



Independent Submission                                           C. Hood
Internet-Draft                                             Nomotic, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                             23 March 2026
Expires: 24 September 2026


                    AGTP Agent Certificate Extension
                     draft-hood-agtp-agent-cert-00

Abstract

   The Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP) base specification defines agent
   identity headers (Agent-ID, Principal-ID, Authority-Scope) that are
   self-asserted: present on every request and mandatory for logging,
   but not cryptographically verified at the transport layer.  This
   document specifies the AGTP Agent Certificate Extension: an optional
   mechanism that binds Agent-ID, Principal-ID, and Authority-Scope to
   an X.509 v3 certificate presented during TLS mutual authentication.
   The extension enables infrastructure components including Scope-
   Enforcement Points (SEPs), load balancers, and governance gateways to
   verify agent identity and enforce authority scope without
   application-layer access, at O(1) cost per request header check.  The
   extension also defines session-level revocation propagation via AGTP
   NOTIFY broadcast and a Certificate Transparency Log for tamper-
   evident governance metadata.

   Note: Certain mechanisms described in this document may be subject to
   pending patent applications by the author.  The licensor is prepared
   to grant a royalty-free license to implementers consistent with the
   IETF's IPR framework.  See the IPR Notice and Section 7.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 September 2026.




Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  The Identity Gap in Base AGTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  The Agent Certificate Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.3.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  AGTP Agent Certificate Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Certificate Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.1.1.  Standard Subject Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  Agent-Governance X.509 v3 Extensions  . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Certificate Issuance Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Issuance Steps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Certificate Validity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  TLS Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Mutual Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Scope Enforcement at SEPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Revocation and Session Propagation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.1.  Revocation Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.2.  Session-Level Revocation Propagation  . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.3.  Session Manager Responsibilities  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  AGTP Certificate Transparency Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  Log Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.3.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     8.1.  Certificate Pinning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.2.  Scope Commitment Forgery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.3.  Cross-Certificate Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.4.  IPR Notice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  X.509 Extension OID Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Relationship to Birth Certificate  . . . . . . . . .  13



Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

1.1.  The Identity Gap in Base AGTP

   The AGTP base specification requires every request to carry Agent-ID,
   Principal-ID, and Authority-Scope headers.  These headers are self-
   asserted: an AGTP client declares its identity and scope, and the
   server logs the declaration.  In the base spec, there is no
   transport-layer mechanism to verify that the declared Agent-ID
   corresponds to a registered agent, that the Principal-ID is accurate,
   or that the Authority-Scope does not exceed what was granted.

   This is a deliberate design choice in the core spec: self-asserted
   identity with mandatory logging provides a useful baseline and
   enables broad adoption.  For many deployments, anomaly detection and
   audit trails over self-asserted headers are sufficient.

   For higher-stakes deployments -- financial transactions, healthcare
   operations, legal actions, multi-organization agent federations --
   the self-assertion model is insufficient.  Infrastructure needs to
   verify agent identity and enforce scope at the transport layer
   without parsing application payloads.

1.2.  The Agent Certificate Extension

   The AGTP Agent Certificate Extension provides cryptographic identity
   binding at the transport layer.  An AGTP Agent Certificate is an
   X.509 v3 certificate with agent-governance-specific extensions.  It
   is presented during TLS mutual authentication, enabling the server
   and any AGTP-aware infrastructure component to verify the agent's
   identity and authority scope from the certificate alone, without
   inspecting the request headers or body.

   This document specifies:

   *  The AGTP Agent Certificate schema and X.509 v3 extension fields

   *  The certificate issuance and renewal protocol

   *  The authority scope commitment mechanism for O(1) per-request
      scope enforcement

   *  Session-level revocation propagation via AGTP NOTIFY

   *  The AGTP Certificate Transparency Log (AGTP-CTL)




Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


1.3.  Scope

   This extension is OPTIONAL.  Core AGTP implementations that do not
   implement this extension remain fully compliant with [AGTP].  The
   extension is required only for Trust Tier 1 agent identity
   verification and for SEP-enforced scope constraint without
   application-layer access.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "*MUST*", "*MUST NOT*", "*REQUIRED*", "*SHALL*",
   "*SHALL NOT*", "*SHOULD*", "*SHOULD NOT*", "*RECOMMENDED*", "*NOT
   RECOMMENDED*", "*MAY*", and "*OPTIONAL*" in this document are to be
   interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only
   when, they appear in all capitals.

