



Web Authorization Protocol                                      O. Terbu
Internet-Draft                                                     MATTR
Intended status: Standards Track                                 D. Fett
Expires: 23 April 2026                                     Authlete Inc.
                                                             B. Campbell
                                                           Ping Identity
                                                         20 October 2025


            SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC)
                     draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-12

Abstract

   This specification describes data formats as well as validation and
   processing rules to express Verifiable Credentials with JSON payloads
   with and without selective disclosure based on the SD-JWT
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] format.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization
   Protocol Working Group mailing list (oauth@ietf.org), which is
   archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-sd-jwt-vc.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 April 2026.





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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  SD-JWT as a Credential Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Verifiable Credentials based on SD-JWT  . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Media Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.1.  JOSE Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       3.2.2.  JWT Claims Set  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.4.  Verification and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     3.5.  Issuer Signature Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.  Presenting Verifiable Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.1.  Data Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.2.  Key Binding JWT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.1.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.3.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   6.  SD-JWT VC Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     6.1.  Type Metadata Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.2.  Type Metadata Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     6.3.  Retrieving Type Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       6.3.1.  From a URL in the vct Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       6.3.2.  From a Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       6.3.3.  Using a Defined Retrieval Method  . . . . . . . . . .  23
       6.3.4.  From a Local Cache  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     6.4.  Extending Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  Document Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23



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   8.  Display Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     8.1.  Rendering Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       8.1.1.  Rendering Method "simple" . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       8.1.2.  Rendering Method "svg_template" . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     8.2.  Extending Display Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   9.  Claim Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     9.1.  Claim Path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       9.1.1.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       9.1.2.  Processing of path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
     9.2.  Claim Display Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     9.3.  Claim Mandatory Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     9.4.  Claim Selective Disclosure Metadata . . . . . . . . . . .  30
     9.5.  Extending Claim Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       9.5.1.  Limitations for sd and mandatory  . . . . . . . . . .  31
       9.5.2.  Example for Extending Type Metadata . . . . . . . . .  31
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     10.1.  Server-Side Request Forgery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     10.2.  Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods . . .  33
     10.3.  Circular "extends" Dependencies of Types . . . . . . . .  33
     10.4.  Robust Retrieval of Type Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . .  33
     10.5.  Risks Associated with Textual Information  . . . . . . .  34
     10.6.  Credential Type Extension and Issuer Authorization . . .  34
     10.7.  Trust in Type Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     10.8.  Use of Data URIs for Claim Types . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
   11. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     11.1.  Unlinkability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
     11.2.  Verifiable Credential Type Identifier  . . . . . . . . .  36
     11.3.  Issuer Phone-Home  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   12. Relationships to Other Documents  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     12.1.  Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata  . . . . .  37
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Appendix A.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     A.1.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration  . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     A.2.  Media Types Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       A.2.1.  application/dc+sd-jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
     A.3.  Well-Known URI Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       A.3.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   Appendix B.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
     B.1.  Example 1: Person Identification Data (PID) Credential  .  41
     B.2.  Example 2: Type Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   Appendix C.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   Appendix D.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62

1.  Introduction




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1.1.  Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model

   In the so-called Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model, Issuers issue so-
   called Verifiable Credentials to a Holder, who can then present the
   Verifiable Credentials to Verifiers.  Verifiable Credentials are
   cryptographically secured statements about a Subject, typically the
   Holder.

            +------------+
            |            |
            |   Issuer   |
            |            |
            +------------+
                  |
       Issues Verifiable Credential
                  |
                  v
            +------------+
            |            |
            |   Holder   |
            |            |
            +------------+
                  |
     Presents Verifiable Credential
                  |
                  v
            +-------------+
            |             |-+
            |  Verifiers  | |-+
            |             | | |
            +-------------+ | |
              +-------------+ |
                +-------------+

                   Figure 1: Issuer-Holder-Verifier Model

   Verifiers can check the authenticity of the data in the Verifiable
   Credentials and optionally enforce Key Binding, i.e., ask the Holder
   to prove that they are the intended Holder of the Verifiable
   Credential, for example, by proving possession of a cryptographic key
   referenced in the credential.  This process is further described in
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].

1.2.  SD-JWT as a Credential Format

   JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) [RFC7519] can in principle be used to express
   Verifiable Credentials in a way that is easy to understand and
   process as it builds upon established web primitives.



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   Selective Disclosure JWT (SD-JWT)
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] is a specification that
   introduces conventions to support selective disclosure for JWTs: For
   an SD-JWT document, a Holder can decide which claims to release
   (within bounds defined by the Issuer).

   SD-JWT is a superset of JWT as it can also be used when there are no
   selectively disclosable claims and also supports JWS JSON
   serialization, which is useful for long term archiving and multi
   signatures.  However, SD-JWT itself does not define the claims that
   must be used within the payload or their semantics.

   This specification uses SD-JWT and the well-established JWT content
   rules and extensibility model as basis for representing Verifiable
   Credentials with JSON payloads.  These Verifiable Credentials are
   called SD-JWT VCs.  The use of selective disclosure in SD-JWT VCs is
   OPTIONAL.

   SD-JWTs VC can contain claims that are registered in "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519], as well as public and
   private claims.

   Note: This specification does not utilize the W3C Verifiable
   Credentials Data Model v1.0, v1.1, or v2.0.

1.3.  Requirements Notation and Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

1.4.  Terms and Definitions

   This specification uses the terms "Holder", "Issuer", "Verifier",
   "Disclosure", "Selectively Disclosable JWT (SD-JWT)", "Key Binding",
   "Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT)", "Selectively Disclosable JWT with Key
   Binding (SD-JWT+KB)" defined by
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].

   Consumer:  Applications using the Type Metadata specified in
      Section 6 are called Consumer.  This typically includes Issuers,
      Verifiers, and Wallets.
   Verifiable Credential (VC):  An assertion with claims about a Subject
      that is cryptographically secured by an Issuer (usually by a
      digital signature).
   SD-JWT-based Verifiable Credential (SD-JWT VC):  A Verifiable




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      Credential encoded using the format defined in
      [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].  It may or may not
      contain selectively disclosable claims.
   Unsecured Payload of an SD-JWT VC:  A JSON object containing all
      selectively disclosable and non-selectively disclosable claims of
      the SD-JWT VC.  The Unsecured Payload acts as the input JSON
      object to issue an SD-JWT VC complying to this specification.

2.  Scope

   This specification defines

   *  a data model and media types for Verifiable Credentials based on
      SD-JWTs, and
   *  validation and processing rules for Verifiers and Holders.

3.  Verifiable Credentials based on SD-JWT

   This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for
   SD-JWT VCs.

3.1.  Media Type

   SD-JWT VCs compliant with this specification MUST use the media type
   application/dc+sd-jwt.

   The base subtype name dc is meant to stand for "digital credential",
   which is a term that is emerging as a conceptual synonym for
   "verifiable credential".

3.2.  Data Format

   An SD-JWT VC MUST be encoded using the SD-JWT format defined in
   Section 4 or Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt],
   where support for the JWS JSON Serialization is OPTIONAL.

   Note that in some cases, an SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively
   disclosable claims, and therefore the encoded SD-JWT will not contain
   any Disclosures.

3.2.1.  JOSE Header

   This section defines JWT header parameters for the SD-JWT component
   of the SD-JWT VC.







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   The typ header parameter of the SD-JWT MUST be present.  The typ
   value MUST use dc+sd-jwt.  This indicates that the payload of the SD-
   JWT contains plain JSON and follows the rules defined in this
   specification.  It further indicates that the SD-JWT is an SD-JWT
   component of an SD-JWT VC.

   The following is a non-normative example of a decoded SD-JWT header:

   {
     "alg": "ES256",
     "typ": "dc+sd-jwt"
   }

   Note that this draft used vc+sd-jwt as the value of the typ header
   from its inception in July 2023 until November 2024 when it was
   changed to dc+sd-jwt to avoid conflict with the vc media type name
   registered by the W3C's Verifiable Credentials Data Model draft.  In
   order to facilitate a minimally disruptive transition, it is
   RECOMMENDED that Verifiers and Holders accept both vc+sd-jwt and
   dc+sd-jwt as the value of the typ header for a reasonable
   transitional period.

3.2.2.  JWT Claims Set

   This section defines the claims that can be included in the payload
   of SD-JWT VCs.

3.2.2.1.  Verifiable Credential Type - vct Claim

   This specification defines the new JWT claim vct (for verifiable
   credential type).  Its value MUST be a case-sensitive string serving
   as an identifier for the type of the SD-JWT VC.  The vct value MUST
   be a Collision-Resistant Name as defined in Section 2 of [RFC7515].

   A type is associated with rules defining which claims may or must
   appear in the Unsecured Payload of the SD-JWT VC and whether they
   may, must, or must not be selectively disclosable.  This
   specification does not define any vct values; instead it is expected
   that ecosystems using SD-JWT VCs define such values including the
   semantics of the respective claims and associated rules (e.g.,
   policies for issuing and validating credentials beyond what is
   defined in this specification).









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   The vct value also effectively identifies the version of the
   credential type definition, as it ties a particular instance of a
   credential to a specific structure, set of semantics, and rules.
   When evolving a credential type without updating the version, changes
   to the structure or meaning of the associated claims need to be made
   in a way that preserves compatibility with existing implementations.

   If a change alters the meaning of existing content, adds new required
   claims, removes previously required elements, or otherwise introduces
   incompatibilities, it is generally advisable to treat that as a new
   version of the credential type and to convey it using a new vct
   value.  This allows different versions of a credential type to
   coexist and helps ensure that participants interpret credentials
   consistently.

   The following is a non-normative example of how vct is used to
   express a type:

   {
     "vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential"
   }

   For example, a value of https://credentials.example.com/
   identity_credential can be associated with rules that define that at
   least the registered JWT claims given_name, family_name, birthdate,
   and address must appear in the Unsecured Payload.  Additionally, the
   registered JWT claims email and phone_number, and the private claims
   is_over_18, is_over_21, and is_over_65 may be used.  The type might
   also indicate that any of the aforementioned claims can be
   selectively disclosable.

3.2.2.2.  Registered JWT Claims

   SD-JWT VCs MAY use any claim registered in the "JSON Web Token
   Claims" registry as defined in [RFC7519].

   The following registered JWT claims are used within the SD-JWT
   component of the SD-JWT VC and MUST NOT be included in the
   Disclosures, i.e., cannot be selectively disclosed:

   *  iss: OPTIONAL.  As defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7519] this
      claim explicitly indicates the Issuer of the Verifiable Credential
      when it is not conveyed by other means (e.g., the subject of the
      end-entity certificate of an x5c header).
   *  nbf: OPTIONAL.  The time before which the Verifiable Credential
      MUST NOT be accepted before validating.  See [RFC7519] for more
      information.




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   *  exp: OPTIONAL.  The expiry time of the Verifiable Credential after
      which the Verifiable Credential is no longer valid.  See [RFC7519]
      for more information.
   *  cnf: OPTIONAL unless cryptographic Key Binding is to be supported,
      in which case it is REQUIRED.  Contains the confirmation method
      identifying the proof of possession key as defined in [RFC7800].
      It is RECOMMENDED that this contains a JWK as defined in
      Section 3.2 of [RFC7800].  For proof of cryptographic Key Binding,
      the KB-JWT in the presentation of the SD-JWT MUST be secured by
      the key identified in this claim.
   *  vct: REQUIRED.  The type of the Verifiable Credential, e.g.,
      https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential, as defined in
      Section 3.2.2.1.
   *  vct#integrity: OPTIONAL.  The hash of the Type Metadata document
      to provide integrity as defined in Section 7.
   *  status: OPTIONAL.  The information on how to read the status of
      the Verifiable Credential.  See [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list] for
      more information.  When the status claim is present and using the
      status_list mechanism, the associated Status List Token MUST be in
      JWT format.

   The following registered JWT claims are used within the SD-JWT
   component of the SD-JWT VC and MAY be included in Disclosures, i.e.,
   can be selectively disclosed:

   *  sub: OPTIONAL.  The identifier of the Subject of the Verifiable
      Credential.  The Issuer MAY use it to provide the Subject
      identifier known by the Issuer.  There is no requirement for a
      binding to exist between sub and cnf claims.
   *  iat: OPTIONAL.  The time of issuance of the Verifiable Credential.
      See [RFC7519] for more information.

3.2.2.3.  Public and Private JWT claims

   Additionally, any public and private claims as defined in Sections
   4.2 and 4.3 of [RFC7519] MAY be used.

   Binary data in claims SHOULD be encoded as data URIs as defined in
   [RFC2397].  Exceptions can be made when data formats are used that
   already define a text encoding suitable for use in JSON or where an
   established text encoding is commonly used.  For example, images
   would make use of data URIs, whereas hash digests in base64 encoding
   do not need to be encoded as such.

   An example of a claim containing binary data encoded as a data URI is
   shown in Appendix B.1.





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3.2.2.4.  SD-JWT VC without Selectively Disclosable Claims

   An SD-JWT VC MAY have no selectively disclosable claims.  In that
   case, the SD-JWT VC MUST NOT contain the _sd claim in the JWT body.
   It also MUST NOT have any Disclosures.

3.3.  Example

   The following is a non-normative example of the user data of an
   unsecured payload of an SD-JWT VC.

   {
     "vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
     "given_name": "John",
     "family_name": "Doe",
     "email": "johndoe@example.com",
     "phone_number": "+1-202-555-0101",
     "address": {
       "street_address": "123 Main St",
       "locality": "Anytown",
       "region": "Anystate",
       "country": "US"
     },
     "birthdate": "1940-01-01",
     "is_over_18": true,
     "is_over_21": true,
     "is_over_65": true
   }

   The following is a non-normative example of how the unsecured payload
   of the SD-JWT VC above can be used in an SD-JWT where the resulting
   SD-JWT VC contains only claims about the Subject that are selectively
   disclosable:


















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   {
     "_sd": [
       "09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY",
       "2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI",
       "EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA",
       "IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw",
       "JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE",
       "PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI",
       "TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo",
       "jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI",
       "jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4"
     ],
     "iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
     "iat": 1683000000,
     "exp": 1883000000,
     "vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
     "_sd_alg": "sha-256",
     "cnf": {
       "jwk": {
         "kty": "EC",
         "crv": "P-256",
         "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
         "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
       }
     }
   }

   Note that a cnf claim has been added to the SD-JWT payload to express
   the confirmation method of the Key Binding.

