



dnsop                                                             Momoka
Internet-Draft                                              WIDE Project
Obsoletes: 3901 (if approved)                                  T. Fiebig
Intended status: Best Current Practice                           MPI-INF
Expires: 16 August 2026                                 12 February 2026


Operational Guidelines for DNS Transport in Mixed IPv4/IPv6 Environments
                      draft-ietf-dnsop-3901bis-17

Abstract

   This document provides guidelines and documents Best Current Practice
   for operating authoritative DNS servers, recursive resolvers and stub
   resolvers in a mixed IPv4/IPv6 environment.  This document recommends
   that both authoritative DNS servers and recursive resolvers support
   IPv4 and IPv6.  It also provides guidance on how recursive DNS
   resolvers should select upstream DNS servers, including when
   IPv4-embedded IPv6 addresses are available.

   This document obsoletes RFC 3901.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ietf-wg-dnsop/draft-ietf-dnsop-3901bis.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 August 2026.






Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Name Space Fragmentation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Misconfigurations Causing IP Address Family Related Name
           Space Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Network Conditions Causing IP Address Family Related Name
           Space Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Reasons for Intentional IP Address Family Related Name
           Space Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Policy Based Avoidance of Name Space Fragmentation  . . . . .  10
     4.1.  Guidelines for Authoritative DNS Server Configuration . .  10
     4.2.  Guidelines for Recursive DNS Resolvers  . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.3.  Guidelines for DNS Stub Resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  Changes Since RFC3901  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20

1.  Introduction

   Despite IPv6 being first discussed since the mid-1990s [RFC2460],
   consistent deployment throughout the whole Internet has not yet been
   accomplished [RFC9386].  Hence, the Internet still consists of
   IPv4-only, dual-stack (networks supporting both IP address families),
   and IPv6-only networks.





Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   This creates a complex landscape where authoritative DNS servers
   might be accessible only via specific network protocols
   [V6DNSRDY-23].  At the same time, DNS resolvers may only be able to
   access the Internet via either IPv4 or IPv6 connectivity.  This poses
   a challenge for such resolvers because they may receive queries for
   names whose authoritative DNS servers do not support the same IP
   address family as the resolver itself.

   [RFC3901] was initially written at a time when IPv6 deployment was
   not widespread, focusing primarily on maintaining name space
   continuity within the IPv4 landscape.  Two decades later, not only is
   IPv6 widely deployed, it is also becoming the de facto standard in
   many areas, such as mobile and access networks and data center
   underlays.  Furthermore, since 2012, IPv6 support being required for
   all IP-capable nodes has been established as a best current practice
   [RFC6540].  This document broadens the scope of [RFC3901]
   recommending IPv6 connectivity for authoritative DNS servers,
   recursive resolvers, and stub resolvers.

   This document provides:

   *  Guidance on IP address family-related name space fragmentation and
      best practices for avoiding it.

   *  Guidelines for configuring authoritative DNS servers for zones.

   *  Guidelines for operating recursive DNS resolvers.

   *  Guidelines for stub DNS resolvers.

   While transition and coexistence setups may mitigate some of the DNS
   resolution issues in a mixed IP address family Internet, making DNS
   data accessible over both IPv4 and IPv6 is the most robust and
   flexible approach.  This approach allows resolvers to retrieve the
   information they need without requiring intermediary translation or
   encapsulation services, which may introduce additional failure cases.

   Refer to Appendix A for an overview of the main changes since
   [RFC3901].

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.




Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


2.  Terminology

   This document uses DNS terminology as described in [RFC9499].
   Furthermore, the following terms are used with a defined meaning:

   IPv4 name server:
      A name server that provides either authoritative or recursive DNS
      services and is reachable via IPv4.  This does not imply anything
      about the DNS data served, but rather that the name server
      receives and answers queries over IPv4.

   IPv6 name server:
      A name server that provides either authoritative or recursive DNS
      services and is reachable via IPv6.  This does not imply anything
      about the DNS data served, but rather that the name server
      receives and answers queries over IPv6.

   Dual-stack name server:
      A name server that is both an "IPv4 name server" and an "IPv6 name
      server".

   Effective PMTU
      The effective Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU) is the largest
      IP packet size (in octets) that can successfully traverse a
      network path from source to destination without requiring
      fragmentation.