   AGTP Agent Certificate:  An X.509 v3 certificate carrying agent-
      governance-specific extensions, presented during TLS mutual
      authentication to establish cryptographic agent identity and
      authority scope at the transport layer.

   Scope-Enforcement Point (SEP):  An AGTP-aware infrastructure
      component that enforces Authority-Scope constraints on AGTP
      requests.  With the Agent Certificate Extension, SEPs verify scope
      from the certificate at O(1) cost per request without application-
      layer access.

   Authority-Scope Commitment:  A cryptographic binding of the agent's
      declared Authority-Scope tokens to the Agent Certificate, enabling
      SEPs to verify scope token membership after a single session-
      establishment signature verification.

   AGTP Certificate Transparency Log (AGTP-CTL):  A Merkle-tree-based
      append-only log of issued AGTP Agent Certificates, providing
      tamper-evident public accountability for certificate issuance and
      revocation.

3.  AGTP Agent Certificate Schema

3.1.  Certificate Structure

   The AGTP Agent Certificate is an X.509 v3 certificate per [RFC5280]
   with the following subject fields and extensions:








Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


3.1.1.  Standard Subject Fields

      +====================+==========+============================+
      | Field              | Required | Value                      |
      +====================+==========+============================+
      | CN (Common Name)   | *MUST*   | Human-readable agent label |
      +--------------------+----------+----------------------------+
      | O (Organization)   | *MUST*   | Organization name (maps to |
      |                    |          | principal_org)             |
      +--------------------+----------+----------------------------+
      | OU (Organizational | *MAY*    | Governance zone identifier |
      | Unit)              |          |                            |
      +--------------------+----------+----------------------------+
      | emailAddress       | *SHOULD* | Contact email of the       |
      |                    |          | responsible principal      |
      +--------------------+----------+----------------------------+

              Table 1: AGTP Agent Certificate Subject Fields

3.1.2.  Agent-Governance X.509 v3 Extensions

   The following extensions are defined for AGTP Agent Certificates.
   OIDs for these extensions are specified in Section 8 (IANA
   Considerations).

   *subject-agent-id* (CRITICAL)  The canonical AGTP Agent-ID derived
      from the governance-layer Birth Certificate's certificate_hash.
      This is the transport-layer Agent-ID used in the AGTP Agent-ID
      header.  Format: hex-encoded 256-bit value.

   *principal-id* (CRITICAL)  The identifier of the human principal
      accountable for this agent's actions.  Maps to the AGTP Principal-
      ID header.  Format: UTF-8 string, maximum 256 characters.

   *authority-scope-commitment* (CRITICAL)  A cryptographic commitment
      to the agent's Authority-Scope token set, enabling SEPs to verify
      token membership without storing the full scope list per session.
      The commitment is computed as an Ed25519 signature over the
      canonical lexicographically sorted Authority-Scope token set.
      SEPs verify token membership by checking the token against the
      commitment after session-establishment signature verification.

   *governance-zone* (NON-CRITICAL)  The governance zone identifier in
      which the agent is registered.  Format: UTF-8 string following the
      zone: prefix convention.

   *trust-tier* (NON-CRITICAL)  The agent's Trust Tier (1, 2, or 3) as
      defined in [AGTP] Section 6.2.  Format: INTEGER.



Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   *archetype* (NON-CRITICAL)  The agent's behavioral archetype as
      defined in [AGTP] Section 6.7.3.  Format: UTF-8 string; one of:
      assistant, analyst, executor, orchestrator, monitor.