   The following are the Disclosures belonging to the SD-JWT payload
   above:

   *Claim given_name*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: jsu9yVulwQQlhFlM_3JlzMaSFzglhQG0DpfayQwLUK4
   *  Disclosure:
      WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiSm9o
      biJd
   *  Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "John"]

   *Claim family_name*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: TGf4oLbgwd5JQaHyKVQZU9UdGE0w5rtDsrZzfUaomLo
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkRv
      ZSJd
   *  Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Doe"]



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   *Claim email*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: JzYjH4svliH0R3PyEMfeZu6Jt69u5qehZo7F7EPYlSE
   *  Disclosure:
      WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
      ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ
   *  Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "email",
      "johndoe@example.com"]

   *Claim phone_number*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: PorFbpKuVu6xymJagvkFsFXAbRoc2JGlAUA2BA4o7cI
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251bWJlciIsICIr
      MS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ
   *  Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "phone_number",
      "+1-202-555-0101"]

   *Claim address*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: IlDzIKeiZdDwpqpK6ZfbyphFvz5FgnWa-sN6wqQXCiw
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVl
      dF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRv
      d24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0
   *  Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "address", {"street_address":
      "123 Main St", "locality": "Anytown", "region": "Anystate",
      "country": "US"}]

   *Claim birthdate*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: jdrTE8YcbY4EifugihiAe_BPekxJQZICeiUQwY9QqxI
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTQw
      LTAxLTAxIl0
   *  Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "birthdate", "1940-01-01"]

   *Claim is_over_18*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 09vKrJMOlyTWM0sjpu_pdOBVBQ2M1y3KhpH515nXkpY
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLCB0cnVl
      XQ
   *  Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "is_over_18", true]

   *Claim is_over_21*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 2rsjGbaC0ky8mT0pJrPioWTq0_daw1sX76poUlgCwbI



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   *  Disclosure:
      WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnVl
      XQ
   *  Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "is_over_21", true]

   *Claim is_over_65*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: EkO8dhW0dHEJbvUHlE_VCeuC9uRELOieLZhh7XbUTtA
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVl
      XQ
   *  Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "is_over_65", true]

   The SD-JWT and the Disclosures would then be serialized by the Issuer
   into the following format for issuance to the Holder:

   eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
   Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C
   VkJRMk0xeTNLaHBINTE1blhrcFkiLCAiMnJzakdiYUMwa3k4bVQwcEpyUGlvV1RxMF9k
   YXcxc1g3NnBvVWxnQ3diSSIsICJFa084ZGhXMGRIRUpidlVIbEVfVkNldUM5dVJFTE9p
   ZUxaaGg3WGJVVHRBIiwgIklsRHpJS2VpWmREd3BxcEs2WmZieXBoRnZ6NUZnbldhLXNO
   NndxUVhDaXciLCAiSnpZakg0c3ZsaUgwUjNQeUVNZmVadTZKdDY5dTVxZWhabzdGN0VQ
   WWxTRSIsICJQb3JGYnBLdVZ1Nnh5bUphZ3ZrRnNGWEFiUm9jMkpHbEFVQTJCQTRvN2NJ
   IiwgIlRHZjRvTGJnd2Q1SlFhSHlLVlFaVTlVZEdFMHc1cnREc3JaemZVYW9tTG8iLCAi
   amRyVEU4WWNiWTRFaWZ1Z2loaUFlX0JQZWt4SlFaSUNlaVVRd1k5UXF4SSIsICJqc3U5
   eVZ1bHdRUWxoRmxNXzNKbHpNYVNGemdsaFFHMERwZmF5UXdMVUs0Il0sICJpc3MiOiAi
   aHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXIiLCAiaWF0IjogMTY4MzAwMDAwMCwgImV4
   cCI6IDE4ODMwMDAwMDAsICJ2Y3QiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9jcmVkZW50aWFscy5leGFtcGxl
   LmNvbS9pZGVudGl0eV9jcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIl9zZF9hbGciOiAic2hhLTI1NiIsICJj
   bmYiOiB7Imp3ayI6IHsia3R5IjogIkVDIiwgImNydiI6ICJQLTI1NiIsICJ4IjogIlRD
   QUVSMTladnUzT0hGNGo0VzR2ZlNWb0hJUDFJTGlsRGxzN3ZDZUdlbWMiLCAieSI6ICJa
   eGppV1diWk1RR0hWV0tWUTRoYlNJaXJzVmZ1ZWNDRTZ0NGpUOUYySFpRIn19fQ.j1qB3
   oGBcHW7TjCGQ3nhEiynwpnNjGDQ7NFiZoxN-D0IRRTv7on7NjxUn18AJZufrqdhSVFSH
   tiikcEX_PpB-Q~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLC
   AiSm9obiJd~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgI
   kRvZSJd~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImVtYWlsIiwgImpvaG5kb2VA
   ZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXQ~WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInBob25lX251b
   WJlciIsICIrMS0yMDItNTU1LTAxMDEiXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIi
   wgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2
   FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOi
   AiVVMifV0~WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOT
   QwLTAxLTAxIl0~WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMTgiLC
   B0cnVlXQ~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfMjEiLCB0cnV
   lXQ~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVlXQ~

   Examples of what presentations of SD-JWT VCs might look like are
   provided in Section 4.3.




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3.4.  Verification and Processing

   The recipient (Holder or Verifier) of an SD-JWT VC MUST process and
   verify an SD-JWT VC as described in Section 7 of
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].  The check in point 2.3 of
   Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt], which
   validates the Issuer and ensures that the signing key belongs to the
   Issuer, MUST be satisfied by determining and validating the public
   verification key used to verify the Issuer-signed JWT, employing an
   Issuer Signature Mechanism (defined in Section 3.5) that is permitted
   for the Issuer according to policy.

   If Key Binding is required (refer to the security considerations in
   Section 9.5 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]), the
   Verifier MUST verify the KB-JWT according to Section 7.3 of
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].  To verify the KB-JWT, the
   cnf claim of the SD-JWT MUST be used.

   If there are no selectively disclosable claims, there is no need to
   process the _sd claim nor any Disclosures.

   If status is present in the verified payload of the SD-JWT, the
   status SHOULD be checked.  It depends on the Verifier policy to
   reject or accept a presentation of a SD-JWT VC based on the status of
   the Verifiable Credential.

   Additional validation rules MAY apply, but their use is out of the
   scope of this specification.

3.5.  Issuer Signature Mechanisms

   An Issuer Signature Mechanism defines how a Verifier determines the
   appropriate key and associated procedure for verifying the signature
   of an Issuer-signed JWT.  This allows for flexibility in supporting
   different trust anchoring systems and key resolution methods without
   changing the core processing model.

   A recipient MUST determine and validate the public verification key
   for the Issuer-signed JWT using a supported Issuer Signature
   Mechanism that is permitted for the given Issuer according to policy.
   This specification defines the following two Issuer Signature
   Mechanisms:

   *  JWT VC Issuer Metadata: A mechanism to retrieve the Issuer's
      public key using web-based resolution.  When the value of the iss
      claim of the Issuer-signed JWT is an HTTPS URI, the recipient
      obtains the public key using the keys from JWT VC Issuer Metadata
      as defined in Section 5.



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   *  X.509 Certificates: A mechanism to retrieve the Issuer's public
      key using the X.509 certificate chain in the SD-JWT header.  When
      the protected header of the Issuer-signed JWT contains the x5c
      parameter, the recipient uses the public key from the end-entity
      certificate of the certificates from that x5c parameter and
      validates the X.509 certificate chain accordingly.  In this case,
      the Issuer of the Verifiable Credential is the subject of the end-
      entity certificate.

   To enable different trust anchoring systems or key resolution
   methods, separate specifications or ecosystem regulations may define
   additional Issuer Signature Mechanisms; however, the specifics of
   such mechanisms are out of scope for this specification.  See
   Section 10.2 for related security considerations.

   If a recipient cannot validate that the public verification key
   corresponds the Issuer of the Issuer-signed JWT using a permitted
   Issuer Signature Mechanism, the SD-JWT VC MUST be rejected.

4.  Presenting Verifiable Credentials

   This section defines encoding, validation and processing rules for
   presentations of SD-JWT VCs.

4.1.  Data Format

   A presentation of an SD-JWT VC MUST be encoded as an SD-JWT or as an
   SD-JWT+KB.  By default, the format defined in Section 4 of
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] is used, whereas support
   for the JWS JSON Serialization in Section 8 of
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] is OPTIONAL.

4.2.  Key Binding JWT

   The KB-JWT MAY include additional claims which, when not understood,
   MUST be ignored by the Verifier.

4.3.  Examples

   The following is a non-normative example of a presentation of the SD-
   JWT shown in Section 3.3 including a KB-JWT.  In this presentation,
   the Holder provides only the Disclosures for the address and
   is_over_65 claims.  Other claims are not disclosed to the Verifier.








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   eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCIsICJraWQiOiAiZG9jLXNp
   Z25lci0wNS0yNS0yMDIyIn0.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dktySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9C
   VkJRMk0xeTNLaHBINTE1blhrcFkiLCAiMnJzakdiYUMwa3k4bVQwcEpyUGlvV1RxMF9k
   YXcxc1g3NnBvVWxnQ3diSSIsICJFa084ZGhXMGRIRUpidlVIbEVfVkNldUM5dVJFTE9p
   ZUxaaGg3WGJVVHRBIiwgIklsRHpJS2VpWmREd3BxcEs2WmZieXBoRnZ6NUZnbldhLXNO
   NndxUVhDaXciLCAiSnpZakg0c3ZsaUgwUjNQeUVNZmVadTZKdDY5dTVxZWhabzdGN0VQ
   WWxTRSIsICJQb3JGYnBLdVZ1Nnh5bUphZ3ZrRnNGWEFiUm9jMkpHbEFVQTJCQTRvN2NJ
   IiwgIlRHZjRvTGJnd2Q1SlFhSHlLVlFaVTlVZEdFMHc1cnREc3JaemZVYW9tTG8iLCAi
   amRyVEU4WWNiWTRFaWZ1Z2loaUFlX0JQZWt4SlFaSUNlaVVRd1k5UXF4SSIsICJqc3U5
   eVZ1bHdRUWxoRmxNXzNKbHpNYVNGemdsaFFHMERwZmF5UXdMVUs0Il0sICJpc3MiOiAi
   aHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXIiLCAiaWF0IjogMTY4MzAwMDAwMCwgImV4
   cCI6IDE4ODMwMDAwMDAsICJ2Y3QiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9jcmVkZW50aWFscy5leGFtcGxl
   LmNvbS9pZGVudGl0eV9jcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIl9zZF9hbGciOiAic2hhLTI1NiIsICJj
   bmYiOiB7Imp3ayI6IHsia3R5IjogIkVDIiwgImNydiI6ICJQLTI1NiIsICJ4IjogIlRD
   QUVSMTladnUzT0hGNGo0VzR2ZlNWb0hJUDFJTGlsRGxzN3ZDZUdlbWMiLCAieSI6ICJa
   eGppV1diWk1RR0hWV0tWUTRoYlNJaXJzVmZ1ZWNDRTZ0NGpUOUYySFpRIn19fQ.j1qB3
   oGBcHW7TjCGQ3nhEiynwpnNjGDQ7NFiZoxN-D0IRRTv7on7NjxUn18AJZufrqdhSVFSH
   tiikcEX_PpB-Q~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLC
   B0cnVlXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmV
   ldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCA
   icmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnkiOiAiVVMifV0~eyJhbGciOiAiRVM
   yNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.eyJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZC
   I6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3NjA5Nzc0Mz
   QsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogImtkTVZfdktsUVctSk9nekYtdUpYdVk3aThlVjNzMEhZeFdOTH
   VpYzRUTUUifQ.caR1YVJE5kN3LaIAoJHfhSbbSvSxFOkDnKWH4V3Q3WFf6bGy9cuai0W
   mI4MfasrLy55OeiBh9QmapyTxj4hQRw

   After validation, the Verifier will have the following processed SD-
   JWT payload available for further handling:






















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   {
     "iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
     "iat": 1683000000,
     "exp": 1883000000,
     "vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
     "cnf": {
       "jwk": {
         "kty": "EC",
         "crv": "P-256",
         "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
         "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
       }
     },
     "is_over_65": true,
     "address": {
       "street_address": "123 Main St",
       "locality": "Anytown",
       "region": "Anystate",
       "country": "US"
     }
   }

   The following example shows a presentation of a (similar but
   different) SD-JWT without a KB-JWT:

   eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjA5dkt
   ySk1PbHlUV00wc2pwdV9wZE9CVkJRMk0xeTNLaHBINTE1blhrcFkiLCAiMnJzakdiYUM
   wa3k4bVQwcEpyUGlvV1RxMF9kYXcxc1g3NnBvVWxnQ3diSSIsICJFa084ZGhXMGRIRUp
   idlVIbEVfVkNldUM5dVJFTE9pZUxaaGg3WGJVVHRBIiwgIklsRHpJS2VpWmREd3BxcEs
   2WmZieXBoRnZ6NUZnbldhLXNONndxUVhDaXciLCAiSnpZakg0c3ZsaUgwUjNQeUVNZmV
   adTZKdDY5dTVxZWhabzdGN0VQWWxTRSIsICJQb3JGYnBLdVZ1Nnh5bUphZ3ZrRnNGWEF
   iUm9jMkpHbEFVQTJCQTRvN2NJIiwgIlRHZjRvTGJnd2Q1SlFhSHlLVlFaVTlVZEdFMHc
   1cnREc3JaemZVYW9tTG8iLCAiamRyVEU4WWNiWTRFaWZ1Z2loaUFlX0JQZWt4SlFaSUN
   laVVRd1k5UXF4SSIsICJqc3U5eVZ1bHdRUWxoRmxNXzNKbHpNYVNGemdsaFFHMERwZmF
   5UXdMVUs0Il0sICJpc3MiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pc3N1ZXIiLCAiaWF
   0IjogMTY4MzAwMDAwMCwgImV4cCI6IDE4ODMwMDAwMDAsICJ2Y3QiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9
   jcmVkZW50aWFscy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbS9pZGVudGl0eV9jcmVkZW50aWFsIiwgIl9zZF9
   hbGciOiAic2hhLTI1NiJ9.NH_4M8mSX0N4pvXxOwedOEtp_swxyp8dB8kEjgpw-UtFSI
   5QXBXRN7gjEw7LhgIXeNIqM5lU_5_MtGCJaZSErg~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5
   JdkNBIiwgImlzX292ZXJfNjUiLCB0cnVlXQ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9B
   IiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7InN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIjogIjEyMyBNYWluIFN0IiwgImxv
   Y2FsaXR5IjogIkFueXRvd24iLCAicmVnaW9uIjogIkFueXN0YXRlIiwgImNvdW50cnki
   OiAiVVMifV0~

   The Verifier will have the following processed SD-JWT payload after
   validation:





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   {
     "iss": "https://example.com/issuer",
     "iat": 1683000000,
     "exp": 1883000000,
     "vct": "https://credentials.example.com/identity_credential",
     "is_over_65": true,
     "address": {
       "street_address": "123 Main St",
       "locality": "Anytown",
       "region": "Anystate",
       "country": "US"
     }
   }

5.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata

   This specification defines the JWT VC Issuer Metadata to retrieve the
   JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration of the Issuer of the SD-JWT VC.
   The Issuer is identified by the iss claim in the JWT.  Use of the JWT
   VC Issuer Metadata is OPTIONAL.

