



Transport Layer Security                                      R. Housley
Internet-Draft                                            Vigil Security
Intended status: Standards Track                         5 February 2026
Expires: 9 August 2026


                   Using the MLS Handshake in TLS 1.3
                draft-housley-tls-using-mls-handshake-00

Abstract

   This document specifies an extension to the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 that allows TLS clients and servers to use
   the Message Layer Security (MLS) Protocol handshake to establish the
   shared secret instead to the traditional shared secret establishment
   mechanism.  The MLS protocol provides straightforward mechanism to
   update the shared secret that can be initiated by either the client
   or the server during the TLS session, and each epoch provides forward
   security and post-compromise security.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at TBD.  Status
   information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-housley-tls-using-mls-
   handshake/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer
   Security mailing list (mailto:tls@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/russhousley/draft-housley-tls-using-mls-handshake.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.





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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Motivation and Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Extension Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  The "tls_using_mls_handshake" Extension . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  MLS Handshake Messages  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  Establishing the Initial TLS Shared Secret with MLS . . .   8
     6.2.  Updating the TLS Shared Secret with MLS . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  Resumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   This document specifies an extension to the Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 [RFC9846] that allows TLS clients and
   servers to use the Message Layer Security (MLS) Protocol [RFC9420]
   handshake to establish the shared secret.  The resulting shared
   secret is used in the TLS key schedule to derive all of the
   cryptographic keying material for the TLS 1.3 protocol.  The MLS



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   protocol provides a straightforward mechanism to update the shared
   secret, and either the client or the server can initiate the update
   during the TLS session.  The period of time during which one shared
   secret is used is called an epoch.  An epoch provides forward
   security and post-compromise security.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Motivation and Design Rationale

   There are operational motivations and security motivations for using
   the MLS handshake to manage TLS shared secrets.

   An operational motivation is the straightforward mechanism for shared
   secret update that can be initiated by either the client or the
   server.  The initial shared secret is based on the client KeyPackage
   and the server Welcome, which are carried in the TLS 1.3 ClientHello
   and the ServerHello, respectively.  The KeyPackage and Welcome are
   specified in [RFC9420].  At any time during the TLS session, the
   client or server can update the keying material in their LeafNode of
   the MLS ratchet tree, which results in the computation of a fresh
   epoch, including a fresh TLS shared secret.  By discarding all stale
   secret values, each epoch provides forward security and post-
   compromise security.

   To apply the MLS protocol in TLS 1.3, the client provide a
   KeyPackage.  In MLS, the KeyPackages are distributed by the Delivery
   Service (DS), but in the TLS environment, the the client KeyPackage
   is sent directly to the server in an extension in the ClientHello
   message.  Once the TLS session is established, the client or server
   can provide an update to the keying material in their LeafNode in a
   mls_handshake message as specified in Section 6.  Each KeyPackage is
   intended to be used only once.  Reuse of KeyPackages can lead to
   replay attacks.

   A security motivation is the ability to obtain both forward secrecy
   and post-compromise security, especially for long-lived TLS sessions.
   Forward secrecy means that TLS records sent at a certain point in
   time are secure in the face of later compromise of a the peer.  Post-
   compromise security means that TLS records are secure even if the
   communicating peer was compromised at some point in the past.




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   Forward secrecy between epochs is provided by deleting private keys
   from past versions of the MLS ratchet tree, as this prevents old
   session secrets from being re-derived.  Forward secrecy within an
   epoch is possible with the MLS protocol, but that feature is not
   currently supported in TLS.

   Post-compromise security (PCS) is provided between epochs by the
   client or server regularly updating their leaf key in the MLS ratchet
   tree.  Updating their leaf key prevents shared secrets from
   continuing to be encrypted to public keys whose private keys had
   previously been compromised.

   Note that a client or server sending an update of the keying material
   for their LeafNode does not achieve PCS until the peer processes the
   MLS Commit.  That is, the PCS guarantees come into effect when the
   peer processes the relevant Commit, not when the sender creates it.

   This specification makes use of the two-party profile for MLS that is
   defined in [I-D.kohbrok-mls-two-party-profile].