   *activation-certificate-id* (NON-CRITICAL)  Cross-layer reference to
      the governance-layer Birth Certificate certificate_hash.  Enables
      audit reconstruction without a cryptographic dependency between
      the transport certificate and the governance certificate.  Format:
      hex-encoded 256-bit value.

   *agtp-ctl-sct* (NON-CRITICAL)  Signed Certificate Timestamp from the
      AGTP Certificate Transparency Log, proving the certificate was
      submitted to the AGTP-CTL before delivery.  Format: SCT structure
      per [RFC6962] Section 3.2.

4.  Certificate Issuance Protocol

4.1.  Eligibility

   Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) for AGTP Agent Certificates
   *MUST* only be accepted for agents in Active lifecycle state in the
   AGTP registry.  A governance platform *MUST* verify the agent's
   lifecycle state at CSR submission time and *MUST* reject CSRs for
   agents in Suspended, Revoked, or Deprecated state.

4.2.  Issuance Steps

   1.  The governance platform generates a key pair for the agent (or
       accepts a CSR with an agent-generated key pair).

   2.  The governance platform populates the certificate subject fields
       and all AGTP-specific extensions from the agent's Birth
       Certificate and registry record.

   3.  The governance platform verifies that the proposed authority-
       scope- commitment does not exceed the scope granted in the
       agent's Birth Certificate.  If it does, the CSR *MUST* be
       rejected.

   4.  The governance platform signs the certificate using its issuing
       CA key per [RFC5280].

   5.  The governance platform submits the certificate to the AGTP-CTL
       and obtains a Signed Certificate Timestamp (SCT).

   6.  The SCT is embedded in the agtp-ctl-sct extension and the
       certificate is delivered to the agent.




Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 6]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   7.  The governance platform publishes the new certificate to the
       agent's registry record, triggering a registry state update.

4.3.  Certificate Validity

   AGTP Agent Certificates *SHOULD* have a validity period of no more
   than 90 days.  Short validity periods limit the exposure window of a
   compromised certificate and reduce reliance on revocation mechanisms.
   Renewal *SHOULD* begin at 80% of the validity period.

   Certificate renewal carries forward the predecessor's subject-agent-
   id and activation-certificate-id unchanged.  The renewed certificate
   receives a new serial number, new validity period, and a new SCT.

5.  TLS Integration

5.1.  Mutual Authentication

   AGTP connections using the Agent Certificate Extension *MUST* use TLS
   1.3 mutual authentication.  The agent presents its AGTP Agent
   Certificate as the client certificate during the TLS handshake.

   The server verifies the client certificate chain against the issuing
   CA trust anchors.  Following successful handshake:

   1.  The server extracts the subject-agent-id extension value and
       verifies it matches the Agent-ID header on the first request.

   2.  The server extracts the principal-id extension value and verifies
       it matches the Principal-ID header on the first request.

   3.  The server extracts the authority-scope-commitment extension
       value and uses it to verify Authority-Scope header tokens on each
       request.

   Any mismatch between certificate extension values and AGTP header
   values *MUST* cause the server to return 401 Unauthorized and *MUST*
   be logged.

5.2.  Scope Enforcement at SEPs

   A SEP operating with the Agent Certificate Extension verifies
   Authority- Scope at O(1) cost per request:

   1.  At session establishment, the SEP extracts the authority-scope-
       commitment from the client certificate.  (One-time per session.)





Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 7]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   2.  On each request, the SEP checks whether the Authority-Scope
       header tokens are covered by the commitment.  (O(1) per request
       after session setup.)

   3.  If any header token is not covered by the commitment, the SEP
       returns 451 Scope Violation without forwarding the request to the
       application layer.

   This enables governance enforcement at line rate without application-
   layer parsing.

