



ipsecme                                                         T. Reddy
Internet-Draft                                                     Nokia
Intended status: Standards Track                              V. Smyslov
Expires: 7 July 2026                                          ELVIS-PLUS
                                                          3 January 2026


  PQ/T Hybrid Composite Key Exchange and Reliable Transport for IKEv2
              draft-reddy-ipsecme-ikev2-hybrid-reliable-00

Abstract

   The eventual transition to post-quantum key exchange will require
   elimination of traditional key exchange for reduced protocol
   complexity and efficiency.  IKEv2 therefore requires a mechanism that
   can operate in a PQC-only environment, without depending on
   traditional key exchange algorithms (e.g., MODP DH or ECDH).  As
   IKEv2 permits arbitrary combinations of algorithms, unnecessary
   complexity and insecure hybrid constructions are easily implemented.

   This document defines PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange algorithms
   for IKEv2 and a single combined KE payload that carries both the
   traditional and post-quantum components.  It also leverages the
   existing IKEv2 reliable transport mechanism so that large PQC key
   exchange messages can be reliably exchanged over TCP.  Together,
   these mechanisms enable secure and efficient PQ/T hybrid deployments
   today and provide a clear path for IKEv2 to operate in environments
   where traditional algorithms have been replaced by PQC algorithms.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-ipsecme-ikev2-hybrid-
   reliable/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the ipsecme Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:ipsecme@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ipsec/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsecme/.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.





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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Reliable Transport Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  PQ/T hybrid composite Key Exchange Algorithms . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Combined Key Exchange Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Reliable Transport Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS Negotiated  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     6.2.  No SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Hybrid Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Example Message Flow  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11






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1.  Introduction

   The Internet Key Exchange version 2 ([IKEv2]) is a key agreement and
   security negotiation protocol used for IPsec key establishment.  The
   emergence of CRQCs will render traditional key exchange algorithms
   obsolete.  In a post-quantum future, many systems will be unable to
   rely on or even ship traditional key exchange algorithms.  For IKEv2
   to remain deployable in such an environment, it must support PQC-only
   key exchange without depending on traditional key exchange
   algorithms.

   However, because IKEv2 requires that its first key exchange occur in
   the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, any PQC KEM public key or ciphertext that
   does not fit within a single IKE_SA_INIT message (without IP
   fragmentation) cannot be sent directly in that exchange.  When a PQC
   KEM does not fit in IKE_SA_INIT, the initial exchange must fall back
   to a traditional key exchange before any PQC public key or ciphertext
   can be sent.  This creates an important limitation: even in a future
   where CRQCs exist and PQC algorithms are mandatory, IKEv2 peers are
   forced to use a traditional key exchange in IKE_SA_INIT whenever the
   PQC KEM exceeds the path MTU.  In deployments that do not implement
   traditional key exchange algorithms, such fallback is unacceptable.
   Absent reliable transport, PQC-only operation is therefore impossible
   when PQC key exchange payloads exceed the path MTU.  PQC-only
   deployments remain impossible for any PQC scheme whose keying
   material does not fit inside an unfragmented IKE_SA_INIT message,
   prolonging reliance on traditional key exchange algorithms far beyond
   their acceptable security horizon.  While functional, these
   mechanisms increase round-trip latency and add protocol complexity.

   Recent guidance, including that discussed in Section 13.3.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers], notes that protocol designs benefit
   from allowing a small number of known good configurations that make
   sense, instead of allowing arbitrary combinations of individual
   configuration choices that may interact in dangerous ways.  Allowing
   arbitrary combinations of traditional and PQC algorithms can lead to
   interactions that have not been thoroughly evaluated.  However, IKEv2
   does not currently follow this guidance as
   [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem] allows arbitrary combinations of DH
   groups and ML-KEM parameters through separate traditional and PQC
   negotiation paths, which may lead to untested or undesirable hybrid
   constructions and makes it difficult to enforce secure algorithm
   pairing.

