



DNSOP Working Group                                         P. Thomassen
Internet-Draft                     SSE - Secure Systems Engineering GmbH
Updates: 7344, 7477 (if approved)                          1 August 2025
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: 2 February 2026


          Clarifications on CDS/CDNSKEY and CSYNC Consistency
                  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-08

Abstract

   Maintenance of DNS delegations requires occasional changes of the DS
   and NS record sets on the parent side of the delegation.  For the
   case of DS records, RFC 7344 provides automation by allowing the
   child to publish CDS and/or CDNSKEY records holding the prospective
   DS parameters which the parent can ingest.  Similarly, RFC 7477
   specifies CSYNC records to indicate a desired update of the
   delegation's NS (and glue) records.  Parent-side entities (e.g.
   Registries, Registrars) can query these records from the child and,
   after validation, use them to update the parent-side RRsets of the
   delegation.

   This document specifies that when performing such queries, parent-
   side entities MUST ensure that updates triggered via CDS/CDNSKEY and
   CSYNC records are consistent across the child's authoritative
   nameservers, before taking any action based on these records.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 February 2026.







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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Updates to RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Processing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  CDS and CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  CSYNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Failure Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     A.1.  DS Breakage due to Replication Lag  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     A.2.  Escalation of Lame Delegation Takeover  . . . . . . . . .  10
     A.3.  Multi-Provider (Permanent Multi-Signer) . . . . . . . . .  10
       A.3.1.  DS Breakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       A.3.2.  NS Breakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.4.  Bogus Provider Change (Temporary Multi-Signer)  . . . . .  11
   Appendix B.  Change History (to be removed before publication)  .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   [RFC7344] automates DNSSEC delegation trust maintenance by having the
   child publish CDS and/or CDNSKEY records which hold the prospective
   DS parameters.  Similarly, [RFC7477] specifies CSYNC records
   indicating a desired update of the delegation's NS and associated
   glue records.  Parent-side entities (e.g. Registries, Registrars) can
   use these records to update the corresponding records of the



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   delegation.

   For ingesting CSYNC records, [RFC7477] Section 3.1 advocates that
   Parental Agents limit queries to just one authoritative nameserver
   (as typically done in normal resolution).  The corresponding
   Section 6.1 of [RFC7344] (CDS/CDNSKEY) contains no provision for how
   specifically queries for these records should be done.

   Retrieving records from just one authoritative server (e.g., by
   directing queries towards a trusted validating resolver) works fine
   when all is in order.  However, problems may arise if CDS/CDNSKEY/
   CSYNC record sets are inconsistent across authoritative nameservers,
   either because they are out of sync (e.g., during a KSK rollover), or
   because they are not controlled by the same entity (e.g., in a multi-
   signer setup [RFC8901]).

   In such cases, if CDS/CDNSKEY/CSYNC records are retrieved from one
   nameserver only ("naively", without a consistency check), each
   nameserver can unilaterally trigger an update of the delegation's DS
   or NS record set.

   For example, a single provider in a multi-signer setup may
   (accidentally or maliciously) cause another provider's trust anchors
   and/or nameservers to be removed from the delegation.  This can occur
   both when the multi-signer configuration is temporary (during a
   provider change) and when it is permanent (for redundancy).  In any
   case, a single provider should not be in the position to remove the
   other providers' records from the delegation.

   Similar breakage can occur when the delegation has lame nameservers,
   where an attacker may illegitimately initialize a DS record set and
   then manipulate the delegation's NS record set at will.  More
   detailed examples are given in Appendix A.

   For a CDS/CDNSKEY/CSYNC consumer, it is generally impossible to
   estimate the impact of a requested delegation update unless all of
   the child's authoritative nameservers are inspected.  At the same
   time, applying an automated delegation update "MUST NOT break the
   current delegation" ([RFC7344], Section 4.1), i.e., it MUST NOT
   hamper availability or validatability of the Child's resolution.

   This document therefore specifies that parent-side entities need to
   ensure that the updates indicated by CDS/CDNSKEY and CSYNC record
   sets are plausibly consistent across the child's nameservers, before
   taking any action based on these records.

   Readers are expected to be familiar with DNSSEC, including [RFC4033],
   [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC6781], [RFC7344], [RFC7477], and [RFC8901].



