheme.  By its nature, it can only be used
   with schemes that rely on UDP.  These resource type uses are no
   change over [cBRSKI] and [cPROXY].  This document does not specifiy
   how to discover BRSKI-PLEDGE via CORE-LF.

   The variations supported by a BRSKI responder socket are indicated
   via the optional "var=" link-extension.  The value is a quoted-string
   of one or more space contatenated BRSKI variation strings.  The
   absence of a "var=" link-extension indicates support for only the
   default variation for the BRSKI context to which the BRSKI service
   belongs.  This can also be indicated as "var=".

   The optional "pw" target attribute indicates priority and weight for
   the selection of the resource target with the semantic and format
   defined in [RFC2782] for priority and weight in DNS SRV resource
   records.  If the attribute pw is absent, then it is assumed to mean
   pw="65535 0".

   A non-empty path-abempty indicates a path prefix for the endpoints
   supporting the BRSKI service and variation that is shorter than the
   default endpoint paths specified for the service.

3.5.3.4.  Examples






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   REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski.*

   RES: 2.05 Content
   Content-Format: 40
   Payload:
    <https://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:4555>;        # [1]
           rt=brski.rs;var="est-tls prm-jose cmp";
           pw="1 2",
    <https://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:4555>;        # [2]
           rt=brski.jp;var="est-tls prm-jose cmp";
           pw="1 2",
    <coaps://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:5684/b>;      # [3]
           rt=brski.rs;var=,
           pw="1 2",
    <coaps://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:5684/b>;      # [4]
           rt=brski.jp;var=,
           pw="1 2",
    <coaps+jpy://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:6534/b>;  # [5]
           rt=brski.rjpy;var=,
           pw="1 2"

              Figure 10: CORE-LF examples for BRSKI variations

   Figure 10 shows example BRSKI variations in CORE-LF format.  Note
   that the example is pretty-printed through indentation and breaking
   long lines.  This additional white space is not compatible with
   actual CORE-LF output.  Likewise, the text following "#" are
   editorial comments.

   Example [1] is the equivalent announcement for a BRSKI registrar
   service as shown for DNS-SD in Figure 2 except for the absence of any
   service instance.  Note the use of "var=" to indicate the list of
   variation strings supported and "pw=" to indicate priority and weight
   as in DNS-SD.

   [3] is likewise the comparable example for the cBRSKI registar
   example with DNS-SD.  Note that here, a non-empty path-abempty "/b"
   is used to indicate a shortened endpoint prefix path for the service.
   There is no equivalent in DNS-SD defined.  When discovering a service
   via DNS-SD, the service will need to use the (longer) pre-defined
   endpoint prefixes, such as "/brski" and "/est" instead of "/b".

   Example [2] is the same socket as [1], but announced as a Join Proxy
   socket for pledges.  Likewise, [4] is the same socket as [2]
   announced as a Join Proxy socket for pledges.  Finally, [5] announces
   the registrars socket in support of stateless Join Proxies using the
   JPY header encapsulation.




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3.5.3.5.  Resource Type Considerations

   CORE-LF expresses information about resources of a target identified
   by a resource type.  This specification encodes BRSKI services in
   CORE-LF also as a resource types, as specified in Section 3.5.3.3.
   For the purpose of CORE-LF, a BRSKI service is just another resource,
   except that it characterizes the overall functionality available
   across a connection to the target, composed of a sequence of endpoint
   instantiations.  In addition, this behavior is further refined by the
   list of supported variations indicated.

   Often, resources in CORE-LF do - instead of a service - describe
   details of as little as a single endpoint, such as its URL prefix and
   format encoding.  The reason why this fine-grained specification is
   not a good replacement for the concept of service and variation is
   that the avilability of a set of endpoints with specific encodings
   does not imply whether the target does support the desired specific
   sequencing of instantiating those endpoints, including the use of any
   endpoint encoding option in any combination.

   Making such arbitrary combinations a requirement can easily lead to
   more generic, but also more costly implementations and testing
   requirements without necessarily gaining deployment benefit.

   BRSKI resource types which are not treated as services according to
   this specification can still be used if so desired to amend the
   discovery of shortened endpoints, as shown in Figure 11.

