



MOQ                                                          C. Jennings
Internet-Draft                                             S. Nandakumar
Intended status: Informational                              R. L. Barnes
Expires: 1 January 2026                                            Cisco
                                                            30 June 2025


                End-to-end Security for Media over QUIC
                     draft-jennings-moq-e2ee-mls-03

Abstract

   The Media over QUIC system allows relays to assist in the delivery of
   real-time media.  While these relays are trusted to facilitate media
   delivery, they are not trusted to access the media content.  The
   document describes an end-to-end security system that prevents relays
   from accessing media content.  MLS is used to establish keys that are
   available only to legitimate participants in a session, which are
   then used to protect media data using SFrame.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   The latest revision of this draft can be found at
   https://suhashere.github.io/moq-e2ee-mls.  Status information for
   this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-
   jennings-moq-e2ee-mls/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Media over QUIC
   Working Group mailing list (mailto:moq@ietf.org), which is archived
   at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/moq/.  Subscribe at
   https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/moq/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/suhasHere/moq-e2ee-mls.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.





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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 January 2026.

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   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Security Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Lifecycle of a Security Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Group Management  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Join and Leave Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.2.  HTTPS-based Coordination Service  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Optimizations for Large Groups  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  Media Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Key Roll-Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

   The Media over QUIC (MOQ) system allows relays to assist in the
   delivery of real-time media.  While these relays are trusted to
   facilitate media delivery, they are not trusted to access the media
   content.  This distinction is especially important in the more
   flexible relay topology that MOQ envisions, where a client might
   enlist a local relay to assist in media distribution, having no prior



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   relationship with this relay.

   The document describes an end-to-end security system that prevents
   relays from accessing media content.  MOQ tracks are associated to
   "security groups" so that content in the track can only be accessed
   by clients that are part of the security group.  Security groups also
   allow clients to authenticate one anothers' identities, so that any
   client can verify that there are no unauthorized parties in the
   security group.

   To create these security groups, we rely on two widely deployed
   security technologies: MLS for group key exchange and SFrame for
   lightweight media encryption [MLS] [SFrame].  The security group
   maintains an MLS group that establishes the identities of group
   members and sets up shared secrets.  The MLS messages required to
   keep MLS state up to date as clients join and leave are primarily
   distributed over MOQ.  The only additional infrastructure required is
   a coordination service that can be provided either by a decentralized
   algorithm or a lightweight HTTPS service.  Media is protected from
   relays simply by adding a layer of SFrame encryption, using keys
   derived from the MLS group.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document makes extensive use of terminology from MOQT, MLS, and
   SFrame [MOQT] [MLS] [SFrame].  The few data structures we define use
   the TLS presentation syntax, defined in Section 3 of [RFC8446], with
   the optional extension defined in Section 2.1.1 of [MLS].

   We introduce the following terms:

   Security group:  A logical grouping of clients that provides
      cryptographic security services to MOQ tracks.

   Coordination service:  A logical service that coordinates the
      operations required to maintain a security group.









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3.  Protocol Overview

   In the Media over QUIC Transport (MOQT), media streams are arranged
   in tracks, each of which carries many individual media objects.  This
   document adds a notion of "security groups", each of which is used to
   protect one or more MOQT tracks.  (Each track has at most one
   security group.)

3.1.  Security Groups

   Logically, a security group is a set of clients with the following
   properties:

   *  Each client can authenticate the identity of every other client.

   *  Each client can encrypt media that can be decrypted by every other
      client.

   A security group is represented on a client an MLS group and an
   SFrame context.  The MLS group stores information about the other
   clients pariticipating in the security group, and information to
   facilitate updating the group's secrets as clients join and leave.
   The SFrame context uses secrets produced by the MLS group to perform
   encryption and decryption operations.

   To facilitate the MLS interactions required to maintain the security
   group, the group must have access to a Coordination Service (CS).
   This function is shown as a discrete role below, but could be
   provided either by a centralized service or by a decentralized
   algorithm.  For example, MLS requires exactly one Commit message per
   epoch of the group; in this system, the CS decides which Commit will
   be sent to group members.  The structure of the CS is not defined
   here, except for one notional design in Section 4.2.

   A security group needs to be configured with three tracks:

   CommitTrack:  A track on which MLS Commit messages will be sent to
      the group.

