

TLS Working Group
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TLS For Secure Element Rendez Vous
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Abstract

TLS for Secure Element (TLS-SE) is a TLS 1.3 profile for secure element. The pre-shared-key (psk) mode requires two security attributes, psk-identity and psk value, somewhat similar to login and password parameters used for classical users accounts. A rendez vous mechanism works with two accounts with different privileges. A root account generates contents and creates guest account with dedicated access rights for these contents. It is a kind of trusted publish-subscribe mechanism based on a TLS1.3 server running in a secure element.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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
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1 Overview

TLS for Secure Element (TLS-SE) [TLS-SE] is an ISO7816 [ISO7816] interface for a TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] server running in a secure element. This server is identified by a TLS server name (SN), and is connected to an electronic board providing internet connectivity. When TLS pre-shared-key (PSK) is used, a couple of attributes (PSK-Identity, PSK) is associated to a user account. Each account, accesses to secure element resources according to a specific security policy. A root account manages all embedded resources, while other accounts have limited rights fixed by root user. Thanks to these mechanisms TLS-SE devices can be used to securely shared information over internet in a way similar to publish-subscribe architecture.

2 Uniform Resources Identifier for TLS-SE resources



One or several TLS-SE [TLS-SE] secure elements are connected to a TCP/IP node thanks to a communication interface, such as ISO7816, I2C, or SPI [GP-SPI-I2C]. The TCP/IP node is a front TLS1.3 server. A TLS-SE device is a TLS end server identified by the Server-Name (SN) attribute.

A resource is identified by the following Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)

schemeS://SEN:PSK(ID)@IP:PORT/?query

where

- scheme is the syntax used over TLS
- S means secured by TLS
- SEN is the TLS Server-Name used by the TLS-SE application
- PSK is the pre-shared-key
- ID is the psk-identity
- IP is the front TLS server IP address
- PORT is the front TLS server port
- query is a request encoded according to the scheme syntax

2 User accounts in secure element

2.1 Root account

A TLS-SE device MUST comprise at least a couple of attributes (psk-identity, psk) which identifies a root account. The root account manages all secure element resources such as secure storage or cryptographic procedures. It MAY also create or delete other accounts, referred as guest, associated with different (psk-identity, psk) tuples, and define a specific access policy for each of them.

2.2 Guest account


Guest accounts are created and deleted by root. They access to embedded resources according to specific access policies.

3 Rendez-Vous

The "Rendez-Vous" mechanism is managed by the root account. A resource is created, and is made available for a guest, according to a specific access policy.

For example the root creates a data record, and gives a read right for a particular guest. Out of band mechanisms are used to notify the associated URI.

In a similar way the root creates a cryptographic key, and gives an encrypt/decrypt right for a particular guess. Out of band mechanisms are used to notify the associated URI.



4 Example

4.1 Writing operation with root account

psk-identity is root

Server Name is key1.com

RxNET

```

16030300F8010000F403035BD19B1B1C65E63B0AF76336564D8E126FDD38FCDC
31CC6CC0D57BE9BEED595B0000021304010000C9002D0003020001002B000302
0304000D001E001C06030503040302030806080B0805080A0804080906010501
040102010033004700450017004104E744613691E94E64959DB785E2EF8589DE
0FE843B94E04B62E75D78C7B6C34644C3D2031D31745DB2A5F71CFA943542257
  
```

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9ADF9ADA8BCE5DBB01632A40F5052A000A00060004001800170000000D000B00
0008 6B6579312E636F6D 0029002F000A0004 726F6F74 000000000021202E
8241F586AD78A9D767CA761624517935BCD99D1C3265E386FBAD67225498E8

Tx: 00D80001F016030300F8010000F40303
5BD19B1B1C65E63B0AF76336564D8E12
6FDD38FCDC31CC6CC0D57BE9BEED595B
0000021304010000C9002D0003020001
002B0003020304000D001E001C060305
03040302030806080B0805080A080408
09060105010401020100330047004500
17004104E744613691E94E64959DB785
E2EF8589DE0FE843B94E04B62E75D78C
7B6C34644C3D2031D31745DB2A5F71CF
A9435422579ADF9ADA8BCE5DBB01632A
40F5052A000A00060004001800170000
000D000B0000086B6579312E636F6D00
29002F000A0004726F6F740000000000
21202E8241F586AD78A9D767CA761624
517935BCD9