3.  Name Space Fragmentation

   When a resolver looks up a name, it starts at the root and follows
   referrals until it reaches a name server set that is authoritative
   for the name.  However, if the referrals lead to a name server set
   that only contains name servers reachable via an IP address family
   not supported by the resolver, the resolver is unable to continue DNS
   resolution.

   If this occurs, the DNS has effectively fragmented due to mismatching
   IP address family support between the recursive DNS resolver and the
   authoritative DNS server.












Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   With the deployment of both IPv4 and IPv6, name space fragmentation
   can occur for different reasons.  One reason is that DNS zones are
   consistently configured to support only either IPv4 or IPv6.  Another
   reason is misconfigurations that make a zone unresolvable by either
   IPv4-only or IPv6-only resolvers.  The latter is often hard to
   identify because the impact of misconfigurations affecting one IP
   address family (IPv4 or IPv6) may be hidden in a dual-stack setting.
   In the worst case, where both IP address families must be fully
   supported by a resolver, a specific name may only be resolvable via
   dual-stack enabled resolvers.

3.1.  Misconfigurations Causing IP Address Family Related Name Space
      Fragmentation

   Even when an administrator assumes that they have enabled support for
   a specific IP address family on their authoritative DNS server,
   various misconfigurations may break the DNS delegation chain of a
   zone for that IP address family, preventing any of its records from
   being resolved by clients that only support that IP address family.
   Such misconfigurations may remain undetected if most clients can
   successfully fall back to the other IP address family.

   The following name-related misconfigurations can cause broken
   delegation for one IP address family:

   No A/AAAA records for NS names:
      If all of the NS resource records (RR) for a zone in their parent
      zone have either only A RRs or only AAAA RRs, then resolution via
      the other IP address family is not possible.

   Missing glue:
      If the name from an NS record for a zone is in-domain (i.e., the
      name is within the zone or below), a parent zone needs to contain
      both IPv4 and IPv6 glue records.  A parent needs to serve the
      corresponding A and AAAA RRs in the additional section when
      returning the NS RRs as the referral response [RFC9471].

   No A/AAAA RR for in-domain NS:
      If the parent provides glue records for both IP address families
      but the child zone itself lacks corresponding A or AAAA RRs for
      its in-domain NS' names, resolution via the missing IP address
      family will fail during delegation revalidation (see, e.g.,
      [I-D.ietf-dnsop-ns-revalidation]).








Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   Zone of sibling domain NSes not resolving:
      If the name from an NS RR for a zone is in a sibling domain, the
      corresponding zone needs to be resolvable via the IP address
      family in question as well.  It is insufficient if the name
      pointed to by the NS RR has an associated A or AAAA RR
      correspondingly.

   Parent zone not resolvable via one IP address family:
      For a zone to be resolvable via an IP address family the parent
      zones up to the root zone needs to be resolvable via that IP
      address family as well.  Any zone not resolvable via the concerned
      IP address family breaks the delegation chain for all its
      children.

   The above misconfigurations are not mutually exclusive.

   Furthermore, any of the misconfigurations above may not only
   materialize via a missing RR but also via an RR providing the IP
   address of a name server that is not configured to answer queries via
   that IP address family [V6DNSRDY-23].

   Finally, at the time of this writing, addresses (A or AAAA RRs) for a
   delegation's authoritative name servers are the only type of glue
   defined for the DNS.  In the future, alternative, yet related,
   delegation systems may be available, where other considerations
   apply.

3.2.  Network Conditions Causing IP Address Family Related Name Space
      Fragmentation

   In addition to explicit misconfigurations in the served DNS zones,
   network conditions may also influence a resolver's ability to resolve
   names in a zone.  The most common issue are packets requiring
   fragmentation given a reduced path MTU (PMTU) and MTU discards, i.e.,
   packets being dropped on-path due to exceeding the MTU of the link to
   the next-hop without the sender being notified.  This can manifest in
   the following ways:

   DNS-over-UDP packets requiring fragmentation
      When using EDNS(0) to communicate support for DNS messages larger
      than 512 octets [RFC6891] via conventional DNS-over-UDP transport
      according to [RFC1035], an IP packet carrying a DNS response may
      exceed the PMTU for the path to a resolver.  If an authoritative
      DNS server does not follow [RFC9715], i.e., honors EDNS(0) sizes
      larger than 1232 octets, it will try to fragment the packet
      according to the discovered PMTU.  Such packets mostly occur for
      DNSKEY responses with DNSSEC [RFC4034].




Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 6]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


      In general, DNS servers SHOULD follow [RFC9715], which provides
      additional guidance on preventing fragmentation.  [RFC9715]
      suggests setting an upper bound for received EDNS(0) sizes of 1400
      octets to avoid the need for fragmentation.  However, the
      [DNSFlagDay2020] initiative suggests using an upper bound EDNS(0)
      size of only 1232 octets, which is also adopted by most
      implementations.  Setting the upper bound at 1232 octets ensures
      that generated packets do not exceed 1280 octets, i.e., the
      minimum MTU for IPv6 [RFC8200] which avoids IPv6 host
      fragmentation by the server.  Hence, for clarity, the present
      document specifically notes that clients MAY use an EDNS(0) size
      of 1232 octets as well.

      Additionally, e.g., as an additional precaution or because the DNS
      implementation in use does not support limiting the effective
      EDNS(0) size, DNS servers MAY opt to explicitly not rely on path
      MTU discovery [RFC4821] or PLPMTUD [RFC8899].  It can do so, for
      example, by setting IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU=1 from [RFC3542] to avoid the
      need to perform PMTU discovery.

   DNS-over-TCP packets requiring fragmentation
      A resolver can for various reasons also initiate connections via
      TCP for resolution to an authoritative server.  However, similar
      to the case of DNS-over-UDP, DNS-over-TCP may encounter MTU
      discards if PMTUD is not possible on a given path.  This can
      occur, for example, if PMTUD related ICMP/ICMPv6 messages are
      dropped (i.e., cannot be returned to the sender) or if the size
      communicated in these messages is incorrect (i.e., an on-path
      device alters packets' size).  Under these conditions, the MSS
      honored by the authoritative DNS server leads to IP packets
      exceeding the effective PMTU of the path taken by responses.  In
      that case, similar to the case of DNS-over-UDP, DNS resolution
      will time out when the recursive DNS resolver did not receive a
      response in time.

      [RFC9715] does not provide explicit guidance on mitigating this
      issue.

      [RFC8200] recommends that IPv6 nodes implement Path MTU Discovery
      in order to discover and take advantage of path MTUs greater than
      1280 octets.  Usually, when a transport protocol can use PMTU (or
      PLPMTUD [RFC8201] or Datagram PLPMTUD [RFC4821] [RFC8899]) this
      SHOULD be used to determine an effective PMTU.

      However, as DNS benefits from low latency, and performing PMTU (or
      PLPMTUD [RFC8201] or Datagram PLPMTUD [RFC4821] [RFC8899]) could
      lead to DNS requests timing out before the effective PMTU can be
      established by the server.  Furthermore, at the time of writing



Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 7]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


      most DNS messages fit into less than 1280 octets [DNSv6MTU], which
      means that the benefits of being able to leverage a larger
      effective PMTU only effect corner cases, e.g., requests for DNSKEY
      RRs.  Additionally, not having to rely on PMTUD benefits DNS' time
      budget, as the time needed for PMTUD could already exceed the
      timeout budget for DNS resolution, i.e., could prevent resolution
      for cases where PMTUD is needed all together.

      Hence, DNS servers SHOULD configure the maximum response size to
      avoid fragmentation or on-path discarding of packets larger than
      the effective PMTU.  For TCP, this can be accomplished by
      restricting the used maximum segment size (MSS), either by the
      host limiting the MSS on its own, or by rewriting the MSS field in
      packets during a TCP handshake.

      Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that DNS servers set a Sender MSS
      (MSS_S) of no more than 1388 octets for TCP connections.  Setting
      this MSS ensures that packets do not exceed a size of 1448 octets,
      i.e., the same packet size recommended to avoid fragmentation for
      DNS-over-UDP packets in [RFC9715].  Furthermore, to provide
      additional clarity similar to the above guidance on UDP, DNS
      servers MAY ensure that a total packet size of 1280 octets is not
      exceeded by setting the Sender MSS (MMS_S) to 1220 octets, as
      suggested by the [DNSFlagDay2020] initiative, see Section 3.7.1 of
      [RFC9293].