6.  Revocation and Session Propagation

6.1.  Revocation Events

   An AGTP Agent Certificate *MUST* be revoked when any of the following
   occur:

   *  The agent's lifecycle state transitions to Revoked or Deprecated

   *  The Birth Certificate's certificate_hash is invalidated

   *  The agent's authority-scope-commitment requires modification

   *  The principal requests revocation

   *  A trust violation is detected

6.2.  Session-Level Revocation Propagation

   Standard certificate revocation (CRL, OCSP) operates on polling
   cycles, leaving a window during which revoked certificates may still
   be used.  For agent systems, this window is unacceptable for high-
   stakes operations.

   AGTP Agent Certificate revocation *MUST* be propagated to active
   sessions via AGTP NOTIFY broadcast:

   1.  The governance platform issues a revocation event to the AGTP-
       CTL.

   2.  The governance platform broadcasts an AGTP NOTIFY to all
       infrastructure components holding active sessions for the revoked
       certificate's subject-agent-id:







Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 8]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   {
     "method": "NOTIFY",
     "parameters": {
       "recipient": "infrastructure:broadcast",
       "content": {
         "event_type": "certificate_revoked",
         "subject_agent_id": "[agent-id]",
         "certificate_serial": "[serial]",
         "revocation_reason": "[reason]",
         "effective_at": "2026-04-01T00:00:00Z"
       },
       "urgency": "critical"
     }
   }

   1.  Infrastructure components receiving this NOTIFY *MUST*
       immediately terminate all active sessions for the identified
       subject-agent-id.  Session termination *MUST* occur before the
       next request is processed on the affected session.

   2.  The target revocation-to-termination latency is 30 seconds.  This
       is materially shorter than standard CRL or OCSP cache-based
       models.

6.3.  Session Manager Responsibilities

   AGTP Session Managers in deployments using the Agent Certificate
   Extension *MUST* maintain a per-certificate-serial active session
   registry.  On receiving a revocation NOTIFY, the Session Manager
   *MUST* terminate all sessions associated with the revoked serial
   before processing the next request on any affected session.

7.  AGTP Certificate Transparency Log

7.1.  Purpose

   The AGTP Certificate Transparency Log (AGTP-CTL) is an append-only,
   Merkle-tree-based log of all issued AGTP Agent Certificates.  It
   provides tamper-evident public accountability for certificate
   issuance and revocation, enabling:

   *  Fleet-level analytics: population-wide trust score distributions,
      archetype frequencies, governance zone composition

   *  Anomaly detection: detection of certificates issued outside normal
      governance flows





Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026               [Page 9]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   *  Audit reconstruction: verifiable history of certificate issuance
      and revocation for compliance

7.2.  Log Structure

   The AGTP-CTL follows the Certificate Transparency log structure
   defined in [RFC6962], adapted for agent governance metadata.  Each
   leaf entry contains:

   *  Certificate serial number

   *  subject-agent-id

   *  principal-id

   *  governance-zone

   *  trust-tier

   *  archetype

   *  activation-certificate-id

   *  Issuance timestamp

   *  Revocation status (updated on revocation)

   *  Merkle leaf hash

   The leaf hash covers all governance metadata fields.  Any
   modification to a log entry is detectable by any party with access to
   the log.

7.3.  Privacy Considerations

   The principal-id field in the AGTP-CTL leaf entries *MAY* be
   pseudonymized to protect individual principal identity while
   maintaining audit integrity.  Pseudonymous principal IDs *MUST* be
   resolvable by authorized parties (regulators, compliance auditors)
   via a trusted resolution service.  The pseudonymization mapping
   *MUST* be maintained separately from the _*RECOMMENDED_ public log.

8.  Security Considerations








Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026              [Page 10]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


8.1.  Certificate Pinning

   Deployments with strict security requirements *MAY* implement
   certificate pinning for known agents, rejecting connections from
   agents whose certificate serial or key does not match a pre-
   registered value.  Certificate pinning interacts with renewal; pinned
   agents *MUST* update pins on each certificate renewal before the old
   certificate expires.