Rx[101ms]:

9000

Tx: 00D800020D9D1C3265E386FBAD672254
98E8

Rx[396ms]:

16030300810200007D03038968138C01
02FEE1A71A65BD7C1FF12B1A6C7D1ADF
4EABFEF4CA1F2CE89498590013040000
55002900020000003300450017004104
54AE904C21CBF67106A551B2191EF3C3
260817A2B81DC7DFF5C4246CE729D617
66F29B6B34EFD1E8805565ED8636701E
2C745075774E8C998661B8780D20638A
002B00020304
9F1C

Tx: 00C000001C

Rx[40ms]:

170303001750FC6821BA8D491FD75F10
CF193E16C3701FEBBC1283B8
9F3A

Tx: 00C000003A

Rx[101ms]:

1703030035ED588DC0A217F525449ADF
88C31C2E75C8B83557DFA0D0AC27331F
542818CECC3CDFE57A879A9D96F6369F
4B0A697E022E05D86379
9000

TxNET

16030300810200007D03038968138C0102FEE1A71A65BD7C1FF12B1A6C7D1ADF
4EABFEF4CA1F2CE8949859001304000055002900020000003300450017004104
54AE904C21CBF67106A551B2191EF3C3260817A2B81DC7DFF5C4246CE729D617

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```
66F29B6B34EFD1E8805565ED8636701E2C745075774E8C998661B8780D20638A
002B00020304170303001750FC6821BA8D491FD75F10CF193E16C3701FEBBC12
83B81703030035ED588DC0A217F525449ADF88C31C2E75C8B83557DFA0D0AC27
331F542818CECC3CDFE57A879A9D96F6369F4B0A697E022E05D86379
```

RxNET