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1.1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

1.2.  Terminology

   Multi-provider setup:  A constellation where several providers
      independently operate authoritative DNS service for a domain,
      usually for purposes of redundancy.  This includes setups both
      with and without DNSSEC.
   Multi-signer setup:  A multi-provider setup for a DNSSEC-enabled
      domain with multiple independent signing entities [RFC8901].  Such
      a setup may be permanent (for redundancy) or temporary (for
      continuity of DNSSEC operation while changing the provider of a
      domain that normally uses a single one).

   Otherwise, the terminology in this document is as defined in
   [RFC7344].

2.  Updates to RFCs

   [RFC7344] Section 4.1 lists acceptance rules for CDS/CDNSKEY records.
   This list is extended with the consistency requirements defined in
   this document.

   [RFC7477] Sections 3.1 and 4.2 have logic for deciding from which
   nameserver to query CSYNC information.  This logic is replaced with
   the CSYNC consistency requirements defined in this document.

3.  Processing Requirements

   Consistency requirements that apply equally to CDS/CDNSKEY and CSYNC
   are listed first; type-specific consistency criteria are described in
   separate subsections.

   In order to determine plausible consistency of CDS/CDNSKEY or CSYNC
   RRsets across the child's nameservers, the Parental Agent MUST fetch
   all IP addresses for each nameserver hostname as listed in the
   Child's delegation from the Parent, using a validating resolver at
   one vantage point, and including glue records if available.  Before
   acting on any CDS/CDNSKEY or CSYNC record for the child, the Parental
   Agent MUST have established plausible consistency by querying all of
   these IP addresses for the record set(s) in question, as per the
   guidelines spelled in the following subsections.



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   In all cases, consistency is REQUIRED across received responses only.
   (A NODATA response is a received response.)

   When a response cannot be obtained from a given nameserver, the
   Parental Agent SHOULD attempt to obtain it at a later time, before
   concluding that the nameserver is permanently unreachable and
   removing it from consideration.  A retry schedule with exponential
   back-off is RECOMMENDED (such as after 5, 10, 20, 40, ... minutes).
   To sidestep localized routing issues, the Parental Agent MAY also
   attempt contacting the nameserver from another vantage point.

   If an inconsistent state is encountered, the Parental Agent MUST
   abort the operation.  Specifically, it MUST NOT delete or alter any
   existing RRset that would have been deleted or altered, and MUST NOT
   create any RRsets that would have been created, had the nameservers
   given consistent responses.

   To accommodate transient inconsistencies (e.g. replication delays),
   the Parental Agent MAY retry the full process, repeating all queries.
   A schedule with exponential back-off is RECOMMENDED.

   Any pending queries can immediately be dequeued when encountering a
   response that confirms the status quo, either implicitly (NODATA) or
   explicitly.  This is because any subsequent responses could only
   confirm that nothing needs to happen, or give an inconsistent result
   in which case nothing needs to happen.  Queries MAY be continued
   across all nameservers for reporting purposes.

   Existing requirements for ensuring integrity remain in effect.  In
   particular, DNSSEC signatures MUST be requested and validated for all
   queries unless otherwise noted.

3.1.  CDS and CDNSKEY

   To retrieve a Child's CDS/CDNSKEY RRset for DNSSEC delegation trust
   maintenance, the Parental Agent, knowing both the Child zone name and
   its NS hostnames, MUST ascertain that queries are made against all
   (reachable) nameservers listed in the Child's delegation from the
   Parent, and ensure that each key referenced in any of the received
   answers is also referenced in all other received responses.

   In other words, CDS/CDNSKEY records at the Child zone apex MUST be
   fetched directly from each (reachable) authoritative server as
   determined by the delegation's NS record set.  When a key is
   referenced in a CDS record set but not the CDNSKEY record set (or
   vice versa), or returned by one nameserver but is missing from at
   least one other nameserver's answer, the CDS/CDNSKEY state MUST be
   considered inconsistent.



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   During initial DS provisioning (DNSSEC bootstrapping), conventional
   DNSSEC validation for CDS/CDNSKEY responses is not (yet) available;
   in this case, authenticated bootstrapping ([RFC9615]) should be used.