4.  Extension Overview

   This section provides a brief overview of the
   "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension.

   The client includes the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension in the
   ClientHello message.  The "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension MUST
   contain the client KeyPackage.

   If the client includes both the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension
   and the "early_data" extension, then the server MUST terminate the
   connection with an "illegal_parameter" alert.

   If the server is willing to use MLS to establish the shared secret,
   then the server includes the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension in
   the ServerHello message.  The "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension
   MUST contain the Welcome message created by the server using the
   client KeyPackage.

   When the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension is successfully
   negotiated, the TLS 1.3 key schedule processing depends on the shared
   secret produced by the MLS ratchet tree and MLS key schedule.

   The server MUST validate the client KeyPackage.  KeyPackage
   validation depends on the GroupContext object, which captures MLS
   state:





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      struct {
          ProtocolVersion version = mls10;
          CipherSuite cipher_suite;
          opaque group_id<V>;
          uint64 epoch;
          opaque tree_hash<V>;
          opaque confirmed_transcript_hash<V>;
          Extension extensions<V>;
      } GroupContext;

   The fields in the MLS state have the following semantics for the TLS
   session:

   *  The cipher_suite is the cipher suite from the client KeyPackage,
      and the same cipher_suite MUST be used in the Welcome generated by
      the server.

   *  The group_id field is an application-defined identifier; it MUST
      contain "tls13".

   *  The epoch field represents the current version, starting with a
      value of 0x0000000000000000.

   *  The tree_hash field contains a commitment to the contents of the
      group's ratchet tree and the credentials for the members of the
      group, which are always only the TLS client and the TLS server.
      See Section 7.8 of [RFC9420] for details.

   *  The confirmed_transcript_hash field contains a running hash over
      the MLS messages that led to this state.  See Section 8.2 of
      [RFC9420] for details.

   *  The extensions field contains the details of any MLS protocol
      extensions that apply to the group.  See Section 12.1.7 of
      [RFC9420] for details.

   The server generates Welcome message, which MUST include an extension
   of type ratchet_tree to ensure that the client and the server have
   the same MLS ratchet tree.  In MLS the ratchet tree is often provided
   by the Delivery Service, which is not an option in TLS.  The Welcome
   message provides the client with the state of the group after it is
   created by the server:

      struct {
        CipherSuite cipher_suite;
        EncryptedGroupSecrets secrets<V>;
        opaque encrypted_group_info<V>;
      } Welcome;



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   See Section 12.4.3.1 of [RFC9420] for details regarding creations and
   processing of the Welcome message.

5.  The "tls_using_mls_handshake" Extension

   This section specifies the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension, which
   MAY appear in the ClientHello message and ServerHello message.  It
   MUST NOT appear in any other messages.  The "tls_using_mls_handshake"
   extension MUST NOT appear in the ServerHello message unless the
   "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension appeared in the preceding
   ClientHello message.  If an implementation recognizes the
   "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension and receives it in any other
   message, then the implementation MUST abort the handshake with an
   "illegal_parameter" alert.

   The general extension mechanisms enable clients and servers to
   negotiate the use of specific extensions.  Clients request extended
   functionality from servers with the extensions field in the
   ClientHello message.  If the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest
   message, then the client sends another ClientHello message as
   described in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC9846], including the same
   "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension as the original ClientHello
   message, or aborts the handshake.

   Many server extensions are carried in the EncryptedExtensions
   message; however, the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension is carried
   in the ServerHello message.  The "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension
   is only present in the ServerHello message if the server recognizes
   the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension and the server is willing to
   use MLS key management and authentication in lieu of the traditional
   TLS 1.3 key management and authentication.

   The Extension structure is defined in [RFC9846]; it is repeated here
   for convenience.

      struct {
        ExtensionType extension_type;
        opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>;
      } Extension;

   The "extension_type" identifies the particular extension type, and
   the "extension_data" contains information specific to the particular
   extension type.