   Issuers publishing JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST make a JWT VC Issuer
   Metadata configuration available at the location formed by inserting
   the well-known string /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer between the host
   component and the path component (if any) of the iss claim value in
   the JWT.  The iss MUST be a case-sensitive URL using the HTTPS scheme
   that contains scheme, host and, optionally, port number and path
   components, but no query or fragment components.

5.1.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata Request

   A JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration MUST be queried using an HTTP
   GET request at the path defined in Section 5.

   The following is a non-normative example of an HTTP request for the
   JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
   https://example.com:

   GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer HTTP/1.1
   Host: example.com

   If the iss value contains a path component, any terminating / MUST be
   removed before inserting /.well-known/ and the well-known URI suffix
   between the host component and the path component.

   The following is a non-normative example of an HTTP request for the
   JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
   https://example.com/tenant/1234:



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   GET /.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer/tenant/1234 HTTP/1.1
   Host: example.com

5.2.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata Response

   A successful response MUST use the 200 OK HTTP and return the JWT VC
   Issuer Metadata configuration using the application/json content
   type.

   An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value.

   This specification defines the following JWT VC Issuer Metadata
   configuration parameters:

   *  issuer: REQUIRED.  The Issuer identifier, which MUST be identical
      to the iss value in the JWT.
   *  jwks_uri: OPTIONAL.  URL string referencing the Issuer's JSON Web
      Key (JWK) Set [RFC7517] document which contains the Issuer's
      public keys.  The value of this field MUST point to a valid JWK
      Set document.
   *  jwks: OPTIONAL.  Issuer's JSON Web Key Set [RFC7517] document
      value, which contains the Issuer's public keys.  The value of this
      field MUST be a JSON object containing a valid JWK Set.

   JWT VC Issuer Metadata MUST include either jwks_uri or jwks in their
   JWT VC Issuer Metadata, but not both.

   It is RECOMMENDED that the JWT contains a kid JWT header parameter
   that can be used to look up the public key in the JWK Set included by
   value or referenced in the JWT VC Issuer Metadata.

   The following is a non-normative example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata
   configuration including jwks:


















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   {
      "issuer":"https://example.com",
      "jwks":{
         "keys":[
            {
               "kid":"doc-signer-05-25-2022",
               "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
               "x": "b28d4MwZMjw8-00CG4xfnn9SLMVMM19SlqZpVb_uNtQ",
               "y": "Xv5zWwuoaTgdS6hV43yI6gBwTnjukmFQQnJ_kCxzqk8"
            },
            {
               "kid":"doc-signer-06-05-2025",
               "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
               "x":"DfjUx4WHBds61vGbqUQhsy3FGX13fAS13QWh2EHIkX8",
               "y":"NfqJt9Kp0EA93xq9ysO80DRZ_hCGlISz-pYLgv4RFvg"
            }
         ]
      }
   }

   The following is a non-normative example of a JWT VC Issuer Metadata
   configuration including jwks_uri:

   {
      "issuer":"https://example.com",
      "jwks_uri":"https://jwt-vc-issuer.example.com/my_public_keys.jwks"
   }

   Additional JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration parameters MAY also
   be used.

5.3.  JWT VC Issuer Metadata Validation

   The issuer value returned MUST be identical to the iss value of the
   JWT.  If these values are not identical, the data contained in the
   response MUST NOT be used.

6.  SD-JWT VC Type Metadata

   An SD-JWT VC type, i.e., the vct value, is associated with Type
   Metadata defining, for example, information about the type and how
   credentials are displayed.

   This section defines Type Metadata that can be associated with a type
   of an SD-JWT VC, as well as a method for retrieving the Type Metadata
   and processing rules.  This Type Metadata is intended to be used,
   among other things, for the following purposes:




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   *  Developers of Issuers and Verifiers can use the Type Metadata to
      understand the semantics of the type and the associated rules.
      While in some cases, Issuers are the parties that define types,
      this is not always the case.  For example, a type can be defined
      by a standardization body or a community.
   *  Verifiers can use the Type Metadata to determine whether a
      credential is valid according to the rules of the type.  For
      example, a Verifier can check whether a credential contains all
      required claims and whether the claims are selectively
      disclosable.
   *  Wallets can use the metadata to display the credential in a way
      that is consistent with the intent of the provider of the Type
      Metadata.

   Type Metadata can be retrieved as described in Section 6.3.

6.1.  Type Metadata Example

   All examples in this section are non-normative.  This section only
   shows excerpts, the full examples can be found in Appendix B.2.

   The following is an example of an SD-JWT VC payload, containing a vct
   claim with the value https://betelgeuse.example.com/
   education_credential:

   {
     "vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential",
     "vct#integrity": "sha256-1odmyxoVQCuQx8SAym8rWHXba41fM/Iv/V1H8VHGN00=",
     ...
   }

   Type Metadata for the type https://betelgeuse.example.com/
   education_credential can be retrieved using various mechanisms as
   described in Section 6.3.  For this example, the vct value is a URL
   as defined in Section 6.3.1 and the following Type Metadata document
   is retrieved from it:

   {
     "vct":"https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential",
     "name":"Betelgeuse Education Credential - Preliminary Version",
     "description":"This is our development version of the education credential. Don't panic.",
     "extends":"https://galaxy.example.com/galactic-education-credential-0.9",
     "extends#integrity":"sha256-ilOUJsTultOwLfz7QUcFALaRa3BP/jelX1ds04kB9yU="
   }

   Note: The hash of the Type Metadata document shown in the second
   example must be equal to the one in the vct#integrity claim in the
   SD-JWT VC payload, 1odmyxoVQCuQx8SAym8rWHXba41fM/Iv/V1H8VHGN00=.



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6.2.  Type Metadata Format

   The Type Metadata document MUST be a JSON object.  The following
   properties are defined:

   *  vct: REQUIRED.  The verifiable credential type described by this
      type metadata document.
   *  name: OPTIONAL.  A human-readable name for the type, intended for
      developers reading the JSON document.
   *  description: OPTIONAL.  A human-readable description for the type,
      intended for developers reading the JSON document.
   *  extends: OPTIONAL.  A URI of another type that this type extends,
      as described in Section 6.4.
   *  display: An array of objects containing display information for
      the type, as described in Section 8.  This property is OPTIONAL.
   *  claims: An array of objects containing claim information for the
      type, as described in Section 9.  This property is OPTIONAL.

   A Type Metadata document MAY contain additional top level or
   subordinate properties.  Consumers MUST ignore properties that are
   not understood.

   An example of a Type Metadata document is shown in Appendix B.2.

6.3.  Retrieving Type Metadata

   A consumer retrieving Type Metadata MUST ensure that the vct value in
   the SD-JWT VC payload is identical to the vct value in the reference
   to the Type Metadata (either in the SD-JWT VC itself or in an extends
   property in a Type Metadata document).

   The following sections define methods to retrieve Type Metadata.

6.3.1.  From a URL in the vct Claim

   A URI in the vct claim can be used to express a type.  If the type is
   a URL using the HTTPS scheme, Type Metadata MAY be retrieved from it.

   The Type Metadata is retrieved using the HTTP GET method.  The
   response MUST be a JSON object as defined in Section 6.2.

   If the claim vct#integrity is present in the SD-JWT VC, its value
   vct#integrity MUST be an "integrity metadata" string as defined in
   Section Section 7.







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6.3.2.  From a Registry

   A Consumer MAY use a registry to retrieve Type Metadata for a SD-JWT
   VC type, e.g., if the type is not an HTTPS URL or if the Consumer
   does not have access to the URL.  The registry MUST be a trusted
   registry, i.e., the Consumer MUST trust the registry to provide
   correct Type Metadata for the type.

   The registry MUST provide the Type Metadata in the same format as
   described in Section 6.2.

6.3.3.  Using a Defined Retrieval Method

   Ecosystems MAY define additional methods for retrieving Type
   Metadata.  For example, a standardization body or a community MAY
   define a service which has to be used to retrieve Type Metadata based
   on a URN in the vct claim.

6.3.4.  From a Local Cache

   A Consumer MAY cache Type Metadata for a SD-JWT VC type.  If a hash
   for integrity protection is present in the Type Metadata as defined
   in Section 7, the Consumer MAY assume that the Type Metadata is
   static and can be cached indefinitely.  Otherwise, the Consumer MUST
   use the Cache-Control header of the HTTP response to determine how
   long the metadata can be cached.

6.4.  Extending Type Metadata

   An SD-JWT VC type can extend another type.  The extended type is
   identified by the URI in the extends property.  Consumers MUST
   retrieve and process Type Metadata for the extended type before
   processing the Type Metadata for the extending type.

   The extended type MAY itself extend another type.  This can be used
   to create a chain or hierarchy of types.  The security considerations
   described in Section 10.3 apply in order to avoid problems with
   circular dependencies.

   Processing details when extending type metadata are described in
   Section 8.2 and Section 9.5.

7.  Document Integrity

   The vct claim in the SD-JWT VC as defined in Section 3.2.2.2 and
   various URIs in the Type Metadata MAY be accompanied by a respective
   claim suffixed with #integrity, in particular:




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   *  extends as defined in Section 6.4, and
   *  uri as used in two places in Section 8.1.

   The value MUST be an "integrity metadata" string as defined in
   Section 3 of [W3C.SRI].  A Consumer of the respective documents MUST
   verify the integrity of the retrieved document as defined in
   Section 3.3.5 of [W3C.SRI].

8.  Display Metadata

   The display property is an array containing display information for
   the type.  The array MUST contain an object for each locale that is
   supported by the type.  The consuming application MUST use the
   language tag it considers most appropriate for the user.

   The objects in the array have the following properties:

   *  locale: A language tag as defined in Section 2 of [RFC5646].  This
      property is REQUIRED.
   *  name: A human-readable name for the type, intended for end users.
      This property is REQUIRED.
   *  description: A human-readable description for the type, intended
      for end users.  This property is OPTIONAL.
   *  rendering: An object containing rendering information for the
      type, as described in Section 8.1.  This property is OPTIONAL.

8.1.  Rendering Metadata

   The rendering property is an object containing rendering information
   for the type.  The object MUST contain a property for each rendering
   method that is supported by the type.  The property name MUST be a
   rendering method identifier and the property value MUST be an object
   containing the properties defined for the rendering method.

8.1.1.  Rendering Method "simple"

   The simple rendering method is intended for use in applications that
   do not support SVG rendering.  The object contains the following
   properties:

   *  logo: An object containing information about the logo to be
      displayed for the type, as described in Section 8.1.1.1.  This
      property is OPTIONAL.
   *  background_image: An object containing information about the
      background image to be displayed for the type, as described in
      Section 8.1.1.2.  This property is OPTIONAL.
   *  background_color: An RGB color value as defined in [W3C.CSS-COLOR]
      for the background of the credential.  This property is OPTIONAL.



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   *  text_color: An RGB color value as defined in [W3C.CSS-COLOR] value
      for the text of the credential.  This property is OPTIONAL.

8.1.1.1.  Logo Metadata

   The logo property is an object containing information about the logo
   to be displayed for the type.  The object contains the following
   properties:

   *  uri: A URI pointing to the logo image.  This property is REQUIRED.
   *  uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
      Section 7.  This property is OPTIONAL.
   *  alt_text: A string containing alternative text for the logo image.
      This property is OPTIONAL.

8.1.1.2.  Background Image Metadata

   The background_image property is an object containing information
   about the background image to be displayed for the type.  The object
   contains the following properties:

   *  uri: A URI pointing to the background image.  This property is
      REQUIRED.
   *  uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
      Section 7.  This property is OPTIONAL.

8.1.2.  Rendering Method "svg_template"

   The svg_template rendering method is intended for use in applications
   that support SVG rendering.  The object MUST contain an array of
   objects containing information about the SVG templates available for
   the type.  Each object contains the following properties:

   *  uri: A URI pointing to the SVG template.  This property is
      REQUIRED.
   *  uri#integrity: An "integrity metadata" string as described in
      Section 7.  This property is OPTIONAL.
   *  properties: An object containing properties for the SVG template,
      as described in Section 8.1.2.1.  This property is REQUIRED if
      more than one SVG template is present, otherwise it is OPTIONAL.











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8.1.2.1.  SVG Template Properties

   The properties property is an object containing properties for the
   SVG template.  Consuming applications MUST use these properties to
   find the best SVG template available for display to the user based on
   the display properties (landscape/portrait) and user preferences
   (color scheme, contrast).  The object MUST contain at least one of
   the following properties:

   *  orientation: The orientation for which the SVG template is
      optimized, with valid values being portrait and landscape.  This
      property is OPTIONAL.
   *  color_scheme: The color scheme for which the SVG template is
      optimized, with valid values being light and dark.  This property
      is OPTIONAL.
   *  contrast: The contrast for which the SVG template is optimized,
      with valid values being normal and high.  This property is
      OPTIONAL.