   RES: 2.05 Content
   Content-Format: 40
   Payload:
    <https://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:4555/b>;      # [1]
           rt=brski.rs;var="est-tls prm-jose cmp";
           pw="1 2",
    <https://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:4555/b/rv>;   # [2]
           rt=brski.rs.requestvoucher,
    <https://[2001:DB8:0815::5e00:5314]:4555/b/vs>;   # [3]
           rt=brski.rs.voucher_status,
    </b/rv>;rt=brski.rs.rv,                           # [4]
    </b/vs>;rt=brski.rs.vs,                           # [5]

                    Figure 11: CORE-LF resource examples

   [1] shows how the prefix for all BRSKI endpoints over "https://" can
   be shortened from "/.well-known/brski" to "/b".  Nevertheless, this
   would still make it necessary to use "/b/requestvoucher" and "/b/
   voucher_status" as endpoints.




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   [2] and [3] show how to shorten those two endpoints to "/b/rv" and
   "/b/rs" by creating resource types "brski.rs.rv" and "brski.rs.vs".
   By using resource type prefix "brski.rs." for both of them as well as
   path prefix "/b", it can be implied that these endpoints are part of
   the service specified in [1],

   These discovery options can be further compacted such as shown in
   example [4] and [5] when assuming that the abbreviations "rv" and
   "vs" are also known even by BRSKI implementations from [cBRSKI].
   Likewise, the full socket details can be avoided when one can infer
   it from context.

   While these shortenings can be highly useful in often called
   resources, each endpoint in BRSKI is typically only instantiated once
   by a pledge, so the overall savings in communication data becauseof
   these shortenings is likely negligible, and it is better to define
   short endpoint paths into the variation specification if they are
   likely needed, such as done in [cBRSKI], such that it is not
   necessary in cBRSKI to add such shortenings in discovery.  For these
   reasons, this document does not specify if or how to use such
   resource targets in cunjunction with BRSKI discovery but only
   discusses possibilities and limitations here.

   Considerations for such non-service resource type use in BRSKI
   nevertheless introduces one requirement to avoid conflicts: The names
   of BRSKI services MUST not duplicate the endpoint names of any
   resources specified for BRSKI protocols.  This means that "rv" or
   "vs" can not be used to create BRSKI service name resource types
   "brski.rv" or "brski.rs", and likewise, additional BRSKI endpoints
   can not be called "rs", "jp", "jpy" or any other string registered in
   the BRSKI discover registry tables.

4.  IANA considerations

4.1.  Core Parameters

4.1.1.  Resource Type Link Target Attribute Values

   IANA is asked to reserve all resource type values starting with
   "brski." in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values"
   table.  Resources with this prefix are meant to be required for
   discovery of BRSKI services and resources (see Section 3.5.3.5) and
   hence SHOULD be listed in the BRSKI Contexts registry table for use
   with CORE-LF, if they indicate a service, or be specified in a BRSKI
   specification if they are resources but not services.






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4.1.2.  Target Attributes

       +===========+======================+============+===========+
       | Attribute | Brief Description    | Change     | Reference |
       | Name      |                      | Controller |           |
       +===========+======================+============+===========+
       | var       | List of supported    | IETF       | [ThisRFC] |
       |           | variations of target |            |           |
       +-----------+----------------------+------------+-----------+
       | pw        | DNS SRV compatible   | IETF       | [ThisRFC] |
       |           | priority and weight  |            |           |
       |           | of resource target   |            |           |
       +-----------+----------------------+------------+-----------+

          Table 1: Target Variation and Priority/Weight Attributes

   IANA is asked to add entries for "var" and "pw" according to above
   Table 1 to the "Target Attributes" table.

   The "var" target attribute is meant to be used for BRSKI targets as
   specified in this document.  It is also meant to be usable for other
   targets if so desired - to indicate variations of the resource type
   of the target.  For targets with a non-BRSKI resource target (not
   using "rt=brski.*"), the format of the value may be different than
   specified for BRSKI.

   The "pw" target attribute indicates priority and weight for the
   selection of the resource target with the semantic and format defined
   in [RFC2782] for priority and weight in DNS SRV resource records.  If
   the attribute pw is absent, then it is assumed to mean pw="65535 0".

4.2.  BRSKI Discovery Parameters Registry (section)

   This document requests a new section named "BRSKI Variations
   Discovery Parameters" in the "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
   Infrastructures (BRSKI) Parameters" registry
   (https://www.iana.org/assignments/brski-parameters/brski-
   parameters.xhtml).  Its initial content is as follows.