   RequestTrack:  A track on which members attempting to join/leave will
      send requests for action by other members of the group.

   WelcomeTrack:  A track on which MLS Welcome messages will be sent to
      new joiners.

   All members of the security group subscribe to the CommitTrack so
   that they can keep up to date on the state of the group.
   "Committers", members who might make Commits to add or remove other



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   members subscribe to the RequestTrack in order to learn what work
   needs to be done.  New joiners subscribe to the WelcomeTrack
   temporarily, so that they can get the Welcome information they need
   to join the group, then they unsubscribe.

3.2.  Lifecycle of a Security Group

   Figure 1 summarizes the interactions involved in managing a security
   group.

   Joiner <----------------------.
      |                           | Welcome
      | JoinRequest               |
      |                    +------+-------+
      +------------------->| Coordination |<---------------+
      |                    +---+-------+--+     Commit +   |
      |                        |       |        Welcome    |
      |                     Commit  Request                |
      |                        |       |                   |
      |                      .-+-.     |                   |
      |                     |     |    |                   |
      |    .----------------|-----|---' '----------.       |
      |   |                 |     |                 |      |
      |   |                 |     |                 |      |
      |   V                 |     |                 V      |
      | +---+               |     |               +---+    |
      | | A |<-------.-----'|     |'-----.------->| H +----+
      | +---+       |       |     |       |       +---+
      |             |       |     |       |
      |             V       |     |       V
      |           +---+     |     |     +---+
      +-----------+ B |     |     |     | G |
   LeaveRequest   +---+     |     |     +---+
                            |     |
                  +---+     |     |     +---+
                  | C |<---'|     |'--->| F |
                  +---+     |     |     +---+
                            V     V
                          +---+ +---+
                          | D | | E |
                          +---+ +---+

                  Figure 1: Overview of E2EE Coordination








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   The life of the security group begins when the first client seeks to
   join, say client A.  Like any other joiner, A subscribes to the
   CommitTrack and the WelcomeTrack.  A has been informed out of band
   that they will act as a committer, so A also commits to the
   RequestTrack.

   When A sends a request to join the group, the CS informs A that the
   group does not yet exist.  A then locally creates a one-member group.

   # A joins
   A->Relay: SUBSCRIBE(CommitTrack)
   A->Relay: SUBSCRIBE(WelcomeTrack)
   A->Relay: SUBSCRIBE(RequestTrack)
   A -> CS: JoinRequest
   CS -> A: Error(Group does not exist)
   A: <Creates group, epoch=0>
   A->Relay: UNSUBSCRIBE(WelcomeTrack)

   When B joins, their JoinRequest is instead forwarded to the
   RequestTrack, and thus to A.  A creates a Welcome message that adds B
   to the group, and a Commit message that updates current members of
   the group.  A sends the Commit and the Welcome to the CS, who
   forwards the Welcome to the WelcomeTrack (and thus to B), and the
   Commit on the CommitTrack.

   When B receives the Welcome, it can initiate its MLS state.  When A
   receives their Commit back, they know that their Commit has been
   selected by the CS, and thus that it is safe to update to the next
   epoch, which includes B.

   At the end of this process, A and B are now both members of the
   security group.  They can authenticate each other, and they share
   secret keys that they can use to encrypt media tracks associated to
   this security group.

















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   # B joins
   B: SUBSCRIBE(CommitTrack)
   B: SUBSCRIBE(WelcomeTrack)
   B -> CS: JoinRequest
   CS -> RequestTrack: JoinRequest
   RequestTrack -> A: JoinRequest
   A -> CS: Commit + Welcome
   CS -> WelcomeTrack: Welcome
   CS -> CommitTrack: Commit

   WelcomeTrack -> B: Welcome
   B: <Uses Welcome to initialize state, epoch=1>
   B->Relay: UNSUBSCRIBE(WelcomeTrack)

   CommitTrack -> A: Commit
   A: <Processes Commit, epoch=1>

   The join process for subsequent members unfolds in the same way: A
   request to join results in a Commit and Welcome from an existing
   member, which are distributed to the group and the joiner.  The only
   difference is that now there are members of the group other than the
   joiner and the committer.  These passive members simply apply the
   Commits as they arrive.