8.1.2.2.  SVG Rendering

   Consuming application MUST preprocess the SVG template by replacing
   placeholders in the SVG template with properly escaped values of the
   claims in the credential.  The placeholders MUST be defined in the
   SVG template using the syntax {{svg_id}}, where svg_id is an
   identifier defined in the claim metadata as described in Section 9.

   Placeholders MUST only be used in the text content of the SVG
   template and MUST NOT be used in any other part of the SVG template,
   e.g., in attributes or comments.

   A consuming application MUST ensure that all special characters in
   the claim values are properly escaped before inserting them into the
   SVG template.  At least the following characters MUST be escaped:

   *  & as &amp;
   *  < as &lt;
   *  > as &gt;
   *  " as &quot;
   *  ' as &apos;

   If the svg_id is not present in the claim metadata, the consuming
   application SHOULD reject not render the SVG template.  If the svg_id
   is present in the claim metadata, but the claim is not present in the
   credential, the placeholder MUST be replaced with an empty string or
   a string appropriate to indicate that the value is absent.





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   The following non-normative example shows a minimal SVG with one
   placeholder using the svg_id value address_street_address which is
   defined in the example in Appendix B.2:

   <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="100" height="100">
     <text x="10" y="20">Street address: {{address_street_address}}</text>
   </svg>

   When rendering the SVG template, the consuming application MUST
   ensure that malicious metadata providers or issuers cannot inject
   executable code into the SVG template and thereby compromise the
   security of the consuming application.  The consuming application
   MUST NOT execute any code in the SVG template.  If code execution
   cannot be prevented reliably, the SVG display MUST be sandboxed.

   Furthermore, consuming applications MUST ensure that references to
   external resources (images, etc.) from within the SVG cannot be used
   to track users or the usage of credentials.

8.2.  Extending Display Metadata

   When an SD-JWT VC type extends another type as described in
   Section 6.4, the display metadata remains valid for the inheriting
   type unless that type defines its own display property, in which case
   the original display metadata is ignored.

9.  Claim Metadata

   The claims property is an array of objects containing information
   about particular claims for displaying and validating the claims.

   The array MAY contain an object for each claim that is supported by
   the type.  Each object contains the following properties:

   *  path: An array indicating the claim or claims that are being
      addressed, as described below.  This property is REQUIRED.
   *  display: An array containing display information for the claim or
      claims that are being addressed, as described in Section 9.2.
      This property is OPTIONAL.
   *  mandatory: A boolean indicating that the claim must be present in
      the issued credential.  This property is OPTIONAL.  If omitted,
      the default value is false.  See Section 9.3 for details.
   *  sd: A string indicating whether the claim is selectively
      disclosable, as described in Section 9.4.  This property is
      OPTIONAL.






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   *  svg_id: A string defining the ID of the claim for reference in the
      SVG template, as described in Section 8.1.2.2.  The ID MUST be
      unique within the type metadata.  It MUST consist of only
      alphanumeric characters and underscores and MUST NOT start with a
      digit.  This property is OPTIONAL.

9.1.  Claim Path

   The path property MUST be a non-empty array of strings, null values,
   or non-negative integers.  It is used to select a particular claim in
   the credential or a set of claims.  A string indicates that the
   respective key is to be selected, a null value indicates that all
   elements of the currently selected array(s) are to be selected, and a
   non-negative integer indicates that the respective index in an array
   is to be selected.

9.1.1.  Example

   The following shows a non-normative, reduced example of a credential:

   {
     "vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential",
     "name": "Arthur Dent",
     "address": {
       "street_address": "42 Market Street",
       "city": "Milliways",
       "postal_code": "12345"
     },
     "degrees": [
       {
         "type": "Bachelor of Science",
         "university": "University of Betelgeuse"
       },
       {
         "type": "Master of Science",
         "university": "University of Betelgeuse"
       }
     ],
     "nationalities": ["British", "Betelgeusian"]
   }

   The following shows examples of path values and the respective
   selected claims in the credential above:

   *  ["name"]: The claim name with the value Arthur Dent is selected.
   *  ["address"]: The claim address with its sub-claims as the value is
      selected.




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   *  ["address", "street_address"]: The claim street_address with the
      value 42 Market Street is selected.
   *  ["degrees", null, "type"]: All type claims in the degrees array
      are selected.

   The example in Appendix B.2 shows how the path can be used to address
   arrays and their elements.

9.1.2.  Processing of path

   In detail, the array components of path are processed from left to
   right as follows:

   1.  Select the root element of the credential, i.e., the top-level
       JSON object.
   2.  Process the path components from left to right:
       1.  If the path component is a string, select the element in the
           respective key in the currently selected element(s).  If any
           of the currently selected element(s) is not an object, abort
           processing and return an error.  If the key does not exist in
           any element currently selected, remove that element from the
           selection.
       2.  If the path component is null, select all elements of the
           currently selected array(s).  If any of the currently
           selected element(s) is not an array, abort processing and
           return an error.
       3.  If the path component is a non-negative integer, select the
           element at the respective index in the currently selected
           array(s).  If any of the currently selected element(s) is not
           an array, abort processing and return an error.  If the index
           does not exist in a selected array, remove that array from
           the selection.
       4.  If the set of elements currently selected is empty, abort
           processing and return an error.

   The result of the processing is the set of elements to which the
   respective claim metadata applies.

   The path property MUST point to the respective claim as if all
   selectively disclosable claims were disclosed to a Verifier.  That
   means that a consuming application which does not have access to all
   disclosures may not be able to identify the claim which is being
   addressed.

   Note: This specification intentionally does not use JSON Pointer
   [RFC6901] for selecting claims, as JSON Pointer requires string
   parsing and does not support wildcard selection of array elements.
   It does not use JSON Path [RFC9535] as that introduces a considerable



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   complexity and brings in many features which are not needed for the
   use case of selecting claims in a credential.  There are also
   security concerns with some implementations.

9.2.  Claim Display Metadata

   The display property is an array containing display information for
   the claim.  The array MUST contain an object for each locale that is
   supported by the type.  The consuming application MUST use the
   language tag it considers most appropriate for the user.

   The objects in the array have the following properties:

   *  locale: A language tag as defined in Section 2 of [RFC5646].  This
      property is REQUIRED.
   *  label: A human-readable label for the claim, intended for end
      users.  This property is REQUIRED.
   *  description: A human-readable description for the claim, intended
      for end users.  This property is OPTIONAL.

9.3.  Claim Mandatory Metadata

   The mandatory property is a boolean indicating that, if set to true,
   the claim MUST be included in the credential by the Issuer.  If the
   value is false or omitted, the claim is considered optional for the
   Issuer to include.  A claim that is mandatory can nonetheless be
   selectively disclosable, as described in Section 9.4.

9.4.  Claim Selective Disclosure Metadata

   The sd property is a string indicating whether the claim is
   selectively disclosable.  The following values are defined:

   *  always: The Issuer MUST make the claim selectively disclosable.
   *  allowed: The Issuer MAY make the claim selectively disclosable.
   *  never: The Issuer MUST NOT make the claim selectively disclosable.

   If omitted, the default value is allowed.  It is RECOMMENDED to use
   either always or never to avoid ambiguity.

9.5.  Extending Claim Metadata

   When an SD-JWT VC type extends another type as described in
   Section 6.4, all claim metadata from the extended type MUST be
   respected and are inherited by the child type.  The child type can
   extend the claim metadata by adding new claims or properties.  If the
   child type defines claim metadata with the same path as in the
   extended type, the child type's object will override the



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   corresponding object from the extended type.

9.5.1.  Limitations for sd and mandatory

   An extending type can specify an sd property for a claim that is
   marked as allowed in the extended type (or where sd was omitted),
   changing it to either always or never.  However, it MUST NOT change a
   claim that is marked as always or never in the extended type to a
   different value.

   Similarly, an extending type can set the mandatory property of a
   claim that is optional in the extended type to true, but it MUST NOT
   change a claim that is mandatory in the extended type to false.

9.5.2.  Example for Extending Type Metadata

   Suppose we have a base type metadata document:

   {
     "vct": "https://example.com/base-type-metadata",
     "claims": [
       {
         "path": ["name"],
         "display": [{"label": "Full Name", "locale": "en"}]
       },
       {
         "path": ["address", "city"],
         "display": [{"label": "City", "locale": "en"}]
       }
     ]
   }

   And a child type metadata document that extends the base type:

   {
     "vct": "https://example.com/custom-type-metadata",
     "extends": "https://example.com/base-type-metadata",
     "claims": [
       {
         "path": ["address", "city"],
         "display": [{"label": "Town", "locale": "en"}]
       },
       {
         "path": ["nationalities"],
         "display": [{"label": "Nationalities", "locale": "en"}]
       }
     ]
   }



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   In this example, the child type inherits the name claim metadata from
   the base type, but overrides the address.city claim metadata with its
   own definition.  It also adds a new claim metadata for nationalities.
   The final effective claim metadata for the child type is:

   {
     "claims": [
       {
         "path": ["name"],
         "display": [{"label": "Full Name", "locale": "en"}]
       },
       {
         "path": ["address", "city"],
         "display": [{"label": "Town", "locale": "en"}]
       },
       {
         "path": ["nationalities"],
         "display": [{"label": "Nationalities", "locale": "en"}]
       }
     ]
   }

10.  Security Considerations

   The Security Considerations in the SD-JWT specification
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] apply to this
   specification.  Additionally, the following security considerations
   need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs:

10.1.  Server-Side Request Forgery

   The JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration is retrieved from the JWT VC
   Issuer by the Holder or Verifier.  Similar to other metadata
   endpoints, the URL for the retrieval MUST be considered an untrusted
   value and could be a vector for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
   attacks.

   Before making a request to the JWT VC Issuer Metadata endpoint, the
   Holder or Verifier MUST validate the URL to ensure that it is a valid
   HTTPS URL and that it does not point to internal resources.  This
   requires, in particular, ensuring that the host part of the URL does
   not address an internal service (by IP address or an internal host
   name) and that, if an external DNS name is used, the resolved DNS
   name does not point to an internal IPv4 or IPv6 address.







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   When retrieving the metadata, the Holder or Verifier MUST ensure that
   the request is made in a time-bound and size-bound manner to prevent
   denial of service attacks.  The Holder or Verifier MUST also ensure
   that the response is a valid JWT VC Issuer Metadata configuration
   document before processing it.

   Additional considerations can be found in [OWASP_SSRF].

10.2.  Ecosystem-specific Public Key Verification Methods

   When defining ecosystem-specific rules for resolution and
   verification of the public key, as outlined in Section 3.5, it is
   critical that those rules maintain the integrity of the relationship
   between the iss value of the SD-JWT, if present, and the public keys
   of the Issuer.

   It MUST be ensured that for any given iss value, an attacker cannot
   influence the type of verification process used.  Otherwise, an
   attacker could attempt to make the Verifier use a verification
   process not intended by the Issuer, allowing the attacker to
   potentially manipulate the verification result to their advantage.

10.3.  Circular "extends" Dependencies of Types

   A type MUST NOT extend another type that extends (either directly or
   with steps in-between) the first type.  This would result in a
   circular dependency that could lead to infinite recursion when
   retrieving and processing the metadata.

   Consumers MUST detect such circular dependencies and reject the
   credential.

10.4.  Robust Retrieval of Type Metadata

   In Section 6.3, various methods for distributing and retrieving
   metadata are described.  Methods relying on a network connection may
   fail due to network issues or unavailability of a network connection
   due to offline usage of credentials, temporary server outages, or
   denial-of-service attacks on the metadata server.

   Consumers SHOULD therefore implement a local cache as described in
   Section 6.3.4 if possible.  Such a cache MAY be populated with
   metadata before the credential is used.

   These measures allow the Consumers to continue to function even if
   the metadata server is temporarily unavailable and avoid privacy
   issues as described in Section 12.1.




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10.5.  Risks Associated with Textual Information

   Some claims in the SD-JWT VC and properties in the Type Metadata,
   e.g., display, allows issuers and providers of metadata to specify
   human-readable information.  These can contain arbitrary textual
   information that may be displayed to end users and developers.  As
   such, any consuming application MUST ensure that maliciously crafted
   information cannot be used to compromise the security of the
   application or the privacy of the user.  To this end, the following
   considerations apply:

   *  The consuming application MUST ensure that the text is properly
      escaped before displaying it to the user or transferring it into
      other contexts.  For example, if the data is displayed in an HTML
      document, the text MUST be properly escaped to prevent Cross-Site
      Scripting (XSS) attacks.
   *  The consuming application MUST ensure that the display of the user
      interface elements cannot be distorted by overly long text or
      special characters.

10.6.  Credential Type Extension and Issuer Authorization

   When processing credentials, it is important to recognize that the
   ability to extend or reference an existing credential type (e.g., a
   well-known identifier such as urn:ec.eu.x.y.z) does not confer any
   implicit authorization to issue credentials of that type or its
   extensions.  In particular:

   *  *Issuer Authorization*: Verifiers and wallets MUST NOT assume that
      any issuer who issues a credential extending a known type is
      authorized to do so.  The mere presence of an extension or
      reference to a recognized type (e.g., a national type urn:de.bla
      extending a European PID type) does not validate the issuer's
      authority.
   *  *Rogue Issuers*: Attackers may issue credentials with types that
      extend or mimic legitimate types (e.g., urn:attacker extending
      urn:ec.eu.x.y.z).  Such credentials MUST NOT be accepted solely
      based on their type hierarchy or extension relationship.
   *  *Processing Rules*: Implementations MUST verify the issuer's
      authorization independently of the credential type or its
      extensions.  This typically involves checking the issuer's
      identity, trust status, and any relevant accreditation or registry
      before accepting a credential.








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   *Recommendation:* Verifiers and wallets SHOULD implement explicit
   checks for issuer authorization and SHOULD NOT rely on type extension
   as a proxy for trust or legitimacy.  Credential acceptance decisions
   MUST be based on both the credential type and the verified authority
   of the issuer.