   To address these issues, this document introduces:






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   *  PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange algorithms for IKEv2,
      representing single, fixed, known good combinations of traditional
      and PQC KEM algorithms.

   *  A combined KE payload format that carries both traditional and PQC
      components within a single payload.

   *  Leverages the IKEv2 reliable transport mechanism defined in
      [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport] so that IKEv2 peers
      can use TCP for large PQC key exchange messages.

   These updates remove the dependency on multi-round negotiation
   exchanges, eliminate the requirement to use traditional algorithms
   solely due to MTU limitations, reduce the risks associated with IP
   fragmentation of large PQC payloads, and provide a clear path for
   IKEv2 to operate securely and efficiently in a future where only PQC
   algorithms remain usable.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document uses terms defined in [RFC9794].  For the purposes of
   this document, it is helpful to be able to divide cryptographic
   algorithms into three classes:

   "Traditional asymmetric cryptographic algorithm": An asymmetric
   cryptographic algorithm based on integer factorisation, finite field
   discrete logarithms, elliptic curve discrete logarithms, or related
   mathematical problems.

   "Post-quantum asymmetric cryptographic algorithm": An asymmetric
   cryptographic algorithm that is intended to be secure against attacks
   using quantum computers as well as classical computers.

   "Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) hybrid scheme": A multi-algorithm
   scheme where at least one component algorithm is a post-quantum
   algorithm and at least one is a traditional algorithm.









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3.  Reliable Transport Requirements

   PQC-only deployments (i.e., deployments that do not implement any
   traditional key exchange algorithms) cannot rely on UDP for
   IKE_SA_INIT when the PQC key exchange payload exceeds the path MTU.
   In these deployments, fallback to UDP would prevent the use of a PQC-
   only key exchange.  Therefore, when a PQC-only key exchange method is
   offered or negotiated and the PQC key exchange payload exceeds the
   path MTU, the initiator MUST start IKE_SA_INIT over TCP, and peers
   MUST NOT fall back to UDP for IKE_SA_INIT.  This requirement follows
   from the reliable transport mechanism defined in
   [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport].

   PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange produces a combined KE payload
   that may or may not exceed the path MTU, depending on the specific
   algorithm combination.  When the combined KE payload exceeds the path
   MTU, the PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange MUST NOT be sent over
   UDP.  If TCP is supported, the initiator MAY migrate to TCP and use
   the PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange; otherwise, the initiator MUST
   use a PQ/T hybrid non-composite key exchange.

4.  PQ/T hybrid composite Key Exchange Algorithms

   This document defines PQ/T hybrid composite key-exchange methods that
   MUST be treated as single, atomic key-exchange identifier.  Because
   IKEv2 treats key-exchange methods (Transform Type 4) as opaque and
   does not define their internal processing (see Section 2.14 of
   [IKEv2]), each hybrid method specifies how its traditional and PQC
   shared secrets are combined.

   Each PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange algorithm implies:

   *  One traditional key exchange component

   *  One PQC KEM component

   *  One combined KE payload format

   *  A PQ/T hybrid key-exchange algorithm specific combiner (see
      Section 7)

   This document defines the following PQ/T hybrid composite key
   exchange algorithms:

   *  ecp256-mlkem768

   *  ecp384-mlkem1024




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   *  curve25519-mlkem768

   Each PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange algorithm is represented as a
   single Transform ID of type 4 (Key Exchange Method) and is negotiated
   as a whole.

5.  Combined Key Exchange Payload

   The KE payload carries both components of the PQ/T hybrid composite
   key exchange algorithm.  Specifically, the initiator includes its
   traditional key exchange public key together with its PQC KEM public
   key:

     KEi = Traditional-Key-Exchange-Public-Key || PQC-KEM-Public-Key

   The responder returns its traditional key exchange public key along
   with the PQC ciphertext:

     KEr = Traditional-Key-Exchange-Public-Key || PQC-Ciphertext

   Because both the traditional and post-quantum key exchange values are
   conveyed within a single exchange, no ADDKE transforms are
   negotiated.  Thus, the IKE_INTERMEDIATE and IKE_FOLLOWUP_KE exchanges
   are not needed for the purpose of key exchange, but peers can
   negotiate and use IKE_INTERMEDIATE for other purposes.