   [ RFC editor.  Please remove the following sentence.  Note to IANA:
   This section contains three tables according to the specifications of
   this document.  Each of these tables should include the table title
   so that they can be more easily distinguished.  If it is not possible
   to introduce more than one table per section, then we will modify the
   request accordingly for three sections, but given how the three
   tables are tightly linked, that would be unfortunate. ]





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   Registration Procedure(s): Standards action or expert review based on
   registration.  See ThisRFC.

   Experts: TBD.

   Reference: ThisRFC.

   Notes:

   Dflt flag:  Indicates a Variation Type Choice that is assumed to be
      used if the service discover/selection mechanism does not indicate
      any variation.

   Rsvd Flag:  Indicates a Variation Type Choice that is reserved for
      use with the mechanism described in the Note(s) column, but for
      which no specification yet exists.

   Spec / Applicability:  A "-" indicates that the variation is
      considered to be feasible through existing specifications, but not
      explicitly mentioned in them.  An "NA" indicates that the
      combination is assumed to be not working with the currently
      available specifications.

4.2.1.  BRSKI Context Registry Table

   [RFC-Editor / IANA: The following IANA tables should also have
   hotlinks for the referenced RFC/drafts.  Unfortunately, several of
   the referenced documents are already referenced in this document with
   protocol names such as cBRSKI instead of draft-if/RFC-number, which
   is to make it easier to read the draft.  However, this is not
   appropriate for pictures or IANA tables.  But as you can see from
   explanations in Changelog for rev 06, i can not figure out how to
   have both type of references.  Hence i have removed the references
   from draft/RFC in this section.  Please re-establish them in the RFC
   if possible.]
















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    +=======+==========+=========+=======================+============+
    |Context|Applicable|Discovery|Service Name(s) /      |Reference(s)|
    |       |Variation |Mechanism|Transport              |            |
    |       |Types     |         |                       |            |
    +=======+==========+=========+=======================+============+
    |BRSKI  |mode      |GRASP    |"AN_join_registrar" /  |RFC8995     |
    |       |vformat   |         |"AN_Proxy"             |            |
    |       |enroll    |         |with IPPROTO_TCP       |            |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+
    |       |          |DNS-SD   |"brski-registrar" /    |RFC8995     |
    |       |          |         |"brski-proxy"          |            |
    |       |          |         |with TCP               |            |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+
    |       |          |CORE-LF  |"rt=brski.jp" /        |THIS-RFC    |
    |       |          |         |"rt=brski.rs" with     |            |
    |       |          |         |https                  |            |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+
    |cBRSKI |mode      |CORE-LF  |rt=brski.jp with coaps |I-D.ietf-   |
    |       |vformat   |         |                       |anima-      |
    |       |enroll    |         |                       |constrained-|
    |       |          |         |                       |voucher     |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+
    |       |          |         |rt=brski.rs /          |I-D.ietf-   |
    |       |          |         |rt=brski.rjpy with     |anima-      |
    |       |          |         |coaps                  |constrained-|
    |       |          |         |                       |join-proxy  |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+
    |       |          |DNS-SD   |"brski-proxy"          |THIS-RFC    |
    |       |          |         |/                      |            |
    |       |          |         |"brski-registrar" /    |            |
    |       |          |         |"brski-registrar-rpy"  |            |
    |       |          |         |with UDP               |            |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+
    |       |          |GRASP    |"AN_join_registrar" /  |[THIS-RFC]  |
    |       |          |         |"AN_join_registrar_rjp"|            |
    |       |          |         |/                      |            |
    |       |          |         |"AN_Proxy"             |            |
    |       |          |         |with IPPROTO_UDP       |            |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+
    |BRSKI- |mode      |DNS-SD   |"brski-pledge" with TCP|[THIS-RFC]  |
    |PLEDGE |vformat   |         |                       |            |
    |       |enroll    |         |                       |            |
    +-------+----------+---------+-----------------------+------------+

                          Table 2: BRSKI Contexts






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4.2.2.  BRSKI Variation Type and Choices Registry Table