10.7.  Trust in Type Metadata

   Type Metadata associated with an SD-JWT VC, e.g., rendering metadata,
   is asserted by the publisher of the Type Metadata and trust in this
   metadata depends on the trust relationship between its publisher and
   the consumer.  A consumer MUST NOT assume that Type Metadata is
   accurate or meaningful unless the publisher is recognized as
   authoritative for the type in question.

   Ecosystems SHOULD define governance or accreditation mechanisms that
   specify which publishers are authorized to provide Type Metadata for
   specific verifiable credential types and under what conditions such
   metadata can be relied upon.

   Consumers SHOULD treat with reduced trust any Type Metadata if the
   publisher is not accredited or otherwise trusted within the
   applicable ecosystem.

10.8.  Use of Data URIs for Claim Types

   The use of data URIs allows embedding of data directly within
   credential payloads.  Implementations SHOULD treat data URIs as
   untrusted input at the processing and rendering layer and apply
   appropriate validation and handling.  Failure to properly escape,
   sanitize or constrain their use can lead to security issues such as
   unintended code execution, resource exhaustion, or misuse of embedded
   content.  Implementations SHOULD restrict the set of accepted media
   types, enforce reasonable size and content limits, and avoid
   dereferencing or interpreting data URIs in ways that could execute or
   render active content, consistent with their overall security model.

11.  Privacy Considerations

   The Privacy Considerations in the SD-JWT specification
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] apply to this
   specification.  Additionally, the following privacy considerations
   need to be taken into account when using SD-JWT VCs.








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11.1.  Unlinkability

   The Privacy Considerations in Section 10.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt] apply especially to the cnf
   claim.

11.2.  Verifiable Credential Type Identifier

   Issuers and Holders have to be aware that while this specification
   supports selective disclosure of claims of a given SD-JWT VC, the vct
   claim is not selectively disclosable.  In certain situations this
   could lead to unwanted leakage of additional context information.

   In general, Issuers are advised to choose vct values following data
   minimization principles.  For example, government Issuers issuing an
   SD-JWT VC to their citizens to enable them to prove their age, might
   consider using a vct value that does not allow third-parties to infer
   additional personal information about the Holder, e.g., country of
   residency or citizenship.

   Additionally, Holders have to be informed that, besides the actual
   requested claims, the vct information is shared with the Verifier.

11.3.  Issuer Phone-Home

   A malicious Issuer can choose the Issuer identifier of the SD-JWT VC
   to enable tracking the usage behavior of the Holder if the Issuer
   identifier is Holder-specific and if the resolution of the key
   material to verify the Issuer-signed JWT requires the Verifier to
   phone home to the Issuer.

   For example, a malicious Issuer could generate a unique value for the
   Issuer identifier per Holder, e.g., https://example.com/issuer/
   holder-1234 and host the JWT VC Issuer Metadata.  The Verifier would
   create an HTTP GET request to the Holder-specific well-known URI when
   the SD-JWT VC is verified.  This would allow the malicious Issuer to
   keep track where and how often the SD-JWT VC was used.

   Verifiers are advised to establish trust in an SD-JWT VC by pinning
   specific Issuer identifiers and should monitor suspicious behavior
   such as frequent rotation of those identifiers.  If such behaviour is
   detected, Verifiers are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs issued by those
   Issuers.

   Another related concern arises from the use of confirmation methods
   in the cnf claim that involve retrieving key material from a remote
   source, especially if that source is controlled by the issuer.  This
   includes, but is not limited to, the use of the x5u parameter in JWKs



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   (Section 4.6 of [RFC7517]), the jku parameter (Section 3.5 of
   [RFC7800]), and cases where a URL is used in the kid parameter
   (Section 3.4 of [RFC7800]).  Future confirmation methods may also
   introduce remote retrieval mechanisms.  Issuers are advised not to
   issue SD-JWT VCs with such cnf methods, and Verifiers and Holders are
   advised not to follow or resolve remote references for key material
   in the cnf claim.  Only confirmation methods that do not require
   remote retrieval of key material SHOULD be supported.

   Holders are advised to reject SD-JWT VCs if they contain easily
   correlatable information in the Issuer identifier.

12.  Relationships to Other Documents

   This specification defines validation and processing rules for
   verifiable credentials using JSON payloads and secured by SD-JWT
   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt].  Other specifications
   exist that define their own verifiable credential formats; for
   example, W3C Verifiable Credential Data Model (VCDM) 2.0 [W3C.VCDM]
   defines a data model for verifiable credentials encoded as JSON-LD,
   and ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 [ISO.18013-5] defines a representation of
   verifiable credentials in the mobile document (mdoc) format encoded
   as CBOR and secured using COSE.

12.1.  Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of Type Metadata

   In Section 6.3, various methods for distributing and retrieving Type
   Metadata are described.  For methods which rely on a network
   connection to a URL (e.g., provided by an Issuer), the Issuer and
   other third parties may be able to track the usage of a credential by
   observing requests to the Type Metadata URL.

   Consumers SHOULD prefer methods for retrieving Type Metadata that do
   not leak information about the usage of a credential to third
   parties.  The recommendations in Section 10.4 apply.

13.  References

13.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt]
              Fett, D., Yasuda, K., and B. Campbell, "Selective
              Disclosure for JWTs (SD-JWT)", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-22, 29
              May 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              ietf-oauth-selective-disclosure-jwt-22>.





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   [I-D.ietf-oauth-status-list]
              Looker, T., Bastian, P., and C. Bormann, "Token Status
              List (TSL)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              oauth-status-list-12, 7 July 2025,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
              status-list-12>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2397]  Masinter, L., "The "data" URL scheme", RFC 2397,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2397, August 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2397>.

   [RFC5646]  Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
              Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
              September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.

   [RFC5785]  Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
              Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.

   [W3C.CSS-COLOR]
              Çelik, T., Lilley, C., and L. D. Baron, "CSS Color Module
              Level 3", 18 January 2022,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/css-color-3>.





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   [W3C.SRI]  Akhawe, D., Braun, F., Marier, F., and J. Weinberger,
              "Subresource Integrity", 23 June 2016,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [EUDIW.ARF]
              Commission, E., "The European Digital Identity Wallet
              Architecture and Reference Framework",
              <https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/eudi-doc-
              architecture-and-reference-framework/releases>.

   [IANA.well-known]
              IANA, "Well-Known URIs",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>.

   [ISO.18013-5]
              ISO/IEC, "ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021", 1 September 2024,
              <https://www.iso.org/standard/69084.html>.

   [OWASP_SSRF]
              OWASP, "Server Side Request Forgery Prevention Cheat
              Sheet", <https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/
              Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html/>.

   [RFC6901]  Bryan, P., Ed., Zyp, K., and M. Nottingham, Ed.,
              "JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Pointer", RFC 6901,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6901, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6901>.

   [RFC9535]  Gössner, S., Ed., Normington, G., Ed., and C. Bormann,
              Ed., "JSONPath: Query Expressions for JSON", RFC 9535,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9535, February 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9535>.

   [W3C.VCDM] Sporny, M., Longley, D., Chadwick, D., and O. Steele,
              "Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2.0", 10 February
              2024, <https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0/>.

Appendix A.  IANA Considerations

A.1.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration

   *  Claim Name: "vct"

   *  Claim Description: Verifiable credential type identifier

   *  Change Controller: IETF



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   *  Specification Document(s): [[ Section 3.2.2.1 of this
      specification ]]

   *  Claim Name: "vct#integrity"

   *  Claim Description: SD-JWT VC vct claim "integrity metadata" value

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Specification Document(s): [[ Section 7 of this specification ]]

A.2.  Media Types Registry

A.2.1.  application/dc+sd-jwt

   The Internet media type for an SD-JWT VC is application/dc+sd-jwt.

   *  Type name: application
   *  Subtype name: dc+sd-jwt
   *  Required parameters: n/a
   *  Optional parameters: n/a
   *  Encoding considerations: 8-bit code points; SD-JWT VC values are
      encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may
      be the empty string) separated by period ('.') and tilde ('~')
      characters.
   *  Security considerations: See Security Considerations in
      Section 10.
   *  Interoperability considerations: n/a
   *  Published specification: [[ this specification ]]
   *  Applications that use this media type: Applications that issue,
      present, and verify SD-JWT-based verifiable credentials.
   *  Additional information:
      -  Magic number(s): n/a
      -  File extension(s): n/a
      -  Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
   *  Person & email address to contact for further information: Oliver
      Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global (mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
   *  Intended usage: COMMON
   *  Restrictions on usage: none
   *  Author: Oliver Terbu oliver.terbu@mattr.global
      (mailto:oliver.terbu@mattr.global)
   *  Change controller: IETF

A.3.  Well-Known URI Registry

   This specification requests the well-known URI defined in Section 5
   in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry [IANA.well-known] established
   by [RFC5785].



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A.3.1.  Registry Contents

   *  URI suffix: jwt-vc-issuer
   *  Change controller: IETF
   *  Specification document: [[ Section 5 of this specification ]]
   *  Related information: (none)
   *  Status: permanent

Appendix B.  Examples

   Important: The following examples are not normative and provided for
   illustrative purposes only.  In particular, neither the structure of
   the claims nor the selection of selectively disclosable claims are
   normative.

   Line breaks have been added for readability.

B.1.  Example 1: Person Identification Data (PID) Credential

   This example shows how the artifacts defined in this specification
   could be used to represent the identity information of a person from
   a fictional European country.  It leans on the concept of Person
   Identification Data (PID) as defined in the "PID Rulebook" in
   [EUDIW.ARF], but does not intend to fully comply with that
   specification.

   Key Binding is applied using the Holder's public key passed in a cnf
   claim in the SD-JWT.

   The following data about the citizen comprises the input JWT Claims
   Set used by the Issuer:




















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   {
     "iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
     "vct": "urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
     "given_name": "Astrid",
     "family_name": "Holmgren",
     "birthdate": "1978-04-10",
     "address": {
       "street_address": "Sjøgata 12",
       "locality": "Viken",
       "postal_code": "12001",
       "country": "Kingdom of Ændgard"
     },
     "nationalities": [
       "Ændgard"
     ],
     "sex": 2,
     "birth_family_name": "Jensen",
     "place_of_birth": {
       "locality": "Ændholm",
       "country": "Kingdom of Ændgard"
     },
     "age_equal_or_over": {
       "12": true,
       "14": true,
       "16": true,
       "18": true,
       "21": true,
       "65": false
     },
     "age_in_years": 47,
     "age_birth_year": 1978,
     "portrait": "
       WAQMAAACSfKx9AAAAAXNSR0IB2cksfwAAAARnQU1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAgY0hSTQA
       AeiYAAICEAAD6AAAAgOgAAHUwAADqYAAAOpgAABdwnLpRPAAAAAZQTFRFAAAA///
       /pdmf3QAAAFFJREFUCNdNylENgDAQA9ASBJyEWcDBLE0CTpDCpCDhPvexrBwlC/y
       8NG3RMunw9Ai5p6/pr/ZzlcAi4WiRN1nlXAesOgheBTSO8JDnND6Z3W+d90fCnTj
       jKQAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==",
     "issuance_date": "2024-01-15",
     "expiry_date": "2034-01-15",
     "issuing_authority": "Kingdom of Ændgard, Ministry of Interior",
     "issuing_country": "ÆG"
   }

   The following is the issued SD-JWT:







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   eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjJyMDA
   5ZHp2SHVWcldyUlhUNWtKTW1IbnFFSEhuV2UwTUxWWnc4UEFUQjgiLCAiM05kREpZUnd
   CcWFFSXlYQ0hjbjRhNVlLSmFnUGdJUDBXa2c5QW9yZ0FLZyIsICI1Zm42SWlYalVQbUd
   RNG1ZSHhEZHQ2RWp2QlE3Z1J2R2NkRW5TQ0VOOEVrIiwgIjZCek1CazdGR2l2b2dibGR
   PNzVmM05Md2pGbGlDcWI3bm4xR2hnQ29rclEiLCAiOTBDVDhBYUJQYm41WDhuUlhrZXN
   qdTFpMEJxaFdxWjN3cUQ0akYtcURHayIsICI5bkV3VXJkZVo2a2NSYkVqNTJRSDNuT1I
   tb2llMF9wOXRNTklBRXVGdk1VIiwgIkhUaDZacjJKOGFpcXBhOTYzY0xrdUtlUURmOU8
   wMEZ6T0hoeWpHcFZmVGciLCAiSkNwMksyTmhILUxFNUwwajdNRTBMTngtVC1weDlRRnR
   hbVNzeG1DVUN4VSIsICJMb01HcmhsRG1fYlVXVVgxZ2RoUnhUc3k0ZDR6eXdHemxTVm9
   jUlNZMDFNIiwgIlVnVWpxNXdoelFld081OWZWTmowZjBtcXlWOFlQWFU1NHNwNGtMZWN
   3UWsiLCAiWTBILUUzaHpLRVVuQXlyaV94OXRUOWstajRpNjVhbzloa2VFSE5leG9zSSI
   sICJlekNBbWFUd0kyblBqXzFJaUIzS1pmaUVPUkxlUndoWnNNTURNWklKOGtBIiwgImk
   wSF8tV0FId2ZFanQ4dHFRSDc0dU9DV3ZxdVkzRnd1WC1reDRlMlJKSDgiLCAicjFHckg
   0NnlEVjYyc2V6SW1FanhhNmNKU1pNVDIxMmpyT1NIaWVjOXl0TSIsICJyVmozUkxzN0s
   4emROeTd6WHoxQ3IzOVk2cm9nOHVsTm96azRGN05DdUMwIiwgInQ1a3AwSGZ4TVMxZUh
   OQ0dSenJLOUdpNW9UWnJlZzVVZTlsTFFJdUx2QjQiXSwgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL3B
   pZC1pc3N1ZXIuYWVuZGdhcmQuZXhhbXBsZSIsICJpYXQiOiAxNjgzMDAwMDAwLCAiZXh
   wIjogMTg4MzAwMDAwMCwgInZjdCI6ICJ1cm46ZXVkaTpwaWQ6YWVuZGdhcmQ6MSIsICJ
   fc2RfYWxnIjogInNoYS0yNTYiLCAiY25mIjogeyJqd2siOiB7Imt0eSI6ICJFQyIsICJ
   jcnYiOiAiUC0yNTYiLCAieCI6ICJUQ0FFUjE5WnZ1M09IRjRqNFc0dmZTVm9ISVAxSUx
   pbERsczd2Q2VHZW1jIiwgInkiOiAiWnhqaVdXYlpNUUdIVldLVlE0aGJTSWlyc1ZmdWV
   jQ0U2dDRqVDlGMkhaUSJ9fX0.NqO-Ms0YSRAHgEfJ0dI0UwVqAreG1LRAQ_H-GwWu7x3
   7dRwnWmB_xz3EiZ5vyzDEfxQ9mYMwqp0GbeycAWFIBw~WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2Zy
   eU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiQXN0cmlkIl0~WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZ
   bnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkhvbG1ncmVuIl0~WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBH
   Ym9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTc4LTA0LTEwIl0~WyJlSThaV205UW5L
   UHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwgIlNqXHUwMGY4Z2F0YSAxMiJd
   ~WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlZpa2VuIl0~WyJ
   BSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjEyMDAxIl0~WyJ
   QYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2RvbSBvZiBcdTA
   wYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ~WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7
   Il9zZCI6IFsiNjBCM0N3cTA0aGxQQndzdnNmdks5SlV4dnVMRlViSlFmZ1BCYk9fSDly
   TSIsICI4eWpQUjNyOGRPNUhXTG55MWdCZU1KVFBSZ2tCY2h1cTQzcUg4V2xfZjFjIiwg
   Ik5hcmQ3NHcyTl85YW5WRW1TbGVjRUpscXgzanhiY3F4dlZ6QnNCRFgweHMiLCAiVS16
   RDFESS03WjB6WW94WHF5NUhTVE5VZWdhaFJDSHlkQWVzS09fc0VQYyJdfV0~WyJsa2x4
   RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbIlx1MDBjNm5kZ2Fy
   ZCJdXQ~WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgInNleCIsIDJd~WyI1YlBzMUlx
   dVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkplbnNlbiJd~WyI
   1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlx1MDBjNm5kaG9sbSJ
   d~WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2RvbSBvZi
   BcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ~WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29
   mX2JpcnRoIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIkpET1lLUzB3MENvZm8tSGpaR3ZyZDdIaXJwU2ZpWUR
   BTFU2cjhUX0xFMWciLCAib1RacjlFbXk5eG1ycGNmUTVaU1U4c3Z4ZE1ZOHk0WElGXzV
   qOVAxdTF5QSJdfV0~WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgIjEyIiwgdHJ1ZV0
   ~WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJIM28xdXN3UDc
   2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFp
   BIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0~WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwgIjIxIiwgdHJ
   1ZV0~WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd~WyJlSzVvNX



