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The MASQUE Proxy  
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## Abstract

MASQUE (Multiplexed Application Substrate over QUIC Encryption) is a set of protocols and extensions to HTTP that allow proxying all kinds of Internet traffic over HTTP. This document defines the concept of a "MASQUE Proxy", an Internet-accessible node that can relay client traffic in order to provide privacy guarantees.

## About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at <https://davidchinazi.github.io/masque-drafts/draft-schinazi-masque-proxy.html>. Status information for this document may be found at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-schinazi-masque-proxy/>.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/DavidSchinazi/masque-drafts>.

## Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

In the early days of HTTP, requests and responses weren't encrypted. In order to add features such as caching, HTTP proxies were developed to parse HTTP requests from clients and forward them on to other HTTP servers. As SSL/TLS became more common, the CONNECT method was introduced [CONNECT] to allow proxying SSL/TLS over HTTP. That gave HTTP the ability to create tunnels that allow proxying any TCP-based protocol. While non-TCP-based protocols were always prevalent on the Internet, the large-scale deployment of QUIC [QUIC] meant that TCP no longer represented the majority of Internet traffic. Simultaneously, the creation of HTTP/3 [HTTP/3] allowed running HTTP over a non-TCP-based protocol. In particular, QUIC allows disabling loss recovery [DGRAM] and that can then be used in HTTP [HTTP-DGRAM]. This confluence of events created both the possibility and the necessity for new proxying technologies in HTTP.

This led to the creation of MASQUE (Multiplexed Application Substrate over QUIC Encryption). MASQUE allows proxying both UDP ([CONNECT-UDP]) and IP ([CONNECT-IP]) over HTTP. While MASQUE has uses beyond improving user privacy, its focus and design are best suited for protecting sensitive information.

## 2. Privacy Protections

There are currently multiple usage scenarios that can benefit from using a MASQUE Proxy.

### 2.1. Protection from Web Servers

Connecting directly to Web servers allows them to access the public IP address of the user. There are many privacy concerns relating to user IP addresses [IP-PRIVACY]. Because of these, many user agents would rather not establish a direct connection to Web servers. They can do that by running their traffic through a MASQUE Proxy. The Web server will only see the IP address of the MASQUE Proxy, not that of the client.

### 2.2. Protection from Network Providers

Some users may wish to obfuscate the destination of their network traffic from their network provider. This prevents network providers from using data harvested from this network traffic in ways the user did not intend.

### 2.3. Partitioning

While routing traffic through a MASQUE proxy reduces the network provider's ability to observe traffic, that information is transferred to the proxy operator. This can be suitable for some threat models, but for the majority of users transferring trust from their network provider to their proxy (or VPN) provider is not a meaningful security improvement.

There is a technical solution that allows resolving this issue: it is possible to nest MASQUE tunnels such that traffic flows through multiple MASQUE proxies. This has the advantage of partitioning sensitive information to prevent correlation [PARTITION].

Though the idea of nested tunnels dates back decades [TODO], MASQUE now allows running HTTP/3 end-to-end from a user agent to an origin via multiple nested CONNECT-UDP tunnels. The proxy closest to the user can see the user's IP address but not the origin, whereas the other proxy can see the origin without knowing the user's IP address. If the two proxies are operated by non-colluding entities, this allows hiding the user's IP address from the origin without the proxies knowing the user's browsing history.

#### 2.4. Obfuscation

The fact that MASQUE is layered over HTTP makes it much more resilient to detection. To network observers, the unencrypted bits in a QUIC connection used for MASQUE are indistinguishable from those of a regular Web browsing connection. Separately, if paired with a non-probeable HTTP authentication scheme [CONCEALED-AUTH], any Web server can also become a MASQUE proxy while remaining indistinguishable from a regular Web server. This defeats detection tools that operate solely on packet formats.

However, it is still possible to perform statistical analyses on the encrypted data. There exist commercially available products that are able to identify visited websites based solely on the timing and size of encrypted packets. While MASQUE increases the cost of such traffic analysis efforts, it doesn't prevent them from being used at scale.

MASQUE implementations can leverage the ability for HTTP/2, HTTP/3, TLS, or QUIC to introduce padding inside the encryption. That enables many defensive strategies such as ensuring that all packets are the same size, or introducing variable amounts of cover traffic. From a theoretical perspective, sending data at a constant bitrate is the only way to fully prevent statistical analysis, but it likely introduces too much overhead to be deployable at scale. Finding padding strategies that balance resistance against statistical analysis with overheads remains an open research problem.

#### 3. Related Technologies

This section discusses how MASQUE fits in with other contemporary privacy-focused IETF protocols.

### 3.1. OHTTP

Oblivious HTTP [OHTTP] uses a cryptographic primitive [HPKE] that is more lightweight than TLS [TLS], making it a great fit for decorrelating HTTP requests. In traditional Web browsing, the user agent will often make many requests to the same origin (e.g., to load HTML, style sheets, images, scripts) and those requests are correlatable since the origin can include identifying query parameters to join separate requests. In such scenarios, MASQUE is a better fit since it operates at the granularity of a connection. However, there are scenarios where a user agent might want to make non-correlatable requests (e.g., to anonymously report telemetry); for those, OHTTP provides better efficiency than using MASQUE with a separate connection per request. While OHTTP and MASQUE are separate technologies that serve different use cases, they can be colocated on the same HTTP server that acts as both a MASQUE Proxy and an OHTTP Relay.

### 3.2. DoH

DNS over HTTPS [DoH] allows encrypting DNS traffic by sending it through an encrypted HTTP connection. Colocating a DoH server with a MASQUE IP proxy provides better performance than using DNS over port 53 inside the encrypted tunnel.

## 4. Security Considerations

Implementers of a MASQUE proxy need to review the Security Considerations of the documents referenced by this one.

## 5. IANA Considerations

This document has no IANA actions.

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## [TODO]

"find that 20 year old email about using nested CONNECT tunnels with SSL to improve privacy".

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