   +=========+===========+===========+===========+=====+===============+
   | Context | Variation | Variation | Reference |Flags| Note(s)       |
   |         | Type      | Type      |           |     |               |
   |         |           | Choice    |           |     |               |
   +=========+===========+===========+===========+=====+===============+
   | BRSKI,  | mode      | rrm       | RFC8995   |Dflt | Registrar     |
   | cBRSKI  |           |           | ThisRFC   |     | Responder     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | Mode          |
   |         |           |           |           |     | the mode      |
   |         |           |           |           |     | specified in  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | RFC8995       |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   |         |           | prm       | ThisRFC   |     | Pledge        |
   |         |           |           |           |     | Responder     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | Mode          |
   |         |           |           |           |     | I-D.ietf-     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | anima-brski-  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | prm           |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | BRSKI   | vformat   | cmsj      | RFC8368   |Dflt | CMS-signed    |
   |         |           |           | ThisRFC   |     | JSON Voucher  |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   |         |           | cose      | ThisRFC   |     | CBOR with     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | COSE          |
   |         |           |           |           |     | signature     |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | cBRSKI  |           | cose      | ThisRFC   |Dflt | CBOR with     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | COSE          |
   |         |           |           |           |     | signature     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | I-D.ietf-     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | anima-        |
   |         |           |           |           |     | constrained-  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | voucher       |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   |         |           | cmsj      | RFC8368   |     | CMS-signed    |
   |         |           |           | ThisRFC   |     | JSON Voucher  |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | BRSKI,  |           | jose      | ThisRFC   |Dflt*| JOSE-signed   |
   | cBRSKI  |           |           |           |     | JSON,         |
   |         |           |           |           |     | Default when  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | prm is used   |
   |         |           |           |           |     | I-D.ietf-     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | anima-jws-    |
   |         |           |           |           |     | voucher, I-   |
   |         |           |           |           |     | D.ietf-       |
   |         |           |           |           |     | anima-brski-  |



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   |         |           |           |           |     | prm           |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | BRSKI-  | mode      | prm       | ThisRFC   |Dflt | Pledge        |
   | PLEDGE  |           |           |           |     | responder     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | Mode          |
   |         |           |           |           |     | I-D.ietf-     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | anima-brski-  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | prm           |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   |         | vformat   | jose      | ThisRFC   |Dflt | JOSE-signed   |
   |         |           |           |           |     | JSON,         |
   |         |           |           |           |     | Default when  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | prm is used   |
   |         |           |           |           |     | I-D.ietf-     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | anima-jws-    |
   |         |           |           |           |     | voucher, I-   |
   |         |           |           |           |     | D.ietf-       |
   |         |           |           |           |     | anima-brski-  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | prm           |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   |         |           | cmsj      | ThisRFC   |Rsvd | CMS-signed    |
   |         |           |           |           |     | JSON          |
   |         |           |           |           |     | Voucher, not  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | specified.    |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   |         |           | cose      | ThisRFC   |Rsvd | CBOR with     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | COSE          |
   |         |           |           |           |     | signature,    |
   |         |           |           |           |     | not           |
   |         |           |           |           |     | specified.    |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | BRSKI,  | enroll    | est       | RFC8995   |Dflt | Enroll via    |
   | BRSKI-  |           |           | RFC7030   |     | EST           |
   | PLEDGE  |           |           |           |     | as specified  |
   |         |           |           |           |     | in RFC8995,   |
   |         |           |           |           |     | extension     |
   |         |           |           |           |     | for BRSKI-    |
   |         |           |           |           |     | PRM when      |
   |         |           |           |           |     | used in       |
   |         |           |           |           |     | context       |
   |         |           |           |           |     | BRSKI-PLEDGE  |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | cBRSKI  |           | est       | ThisRFC   |Dflt | Enroll via    |
   |         |           |           |           |     | EST over      |
   |         |           |           |           |     | COAP,         |
   |         |           |           |           |     | RFC9148       |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | BRSKI,  |           | cmp       | ThisRFC   |     | Lightweight   |



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   | BRSKI-  |           |           |           |     | CMP Profile   |
   | PLEDGE  |           |           |           |     | RFC9733,      |
   |         |           |           |           |     | RFC9483.      |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+
   | BRSKI   |           | scep      | ThisRFC   |Rsvd | RFC8894       |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----+---------------+