   This document specifies the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension,
   adding one new type to ExtensionType:





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      enum {
       tls_using_mls_handshake(TBD0),
       (65535)
      } ExtensionType;

   The "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension is relevant when the client
   and server are willing to use the MLS protocol for key management and
   authentication.  The "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension provides the
   client KeyPackage and the server KeyPackage needed to build the MLS
   ratchet tress for the client and server.  The KeyPackage structure is
   defined in Section 10 of [RFC9420].  The "tls_using_mls_handshake"
   extension has the following syntax:

      struct {
        select (Handshake.msg_type) {
            case client_hello: KeyPackage;
            case server_hello: Welcome;
        };
      } TLSUsingMLSHandshake;

   The TLS client creates its own KeyPackage for inclusion in the
   ClientHello.  The KeyPackage includes a cipher suite and any MLS
   extensions that the client desires.

   If the TLS server supports MLS handshake, then the TLS server
   inspects KeyPackage from the ClientHello to determine whether the
   cipher suite is supported and acceptable, whether all of the client
   provided MLS extensions are supported and acceptable, and whether the
   client credential is valid.  If all of these checks are successful,
   then the TLS server creates the MLS group and sends the Welcome
   message in the ServerHello.

6.  MLS Handshake Messages

   If the "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension is successfully
   negotiated, then the client and the server can update the keying
   material in their LeafNode by encapsulating inside a TLS handshake
   message with a "mls_handshake" type.  Only the MLS Commit message is
   needed to achieve this capability, but any MLS handshake message
   could be carried in this TLS handshake message to ensure future
   compatibility.

      enum {
        mls_handshake(TBD1),
        (255)
      } HandshakeType;





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   In the TLS protocol, the "mls_handshake" message encapsulates one of
   the MLS Handshake messages specified in
   [I-D.kohbrok-mls-two-party-profile] for key update or resumption.
   When updating the keying material in the MLS LeafNode, the Commit
   message MUST include the update by value.  The TwoPartyMLSMessage
   types are:

      struct {
        ProtocolVersion version = mls10;
        uint16 tpmlsmt;
        select (TwoPartyMLSMessage.tpmlsmt) {
            case mls_connection_update:
                Commit commit;
            case mls_epoch_key_update:
                uint64 epoch;
            case mls_resumption_request:
                Commit commit;
            case mls_resumption_response:
                Commit commit;
        };
      } TwoPartyMLSMessage;

   The format for each message is defined in [RFC9420].

   Since the TLS environment does not include a Delivery Service, the
   MLS Commit message MUST contain the proposal to be applied by value
   as specified in Section 12.4 of [RFC9420].

6.1.  Establishing the Initial TLS Shared Secret with MLS

   The TLS server creates the MLS group, add it adds the client with the
   KeyPackage provided in the ClientHello, which results in a group of
   two members.  The server send the Welcome message to the client in
   the ServerHello.  The Welcome can include any MLS extensions that are
   supported by the client KeyPackage.

   Upon successful completion of the MLS handshake, the exporter_secret
   produced by the MLS key schedule is used to derive the TLS shared
   secret, this value is referred to as the "Handshake Secret" in
   [RFC9846].  The TLS shared secret is derived as:

      MLS-Exporter(Label, Context, Length) =
          ExpandWithLabel(DeriveSecret(exporter_secret,
              "TLS shared secret"), "exported",
              Hash(Context), Length)

   Note: Length is the size of the TLS shared secret to be input into
   the TLS key schedule.



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6.2.  Updating the TLS Shared Secret with MLS

   After the initial MLS handshake is successfully completed or a
   session is resumed, the client or the server can update the session
   key using a Commit message, which results in a new TLS shared secret.
   Once the new MLS key schedule is computed, a fresh "Handshake Secret"
   is exported to compute a new TLS key schedule.

   To enforce the forward secrecy and post-compromise security, the
   client and the server periodically update the keys that represent
   them to the MLS group by sending a Commit message that includes an
   Update by value for their own LeafNode.  See Section 12.1.2 of
   [RFC9420] for details.