   The lengths of the traditional and PQC components are fixed and
   defined by the selected PQ/T hybrid composite Transform ID.  No
   additional length fields are included in the KE payload.

6.  Reliable Transport Negotiation

   PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange requires a reliable transport to
   avoid IP-layer fragmentation of large PQC key exchange values.
   Transport selection follows
   [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport].  The initiator MUST
   follow the rules in the scenarios below.

6.1.  SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS Negotiated

   If the initiator starts the IKE_SA_INIT exchange over TCP and
   includes a SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS Notify, and the responder also
   includes a SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS Notify, then the IKE SA is established
   using separate transports.  In this configuration, all IKE messages
   are sent over TCP.  ESP is sent over UDP (or directly over IP) if
   possible; if both UDP and IP are blocked, ESP is sent over TCP as
   described in [RFC9329].




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6.2.  No SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS

   If the initiator starts the IKE_SA_INIT exchange over TCP and the
   responder accepts the TCP transport but does not include a
   SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS Notify, then the IKE SA operates in the mode
   defined by [RFC9329].  In this configuration, both IKE messages and
   ESP traffic are carried over the same TCP connection.  PQ/T hybrid
   key exchange payloads can be sent in this configuration since the IKE
   messages are transported reliably.

7.  Hybrid Derivation

   Each PQ/T hybrid key exchange method defined in this document
   produces two independent shared secrets: one from the traditional
   component (K_T) and one from the PQC component (K_PQ).  Because IKEv2
   treats key exchange methods as opaque, the function that combines
   these secrets is defined per hybrid KE method.  The PQ/T hybrid key
   exchange methods in this document use the Universal Combiner defined
   in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems].  Note that in all PQ/T hybrid
   composite KE algorithms defined in this document, the PQC component
   is listed second in the algorithm name but is passed first to the
   Universal Combiner.

   Let:

   *  K_T = traditional ECDH shared secret

   *  K_PQ = post-quantum shared secret

   The combined secret is computed as:

     label      = "IKEv2-HYBRID-KE-v1"
     K_combined = UniversalCombiner(K_PQ, K_T, CT_PQ, "", PK_PQ,
                  PK_T, label)

   Where:

   *  K_PQ : PQC shared secret

   *  K_T : traditional shared secret

   *  CT_PQ : PQC ciphertext

   *  PK_PQ : PQC public key

   *  PK_T : traditional public key

   *  label : protocol-specific domain separation string



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   The traditional component does not produce a ciphertext; therefore,
   the ciphertext argument corresponding to the traditional component is
   the empty string.

   The SKEYSEED value is computed as:

     SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, K_combined)

   This replaces the g^ir shared secret defined in [IKEv2]; all other
   aspects of SKEYSEED computation remain unchanged.

   Once SKEYSEED is derived, the remainder of the IKEv2 key hierarchy is
   computed exactly as specified in [IKEv2].

   This construction aligns with the hybrid key exchange approach used
   in TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design], where traditional and post-
   quantum secrets are concatenated before key derivation to ensure
   security against both traditional and quantum adversaries.

8.  Example Message Flow

   This section illustrates an IKEv2 exchange using a PQ/T hybrid
   composite key exchange algorithm.  The initiator sends a combined KE
   payload containing both the traditional DH public key and the PQC
   public key.  The responder returns its DH public key together with
   the PQC ciphertext.

   The exchange is shown using TCP, negotiated using the IKEv2 reliable
   transport mechanism.  Both peers include the SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS
   Notify to indicate support for separate IKE and ESP transports.





