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   BIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVyIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIj
   F0RWl5elBSWU9Lc2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbm
   x5NVA5MHlKczNFd3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lOQTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcj
   hfM0FtSncyWFo4a0kxeTBRel96ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2aj
   BoczJaTnd4Y3FPbGY4bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZV
   R6YUZDVWNlSVFBYUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWn
   FxalFXejB0TGl1Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ~WyJqN0FEZGIwVVZiMExpMGNpUGNQMGV
   3IiwgImFnZV9pbl95ZWFycyIsIDQ3XQ~WyJXcHhKckZ1WDh1U2kycDRodDA5anZ3Iiwg
   ImFnZV9iaXJ0aF95ZWFyIiwgMTk3OF0~WyJhdFNtRkFDWU1iSlZLRDA1bzNKZ3RRIiwg
   InBvcnRyYWl0IiwgImRhdGE6aW1hZ2UvcG5nO2Jhc2U2NCxpVkJPUncwS0dnb0FBQUFO
   U1VoRVVnQUFBQ1FBQUFBV0FRTUFBQUNTZkt4OUFBQUFBWE5TUjBJQjJja3Nmd0FBQUFS
   blFVMUJBQUN4and2OFlRVUFBQUFnWTBoU1RRQUFlaVlBQUlDRUFBRDZBQUFBZ09nQUFI
   VXdBQURxWUFBQU9wZ0FBQmR3bkxwUlBBQUFBQVpRVEZSRkFBQUEvLy8vcGRtZjNRQUFB
   RkZKUkVGVUNOZE55bEVOZ0RBUUE5QVNCSnlFV2NEQkxFMENUcERDcENEaFB2ZXhyQnds
   Qy95OE5HM1JNdW53OUFpNXA2L3ByL1p6bGNBaTRXaVJOMW5sWEFlc09naGVCVFNPOEpE
   bk5ENlozVytkOTBmQ25UampLUUFBQUFCSlJVNUVya0pnZ2c9PSJd~WyI0S3lSMzJvSVp
   0LXprV3ZGcWJVTEtnIiwgImlzc3VhbmNlX2RhdGUiLCAiMjAyNC0wMS0xNSJd~WyJjaE
   JDc3loeWgtSjg2SS1hd1FEaUNRIiwgImV4cGlyeV9kYXRlIiwgIjIwMzQtMDEtMTUiXQ
   ~WyJmbE5QMW5jTXo5TGctYzlxTUl6XzlnIiwgImlzc3VpbmdfYXV0aG9yaXR5IiwgIkt
   pbmdkb20gb2YgXHUwMGM2bmRnYXJkLCBNaW5pc3RyeSBvZiBJbnRlcmlvciJd~WyJvdm
   9WMXJraF9BTm04NjFxVUFBMkF3IiwgImlzc3VpbmdfY291bnRyeSIsICJcdTAwYzZHIl
   0~

   This is the payload of that SD-JWT:



























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   {
     "_sd": [
       "2r009dzvHuVrWrRXT5kJMmHnqEHHnWe0MLVZw8PATB8",
       "3NdDJYRwBqaEIyXCHcn4a5YKJagPgIP0Wkg9AorgAKg",
       "5fn6IiXjUPmGQ4mYHxDdt6EjvBQ7gRvGcdEnSCEN8Ek",
       "6BzMBk7FGivogbldO75f3NLwjFliCqb7nn1GhgCokrQ",
       "90CT8AaBPbn5X8nRXkesju1i0BqhWqZ3wqD4jF-qDGk",
       "9nEwUrdeZ6kcRbEj52QH3nOR-oie0_p9tMNIAEuFvMU",
       "HTh6Zr2J8aiqpa963cLkuKeQDf9O00FzOHhyjGpVfTg",
       "JCp2K2NhH-LE5L0j7ME0LNx-T-px9QFtamSsxmCUCxU",
       "LoMGrhlDm_bUWUX1gdhRxTsy4d4zywGzlSVocRSY01M",
       "UgUjq5whzQewO59fVNj0f0mqyV8YPXU54sp4kLecwQk",
       "Y0H-E3hzKEUnAyri_x9tT9k-j4i65ao9hkeEHNexosI",
       "ezCAmaTwI2nPj_1IiB3KZfiEORLeRwhZsMMDMZIJ8kA",
       "i0H_-WAHwfEjt8tqQH74uOCWvquY3FwuX-kx4e2RJH8",
       "r1GrH46yDV62sezImEjxa6cJSZMT212jrOSHiec9ytM",
       "rVj3RLs7K8zdNy7zXz1Cr39Y6rog8ulNozk4F7NCuC0",
       "t5kp0HfxMS1eHNCGRzrK9Gi5oTZreg5Ue9lLQIuLvB4"
     ],
     "iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
     "iat": 1683000000,
     "exp": 1883000000,
     "vct": "urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
     "_sd_alg": "sha-256",
     "cnf": {
       "jwk": {
         "kty": "EC",
         "crv": "P-256",
         "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
         "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
       }
     }
   }

   The digests in the SD-JWT payload reference the following
   Disclosures:

   *Claim given_name*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 3NdDJYRwBqaEIyXCHcn4a5YKJagPgIP0Wkg9AorgAKg
   *  Disclosure:
      WyIyR0xDNDJzS1F2ZUNmR2ZyeU5STjl3IiwgImdpdmVuX25hbWUiLCAiQXN0
      cmlkIl0
   *  Contents: ["2GLC42sKQveCfGfryNRN9w", "given_name", "Astrid"]

   *Claim family_name*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: JCp2K2NhH-LE5L0j7ME0LNx-T-px9QFtamSsxmCUCxU



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   *  Disclosure:
      WyJlbHVWNU9nM2dTTklJOEVZbnN4QV9BIiwgImZhbWlseV9uYW1lIiwgIkhv
      bG1ncmVuIl0
   *  Contents: ["eluV5Og3gSNII8EYnsxA_A", "family_name", "Holmgren"]

   *Claim birthdate*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 5fn6IiXjUPmGQ4mYHxDdt6EjvBQ7gRvGcdEnSCEN8Ek
   *  Disclosure:
      WyI2SWo3dE0tYTVpVlBHYm9TNXRtdlZBIiwgImJpcnRoZGF0ZSIsICIxOTc4
      LTA0LTEwIl0
   *  Contents: ["6Ij7tM-a5iVPGboS5tmvVA", "birthdate", "1978-04-10"]

   *Claim street_address*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 8yjPR3r8dO5HWLny1gBeMJTPRgkBchuq43qH8Wl_f1c
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJlSThaV205UW5LUHBOUGVOZW5IZGhRIiwgInN0cmVldF9hZGRyZXNzIiwg
      IlNqXHUwMGY4Z2F0YSAxMiJd
   *  Contents: ["eI8ZWm9QnKPpNPeNenHdhQ", "street_address",
      "Sj\u00f8gata
      12"]

   *Claim locality*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: Nard74w2N_9anVEmSlecEJlqx3jxbcqxvVzBsBDX0xs
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJRZ19PNjR6cUF4ZTQxMmExMDhpcm9BIiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlZpa2Vu
      Il0
   *  Contents: ["Qg_O64zqAxe412a108iroA", "locality", "Viken"]

   *Claim postal_code*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 60B3Cwq04hlPBwsvsfvK9JUxvuLFUbJQfgPBbO_H9rM
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJBSngtMDk1VlBycFR0TjRRTU9xUk9BIiwgInBvc3RhbF9jb2RlIiwgIjEy
      MDAxIl0
   *  Contents: ["AJx-095VPrpTtN4QMOqROA", "postal_code", "12001"]

   *Claim country*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: U-zD1DI-7Z0zYoxXqy5HSTNUegahRCHydAesKO_sEPc
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJQYzMzSk0yTGNoY1VfbEhnZ3ZfdWZRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2Rv
      bSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ
   *  Contents: ["Pc33JM2LchcU_lHggv_ufQ", "country", "Kingdom of
      \u00c6ndgard"]




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   *Claim address*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: i0H_-WAHwfEjt8tqQH74uOCWvquY3FwuX-kx4e2RJH8
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJHMDJOU3JRZmpGWFE3SW8wOXN5YWpBIiwgImFkZHJlc3MiLCB7Il9zZCI6
      IFsiNjBCM0N3cTA0aGxQQndzdnNmdks5SlV4dnVMRlViSlFmZ1BCYk9fSDly
      TSIsICI4eWpQUjNyOGRPNUhXTG55MWdCZU1KVFBSZ2tCY2h1cTQzcUg4V2xf
      ZjFjIiwgIk5hcmQ3NHcyTl85YW5WRW1TbGVjRUpscXgzanhiY3F4dlZ6QnNC
      RFgweHMiLCAiVS16RDFESS03WjB6WW94WHF5NUhTVE5VZWdhaFJDSHlkQWVz
      S09fc0VQYyJdfV0
   *  Contents: ["G02NSrQfjFXQ7Io09syajA", "address", {"_sd":
      ["60B3Cwq04hlPBwsvsfvK9JUxvuLFUbJQfgPBbO_H9rM",
      "8yjPR3r8dO5HWLny1gBeMJTPRgkBchuq43qH8Wl_f1c",
      "Nard74w2N_9anVEmSlecEJlqx3jxbcqxvVzBsBDX0xs",
      "U-zD1DI-7Z0zYoxXqy5HSTNUegahRCHydAesKO_sEPc"]}]

   *Claim nationalities*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: HTh6Zr2J8aiqpa963cLkuKeQDf9O00FzOHhyjGpVfTg
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBb
      Ilx1MDBjNm5kZ2FyZCJdXQ
   *  Contents: ["lklxF5jMYlGTPUovMNIvCA", "nationalities",
      ["\u00c6ndgard"]]

   *Claim sex*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 90CT8AaBPbn5X8nRXkesju1i0BqhWqZ3wqD4jF-qDGk
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJuUHVvUW5rUkZxM0JJZUFtN0FuWEZBIiwgInNleCIsIDJd
   *  Contents: ["nPuoQnkRFq3BIeAm7AnXFA", "sex", 2]

   *Claim birth_family_name*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: t5kp0HfxMS1eHNCGRzrK9Gi5oTZreg5Ue9lLQIuLvB4
   *  Disclosure:
      WyI1YlBzMUlxdVpOYTBoa2FGenp6Wk53IiwgImJpcnRoX2ZhbWlseV9uYW1l
      IiwgIkplbnNlbiJd
   *  Contents: ["5bPs1IquZNa0hkaFzzzZNw", "birth_family_name",
      "Jensen"]

   *Claim locality*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: JDOYKS0w0Cofo-HjZGvrd7HirpSfiYDALU6r8T_LE1g
   *  Disclosure:
      WyI1YTJXMF9OcmxFWnpmcW1rXzdQcS13IiwgImxvY2FsaXR5IiwgIlx1MDBj
      Nm5kaG9sbSJd
   *  Contents: ["5a2W0_NrlEZzfqmk_7Pq-w", "locality", "\u00c6ndholm"]



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   *Claim country*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: oTZr9Emy9xmrpcfQ5ZSU8svxdMY8y4XIF_5j9P1u1yA
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJ5MXNWVTV3ZGZKYWhWZGd3UGdTN1JRIiwgImNvdW50cnkiLCAiS2luZ2Rv
      bSBvZiBcdTAwYzZuZGdhcmQiXQ
   *  Contents: ["y1sVU5wdfJahVdgwPgS7RQ", "country", "Kingdom of
      \u00c6ndgard"]