      Additionally, e.g., as an additional precaution or because the DNS
      implementation in use does not support limiting the effective MSS
      size, DNS servers MAY opt to explicitly not rely on path MTU
      discovery [RFC4821] or PLPMTUD [RFC8899].  It can do so, for
      example, by setting IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU=1 from [RFC3542].

   Broken IP Connectivity at the Resolver
      Similar to authoritative servers, (stub) recursive resolvers may
      face broken IP connectivity for either IPv4 or IPv6:

      IPv4 connectivity for a DNS resolver may experience issues, e.g.,
      if the resolver is deployed behind a Carrier Grade NAT (CGN)
      [RFC6888] that implements strict timeouts on active sessions, or
      limits the number of available TCP and UDP ports numbers for
      connections below the number required by the multiple connections
      necessary during recursive DNS resolution.  Similarly, [RFC1918]
      addressing may be in use on the resolver, while address
      translation is not performed, or, similar to the case for IPv6,
      when the DNS resolver has a global IPv4 address, but that address
      is not forwarded on the resolver's network.





Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 8]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


      IPv6 connectivity for a DNS resolver may experience issues, if,
      e.g., a client has been assigned a global unicast IPv6 address,
      but IPv6 traffic is not forwarded on the resolver's network.
      Also, a resolver may only have received an [RFC4193] unique local
      IPv6 unicast address (ULA), which does not allow it to reach
      global addresses without translation.  Similarly, IPv6
      connectivity can experience issues when IPv4-IPv6 transition
      technologies like NAT64 [RFC6146] on IPv6-mostly networks
      [RFC9313] are in use, where the use of NAT64 can be, e.g.,
      discovered through PREF64 in Router Advertisements (RAs) [RFC8781]
      or DNS64 [RFC7050].  There, the synthesized IPv6 addresses used
      in, e.g., 464XLAT [RFC6877] encounter additional PMTU fluctuation
      due to the difference in header size between IPv4 and IPv6,
      possibly impacting DNS resolution.

   Note: This document only explicitly discusses DNS-over-TCP and DNS-
   over-UDP.  However, several other transport methods between recursive
   and authoritative DNS severs exist, including DNS over various
   encrypted transports.  Some of these technologies provide additional
   mechanisms for preventing the impact of a reduced PMTU or MTU
   discards.  Guidance in this document focuses on IP address family
   support, and questions of the underlying transport protocol (TCP or
   UDP).  If DNS servers use an additional protocol layer, e.g., DNS-
   over-TLS [RFC7858] or DNS-over-QUIC [RFC9250], for their
   communication, and that protocol supports additional measures to
   prevent issues related to fragmentation on the IP layer, these
   measures SHOULD be used for the connection.  If the protocol is not
   resilient to IP layer fragmentation related issues by default, the
   above guidance for TCP and UDP based connections SHOULD be applied
   analogously.

3.3.  Reasons for Intentional IP Address Family Related Name Space
      Fragmentation

   Intentional IP related name space fragmentation occurs if an operator
   consciously decides not to deploy IPv4 or IPv6 for a part of the
   resolution chain.  Most commonly, this is realized by intentionally
   not listing A/AAAA RRs for NS names.  Based on a 2023 study, the
   share of zones not resolvable via IPv4 is negligible, while a little
   less than 40% of zones are not resolvable via IPv6 [V6DNSRDY-23].
   However, as IPv4 address exhaustion progresses, IPv6 adoption is
   expected to increase.









Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                 [Page 9]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


4.  Policy Based Avoidance of Name Space Fragmentation

   With the final exhaustion of IPv4 address pools in RIRs, e.g.,
   [RIPEV4], and the progressing deployment of IPv6, IPv4 and IPv6 have
   become comparably relevant.  Yet, while it is observed that the first
   zones becoming exclusively IPv6 resolvable, there is still a major
   portion of zones solely relying on IPv4 [V6DNSRDY-23].  Hence, dual-
   stack connectivity is still instrumental to be able to resolve zones
   and avoid name space fragmentation.

   Having zones served only by name servers reachable via one IP address
   family would fragment the DNS.  Hence, the need for a way to avoid
   this fragmentation.

   The recommended approach to maintain name space continuity is to use
   administrative policies, as described in this section.