3.2.  CSYNC

   A CSYNC-based workflow generally consists of (1) querying the CSYNC
   (and possibly SOA) record to determine which data records shall be
   synchronized from child to parent, and (2) querying for these data
   records (e.g. NS), before placing them in the parent zone.  If the
   below conditions are not met during these steps, the CSYNC state MUST
   be considered inconsistent.

   When querying the CSYNC record, the Parental Agent MUST ascertain
   that queries are made against all (reachable) nameservers listed in
   the Child's delegation from the Parent, and ensure that the record's
   immediate flag and type bitmap are equal across received responses.

   The CSYNC record's SOA serial field and soaminimum flag might
   legitimately differ across nameservers (such as in multi-provider
   setups); equality is thus not required across responses.  Instead,
   for a given response, processing of these values MUST occur with
   respect to the SOA record as obtained from the same nameserver.  If
   the resulting per-nameserver assessments of whether the update is
   permissible do not all agree, the CSYNC state MUST be considered
   inconsistent.

   Further, when retrieving the data record sets as indicated in the
   CSYNC record (such as NS or A/AAAA records), the Parental Agent MUST
   ascertain that all queries are made against all (reachable)
   nameservers listed in the delegation, and ensure that all return
   responses with equal rdata sets (including all empty).

   Other CSYNC processing rules from [RFC7477] Section 3 remain in place
   without modification.  For example, when the NS type flag is present,
   associated NS processing has to occur before potential glue updates
   to ensure that glue addresses match the right set of nameservers.
   Also, when the type bitmap contains the A/AAAA flags, corresponding
   address queries are only to be sent for NS hostnames "that are in
   bailiwick", while out-of-bailiwick NS records are ignored.  For
   details, see [RFC7477] Sections 3.2.2 and Section 4.3.

   CSYNC-based updates may cause validation or even insecure resolution
   to break (e.g. by changing the delegation to a set of nameservers
   that do not serve required DNSKEY records or do not know the zone at
   all).  Parental Agents SHOULD check that CSYNC-based updates, if
   applied, do not break the delegation.




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4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

5.  Security Considerations

   The level of rigor mandated by this document is needed to prevent
   publication of half-baked DS or delegation NS RRsets (authorized only
   under an insufficient subset of authoritative nameservers), ensuring
   that a single operator cannot unilaterally modify the delegation (add
   or remove trust anchors or nameservers) when other operators are
   present.  This applies both when the setup is intentional and when it
   is unintentional (such as in the case of lame delegation hijacking).

   As a consequence, the delegation's records can only be modified when
   zones are synchronized across operators, unanimously reflecting the
   domain owner's intentions.  Both availability and integrity of the
   domain's DNS service benefit from this policy.

   In order to resolve situations in which consensus about child zone
   contents cannot be reached (e.g. because one of the nameserver
   operators is uncooperative), Parental Agents SHOULD continue to
   accept DS and NS/glue update requests from the domain owner via an
   authenticated out-of-band channel (such as EPP [RFC5730]),
   irrespective of the adoption of automated delegation maintenance.
   Availability of such an interface also enables recovery from a
   situation where the private key is no longer available for signing
   the CDS/CDNSKEY or CSYNC records in the child zone.

6.  Implementation Status

   *Note to the RFC Editor*: please remove this entire section before
   publication.

   This draft has been implemented by

   *  TANGO Registry Services
   *  CORE Registry

7.  Acknowledgments

   In order of first contribution or review: Viktor Dukhovni, Wes
   Hardaker, Libor Peltan, Oli Schacher, David Blacka, Charlie Kaufman,
   Michael Bauland, Patrick Mevzek, Joe Abley, Ondřej Caletka.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References



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   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.

   [RFC5730]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
              STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.

   [RFC7344]  Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
              DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.

   [RFC7477]  Hardaker, W., "Child-to-Parent Synchronization in DNS",
              RFC 7477, DOI 10.17487/RFC7477, March 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7477>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9615]  Thomassen, P. and N. Wisiol, "Automatic DNSSEC
              Bootstrapping Using Authenticated Signals from the Zone's
              Operator", RFC 9615, DOI 10.17487/RFC9615, July 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9615>.

8.2.  Informative References








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   [LAME1]    Akiwate, G., Jonker, M., Sommese, R., Foster, I., Voelker,
              G. M., Savage, S., Claffy, K., and ACM, "Unresolved
              Issues", Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement
              Conference, DOI 10.1145/3419394.3423623, 27 October 2020,
              <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423623>.