```
1703030035675062F7FB7D6C1D4D61A753755A273F3582D691AF9A47AB725B66
4750ACE4B84E001F30F89D98A138C0145F7E71A5B3F23E416BCB
```

Tx: 00D800033A1703030035675062F7FB7D

6C1D4D61A753755A273F3582D691AF9A

47AB725B664750ACE4B84E001F30F89D

98A138C0145F7E71A5B3F23E416BCB

Rx[218ms]:

9001

TLS-PSK OPEN

Writing 32 bytes at record 00, encoded in hexadecimal

Z001234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF1234567890ABCDEF

Return: OK

RxNET

170303005680A9EFBA1AAD90DBB8B454C60B02FCFD32F8FFBB8B6C356654F482

B88C916D4F2F3E23D80E8884A2E2F98C449E61565A0501B416961E90405F4C82

12A0EAB8BCB7A91BD6FB2DF86C79C6ECCF58EED1C633057B6461DB

Tx: 00D800035B170303005680A9EFBA1AAD

90DBB8B454C60B02FCFD32F8FFBB8B6C

356654F482B88C916D4F2F3E23D80E88

84A2E2F98C449E61565A0501B416961E

90405F4C8212A0EAB8BCB7A91BD6FB2D

F86C79C6ECCF58EED1C633057B6461DB

Rx[126ms]:

17030300154B56A506A564B0E77B9C37

903B66D1A3EBF75C6D49

9000

TxNET

17030300154B56A506A564B0E77B9C37903B66D1A3EBF75C6D49

4.2 Reading operation with guest account

psk-identity is guest

Server Name is key1.com

RxNET

16030300F9010000F5030344E287926C1581927C0D6AB7FAECD454D85BE7CE88

ADAA91FD4F0AD1F93819FC0000021304010000CA002D0003020001002B000302

0304000D001E001C06030503040302030806080B0805080A0804080906010501

04010201003300470045001700410431A71EFFF0B95E9FF0CEADF9708EA0D71B

E70465820324B755EE8627549BDE463DE646F88654D629653E9425BDFED09EDB
FBABA235CC493303EB577C695AC1F7000A00060004001800170000000D000B00
0008 6B6579312E636F6D 00290030000B0005 6775657374 0000000002120
FAF96847AB730FAE992C475E18F9212384DD7EC66DF08CEC62564CC60D3C87DF

Tx: 00D80001F016030300F9010000F50303
44E287926C1581927C0D6AB7FAECD454
D85BE7CE88ADAA91FD4F0AD1F93819FC
0000021304010000CA002D0003020001
002B0003020304000D001E001C060305
03040302030806080B0805080A080408
09060105010401020100330047004500
1700410431A71EFFF0B95E9FF0CEADF9
708EA0D71BE70465820324B755EE8627
549BDE463DE646F88654D629653E9425
BDFED09EDBFBABA235CC493303EB577C
695AC1F7000A00060004001800170000
000D000B0000086B6579312E636F6D00
290030000B0005677565737400000000
002120FAF96847AB730FAE992C475E18
F9212384DD

Rx[101ms]:

9000

Tx: 00D800020E7EC66DF08CEC62564CC60D
3C87DF

Rx[397ms]:

16030300810200007D03031ABA22C6DC
69DF27170FFC086E7B3CD6A2120656C0
E57868E70043DCC9D519430013040000
55002900020000003300450017004104
194A75BF7C9CB96E09CFEB75CE2D4B09
FA4EAEFFFCB8EBEA8115D637FB77D441
F292ABBEC8833C5B452E08D2E35C3410
9A6F8AD223E99F8EE984CEC767A98237
002B00020304
9F1C

Tx: 00C000001C

Rx[42ms]:

1703030017D82DE3B01BD709F1E325E8
671C95AA15E1286C65245AA0
9F3A

Tx: 00C000003A

Rx[98ms]:

17030300350DFEEC2D27131499695A19
BD743D32D6C70382772AC7549F77CCED
024940409070A6231CF6C4611330AC0B
CF4B217B841AC32F4682
9000

TxNET

16030300810200007D03031ABA22C6DC69DF27170FFC086E7B3CD6A2120656C0

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E57868E70043DCC9D51943001304000055002900020000003300450017004104
194A75BF7C9CB96E09CFEB75CE2D4B09FA4EAEFFFCB8EBEA8115D637FB77D441
F292ABBEC8833C5B452E08D2E35C34109A6F8AD223E99F8EE984CEC767A98237
002B000203041703030017D82DE3B01BD709F1E325E8671C95AA15E1286C6524
5AA017030300350DFEEC2D27131499695A19BD743D32D6C70382772AC7549F77
CCED024940409070A6231CF6C4611330AC0BCF4B217B841AC32F4682

RxNET

17030300356935F41A5C9C3EE7CCE3543957912880B4CE3395E14509A718CE89
D1C731B3AAB47B78E2BE8E87379358478A041A6DDDABD93A34B3

Tx: 00D800033A17030300356935F41A5C9C
3EE7CCE3543957912880B4CE3395E145
09A718CE89D1C731B3AAB47B78E2BE8E
87379358478A041A6DDDABD93A34B3

Rx[218ms]:
9001

TLS-PSK OPEN

Reading 32 bytes at record 00: I00

RxNET

1703030016CAC2F4BBF97ABCB82F628E8674C19EBB73CE03F90AD4

Tx: 00D800031B1703030016CAC2F4BBF97A
BCB82F628E8674C19EBB73CE03F90AD4

Rx[117ms]:
1703030053E72D6092F22C59106D033B
7DA402C18ED7BBB107D0C0C52B769019
1CD5F8D99698F111B86856EC984CDA58
5652C176C78456E41CEF089B74A4CE67
44BCBCEB695298ED8DEC7F65D2FF29AA
D7D2B75CC9E67EE7
9000

TxNET

1703030053E72D6092F22C59106D033B7DA402C18ED7BBB107D0C0C52B769019
1CD5F8D99698F111B86856EC984CDA585652C176C78456E41CEF089B74A4CE67
44BCBCEB695298ED8DEC7F65D2FF29AAD7D2B75CC9E67EE7

5 IANA Considerations

This draft does not require any action from IANA.

6 Security Considerations

This entire document is about security.

7 References

7.1 Normative References

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[GP-SPI-I2C] GlobalPlatform Technology, APDU Transport over SPI/I2C Version 0.0.0.39, July 2019

7.2 Informative References

[TLS-SE] Secure Element for TLS Version 1.3, draft-urien-tls-se-08, December 2024

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