4.1.  Guidelines for Authoritative DNS Server Configuration

   It is usually recommended that DNS zones contain at least two name
   servers (Section 4.1 of [RFC1034]).  Typically, these servers are
   geographically diverse and operate under different routing policies
   [RFC2182], as also mirrored by, e.g., the IANA requirements for TLD
   authoritative name servers [IANANS].  To prevent DNS name space
   fragmentation, at least two IPv4-reachable and two IPv6-reachable
   name servers MUST be configured for a zone.  A single name server
   that is reachable over both IPv4 and IPv6 counts once per address
   family.  Specifically, key requirements for a zone are:

   IPv4 adoption:
      To maintain name space continuity, every DNS zone MUST be served
      by at least two authoritative DNS servers providing services via
      IPv4.  Furthermore, the delegation configuration of an NS
      (Resolution of the parent, resolution of sibling domain names,
      glue) MUST NOT rely on IPv6 connectivity being available.

   IPv6 adoption:
      To maintain name space continuity, every DNS zone MUST be served
      by at least two authoritative DNS servers providing services via
      IPv6.  To avoid reachability issues, authoritative DNS servers
      MUST NOT use IPv4-embedded addresses [RFC6052] (including
      IPv4-Mapped IPv6 addresses and deprecated IPv4-Compatible
      addresses [RFC4291]) for receiving queries.  Furthermore, the
      delegation configuration of an NS (Resolution of the parent,
      resolution of sibling domain names, glue) MUST NOT rely on IPv4
      connectivity being available.





Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 10]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   Consistency:
      Both IPv4 and IPv6 transports MUST serve identical DNS data to
      ensure a consistent resolution experience across different network
      types.

   Avoiding IP Fragmentation:
      IP fragmentation has been reported to be fragile [RFC8900].
      Furthermore, IPv6 transition technologies can introduce unexpected
      reductions in the effective PMTU (e.g., when NAT64 is used
      (Section 7 of [RFC7269])).  Therefore, IP fragmentation SHOULD be
      avoided by following guidance on maximum DNS payload sizes
      [RFC9715].  Furthermore, as per Section 5 of [RFC7766], DNS-over-
      TCP MUST be available as a fall-back option, instead of relying on
      fragmented UDP packets.  Similar to the guidance in [RFC9715],
      authoritative DNS servers MAY set an MSS of either 1388 (analogous
      to [RFC9715]) or 1220 (analogous to the [DNSFlagDay2020]
      suggestions) in TCP sessions carrying DNS responses.

   To prevent name space fragmentation, zone validation processes SHOULD
   ensure that:

   *  There are at least two IPv4 address records and two IPv6 address
      records available for the name servers of any child delegation
      within the zone.

   *  The zone's authoritative servers follow [RFC9715] for avoiding
      fragmentation on DNS-over-UDP.

   *  The zone's authoritative servers support DNS-over-TCP [RFC9210].

   *  The zone's authoritative servers can be reached via IPv4 and IPv6
      when performing DNS resolution via IPv4-only and IPv6-only
      networks respectively.

4.2.  Guidelines for Recursive DNS Resolvers

   To ensure robust DNS resolution even when facing namespace
   fragmentation, every recursive DNS resolver SHOULD be dual-stack.
   Exceptions apply if one of the below methods to prevent namespace
   fragmentation are in place.

   While the zones that IPv6-only recursive DNS resolvers can resolve
   are growing, they do not yet cover all zones.  Hence, a recursive DNS
   resolver MAY be IPv6-only, if it uses a transition mechanism that
   allows it to also query IPv4-only authoritative DNS servers or uses a
   configuration where it forwards queries failing IPv6-only DNS
   resolution to a dual-stack recursive DNS resolver (i.e., a resolver
   that is also able to perform DNS resolution over IPv4).  If a



Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 11]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   recursive DNS resolver is aware of a PREF64 to use for NAT64
   [RFC6146], either through static configuration or by discovering it
   (e.g., [RFC8781]), it MAY synthesize IPv6 addresses for remote
   authoritative DNS servers.

   Similarly, a recursive DNS resolver MAY be IPv4-only, if it uses a
   configuration where such resolvers forward queries failing IPv4-only
   DNS resolution to a dual-stack recursive DNS resolver (i.e., a
   resolver that is also able to perform DNS resolution over IPv6).