   [LAME2]    Akiwate, G., Savage, S., Voelker, G. M., Claffy, K C, and
              ACM, "Risky BIZness", Proceedings of the 21st ACM Internet
              Measurement Conference, DOI 10.1145/3487552.3487816, 2
              November 2021,
              <http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3487552.3487816>.

   [RFC6781]  Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
              Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6781, December 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781>.

   [RFC8901]  Huque, S., Aras, P., Dickinson, J., Vcelak, J., and D.
              Blacka, "Multi-Signer DNSSEC Models", RFC 8901,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8901, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8901>.

Appendix A.  Failure Scenarios

   The following scenarios are examples of how things can go wrong when
   consistency is not enforced by the parent during CDS/CDNSKEY/CSYNC
   processing.  Other scenarios that cause similar (or perhaps even
   more) harm may exist.

   The common feature of these scenarios is that if one nameserver steps
   out of line and the parent is not careful, DNS resolution and/or
   validation will break down.  When several DNS providers are involved,
   this undermines the very guarantees of operator independence that
   multi-provider configurations are intended to provide.

A.1.  DS Breakage due to Replication Lag

   If an authoritative nameserver is lagging behind during a key
   rollover, the parent may see different CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets depending
   on the nameserver contacted.  This may cause old and new DS RRsets to
   be deployed in an alternating fashion and without the awareness of
   the zone maintainer, who may then inadvertently break the chain of
   trust by prematurely removing a DNSKEY still referenced by a (stale)
   CDS/CDNSKEY RRset.







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   While foreseen in [RFC7344] Section 6.2, the solution suggested there
   requires parents to keep state on CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets.  This document
   achieves the same without this burden, and in case the parent reports
   consistency errors downstream, can also help detection of the child-
   side replication issue by the operator.

A.2.  Escalation of Lame Delegation Takeover

   A delegation may include a non-existent NS hostname, for example due
   to a typo or when the nameserver's domain registration has expired.
   (Re-)registering such a non-resolvable nameserver domain allows a
   third party to run authoritative DNS service for all domains
   delegated to that NS hostname, serving responses different from the
   legitimate ones.

   This strategy for hijacking (at least part of the) DNS traffic and
   spoofing responses is not new, but surprisingly common
   [LAME1][LAME2].  It is also known that DNSSEC reduces the impact of
   such an attack, as validating resolvers will reject illegitimate
   responses due to lack of signatures consistent with the delegation's
   DS records.

   On the other hand, if the delegation is not protected by DNSSEC, the
   rogue nameserver is not only able to serve unauthorized responses
   without detection; it is even possible for the attacker to escalate
   the nameserver takeover to a full domain takeover.

   In particular, the rogue nameserver can publish CDS/CDNSKEY records.
   If those are processed by the parent without ensuring consistency
   with other authoritative nameservers, the delegation will, with some
   patience, get secured with the attacker's DNSSEC keys.  Of course, as
   the parent’s query (or sometimes queries) need to hit the attacker's
   nameserver, this requires some statistical luck; but eventually it
   will succeed.  As responses served by the remaining legitimate
   nameservers are not signed with these keys, validating resolvers will
   start rejecting them.

   Once DNSSEC is established, the attacker can use CSYNC to remove
   other nameservers from the delegation at will (and potentially add
   new ones under their control), or change glue records to point to the
   attacker's nameservers.  This enables the attacker to position
   themself as the only party providing authoritiative DNS service for
   the victim domain, significantly augmenting the attack's impact.

A.3.  Multi-Provider (Permanent Multi-Signer)






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A.3.1.  DS Breakage

   While performing a key rollover and adjusting the corresponding CDS/
   CDNSKEY records, a provider could accidentally publish CDS/CDNSKEY
   records that only include its own keys.

   When the parent happens to retrieve the records from a nameserver
   controlled by this provider, the other providers' DS records would be
   removed from the delegation.  As a result, the zone is broken at
   least for some queries.

A.3.2.  NS Breakage

   A similar scenario affects the CSYNC record, which is used to update
   the delegation's NS record set at the parent.  The issue occurs, for
   example, when a provider accidentally includes only their own set of
   hostnames in the local NS record set, or publishes an otherwise
   flawed NS record set.