   # C joins
   C->Relay: SUBSCRIBE(CommitTrack)
   C->Relay: SUBSCRIBE(WelcomeTrack)
   C -> CS: JoinRequest
   CS -> RequestTrack: JoinRequest
   RequestTrack -> A: JoinRequest
   A -> CS: Commit + Welcome
   CS -> WelcomeTrack: Welcome
   CS -> CommitTrack: Commit

   WelcomeTrack -> C: Welcome
   C: <Uses Welcome to initialize state, epoch=2>
   C->Relay: UNSUBSCRIBE(WelcomeTrack)

   CommitTrack -> A: Commit
   A: <Processes Commit, epoch=2>

   CommitTrack -> B: Commit
   B: <Processes Commit, epoch=2>

   A member leaving works similarly.  The member sends a LeaveRequest to
   the CS, who forwards it on the RequestTrack.  Another member
   generates a Commit that removes the leaving member; no Welcome is
   needed in this case.



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   # B Leaves
   B->Relay: UNSUBSCRIBE(CommitTrack)
   B -> CS: LeaveRequest
   CS -> RequestTrack: LeaveRequest
   RequestTrack -> A: LeaveRequest
   A -> CS: Commit
   CS -> CommitTrack: Commit

   WelcomeTrack -> C: Commit
   B: <Processes Commit, epoch=3>

   CommitTrack -> A: Commit
   A: <Processes Commit, epoch=3>

4.  Group Management

   A security group is managed using three tracks and a Coordination
   Service (CS).

   All members of the group subscribe to the CommitTrack.  Each object
   sent on this track contains an MLS PrivateMessage object, with
   content type commit.  The MOQT group ID for this object MUST be the
   epoch number in which the Commit is sent.  The MOQT object ID for
   this object MUST be zero.  When a client receives an object on the
   CommitTrack, it applies the enclosed Commit to its local MLS state in
   order to advance to the next epoch.

   Members of the group that might make Commits subscribe to the
   RequestTrack.  Each object sent on this track contains a Request
   object in the format described in Section 4.1.  The MOQT group ID and
   object ID for objects sent within this track are set by the CS.

   Clients seeking to join the group subscribe to the WelcomeTrack.
   Each object sent in this track contains an MLS Welcome object.  A
   client uses information in the Welcome to detect with one is intended
   for them, and ignores others.  The MOQT group ID and object ID for
   objects sent within this track are set by the CS.

   The CS must present two interfaces:

   *  A *request interface* that clients can use to ask to join and
      leave the group.  If a request is accepted, it is forwarded on the
      RequestTrack.








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   *  A *commit interface* that allows a group member to submit an MLS
      Commit that changes the state of the group, together with an
      optional MLS Welcome message that adds any new members.  If a
      Commit+Welcome is accepted, the Commit is forwarded on the
      CommitTrack and the Welcome (if present) is forwarded on the
      WelcomeTrack.

4.1.  Join and Leave Requests

   A client requests to join a group by submitting an MLS KeyPackage
   object.  This object provides the information that a group member
   needs to add the new client to the group.

   A client requests to leave a group by submitting an MLS SelfRemove
   proposal that proposes the client's own removal
   [I-D.ietf-mls-extensions].  This proposal MUST be sent within an MLS
   PrivateMessage structure to allow other clients to verify its
   authenticity.

   struct {
       RequestType request_type;
       switch (request_type) {
           case join:
               KeyPackage key_package;
           case leave:
               PrivateMessage remove;
       }
   } Request;

4.2.  HTTPS-based Coordination Service

   This section describes a simple HTTPS-based CS.  The CS has two HTTP
   endpoints, a request endpoint and a commit endpoint.  The only state
   that the CS keeps is the current epoch, which is initally set to an
   unknown value.

   The request endpoint accepts POST requests from clients.  The body of
   the POST request MUST be a Request object in the format defined in
   Section 4.1.  The response to a request indicates the disposition of
   the request using an HTTP status code:

   200 (OK):  The group exists, and the request has been accepted and
      forwarded on the RequestTrack for the group.

   201 (Created):  The group did not exist prior to this request.  The
      CS has updated its internal epoch counter to 0, and the requestor
      should locally create a one-member group.




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   The CS MUST ensure that only one client receives a 201 response per
   group.  If the CS receives initial requests from two clients
   simultaneously, it MUST return 201 to one of them and 200 to the
   other, and perform the corresponding actions.