                 Table 3: BRSKI Variation Type and Choices

4.2.3.  BRSKI Variations and Variation Strings

     +=========+==============+===========+===========+==============+
     | Context | Reference    | Variation | Variation | Explanations |
     |         |              | String    |           | / Notes      |
     +=========+==============+===========+===========+==============+
     | BRSKI   | RFC8995      | "" /      | rrm cmsj  | Note 1       |
     |         |              | "EST-TLS" | est       |              |
     +---------+--------------+-----------+-----------+--------------+
     |         | RFC9733      | cmp       | rrm cmsj  |              |
     |         |              |           | cmp       |              |
     +---------+--------------+-----------+-----------+--------------+
     |         | RFC9733      | prm-jose  | prm jose  | RFC9733 also |
     |         |              |           | est       | includes     |
     |         |              |           |           | required     |
     |         |              |           |           | extensions   |
     |         |              |           |           | to EST       |
     +---------+--------------+-----------+-----------+--------------+
     | BRSKI-  | I-D.ietf-    | "" /      | prm jose  |              |
     | PLEDGE  | anima-brski- | "prm-     | est       |              |
     |         | prm          | jose"     |           |              |
     +---------+--------------+-----------+-----------+--------------+
     | cBRSKI  | I-D.ietf-    | "" /      | rrm cose  |              |
     |         | anima-       | "rrm-     | est       |              |
     |         | constrained- | cose"     |           |              |
     |         | voucher      |           |           |              |
     +---------+--------------+-----------+-----------+--------------+

               Table 4: BRSKI Variation and Variation Strings

   Note 1:  The Variation String "EST-TLS" is equivalent to the
      Variation String "" and is required and only permitted for the
      AN_join_registrar objective value in GRASP for backward
      compatibility with RFC8995, where it is used for this variation.
      Note that AN_proxy uses "".







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4.3.  Service Names Registry

   IANA is asked to modify and amend the "Service Name and Transport
   Protocol Port Number Registry" registry
   (https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-
   names-port-numbers.txt) as follows:

   brski-proxy and brski-registrar are to be added as Service Names for
   the "udp" protocol using ThisRFC as the reference.

   The registrations for brski-proxy and brski-registrar for the "tcp"
   protocol are to be updated to also include ThisRFC as their
   reference.

   The Defined TXT keys column for brski-proxy and brski-registrar for
   both "tcp" and "udp" protocols are to state the following text:

   See ThisRFC and the "BRSKI Variation Type Choices" table in the
   "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) Parameters"
   registry.

   TBD: This request likely does not include all the necessary
   formatting.

4.4.  BRSKI Well-Known URIs fixes (opportunistic)

   The following change requests to "https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   brski-parameters/brski-parameters.xhtml#brski-well-known-uris" are
   cosmetic in nature and are included in this document solely because
   support for Endpoint URIs is implied by the mechanisms specified in
   this document and the existing registry has these cosmetic issues.

   1.  IANA is asked to change the name of the first column of the table
       from "URI" to "URI Suffix".  This is in alignment with other
       table columns with the same syntax/semantic, such as
       "https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-
       uris.xhtml".

   2.  IANA is asked to change the Reference from "RFC8995" to "RFC8995,
       Section 8.3.1".

   3.  IANA is asked to include the following "Note" text: The following
       table contains the assigned BRSKI protocol Endpoint URI suffixes
       under "/.well-known/brski"." - This note is added to introduce
       the term "Endpoint" into the registry table as that is the term
       commonly used (instead of URI) in several of the memos for which
       this discovery document was written.  It is meant to help readers
       map the registry to the terminology used in those documents.



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5.  Security Considerations

   In [BRSKI-PRM], pledges are easier subject to DoS attacks than in
   [BRSKI], because attackers can be initiators and delay or prohibit
   enrollment of a pledge by opening so many connections to the pledge
   that a valid Registrar-Agents connection to the pledge may not be
   possible.  Discovery of the pledge via DNS-SD increases the ability
   of attackers to discover pledges against which such DoS attacks can
   be attempted.

   Especially when supporting DNS-SD browsing across unicast DNS,
   pledges MUST implement DoS prevention measures, such as limiting the
   number and rate of accepted TCP connections on a per-initiator basis.
   If feasible for the implementation, simultaneous connections SHOULD
   be possible, so that an ongoing attacker connection will not delay a
   valid Registrar-Agent connection.  When accepting connections, a
   strategy such as LRU MAY be used to ensure that an attacker will not
   be able to monopolize connections.