   Finally, when responding to recursive queries (i.e., a query with the
   RD bit set [RFC1035]), a DNS resolver SHOULD follow the above
   guidance on fragmentation avoidance (Section 4.1) for communication
   between authoritative DNS servers and recursive DNS resolvers
   analogously.

4.3.  Guidelines for DNS Stub Resolvers

   Contrary to authoritative DNS servers and recursive DNS resolvers,
   stub DNS resolvers are more likely to find themselves in either an
   IPv6-mostly or IPv4-only environment, as they are usually run on end-
   hosts / clients.  Furthermore, a stub DNS resolver has to rely on
   recursive DNS servers discovered for the local network, e.g., using
   DHCPv4 [RFC2131], DHCPv6 [RFC9915], and/or router advertisements
   [RFC8106].  In that case, the stub resolver may obtain multiple
   different IPv4 and IPv6 DNS resolver addresses to use.

   To prioritize different IPv4 and IPv6 DNS resolver addresses, a stub
   resolver SHOULD follow [RFC6724].  However, a stub DNS resolver
   SHOULD NOT utilize IPv4-embedded IPv6 addresses if it is able to
   identify them as such, e.g., by having discovered the PREF64 in use
   for the network [RFC8781].

   When providing multiple DNS servers to stub resolvers, network
   operators have to consider that, at the time of writing, various
   implementations can only configure a small set of possible DNS
   resolvers, e.g., only up to three for libc [MAN], and additional
   resolvers provided may be ignored by clients.  Hence, when providing
   more than three DNS servers to stub resolvers, operators SHOULD
   ensure that no more than two recursive DNS servers supplied to
   clients are unable to perform dual-stack DNS resolution, and at least
   one of the supplied recursive DNS servers is able to perform dual-
   stack DNS resolution.  If this is not done, a client might select a
   subset of recursive DNS servers that leads to address family based
   namespace fragmentation.






Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 12]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


5.  Security Considerations

   The guidelines described in this memo introduce no new security
   considerations into the DNS protocol itself.

   Nevertheless, corner cases exist where forwarding queries requiring
   an IP address family for resolution that is not supported by the
   initial resolver lead to an infinite forwarding loop, under the
   following conditions:

   *  Two resolvers handle queries for a set of clients, each of these
      resolvers support one and only one address family that is distinct
      from the address family supported by the other resolver;

   *  Both resolvers are configured to forward queries requiring DNS
      resolution via the IP address family they do not support to the
      other; and

   *  A query for a zone that is not resolvable via IPv4 and not
      resolvable via IPv6 is received.

   In such a case, a query for the non-resolvable zone would be
   endlessly forwarded between these resolvers.

   To prevent such cases, single-stack recursive DNS resolvers SHOULD be
   configured to forward queries they cannot resolve due to lacking
   support for one address family to dual-stack recursive DNS resolvers.
   Furthermore, recursive DNS resolvers MUST NOT be configured to
   forward queries to DNS resolvers that are configured to forward
   queries to them in the first place.

   Recommendations for recursive and stub resolvers rely on a correctly
   discovered PREF64.  Security issues may materialize if an incorrect
   PREF64 is used.  Hence, guidance from [RFC9872] on securely
   discovering PREF64 SHOULD be followed.

   Preventing fragmentation according to the guidance in this document
   may increase load on DNS servers, as more TCP fallbacks might be
   required.  While measurements have shown this to be (at the time of
   writing) in the range of 3-5% of connections [DNSv6MTU], operators
   SHOULD monitor the actual impact on their servers when implementing
   guidance from this document to detect unexpected load increases early
   on.








Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 13]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


6.  IANA Considerations

   This document requests IANA consider updating its technical
   requirements for authoritative DNS servers to require both IPv4 and
   IPv6 addresses for each authoritative server [IANANS], in accordance
   with its processes for reviewing and revising these procedures.

Acknowledgments

   Valuable input for this draft was provided by: Bob Harold, Andreas
   Schulze, Tommy Jensen, Nick Buraglio, Jen Linkova, Tim Chown, Brian E
   Carpenter, Tom Petch, Philipp S.  Tiesel, Mark Andrews, Stefan
   Ubbink, Joe Abley, Gorry Fairhurst, Paul Vixie, Lorenzo Colitti,
   David Farmer, Pieter Lexis, Ralf Weber, Philip Homburg, Marco Davids,
   Mohamed Boucadair, Thomas Fossati, Aihua Guo, Bernie Volz, David
   Dong, Roman Danyliw, Éric Vyncke

   Thank you for reading this draft.