   The commit endpoint accepts POST requests from clients.  The body of
   the POST request MUST be a CommitRequest object of the following
   form:

   struct {
       PrivateMessage commit;
       optional<Welcome> welcome;
   } CommitRequest;

   The response to a request indicates the disposition of the request
   using an HTTP status code:

   200 (OK):  The group exists and the CS's internal epoch counter
      matches the epoch value in the PrivateMessage commit.  The commit
      data has been forwarded on the CommitTrack and the welcome data,
      if present, has been forwarded on the WelcomeTrack.  The CS has
      incremented its internal epoch counter by one.

   409 (Conflict):  The group exists and the CS's internal epoch counter
      does not match the epoch value in the PrivateMessage commit.  No
      further action has been taken.

4.3.  Optimizations for Large Groups

   MOQT sessions are envisioned to include large numbers of clients.  In
   such settings, MLS Commit and Welcome messages can become large,
   slowing down MLS operations and potentially causing gaps in media.
   Commit messages can be optimized from linear size to constant size at
   the expense of putting more processing in the CS
   [I-D.mularczyk-mls-splitcommit].  Welcome messages can be similarly
   optimized, but only by reducing the authentication guarantees that
   clients receive [I-D.kiefer-mls-partial].

5.  Media Protection

   In a track with an assiciated security group, each object contains an
   SFrame ciphertext, as specified in [SFrame].  A media sender applies
   SFrame encryption immediately before sending the object; the
   plaintext encapsulated in the ciphertext is the data that would have
   been sent in the object if a security group were not associated.






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   SFrame parameters are set using the MLS-based key management
   framewrok described in Section 5.2 of [RFC9605].  This scheme
   automatically sets the SFrame KID and CTR values based on the
   sender's MLS state, and automatically derives per-sender keys and
   nonces.

   The metadata input to SFrame computations comprises the unique MOQT
   identifier for the object, namely the track namespace, track name,
   group ID, and object ID.

      TODO: Define a serialization for the metadata.

5.1.  Key Roll-Over

      TODO: In practice, it has been useful to have coordinated key
      roll-over, where clients report that they have received a new key
      and wait for a quorum before starting to encrypt with it.

6.  Security Considerations

      TODO: Document security properties, in particular the significance
      of forward secrecy and post-compromise security in this setting.
      Note that these properties do not take effect until the media keys
      have rolled over.

      TODO: Define some sort of identity story.  How might clients
      authenticate one another?  Does this interact with the MOQ
      authorization story?

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [MLS]      Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J.,
              Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer
              Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420,
              July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420>.

   [MOQT]     Nandakumar, S., Vasiliev, V., Swett, I., and A. Frindell,
              "Media over QUIC Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-moq-transport-12, 23 June 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-moq-
              transport-12>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.



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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9605]  Omara, E., Uberti, J., Murillo, S. G., Barnes, R., Ed.,
              and Y. Fablet, "Secure Frame (SFrame): Lightweight
              Authenticated Encryption for Real-Time Media", RFC 9605,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9605, August 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9605>.

   [SFrame]   Omara, E., Uberti, J., Murillo, S. G., Barnes, R., Ed.,
              and Y. Fablet, "Secure Frame (SFrame): Lightweight
              Authenticated Encryption for Real-Time Media", RFC 9605,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9605, August 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9605>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-mls-extensions]
              Robert, R., "The Messaging Layer Security (MLS)
              Extensions", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              mls-extensions-06, 19 February 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mls-
              extensions-06>.

   [I-D.kiefer-mls-partial]
              Kiefer, F., Bhargavan, K., Barnes, R., Joël, and M.
              Mularczyk, "Partial MLS", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-kiefer-mls-partial-00, 28 June 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kiefer-mls-
              partial-00>.

   [I-D.mularczyk-mls-splitcommit]
              Joël and M. Mularczyk, "MLS Split Commits", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-mularczyk-mls-splitcommit-
              00, 21 October 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-mularczyk-
              mls-splitcommit-00>.

Authors' Addresses

   Cullen Jennings
   Cisco
   Email: fluffy@cisco.com



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   Suhas Nandakumar
   Cisco
   Email: snandaku@cisco.com


   Richard L. Barnes
   Cisco
   Email: rlb@ipv.sx











































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