   Browsing via DNS-SD, especially via unicast DNS which makes
   information available network-wide does also introduce a perpass
   attack, gathering intelligence against what type and serial number of
   devices are installed in the network.  Whether or not this is seen as
   a relevant risk is highly installation dependent.  Networks SHOULD
   implement filtering measures at mDNS and/or DNS RR/services level to
   prohibit such data collection if there is a risk, and this is seen as
   an undesirable attack vector.

   Service instance names as defined in Section 3.4 are used to discover
   pledges by their manufacturer assiged serial numbers.  Today, DNS-SD
   does not provide security against impersonation of such service
   instance names.  Instead, impersonation can and will only be
   discovered after performing BRSKI connections to the pledge.  It
   should be noted, that the scheme used by Section 3.4 could actually
   be used to protect against impersonation when [DNSSD-SRP] with some
   security extension is used: Pledges need to signal their IDevID for
   their SRP TLS connection, and the SRV server needs to have the same
   manufacturer Service Instance Name schema and manufacturer trust
   anchor information as BRSKI registrars and can then allow only the
   permissible service instance name DNS-SD RRs for this pledge.  In
   fact, the SRP server could create the all necessary Section 3.4
   required DNS-SD RRs from the IDevID information even if the pledge
   itself is not requesting them or is requesting other DNS-SD RRs.
   Definition of these procedures is outside the scope of this
   specification though.






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   None of the discovery mechanisms (DNS-SD, GRASP or CORE-LF) are
   necessarily secure.  Instead, it is a matter of their deployment, how
   trustworthy service announcements are.  In an unprotected deployment
   with DNS-SD via mDNS for example, an attacker could attract
   connections from responders by announcing itself with the best
   priority value.  When a deployment instead uses a secure domain
   deployment model, such as an [ACP], a secured wireless mesh
   technology, or discovery via a secured DNS server, then service
   announcements are typically assumed to be trustworthy and with them
   their service parameters.  In those deployments, the security
   question is then primarily the attack vectors to impair such a
   responder to make it behave in undesirable means.

6.  Acknowledgments

   Many thanks for reviews by Arthur Hecker, Steffen Fries and
   discussions/feedbacks by Brian Carpenter, Michael Richardson, Michael
   Kovatsch.

6.1.  Change log

   [RFC Editor: please remove this section.]

   WG draft 07:

   Defined document to be update to draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm (for the
   specifiation of IDevID derived DNS-SD discovery of pledges)

   Resolved open Q text wether SRP allows discovery of SRP server.
   According to Stuart Cheshire this is supported.

   Incorporated initial Feedback from Michael Kovatsch

   Added section explaining that there is no spec for how to do pledge
   discovery via CORE-LF or GRASP.

   *  Rewrote 2.1 Challenges to now be a more comprehensive set of 3
      example deployment issues without this work.

   Incorporated review by Artur Hecker

   *  Rewrote abstract to more comprehensively (and easier
      understandable) describe the scope of this document

   *  Simplified terminology: removed "variation context", not only
      calling it "context".





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   *  changed name of BRSKI context in IANA registry to 'tBRSKI' (TCP
      BRSKI) - to make it easier to know when text refers to BRSKI as an
      overall cncept or specifically to the TCP based set of variations
      of BRSKI.

   *  Removed duplicate text paragraphs in proxy sections.

   *  Added note about (in)security of discovery mechanisms in general
      and how deployments typically defer to the "secure domain" context
      to overcome this issue.

   *  Large number of textual fixes (thanks a lot for the thorough
      read!).

   WG draft 06:

   Initial overview review feedback from Michael Kovatch and Artur
   Hecker

   Made abstract and Challenges introduction hopefully better explaining
   the scope of the document and motivate it's need.

   Review Steffen Fries:

   Cleaned up terminology IP/IPv6 -> IP/IPv4/IPv6.

   CA -> trust anchor

   BRSKI proxy -> Join Proxy for consistency with RFC8995.

   Added mentioning of Registrar-Agent from BRSKI-PRM where appropriate

   Rewrote 2.1.3 to make the functionalty of variation agnostistic
   proxying clearer (hopefully)

   Rewrite 3.1.1 to clearer define role and services and distinguish
   them.

   Changed "cms" to "cmsj"(as well as derived variation strings) so that
   it is clear that this variation type does not mean all possible
   encoding options for CMS but only JSON.

   Added explanation about the fact that a variation may introduce
   changes to a variation type component that shares the same name
   (3.1.6)

   Noted that discovery of pledges does not apply in 3.2 which talks
   about redundant service discovery/selection.