   The authors furthermore express their thanks towards the authors of
   [RFC3901], Alain Durand and Johan Ihren, and provide their original
   acknowledgements verbatim below:

   This document is the result of many conversations that happened in
   the DNS community at IETF and elsewhere since 2001.  During that
   period of time, a number of Internet drafts have been published to
   clarify various aspects of the issues at stake.  This document
   focuses on the conclusion of those discussions.

   The authors would like to acknowledge the role of Pekka Savola in his
   thorough review of the document.

References

Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.



Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 14]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.

   [RFC4821]  Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
              Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.

   [RFC6052]  Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M., and X.
              Li, "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators", RFC 6052,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6052, October 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6052>.

   [RFC6724]  Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
              "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
              (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.

   [RFC6891]  Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
              for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.

   [RFC7766]  Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and
              D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
              Requirements", RFC 7766, DOI 10.17487/RFC7766, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7766>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8200]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.

   [RFC8899]  Fairhurst, G., Jones, T., Tüxen, M., Rüngeler, I., and T.
              Völker, "Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery for
              Datagram Transports", RFC 8899, DOI 10.17487/RFC8899,
              September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8899>.

   [RFC9210]  Kristoff, J. and D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP -
              Operational Requirements", BCP 235, RFC 9210,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9210, March 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9210>.





Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 15]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   [RFC9293]  Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)",
              STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9293>.

   [RFC9471]  Andrews, M., Huque, S., Wouters, P., and D. Wessels, "DNS
              Glue Requirements in Referral Responses", RFC 9471,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9471, September 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9471>.

   [RFC9715]  Fujiwara, K. and P. Vixie, "IP Fragmentation Avoidance in
              DNS over UDP", RFC 9715, DOI 10.17487/RFC9715, January
              2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9715>.

Informative References

   [DNSFlagDay2020]
              "DNS flag day 2020", <https://dnsflagday.net/2020/>.

   [DNSv6MTU] Fiebig, T. and A. Feldmann, "'How I learned to stop
              worrying and love IPv6': Measuring the Internet's
              Readiness for DNS over IPv6", October 2025,
              <https://doi.org/10.1145/3730567.3764439>.

   [I-D.ietf-dnsop-ns-revalidation]
              Huque, S., Vixie, P. A., and W. Toorop, "Delegation
              Revalidation by DNS Resolvers", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dnsop-ns-revalidation-11, 19
              October 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-dnsop-ns-revalidation-11>.

   [IANANS]   IANA, "Technical requirements for authoritative name
              servers",
              <https://www.iana.org/help/nameserver-requirements>.

   [MAN]      Linux, "resolv.conf(5) — Linux manual page", 2025,
              <https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/
              resolv.conf.5.html>.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.
              J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
              Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918,
              February 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.

   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.





Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 16]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   [RFC2182]  Elz, R., Bush, R., Bradner, S., and M. Patton, "Selection
              and Operation of Secondary DNS Servers", BCP 16, RFC 2182,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2182, July 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2182>.

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.

   [RFC3542]  Stevens, W., Thomas, M., Nordmark, E., and T. Jinmei,
              "Advanced Sockets Application Program Interface (API) for
              IPv6", RFC 3542, DOI 10.17487/RFC3542, May 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3542>.

   [RFC3901]  Durand, A. and J. Ihren, "DNS IPv6 Transport Operational
              Guidelines", BCP 91, RFC 3901, DOI 10.17487/RFC3901,
              September 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3901>.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.

   [RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
              April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.

   [RFC6540]  George, W., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and L. Howard,
              "IPv6 Support Required for All IP-Capable Nodes", BCP 177,
              RFC 6540, DOI 10.17487/RFC6540, April 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6540>.

   [RFC6877]  Mawatari, M., Kawashima, M., and C. Byrne, "464XLAT:
              Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation",
              RFC 6877, DOI 10.17487/RFC6877, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6877>.

   [RFC6888]  Perreault, S., Ed., Yamagata, I., Miyakawa, S., Nakagawa,
              A., and H. Ashida, "Common Requirements for Carrier-Grade
              NATs (CGNs)", BCP 127, RFC 6888, DOI 10.17487/RFC6888,
              April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6888>.





Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 17]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   [RFC7050]  Savolainen, T., Korhonen, J., and D. Wing, "Discovery of
              the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis",
              RFC 7050, DOI 10.17487/RFC7050, November 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7050>.

   [RFC7269]  Chen, G., Cao, Z., Xie, C., and D. Binet, "NAT64
              Deployment Options and Experience", RFC 7269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7269, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7269>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8106]  Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli,
              "IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration",
              RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, March 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.

   [RFC8201]  McCann, J., Deering, S., Mogul, J., and R. Hinden, Ed.,
              "Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6", STD 87, RFC 8201,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8201, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8201>.

   [RFC8781]  Colitti, L. and J. Linkova, "Discovering PREF64 in Router
              Advertisements", RFC 8781, DOI 10.17487/RFC8781, April
              2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8781>.

   [RFC8900]  Bonica, R., Baker, F., Huston, G., Hinden, R., Troan, O.,
              and F. Gont, "IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile",
              BCP 230, RFC 8900, DOI 10.17487/RFC8900, September 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8900>.

   [RFC9250]  Huitema, C., Dickinson, S., and A. Mankin, "DNS over
              Dedicated QUIC Connections", RFC 9250,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9250, May 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9250>.

   [RFC9313]  Lencse, G., Palet Martinez, J., Howard, L., Patterson, R.,
              and I. Farrer, "Pros and Cons of IPv6 Transition
              Technologies for IPv4-as-a-Service (IPv4aaS)", RFC 9313,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9313, October 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9313>.







Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 18]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   [RFC9386]  Fioccola, G., Volpato, P., Palet Martinez, J., Mishra, G.,
              and C. Xie, "IPv6 Deployment Status", RFC 9386,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9386, April 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9386>.

   [RFC9499]  Hoffman, P. and K. Fujiwara, "DNS Terminology", BCP 219,
              RFC 9499, DOI 10.17487/RFC9499, March 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9499>.

   [RFC9872]  Buraglio, N., Jensen, T., and J. Linkova, "Recommendations
              for Discovering IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address
              Synthesis", RFC 9872, DOI 10.17487/RFC9872, September
              2025, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9872>.

   [RFC9915]  Mrugalski, T., Volz, B., Richardson, M., Jiang, S., and T.
              Winters, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
              (DHCPv6)", STD 102, RFC 9915, DOI 10.17487/RFC9915,
              January 2026, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9915>.

   [RIPEV4]   RIPE NCC, "The RIPE NCC has run out of IPv4 Addresses",
              November 2019, <https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/
              about-ripe-ncc-and-ripe/the-ripe-ncc-has-run-out-of-
              ipv4-addresses>.

   [V6DNSRDY-23]
              Streibelt, F., Sattler, P., Lichtblau, F., Hernandez-
              Gañán, C., Gasser, O., and T. Fiebig, "How Ready is DNS
              for an IPv6-Only World?", March 2023,
              <https://link.springer.com/
              chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-28486-1_22>.

Appendix A.  Changes Since [RFC3901]

   The following changes have been made to the guidance published in
   [RFC3901]:

   *  Expanded the terminology section, also taking considerations from
      [RFC9499] into account.

   *  Expanded namespace fragmentation, independently discussing IP
      address family related namespace fragmentation, network condition
      based namespace fragmentation, and intentional namespace
      fragmentation.

   *  Now recommends the use of IPv4 and IPv6 for authoritative DNS
      servers, instead of leaving IPv6 optional.





Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 19]

Internet-Draft                   3901bis                   February 2026


   *  Now recommends testing IPv4 and IPv6 resolvability when delegating
      zones, instead of only testing IPv4 resolvability.

   *  Added guidance on handling IP layer fragmentation.

   *  Added guidance for IP address family handling for recursive and
      stub resolvers.

Authors' Addresses

   Momoka Yamamoto
   WIDE Project
   Email: momoka.my6@gmail.com


   Tobias Fiebig
   Max-Planck-Institut fuer Informatik
   Campus E14
   66123 Saarbruecken
   Germany
   Phone: +49 681 9325 3527
   Email: tfiebig@mpi-inf.mpg.de





























Momoka & Fiebig          Expires 16 August 2026                [Page 20]