   *Claim place_of_birth*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: r1GrH46yDV62sezImEjxa6cJSZMT212jrOSHiec9ytM
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJIYlE0WDhzclZXM1FEeG5JSmRxeU9BIiwgInBsYWNlX29mX2JpcnRoIiwg
      eyJfc2QiOiBbIkpET1lLUzB3MENvZm8tSGpaR3ZyZDdIaXJwU2ZpWURBTFU2
      cjhUX0xFMWciLCAib1RacjlFbXk5eG1ycGNmUTVaU1U4c3Z4ZE1ZOHk0WElG
      XzVqOVAxdTF5QSJdfV0
   *  Contents: ["HbQ4X8srVW3QDxnIJdqyOA", "place_of_birth", {"_sd":
      ["JDOYKS0w0Cofo-HjZGvrd7HirpSfiYDALU6r8T_LE1g",
      "oTZr9Emy9xmrpcfQ5ZSU8svxdMY8y4XIF_5j9P1u1yA"]}]

   *Claim 12*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: gkvy0FuvBBvj0hs2ZNwxcqOlf8mu2-kCE7-Nb2QxuBU
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJDOUdTb3VqdmlKcXVFZ1lmb2pDYjFBIiwgIjEyIiwgdHJ1ZV0
   *  Contents: ["C9GSoujviJquEgYfojCb1A", "12", true]

   *Claim 14*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: y6SFrVFRyq50IbRJviTZqqjQWz0tLiuCmMeO0KqazGI
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJreDVrRjE3Vi14MEptd1V4OXZndnR3IiwgIjE0IiwgdHJ1ZV0
   *  Contents: ["kx5kF17V-x0JmwUx9vgvtw", "14", true]

   *Claim 16*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: hrY4HnmF5b5JwC9eTzaFCUceIQAaIdhrqUXQNCWbfZI
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJIM28xdXN3UDc2MEZpMnllR2RWQ0VRIiwgIjE2IiwgdHJ1ZV0
   *  Contents: ["H3o1uswP760Fi2yeGdVCEQ", "16", true]

   *Claim 18*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: CVKnly5P90yJs3EwtxQiOtUczaXCYNA4IczRaohrMDg
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE4IiwgdHJ1ZV0
   *  Contents: ["OBKlTVlvLg-AdwqYGbP8ZA", "18", true]



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   *Claim 21*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 1tEiyzPRYOKsf7SsYGMgPZKsOT1lQZRxHXA0r5_Bwkk
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJNMEpiNTd0NDF1YnJrU3V5ckRUM3hBIiwgIjIxIiwgdHJ1ZV0
   *  Contents: ["M0Jb57t41ubrkSuyrDT3xA", "21", true]

   *Claim 65*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: a44-g2Gr8_3AmJw2XZ8kI1y0Qz_ze9iOcW2W3RLpXGg
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJEc210S05ncFY0ZEFIcGpyY2Fvc0F3IiwgIjY1IiwgZmFsc2Vd
   *  Contents: ["DsmtKNgpV4dAHpjrcaosAw", "65", false]

   *Claim age_equal_or_over*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 2r009dzvHuVrWrRXT5kJMmHnqEHHnWe0MLVZw8PATB8
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRqMXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVy
      IiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjF0RWl5elBSWU9Lc2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4
      SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbmx5NVA5MHlKczNFd3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lO
      QTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcjhfM0FtSncyWFo4a0kxeTBRel96
      ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2ajBoczJaTnd4Y3FPbGY4
      bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZVR6YUZDVWNl
      SVFBYUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWnFx
      alFXejB0TGl1Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ
   *  Contents: ["eK5o5pHfgupPpltj1qhAJw", "age_equal_or_over", {"_sd":
      ["1tEiyzPRYOKsf7SsYGMgPZKsOT1lQZRxHXA0r5_Bwkk",
      "CVKnly5P90yJs3EwtxQiOtUczaXCYNA4IczRaohrMDg",
      "a44-g2Gr8_3AmJw2XZ8kI1y0Qz_ze9iOcW2W3RLpXGg",
      "gkvy0FuvBBvj0hs2ZNwxcqOlf8mu2-kCE7-Nb2QxuBU",
      "hrY4HnmF5b5JwC9eTzaFCUceIQAaIdhrqUXQNCWbfZI",
      "y6SFrVFRyq50IbRJviTZqqjQWz0tLiuCmMeO0KqazGI"]}]

   *Claim age_in_years*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: LoMGrhlDm_bUWUX1gdhRxTsy4d4zywGzlSVocRSY01M
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJqN0FEZGIwVVZiMExpMGNpUGNQMGV3IiwgImFnZV9pbl95ZWFycyIsIDQ3
      XQ
   *  Contents: ["j7ADdb0UVb0Li0ciPcP0ew", "age_in_years", 47]

   *Claim age_birth_year*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: rVj3RLs7K8zdNy7zXz1Cr39Y6rog8ulNozk4F7NCuC0
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJXcHhKckZ1WDh1U2kycDRodDA5anZ3IiwgImFnZV9iaXJ0aF95ZWFyIiwg
      MTk3OF0



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   *  Contents: ["WpxJrFuX8uSi2p4ht09jvw", "age_birth_year", 1978]

   *Claim portrait*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 9nEwUrdeZ6kcRbEj52QH3nOR-oie0_p9tMNIAEuFvMU
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJhdFNtRkFDWU1iSlZLRDA1bzNKZ3RRIiwgInBvcnRyYWl0IiwgImRhdGE6
      aW1hZ2UvcG5nO2Jhc2U2NCxpVkJPUncwS0dnb0FBQUFOU1VoRVVnQUFBQ1FB
      QUFBV0FRTUFBQUNTZkt4OUFBQUFBWE5TUjBJQjJja3Nmd0FBQUFSblFVMUJB
      QUN4and2OFlRVUFBQUFnWTBoU1RRQUFlaVlBQUlDRUFBRDZBQUFBZ09nQUFI
      VXdBQURxWUFBQU9wZ0FBQmR3bkxwUlBBQUFBQVpRVEZSRkFBQUEvLy8vcGRt
      ZjNRQUFBRkZKUkVGVUNOZE55bEVOZ0RBUUE5QVNCSnlFV2NEQkxFMENUcERD
      cENEaFB2ZXhyQndsQy95OE5HM1JNdW53OUFpNXA2L3ByL1p6bGNBaTRXaVJO
      MW5sWEFlc09naGVCVFNPOEpEbk5ENlozVytkOTBmQ25UampLUUFBQUFCSlJV
      NUVya0pnZ2c9PSJd
   *  Contents: ["atSmFACYMbJVKD05o3JgtQ", "portrait", "data:image/
      png;base6
      4,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAACQAAAAWAQMAAACSfKx9AAAAAXNSR0IB2c
      ksfwAAAARnQU1BAACxjwv8YQUAAAAgY0hSTQAAeiYAAICEAAD6AAAAgOgAAH
      UwAADqYAAAOpgAABdwnLpRPAAAAAZQTFRFAAAA////pdmf3QAAAFFJREFUCN
      dNylENgDAQA9ASBJyEWcDBLE0CTpDCpCDhPvexrBwlC/y8NG3RMunw9Ai5p6
      /pr/ZzlcAi4WiRN1nlXAesOgheBTSO8JDnND6Z3W+d90fCnTjjKQAAAABJRU
      5ErkJggg=="]

   *Claim issuance_date*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: ezCAmaTwI2nPj_1IiB3KZfiEORLeRwhZsMMDMZIJ8kA
   *  Disclosure:
      WyI0S3lSMzJvSVp0LXprV3ZGcWJVTEtnIiwgImlzc3VhbmNlX2RhdGUiLCAi
      MjAyNC0wMS0xNSJd
   *  Contents: ["4KyR32oIZt-zkWvFqbULKg", "issuance_date",
      "2024-01-15"]

   *Claim expiry_date*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: Y0H-E3hzKEUnAyri_x9tT9k-j4i65ao9hkeEHNexosI
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJjaEJDc3loeWgtSjg2SS1hd1FEaUNRIiwgImV4cGlyeV9kYXRlIiwgIjIw
      MzQtMDEtMTUiXQ
   *  Contents: ["chBCsyhyh-J86I-awQDiCQ", "expiry_date", "2034-01-15"]

   *Claim issuing_authority*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: 6BzMBk7FGivogbldO75f3NLwjFliCqb7nn1GhgCokrQ
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJmbE5QMW5jTXo5TGctYzlxTUl6XzlnIiwgImlzc3VpbmdfYXV0aG9yaXR5
      IiwgIktpbmdkb20gb2YgXHUwMGM2bmRnYXJkLCBNaW5pc3RyeSBvZiBJbnRl
      cmlvciJd



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   *  Contents: ["flNP1ncMz9Lg-c9qMIz_9g", "issuing_authority", "Kingdom
      of
      \u00c6ndgard, Ministry of Interior"]

   *Claim issuing_country*:

   *  SHA-256 Hash: UgUjq5whzQewO59fVNj0f0mqyV8YPXU54sp4kLecwQk
   *  Disclosure:
      WyJvdm9WMXJraF9BTm04NjFxVUFBMkF3IiwgImlzc3VpbmdfY291bnRyeSIs
      ICJcdTAwYzZHIl0
   *  Contents: ["ovoV1rkh_ANm861qUAA2Aw", "issuing_country", "\u00c6G"]

   This shows a presentation of the SD-JWT with a Key Binding JWT that
   discloses only nationality and the fact that the person is over 18
   years old:




































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   eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImRjK3NkLWp3dCJ9.eyJfc2QiOiBbIjJyMDA
   5ZHp2SHVWcldyUlhUNWtKTW1IbnFFSEhuV2UwTUxWWnc4UEFUQjgiLCAiM05kREpZUnd
   CcWFFSXlYQ0hjbjRhNVlLSmFnUGdJUDBXa2c5QW9yZ0FLZyIsICI1Zm42SWlYalVQbUd
   RNG1ZSHhEZHQ2RWp2QlE3Z1J2R2NkRW5TQ0VOOEVrIiwgIjZCek1CazdGR2l2b2dibGR
   PNzVmM05Md2pGbGlDcWI3bm4xR2hnQ29rclEiLCAiOTBDVDhBYUJQYm41WDhuUlhrZXN
   qdTFpMEJxaFdxWjN3cUQ0akYtcURHayIsICI5bkV3VXJkZVo2a2NSYkVqNTJRSDNuT1I
   tb2llMF9wOXRNTklBRXVGdk1VIiwgIkhUaDZacjJKOGFpcXBhOTYzY0xrdUtlUURmOU8
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   hbVNzeG1DVUN4VSIsICJMb01HcmhsRG1fYlVXVVgxZ2RoUnhUc3k0ZDR6eXdHemxTVm9
   jUlNZMDFNIiwgIlVnVWpxNXdoelFld081OWZWTmowZjBtcXlWOFlQWFU1NHNwNGtMZWN
   3UWsiLCAiWTBILUUzaHpLRVVuQXlyaV94OXRUOWstajRpNjVhbzloa2VFSE5leG9zSSI
   sICJlekNBbWFUd0kyblBqXzFJaUIzS1pmaUVPUkxlUndoWnNNTURNWklKOGtBIiwgImk
   wSF8tV0FId2ZFanQ4dHFRSDc0dU9DV3ZxdVkzRnd1WC1reDRlMlJKSDgiLCAicjFHckg
   0NnlEVjYyc2V6SW1FanhhNmNKU1pNVDIxMmpyT1NIaWVjOXl0TSIsICJyVmozUkxzN0s
   4emROeTd6WHoxQ3IzOVk2cm9nOHVsTm96azRGN05DdUMwIiwgInQ1a3AwSGZ4TVMxZUh
   OQ0dSenJLOUdpNW9UWnJlZzVVZTlsTFFJdUx2QjQiXSwgImlzcyI6ICJodHRwczovL3B
   pZC1pc3N1ZXIuYWVuZGdhcmQuZXhhbXBsZSIsICJpYXQiOiAxNjgzMDAwMDAwLCAiZXh
   wIjogMTg4MzAwMDAwMCwgInZjdCI6ICJ1cm46ZXVkaTpwaWQ6YWVuZGdhcmQ6MSIsICJ
   fc2RfYWxnIjogInNoYS0yNTYiLCAiY25mIjogeyJqd2siOiB7Imt0eSI6ICJFQyIsICJ
   jcnYiOiAiUC0yNTYiLCAieCI6ICJUQ0FFUjE5WnZ1M09IRjRqNFc0dmZTVm9ISVAxSUx
   pbERsczd2Q2VHZW1jIiwgInkiOiAiWnhqaVdXYlpNUUdIVldLVlE0aGJTSWlyc1ZmdWV
   jQ0U2dDRqVDlGMkhaUSJ9fX0.NqO-Ms0YSRAHgEfJ0dI0UwVqAreG1LRAQ_H-GwWu7x3
   7dRwnWmB_xz3EiZ5vyzDEfxQ9mYMwqp0GbeycAWFIBw~WyJlSzVvNXBIZmd1cFBwbHRq
   MXFoQUp3IiwgImFnZV9lcXVhbF9vcl9vdmVyIiwgeyJfc2QiOiBbIjF0RWl5elBSWU9L
   c2Y3U3NZR01nUFpLc09UMWxRWlJ4SFhBMHI1X0J3a2siLCAiQ1ZLbmx5NVA5MHlKczNF
   d3R4UWlPdFVjemFYQ1lOQTRJY3pSYW9ock1EZyIsICJhNDQtZzJHcjhfM0FtSncyWFo4
   a0kxeTBRel96ZTlpT2NXMlczUkxwWEdnIiwgImdrdnkwRnV2QkJ2ajBoczJaTnd4Y3FP
   bGY4bXUyLWtDRTctTmIyUXh1QlUiLCAiaHJZNEhubUY1YjVKd0M5ZVR6YUZDVWNlSVFB
   YUlkaHJxVVhRTkNXYmZaSSIsICJ5NlNGclZGUnlxNTBJYlJKdmlUWnFxalFXejB0TGl1
   Q21NZU8wS3FhekdJIl19XQ~WyJPQktsVFZsdkxnLUFkd3FZR2JQOFpBIiwgIjE4Iiwgd
   HJ1ZV0~WyJsa2x4RjVqTVlsR1RQVW92TU5JdkNBIiwgIm5hdGlvbmFsaXRpZXMiLCBbI
   lx1MDBjNm5kZ2FyZCJdXQ~eyJhbGciOiAiRVMyNTYiLCAidHlwIjogImtiK2p3dCJ9.e
   yJub25jZSI6ICIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwgImF1ZCI6ICJodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tL
   3ZlcmlmaWVyIiwgImlhdCI6IDE3NjA5Nzc0MzQsICJzZF9oYXNoIjogImtiYUJ1X0E1X
   zQ4YkNSOTRkM2toNVVtVmZlc0o5MTlJWXh3Q192SUVqazgifQ.bUfNjzIZ9vDNzLzkF_
   KShyeKqr7VP6yJGOmRz1Xpq7U_2dE70LPcbSa9IsdkP84PoEZlEDChP6opy46svE37dA