   If the parent then observes a CSYNC signal and fetches the flawed NS
   record set without ensuring consistency across nameservers, the
   delegation may be updated in a way that breaks resolution or silently
   reduces the multi-provider setup to a single-provider setup.

A.4.  Bogus Provider Change (Temporary Multi-Signer)

   Transferring DNS service for a domain name from one (signing) DNS
   provider to another, without going insecure, necessitates a brief
   period during which the domain is operated in multi-signer mode:
   First, the providers include each other's signing keys as DNSKEY and
   CDS/CDNSKEY records in their copy of the zone.  Once the parent
   learns about the updated CDS/CDNSKEY record set at the old provider,
   the delegation's DS record set is updated.  Then, after waiting for
   cache expiration, the new provider's NS hostnames can be added to the
   zone's NS record set, so that queries start balancing across both
   providers.  (To conclude the hand-over, the old provider is removed
   by inverting these steps with swapped roles.)

   The multi-signer phase of this process breaks when the new provider,
   perhaps unaware of the situation and its intricacies, fails to
   include the old provider's keys in the DNSKEY (and CDS/CDNSKEY)
   record sets.  One obvious consequence of that is that whenever the
   resolver happens to retrieve the DNSKEY record set from the new
   provider, the old provider's RRSIGs do no longer validate, causing
   SERVFAIL to be returned.






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   However, an even worse consequence can occur when the parent performs
   their next CDS/CDNSKEY scan: It may then happen that the incorrect
   CDS/CDNSKEY record set is fetched from the new provider and used to
   update the delegation's DS record set.  As a result, the old provider
   (who still appears in the delegation) is prematurely removed from the
   domain's DNSSEC chain of trust.  The new DS record set authenticates
   the new provider's DNSKEYs only, and DNSSEC validation fails for all
   answers served by the old provider.

Appendix B.  Change History (to be removed before publication)

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-08

   |  Take into account RFC 7344 Section 6.2 for Appendix A.1
   |  considerations

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-07

   |  Clarify that "all nameservers" means fetching all delegation NS
   |  IPs

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-06

   |  Editorial changes from Dnsdir early review
   |  
   |  Add Implementation Status

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-05

   |  Editorial overhaul

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-04

   |  Clarify that existing CSYNC NS and glue processing rules remain in
   |  place
   |  
   |  Editorial changes
   |  
   |  Clean up "multi-homing" and define "multi-provider"/"multi-signer"

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-03

   |  Clarify that CSYNC updates should not break delegations
   |  
   |  Describe consistency requirements for CSYNC soaminimum
   |  
   |  Editorial changes




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   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-02

   |  Retry before assuming a nameserver is permanently unreachable

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-01

   |  Make nits tool happy
   |  
   |  New failure mode: DS Breakage due to Replication Lag
   |  
   |  Point out zero overhead if nothing changed, and need for OOB
   |  interface
   |  
   |  Editorial changes
   |  
   |  Moved Failure Scenarios to appendix

   *  draft-ietf-dnsop-cds-consistency-00

   |  Point out zero overhead if nothing changed, and need for OOB
   |  interface
   |  
   |  Editorial changes.

   *  draft-thomassen-dnsop-cds-consistency-03

   |  Describe risk from lame delegations
   |  
   |  Acknowledgments
   |  
   |  Say what is being updated
   |  
   |  Editorial changes.
   |  
   |  Retry mechanism to resolve inconsistencies

   *  draft-thomassen-dnsop-cds-consistency-02

   |  Don't ignore DoE responses from individual nameservers (instead,
   |  require consistency across all responses received)

   *  draft-thomassen-dnsop-cds-consistency-01

   |  Allow for nameservers that don't respond or provide DoE (i.e.
   |  require consistency only among the non-empty answers received)
   |  
   |  Define similar requirements for CSYNC.
   |  



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   |  Editorial changes.

   *  draft-thomassen-dnsop-cds-consistency-00

   |  Initial public draft.

Author's Address

   Peter Thomassen
   SSE - Secure Systems Engineering GmbH
   Hauptstraße 3
   10827 Berlin
   Germany
   Email: peter.thomassen@securesystems.de





































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