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   removed last paragraph from 3.3.2.2 - duplicate from earlier section.

   Improved 3.4.3 by better structuring the example figure and rewriting
   the explanation text as a step-by-step explanation how a Registrar-
   Agent would perform the steps.

   Fixed small bugs in GRASp example section 3.5.2.2 but ended up
   improving examples a lot and make them more useful (registrat AND
   proxy )

   Still can not figure out how to nicely get hotlinks to the
   terminology section definitions.  They just show up in text format as
   "Section 1" or the like.  Giving up on the idea.  TBD: Maybe ask RFC
   editor/RSWG.  Likewise, i can not have references to BRSKI RFCs both
   with a logical name like BRSKI-PRM and in other places references
   with the RFC number.  I need to define both as references and then
   the same RFC will have two entries.  Stupid.  Now i only have logical
   references, but in all places where i need to actually reference the
   RFC by number, such as IANA registries or pictures, i do not use
   references anymore.

   WG draft 05:

   Mayor update to specifiy resilience aspects in selection of
   responders.

   Mayor update/simpliciation of CORE-LF section.

   WG draft 02/03:

   Fix up tables to be correctly rendered by html output.

   WG draft 01:

   Core-LF improvements / interim work.

   WG draft 00:

   Added section for CORE-LF.  Still missing to update existing text
   with the CORE-LF definitions.

   Individual version 01:

   Various enhancements

   Individual version 00:

   Initial version.



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7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [ACP]      Eckert, T., Ed., Behringer, M., Ed., and S. Bjarnason, "An
              Autonomic Control Plane (ACP)", RFC 8994,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8994, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8994>.

   [BRSKI]    Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.

   [BRSKI-AE] von Oheimb, D., Ed., Fries, S., and H. Brockhaus, "BRSKI
              with Alternative Enrollment (BRSKI-AE)", RFC 9733,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9733, March 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9733>.

   [BRSKI-PRM]
              Fries, S., Werner, T., Lear, E., and M. Richardson, "BRSKI
              with Pledge in Responder Mode (BRSKI-PRM)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm-23, 3
              June 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              ietf-anima-brski-prm-23>.

   [cBRSKI]   Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
              Dijk, "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (cBRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-28, 6 July
              2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              anima-constrained-voucher-28>.

   [CORE-LF]  Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
              Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6690>.

   [cPROXY]   Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
              Dijk, "Join Proxy for Bootstrapping of Constrained Network
              Elements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              anima-constrained-join-proxy-17, 5 July 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-anima-
              constrained-join-proxy-17>.

   [DNS-SD]   Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6763>.




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   [DNSSD-SRP]
              Lemon, T. and S. Cheshire, "Service Registration Protocol
              for DNS-Based Service Discovery", RFC 9665,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9665, June 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9665>.

   [EST]      Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
              "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7030>.

   [GRASP]    Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., Ed., and B. Liu, Ed., "GeneRic
              Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", RFC 8990,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8990, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8990>.

   [JWS-VOUCHER]
              Werner, T. and M. Richardson, "JWS signed Voucher
              Artifacts for Bootstrapping Protocols", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16, 15
              January 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-anima-jws-voucher-16>.

   [mDNS]     Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2782]  Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
              specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2782, February 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2782>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.




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   [RFC7390]  Rahman, A., Ed. and E. Dijk, Ed., "Group Communication for
              the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7390,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7390, October 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7390>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8368]  Eckert, T., Ed. and M. Behringer, "Using an Autonomic
              Control Plane for Stable Connectivity of Network
              Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM)",
              RFC 8368, DOI 10.17487/RFC8368, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8368>.

   [RFC9148]  van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S.
              Raza, "EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with
              the Secure Constrained Application Protocol", RFC 9148,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9148, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9148>.

   [RFC9176]  Amsüss, C., Ed., Shelby, Z., Koster, M., Bormann, C., and
              P. van der Stok, "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
              Resource Directory", RFC 9176, DOI 10.17487/RFC9176, April
              2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9176>.

   [RFC9483]  Brockhaus, H., von Oheimb, D., and S. Fries, "Lightweight
              Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) Profile", RFC 9483,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9483, November 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9483>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [COAP]     Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
              Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7252>.

   [HRW98]    Thaler, D. D. and C. V. Ravishankar, "Using Name-Based
              Mappings to Increase Hit Rates", 1998,
              <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-
              content/uploads/2017/02/HRW98.pdf>.