8.2.  Scope Commitment Forgery

   The authority-scope-commitment is an Ed25519 signature over the
   canonical scope token set, signed by the governance platform's
   issuing key.  An attacker who compromises the issuing key can forge
   scope commitments.  Issuing key compromise *MUST* trigger immediate
   revocation of all certificates issued by that key and issuance of
   replacement certificates from a new key pair.  Issuing keys *SHOULD*
   be stored in hardware security modules.

8.3.  Cross-Certificate Confusion

   An agent MAY hold multiple certificates (e.g., during renewal
   overlap).  Infrastructure *MUST* use the subject-agent-id extension
   value as the authoritative agent identifier, not the certificate
   subject CN, to prevent cross-certificate identity confusion during
   renewal windows.

8.4.  IPR Notice

   Certain mechanisms described in this document may be subject to
   pending patent applications by the author, specifically: the
   authority-scope-commitment mechanism and the session-level revocation
   propagation architecture.  The licensor (Chris Hood / Nomotic, Inc.)
   is prepared to grant a royalty-free license to implementers for any
   patent claims covering these mechanisms, consistent with the IETF's
   IPR framework under the normative reference in [AGTP] Section 8.7.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  X.509 Extension OID Registrations

   This document requests registration of the following Object
   Identifiers in the IANA Private Enterprise Numbers registry or an
   appropriate OID arc for IETF use.  Specific OID assignments are
   subject to IANA allocation:






Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026              [Page 11]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


           +============================+===========+==========+
           | Extension                  | OID (TBD) | Critical |
           +============================+===========+==========+
           | subject-agent-id           | TBD       | Yes      |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+
           | principal-id               | TBD       | Yes      |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+
           | authority-scope-commitment | TBD       | Yes      |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+
           | governance-zone            | TBD       | No       |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+
           | trust-tier                 | TBD       | No       |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+
           | archetype                  | TBD       | No       |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+
           | activation-certificate-id  | TBD       | No       |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+
           | agtp-ctl-sct               | TBD       | No       |
           +----------------------------+-----------+----------+

            Table 2: AGTP Agent Certificate X.509 Extension OIDs

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [AGTP]     Hood, C., "Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-independent-agtp-02,
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-
              independent-agtp-02>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.






Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026              [Page 12]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   [RFC8555]  Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
              Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
              (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8555>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6962]  Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
              Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962>.

   [RFC9334]  Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
              W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
              Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
              2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.

Appendix A.  Relationship to Birth Certificate

   The AGTP Agent Certificate and the Agent Birth Certificate (defined
   in [AGTP] Section 6.7) are complementary but distinct:



























Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026              [Page 13]

Internet-Draft                  AGTP-CERT                     March 2026


   +=================+=====================+===========================+
   | Property        | Birth               | Agent Certificate         |
   |                 | Certificate         |                           |
   +=================+=====================+===========================+
   | Layer           | Governance /        | Transport / TLS           |
   |                 | registry            |                           |
   +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+
   | Format          | JSON document       | X.509 v3                  |
   +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+
   | Issued by       | Governance          | Governance platform CA    |
   |                 | platform            |                           |
   +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+
   | Lifetime        | Permanent           | 90 days (renewable)       |
   |                 | (archived on        |                           |
   |                 | revoke)             |                           |
   +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+
   | Carries         | Full identity +     | Transport identity +      |
   |                 | archetype +         | scope commitment          |
   |                 | scope               |                           |
   +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+
   | Purpose         | Genesis record,     | TLS mutual auth, SEP      |
   |                 | registry anchor     | enforcement               |
   +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+
   | Cross-reference | certificate_hash    | activation-certificate-id |
   +-----------------+---------------------+---------------------------+

                                  Table 3

   The activation-certificate-id field in the Agent Certificate contains
   the Birth Certificate's certificate_hash, creating a verifiable
   cross-layer link between the transport certificate and the governance
   record without introducing a cryptographic dependency that would
   require re-issuance of the Agent Certificate whenever the governance
   record is updated.

Author's Address

   Chris Hood
   Nomotic, Inc.
   Email: chris@nomotic.ai
   URI:   https://nomotic.ai










Hood                    Expires 24 September 2026              [Page 14]