   The following is the payload of a corresponding Key Binding JWT:

   {
     "nonce": "1234567890",
     "aud": "https://example.com/verifier",
     "iat": 1760977434,
     "sd_hash": "kbaBu_A5_48bCR94d3kh5UmVfesJ919IYxwC_vIEjk8"
   }

   After validation, the Verifier will have the following processed SD-
   JWT payload available for further handling:



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   {
     "iss": "https://pid-issuer.aendgard.example",
     "iat": 1683000000,
     "exp": 1883000000,
     "vct": "urn:eudi:pid:aendgard:1",
     "cnf": {
       "jwk": {
         "kty": "EC",
         "crv": "P-256",
         "x": "TCAER19Zvu3OHF4j4W4vfSVoHIP1ILilDls7vCeGemc",
         "y": "ZxjiWWbZMQGHVWKVQ4hbSIirsVfuecCE6t4jT9F2HZQ"
       }
     },
     "age_equal_or_over": {
       "18": true
     },
     "nationalities": [
       "Ændgard"
     ]
   }

B.2.  Example 2: Type Metadata

   The following example for Type Metadata assumes an SD-JWT VC payload
   structured as follows:


























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   {
     "vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential",
     "vct#integrity": "sha256-1odmyxoVQCuQx8SAym8rWHXba41fM/Iv/V1H8VHGN00=",
     "name": "Zaphod Beeblebrox",
     "address": {
       "street_address": "42 Galaxy Way",
       "city": "Betelgeuse City",
       "postal_code": "12345",
       "country": "Betelgeuse"
     },
     "degrees": [
       {
         "field_of_study": "Intergalactic Politics",
         "date_awarded": "2020-05-15"
       },
       {
         "field_of_study": "Space Navigation",
         "date_awarded": "2018-06-20"
       },
       {
         "field_of_study": "Quantum Mechanics",
         "date_awarded": "2016-07-25"
       }
     ]
   }

   The Type Metadata for this SD-JWT VC could be defined as follows:

   {
     "vct": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/education_credential",
     "name": "Betelgeuse Education Credential - Preliminary Version",
     "description": "This is our development version of the education credential. Don't panic.",
     "extends": "https://galaxy.example.com/galactic-education-credential-0.9",
     "extends#integrity": "sha256-ilOUJsTultOwLfz7QUcFALaRa3BP/jelX1ds04kB9yU=",
     "display": [
       {
         "locale": "en-US",
         "name": "Betelgeuse Education Credential",
         "description": "An education credential for all carbon-based life forms on Betelgeusians",
         "rendering": {
           "simple": {
             "logo": {
               "uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/education-logo.png",
               "uri#integrity": "sha256-LmXfh+9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1U=",
               "alt_text": "Betelgeuse Ministry of Education logo"
             },
             "background_image": {
               "uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-background.png",



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               "uri#integrity": "sha256-5sBT7mMLylHLWrrS/qQ8aHpRAxoraWVmWX6eUVMlrrA="
             },
             "background_color": "#12107c",
             "text_color": "#FFFFFF"
           },
           "svg_templates": [
             {
               "uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-english.svg",
               "uri#integrity": "sha256-I4JcBGO7UfrkOBrsV7ytNJAfGuKLQh+e+Z31mc7iAb4=",
               "properties": {
                 "orientation": "landscape",
                 "color_scheme": "light",
                 "contrast": "high"
               }
             }
           ]
         }
       },
       {
         "locale": "de-DE",
         "name": "Betelgeuse-Bildungsnachweis",
         "rendering": {
           "simple": {
             "logo": {
               "uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/education-logo-de.png",
               "uri#integrity": "sha256-LmXfh+9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1U=",
               "alt_text": "Logo des Betelgeusischen Bildungsministeriums"
             },
             "background_image": {
               "uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-background-de.png",
               "uri#integrity": "sha256-9cLlJNXN+TsMk+PmKjZ5t0WRL5ca/xGgX3c1ULmXfh="
             },
             "background_color": "#12107c",
             "text_color": "#FFFFFF"
           },
           "svg_templates": [
             {
               "uri": "https://betelgeuse.example.com/public/credential-german.svg",
               "uri#integrity": "sha256-I4JcBGO7UfrkOBrsV7ytNJAfGuKLQh+e+Z31mc7iAb4=",
               "properties": {
                 "orientation": "landscape",
                 "color_scheme": "light",
                 "contrast": "high"
               }
             }
           ]
         }
       }



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     ],
     "claims": [
       {
         "path": ["name"],
         "display": [
           {
             "locale": "de-DE",
             "label": "Vor- und Nachname",
             "description": "Der Name des Studenten"
           },
           {
             "locale": "en-US",
             "label": "Name",
             "description": "The name of the student"
           }
         ],
         "sd": "always",
         "mandatory": true
       },
       {
         "path": ["address"],
         "display": [
           {
             "locale": "de-DE",
             "label": "Adresse",
             "description": "Adresse zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses"
           },
           {
             "locale": "en-US",
             "label": "Address",
             "description": "Address at the time of graduation"
           }
         ],
         "sd": "always"
       },
       {
         "path": ["address", "street_address"],
         "display": [
           {
             "locale": "de-DE",
             "label": "Straße"
           },
           {
             "locale": "en-US",
             "label": "Street Address"
           }
         ],
         "sd": "always",



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         "svg_id": "address_street_address"
       },
       {
         "path": ["degrees"],
         "display": [
           {
             "locale": "de-DE",
             "label": "Abschlüsse",
             "description": "Abschlüsse des Studenten"
           },
           {
             "locale": "en-US",
             "label": "Degrees",
             "description": "Degrees earned by the student"
           }
         ],
         "sd": "never"
       },
       {
         "path": ["degrees", null],
         "sd": "always"
       },
       {
         "path": ["degrees", null, "field_of_study"],
         "display": [
           {
             "locale": "de-DE",
             "label": "Studienfach"
           },
           {
             "locale": "en-US",
             "label": "Field of Study"
           }
         ],
         "sd": "never"
       },
       {
         "path": ["degrees", null, "date_awarded"],
         "display": [
           {
             "locale": "de-DE",
             "label": "Verleihungsdatum"
           },
           {
             "locale": "en-US",
             "label": "Date Awarded"
           }
         ],



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         "sd": "always"
       }
     ]
   }

   Note that in this example, there are four definitions affecting the
   degrees claim:

   1.  The degrees array itself is marked as sd: never, meaning the
       element degrees cannot be selectively disclosed and will always
       exist in the disclosed SD-JWT.  Changing this to sd: always would
       mean that the degrees array itself is selectively disclosable.
   2.  Each item in the degrees array (denoted by null in the path) is
       marked as sd: always, meaning each degree object will be
       selectively disclosed as a whole.
   3.  The field_of_study property of each degree object is marked as
       sd: never, meaning that if the respective degree object is
       disclosed, the field_of_study property will always be included
       and cannot be hidden.
   4.  The date_awarded property of each degree object is marked as sd:
       always, meaning it can be selectively disclosed.

Appendix C.  Acknowledgements

   We would like to thank Aaron Parecki, Alen Horvat, Andres Uribe,
   Andrii Deinega, Babis Routis, Christian Bormann, Denis Pinkas, George
   J Padayatti, Giuseppe De Marco, Lukas J Han, Leif Johansson, Michael
   B.  Jones, Mike Prorock, Mirko Mollik, Orie Steele, Paul Bastian,
   Pavel Zarecky, Stefan Charsley, Tim Cappalli, Timo Glastra, Torsten
   Lodderstedt, Tobias Looker, and Kristina Yasuda for their
   contributions (some of which substantial) to this draft and to the
   initial set of implementations.

Appendix D.  Document History

   -12

   *  Change lang to locale.  While lang is more accurate, locale is
      what has traditionally been used in OpenID Connect and later
      related specs.
   *  Remove JSON schema from Type Metadata
   *  Introduce optional mandatory property for claims
   *  Explicitly mention that Type Metadata can have additional stuff
      that has to be ignored if not understood
   *  Clarify that an SD-JWT VC doesn't contain a KB-JWT but rather
      might have an associated one (which makes it a SD-JWT+KB and Brian
      is still not sure about the term or these words, but it's where
      we've ended up)



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   *  Remove the requirement to ignore unknown claims, as some
      applications may not want to follow this rule
   *  Fix cnf claim and JWK references and move them to normative
   *  List vct as one of the required values in type metadata and ensure
      that the use of the document integrity claims is clear
   *  Remove discussion of status and Status Provider from the
      Introduction
   *  Add a background_image property to the simple rendering aligned
      with the definition in OpenID4VCI
   *  Recommend to use sd=always or sd=never to avoid ambiguity and
      introduce rules for sd and mandatory when extending types
   *  Provide some guidance on versioning via the vct value
   *  Add security considerations for trust in type metadata
   *  Require data URIs for non-JSON types
   *  Require x5c to be in the protected header
   *  Clarify presentations of SD-JWT VC do not require KB
   *  Updated/expanded example for Type Metadata
   *  Be more consistent with style for lists of claims/parameters/
      properties
   *  Update PID example to make clear that it is not normative
   *  Clarification on processing of display metadata

   -11

   *  Clarify extend support for claim metadata
   *  Add privacy concerns regarding the use of x5u parameter in JWKs
      and similar remote retrieval mechanisms
   *  Added a section on Credential Type Extension and Issuer
      Authorization.
   *  Fixed an inconsistency to the description of display attribute of
      claim metadata.
   *  add vct#integrity to the list of claims that cannot be selectively
      disclosed
   *  Drop explicit treatment of the glue type metadata document concept
   *  Editorial updates and fixes.
   *  State that when the status claim is present and using the
      status_list mechanism, the associated Status List Token has to be
      a JWT.
   *  vct datatype is now just a string

   -10










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   *  Rename 'Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation' to 'Issuer
      Signature Mechanisms' and rework some text accordingly.  Provide a
      web-based metadata resolution mechanism and an inline x509
      mechanism.  A DID-based mechanism is not explicitly provided
      herein but still possible via profile/extension.  Be explicit that
      the employed Issuer Signature Mechanism has to be one that is
      permitted for the Issuer according to policy.  Be more clear that
      one permitted Issuer Signature Mechanism is sufficient.
   *  Fix [...]#integrity claim values in examples (Subresource
      Integrity uses regular base64 encoding and some were wrong length)

   -09

   *  Use SD-JWT KB in place of SD-JWT with Key Binding JWT
   *  Editorial changes
   *  Document reasons for not using JSON Pointer or JSON Path (Issue
      #267)
   *  Clarify that private claim names MAY be used
   *  Update PID Example
   *  Fix section numbering in a few SD-JWT references

   -08

   *  Fix formatting issue introduced by the reintroduction of the DID
      paragraph in -07

   -07

   *  Revert change from previous release that removed explicit mention
      of DIDs in the Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key Validation
      section
   *  Remove the requirement to insert a .well-known part for vct URLs
   *  fix section numbering in SD-JWT references to align with the
      latest -14 version

   -06

   *  Update the anticipated media type registration request from
      application/vc+sd-jwt to application/dc+sd-jwt
   *  Tightened the exposition of the Issuer-signed JWT Verification Key
      Validation section
   *  Add the “Status” field for the well-known URI registration per
      IANA early review

   -05

   *  Include display and claim type metadata
   *  Added example for type metadata



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   *  Clarify, add context, or otherwise improved the examples

   -04

   *  update reference to IETF Status List
   *  Include Type Metadata
   *  Include schema Type Metadata
   *  Editorial changes
   *  Updated terminology to clarify digital signatures are one way to
      secure VCs and presentations
   *  Rework key resolution/validation for x5c

   -03

   *  Include disclosure of age_equal_or_over/18 in the PID example

   -02

   *  Made specific rules for public verification key validation
      conditional
   *  Finetuned rules for obtaining public verification key
   *  Editorial changes
   *  added Brian Campbell as co-author
   *  Renamed JWT Issuer Metadata to JWT VC Issuer Metadata
   *  'iat' is now optional and allowed to be selectively disclosable
   *  Fix inconstancy in the .well-known path construction
   *  Added registration request to IANA for the well-known URI
   *  Fix some formatting and text in the media type and JWT claim
      registration requests
   *  Clarify the optionality of the cnf claim
   *  Added relationships to other documents
   *  Added PID example

   -01

   *  Introduce rules for type identifiers (Collision-Resistant Name)
   *  Rename type to vct
   *  Removed duplicated and inconsistent requirements on KB-JWT
   *  Editorial changes
   *  Added issuer public verification key discovery section.

   -00

   *  Upload as draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-00
   *  Aligned terminology and descriptions with latest version of SD-JWT

   [[ pre Working Group Adoption: ]]




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   -00

   *  Initial Version
   *  Removed W3C VCDM transformation algorithm
   *  Various editorial changes based on feedback
   *  Adjusted terminology based on feedback
   *  Added non-selectively disclosable JWT VC
   *  Added a note that this is not W3C VCDM

Authors' Addresses

   Oliver Terbu
   MATTR
   Email: oliver.terbu@mattr.global


   Daniel Fett
   Authlete Inc.
   Email: mail@danielfett.de


   Brian Campbell
   Ping Identity
   Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com



























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