   Once the Commit message is sent, some traffic using the previous
   keying material might still be in flight.  Once traffic using the new
   keying material is received, then the stale keying material can
   safely be discarded.

   The following illustrates the update of the TLS shared secret.

   Client                            Server
   (Initiator)                       (Responder)

     /------------------------------------------\
    |            Initial Handshake               |
     \------------------------------------------/

   [Application Data]N    -------->
                          <-------- [Application Data]N

     /------------------------------------------\
    |             Some time later ...            |
     \------------------------------------------/

   mls_connection_update  -------->

                                    # no epoch change yet
                          <-------- [Application Data]N
                                    # confirms epoch change
                          <-------- mls_epoch_key_update=N+1
                          <-------- [Application Data]N+1
   [Application Data]N+1  -------->
                          <-------- [Application Data]N+1

   Legend:

       []N Indicates messages protected with keys derived from epoch N



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6.3.  Resumption

   After the initial MLS handshake is successfully completed, a session
   can resume as long as the client and server have retained the MLS
   group state.  The normal TLS 1.3 resumption process is described in
   Section 2.2 of [RFC9846].

   To cryptographically separate the resumed session from the original
   session and ensure forward secrecy and post-compromise security, the
   client and the server each update their nodes in the MLS ratchet tree
   with a Commit message.

   If the client had sent a Update before the TLS session was
   disconnected, and the client was waiting for a EpochKeyUpdate, then
   the client MUST use that pending Update message as the basis for the
   Commit message.

   If the server had sent a Update before the TLS session was
   disconnected, and the server was waiting for a EpochKeyUpdate, then
   the server MUST use that pending Update message as the basis for the
   Commit message.

   The following illustrates the update of the TLS shared secret after
   resumption.



























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   Client                            Server
   (Initiator)                       (Responder)

     /------------------------------------------\
    |             Initial Handshake              |
     \------------------------------------------/

   [Application Data]N    -------->
                          <-------- [Application Data]N

     /------------------------------------------\
    |  Disconnect and resume some time later ... |
     \------------------------------------------/

   mls_resumption_request -------->
                          <-------- mls_resumption_response
                                    # confirms epoch changes
                          <-------- [Application Data]N+2
   [Application Data]N+2  -------->
                          <-------- [Application Data]N+2

   Legend:

       []N Indicates messages protected with keys derived from epoch N

7.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations in [RFC9846] and [RFC9420] apply.

8.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to update the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry
   [IANA-TLS-EXT] to include "tls_using_mls_handshake" with a value of
   TBD0 and the list of messages "CH, SH" in which the
   "tls_using_mls_handshake" extension is allowed to appear.

   IANA is requested to update the "TLS HandshakeType Values" registry
   [IANA-TLS-HS] to include "mls_handshake" with a value of TBD1, a
   DTLS-OK value of "Y", and a Reference to this document (once it is
   published as an RFC).

   IANA is requested to update the "MLS Exporter Labels" registry
   [IANA-MLS-EL] to include "TLS shared secret", a Recommended value of
   "N", and a Reference to this document (once it is published as an
   RFC).

9.  References




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9.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.kohbrok-mls-two-party-profile]
              Kohbrok, K. and R. Robert, "A two-party profile for MLS",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-kohbrok-mls-two-
              party-profile-00, 3 February 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kohbrok-mls-
              two-party-profile-00>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9420]  Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J.,
              Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer
              Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420,
              July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420>.

   [RFC9846]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 9846, February 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9846>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [IANA-MLS-EL]
              IANA, "TMLS Exporter Labels", n.d.,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/mls/mls.xhtml#mls-
              exporter-labels>.

   [IANA-TLS-EXT]
              IANA, "TLS ExtensionType Values", n.d.,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-
              values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml>.

   [IANA-TLS-HS]
              IANA, "TLS HandshakeType Values", n.d.,
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
              parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-7>.

Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Sean Turner, Raphael Robert, and Konrad Kohbrok for
   providing constructive comments.



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Author's Address

   Russ Housley
   Vigil Security, LLC
   Email: housley@vigilsec.com














































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