



Network Working Group                                          R. Ehlers
Internet-Draft                                             PastWipe S.L.
Intended status: Standards Track                        2 September 2025
Expires: 6 March 2026


                 Reputation Security Protocol (RepSec)
                         draft-ehlers-repsec-00

Abstract

   The Reputation Security Protocol (RepSec) defines a lightweight,
   extensible, and secure method for exchanging digital reputation and
   security-state information across the Internet.  RepSec follows the
   design philosophy of SMTP (simplicity) and SNMP (extensibility).
   Entities can register, verify, remove, and audit reputation data in
   an interoperable and standardized way.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 March 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.



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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Protocol Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.1.  Transport and Encoding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.2.  Commands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       5.2.1.  REGISTER  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
       5.2.2.  VERIFY  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       5.2.3.  REMOVE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       5.2.4.  AUDIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       5.2.5.  PING  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.3.  Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.4.  Example Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  Licensing and IPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6

1.  Introduction

   Current approaches to reputation and security metadata are fragmented
   and proprietary.  RepSec provides a standardized protocol for secure,
   interoperable exchange of this information.  The protocol is designed
   to be simple to implement, secure by default, and extensible for
   future needs, drawing on SMTP's command/response model and SNMP's
   extensible object framework.

   Goals:

   - Simple, JSON-based message exchange
   - Secure by default (TLS mandatory)
   - Extensible command set and object schemas
   - Open and free to implement










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2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Protocol Overview

   RepSec uses a client/server request–response model.

   Transport: TCP with mandatory TLS (TLS 1.2 or later; TLS 1.3 SHOULD
   be supported).
   Port: TBD by IANA (proposed: 4655).
   Encoding: UTF-8 JSON for commands and responses.
   Status Codes: Numeric, modeled after SMTP.

4.  Terminology

   Client: entity initiating RepSec commands.
   Server: entity providing RepSec services.
   Entity: subject of registration (domain, IP, userID, organization,
   etc.).
   Message: JSON-encoded RepSec command or response.
   Extension: optional module that defines new commands and/or schemas.

5.  Protocol Elements

5.1.  Transport and Encoding

   All RepSec traffic MUST be transmitted over TLS.  Servers SHOULD
   support TLS 1.3.  Messages MUST be encoded as UTF-8 JSON objects.  If
   compression is used, it MUST be negotiated at the TLS layer; TLS
   record compression is NOT RECOMMENDED.

5.2.  Commands

   The minimum interoperable command set is shown below.  Commands are
   JSON objects with a "command" field and command-specific parameters.

5.2.1.  REGISTER

   Registers an entity with RepSec.

{ "command": "REGISTER", "entity": "example.com", "type": "domain", "auth": "token123" }





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5.2.2.  VERIFY

   Verifies authenticity of registered data.

   { "command": "VERIFY", "entity": "example.com" }

5.2.3.  REMOVE

   Removes registered data.

   { "command": "REMOVE", "entity": "example.com" }

5.2.4.  AUDIT

   Retrieves entity history (audit log).

   { "command": "AUDIT", "entity": "example.com" }

5.2.5.  PING

   Checks server availability and round-trip.

   { "command": "PING" }

5.3.  Responses

   Responses MUST include a numeric status code and a human-readable
   message.  Additional fields are allowed.

   200 OK                Command succeeded
   400 BAD REQUEST       Syntax error or missing parameters
   401 UNAUTHORIZED      Authentication required or failed
   403 FORBIDDEN         Command not permitted
   404 NOT FOUND         No such entity or resource
   409 CONFLICT          State conflict (e.g., already registered)
   429 TOO MANY REQUESTS Rate limiting in effect
   500 SERVER ERROR      Internal processing error

   Example:

   { "status": 200, "message": "Entity registered successfully" }

5.4.  Example Session








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C: { "command": "REGISTER", "entity": "example.com", "type": "domain" }
S: { "status": 200, "message": "Entity registered successfully" }

C: { "command": "VERIFY", "entity": "example.com" }
S: { "status": 200, "verified": true, "last_updated": "2025-09-02T10:00:00Z" }

6.  Security Considerations

   All RepSec sessions MUST use TLS with server authentication; mutual
   authentication via client certificates or token-based schemes is
   RECOMMENDED.  Implementations MUST provide replay protection (e.g.,
   timestamps and nonces) and SHOULD employ rate limiting and abuse
   detection.  Privacy by design: servers MUST NOT expose unnecessary
   metadata and SHOULD minimize data retention.

7.  Extensibility

   RepSec supports extensions similar to SMTP EHLO and SNMP MIBs.
   Extensions MAY define new commands and/or JSON schemas (RepSec Object
   Definitions).  Servers SHOULD advertise supported extensions during
   capability discovery (future work).

8.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to assign a new TCP port for RepSec (suggested:
   4655) and to create a new "RepSec Parameters" registry containing:

   - Registered RepSec Commands (Specification Required)
   - Registered RepSec Extensions (Specification Required)
   - Status Codes (Standards Action)

9.  Licensing and IPR

   This specification is made available under the IETF Trust Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (TLP).  Implementations may be
   licensed under permissive or copyleft licenses (e.g., Apache-2.0,
   GPL/LGPL), provided interoperability with the open standard is
   maintained.  "RepSec" may be used as a trademark to indicate
   interoperable implementations.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.




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   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", RFC 8174, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              October 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5321>.

   [RFC3411]  Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
              Architecture for Describing SNMP Management Frameworks",
              RFC 3411, December 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3411>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   RepSec was inspired by the simplicity of SMTP and the extensibility
   of SNMP, with the goal of creating an open, non-proprietary Internet
   standard for reputation security.

Author's Address

   Ralph Ehlers
   PastWipe S.L.
   Marbella
   Spain
   Email: info@pastwipe.com
























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