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 Initiator                                                   Responder
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------

   IKE_SA_INIT (over TCP)
   HDR, SAi1,
   N(SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS),
   KEi( DH_pub_i || PQC_pub_i ),
   Ni                                    --->

                                        <---  HDR, SAr1,
                                              N(SEPARATE_TRANSPORTS),
                                              KEr( DH_pub_r || PQC_ct ),
                                              Nr

   IKE_AUTH
   HDR, SK { IDi, AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr } --->

                                        <---  HDR, SK { IDr, AUTH, SAr2,
                                              TSi, TSr }

 Child SA established; ESP traffic uses UDP.
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------

9.  Security Considerations

   PQ/T hybrid composite key exchange algorithms reduce the risk of
   insecure or unintended algorithm combinations by ensuring that only
   well-defined, vetted pairs of traditional and PQC algorithms are
   used.  This prevents deployments from constructing ad-hoc hybrids
   that may provide weaker security than either component alone.

   As in standard IKEv2, the KE payload (including both the traditional
   and PQC components) is integrity-protected and authenticated during
   the IKE_AUTH exchange.  This protection prevents modification of
   either component by an active attacker.

   This document leverages the IKEv2 reliable transport mechanism to
   avoid IP-layer fragmentation of large PQC payloads.  Finally, by
   enabling a PQC-only key exchange within IKE_SA_INIT and by avoiding
   fallback to traditional key exchange due solely to MTU constraints,
   the mechanisms in this document ensure that IKEv2 remains secure and
   deployable even in environments where traditional algorithms have
   been deprecated or removed due to their vulnerability to quantum-
   capable adversaries.







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10.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to assign three new values for the PQ/T hybrid
   composite key exchange algorithm names "ecp256-mlkem768",
   "ecp384-mlkem1024", and "curve25519-mlkem768" in the IKEv2 "Transform
   Type 4 Key Exchange Method Transform IDs" registry and list this
   document as the reference.

      +========+======================+===========+
      | Number | Name                 | Reference |
      +========+======================+===========+
      |  TBD1  | ecp256-mlkem768      |[this RFC] |
      +--------+----------------------+-----------+
      |  TBD2  | ecp384-mlkem1024     |[this RFC] |
      +--------+----------------------+-----------+
      |  TBD3  | curve25519-mlkem768  |[this RFC] |
      +--------+----------------------+-----------+

   Table 1: Updates to the IANA "Transform Type 4 - Key Exchange Method Transform IDs" registry

Acknowledgments

   The authors thank Dan Wing for his contributions to this
   specification.

References

Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem]
              Kampanakis, P., "Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-
              KEM in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              ipsecme-ikev2-mlkem-03, 29 September 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-
              ikev2-mlkem-03>.

   [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport]
              Smyslov, V. and T. Reddy.K, "Separate Transports for IKE
              and ESP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport-00, 6 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-ipsecme-
              ikev2-reliable-transport-00>.

   [IKEv2]    Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
              Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
              (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7296>.



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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9329]  Pauly, T. and V. Smyslov, "TCP Encapsulation of Internet
              Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) and IPsec Packets", RFC 9329,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9329, November 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9329>.

Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers]
              Banerjee, A., Reddy.K, T., Schoinianakis, D., Hollebeek,
              T., and M. Ounsworth, "Post-Quantum Cryptography for
              Engineers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              pquip-pqc-engineers-14, 25 August 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-
              pqc-engineers-14>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]
              Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key
              exchange in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-16, 7 September 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              hybrid-design-16>.

   [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems]
              Connolly, D., Barnes, R., and P. Grubbs, "Hybrid PQ/T Key
              Encapsulation Mechanisms", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems-07, 20 October 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
              hybrid-kems-07>.

   [RFC9794]  Driscoll, F., Parsons, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for
              Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", RFC 9794,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9794, June 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9794>.

Authors' Addresses







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   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Nokia
   Bangalore
   Karnataka
   India
   Email: kondtir@gmail.com


   Valery Smyslov
   ELVIS-PLUS
   Russian Federation
   Email: svan@elvis.ru







































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