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   [I-D.eckert-anima-grasp-dnssd]
              Eckert, T. T., Boucadair, M., Jacquenet, C., and M. H.
              Behringer, "DNS-SD Compatible Service Discovery in GeneRic
              Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-eckert-anima-grasp-dnssd-08, 7 July
              2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-eckert-
              anima-grasp-dnssd-08>.

   [I-D.ietf-bess-evpn-fast-df-recovery]
              Brissette, P., Sajassi, A., Burdet, L. A., Drake, J., and
              J. Rabadan, "Fast Recovery for EVPN Designated Forwarder
              Election", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              bess-evpn-fast-df-recovery-12, 20 November 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bess-
              evpn-fast-df-recovery-12>.

   [RFC5988]  Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5988, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5988>.

   [RFC8894]  Gutmann, P., "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol",
              RFC 8894, DOI 10.17487/RFC8894, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8894>.

Appendix A.  Possible future variations

   The following table Table 5 shows possible future entries for
   "Variation String" if there is an interest for such a variation.
   Thesew would be subject to expert review and could hence require
   appropriate additional specification so that interoperability based
   on that variation string can be guaranteed.

   +=========+===========+===========+============+====================+
   | Context | Reference | Variation | Variations | Explanations /     |
   |         |           | String    |            | Notes              |
   +=========+===========+===========+============+====================+
   | BRSKI   | -         | jose      | rrm jose   | possible           |
   |         |           |           | est        | variation of       |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC8995 with       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher            |
   |         |           |           |            | according to I-    |
   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | jws-voucher        |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+--------------------+
   |         | -         | jose-cmp  | rrm jose   | possible           |
   |         |           |           | cmp        | variation of       |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC8995 with       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher            |



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   |         |           |           |            | according to I-    |
   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | jws-voucher and    |
   |         |           |           |            | enrollment         |
   |         |           |           |            | according to       |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC9483, see       |
   |         |           |           |            | also RFC9733       |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+--------------------+
   |         | -         | cose      | rrm cose   | possible           |
   |         |           |           | est        | variation of       |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC8995 with       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher            |
   |         |           |           |            | according to I-    |
   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | constrained-       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher            |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+--------------------+
   |         | -         | cose-cmp  | rrm cose   | possible           |
   |         |           |           | cmp        | variation of       |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC8995 with       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher            |
   |         |           |           |            | according to I-    |
   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | constrained-       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher and        |
   |         |           |           |            | enrollment         |
   |         |           |           |            | according to       |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC9483, see       |
   |         |           |           |            | also RFC9733       |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+--------------------+
   |         | -         | prm-cmp   | prm jose   | possible           |
   |         |           |           | cmp        | variation of I-    |
   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | brski-prm and      |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC9733            |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+--------------------+
   |         | -         | prm-cose  | prm cose   | possible           |
   |         |           |           | est        | variation of I-    |
   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | brski-prm and      |
   |         |           |           |            | I-D.ietf-anima-    |
   |         |           |           |            | constrained-       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher            |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+--------------------+
   |         | -         | prm-cose- | prm cose   | possible           |
   |         |           | cmp       | cmp        | variation of I-    |
   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | brski-prm, I-      |



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   |         |           |           |            | D.ietf-anima-      |
   |         |           |           |            | constrained-       |
   |         |           |           |            | voucher and        |
   |         |           |           |            | RFC9733            |
   +---------+-----------+-----------+------------+--------------------+

                                  Table 5

Contributors

   Thomas Werner
   Siemens AG
   Germany
   Email: thomas-werner@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/


   Steffen Fries
   Siemens AG
   Germany
   Email: steffen.fries@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/


   Hendrik Brockhaus
   Siemens AG
   Germany
   Email: hendrik.brockhaus@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/


   Michael Richardson
   Canada
   Phone: +41 44 878 9200
   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.org


   David von Oheimb
   Siemens AG
   Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
   81739 Munich
   Germany
   Email: david.von.oheimb@siemens.com
   URI:   https://www.siemens.com/


Authors' Addresses




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   Toerless Eckert (editor)
   Futurewei USA
   United States of America
   Email: tte@cs.fau.de


   Esko Dijk
   IoTconsultancy.nl
   Email: esko.dijk@iotconsultancy.nl










































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