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J. Lombardo
AWS
A. Babeanu
IndyKite
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OAuth 2.0 client extension claims
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Abstract

This specification defines new claims for JWT profiled access tokens [RFC9068] so that resource providers can benefit from more granular information about the client: its authentication methods as well as the grant flow and the grant flow extensions used as part of the issuance of the associated tokens.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at <https://identitymonk.github.io/draft-lombardo-oauth-client-extension-claims/draft-lombardo-oauth-client-extension-claims.html>. Status information for this document may be found at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-lombardo-oauth-client-extension-claims/>.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Web Authorization Protocol mailing list (<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>), which is archived at <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>. Subscribe at <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth/>.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/identitymonk/draft-lombardo-oauth-client-extension-claims>.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

Resource providers need information about the subject, the action, the resource, and the context involved in the request in order to be able to determine properly if a resource can be disclosed. This decision may also involve the help of a Policy Decision Point (PDP).

When accessed with a JWT profiled OAuth2 Access Token [RFC9068] presented as a bearer token [RFC6750], a resource provider receives mainly information about the subject in the form of: - The sub claim, - Any user profile claim set by the Authorization Server if applicable, - Any Authentication Information claims like the user class of authentication (acrclaim) or user method of authentication (claim amr [RFC8176]) - Any Authorization Information if applicable

The resource provider has very little information about the client, mainly in the form of the client_id [RFC8693] claim. It falls short in several important circumstances, for instance, in [FAPI2.0-Security-Profiles] or [hl7.fhir.uv.smart-app-launch] regulated APIs when they require peculiar client authentication mechanisms to be enforced or transaction specific details to be present in the token.

This document defines 4 new claims allowing to describe with more precise information the client and metadata on how it interacted with the authorization server during the issuance of the access token. It respects description of how to encode access tokens in JWT format.

The process by which the client interacts with the authorization server is out of scope.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

JWT access token: An OAuth 2.0 access token encoded in JWT format and complying to the requirements described in [RFC9068].

This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization server", "authorization endpoint", "authorization request", "client", "protected resource", and "resource server" defined by "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749].

3. JWT Access Token Client Extensions Data Structure

The following claims extend the [RFC9068] access token payload data structure:

3.1. Client Flow Information Claims

The claims listed in this section MUST be issued and reflect grant type and extensions used with authorization server as part of the authorization request from the client. Their values are dynamic across all access tokens that derive from a given authorization response to reflect the elements used in the process that lead to their issuance.

gty: REQUIRED - defines the OAuth2 authorization grant type the client used for the issuance of the access token. String that is an identifier for an OAuth2 Grant type. Values used in the gty Claim MUST be from those registered in the IANA Grant Type Reference Values registry TODO established by this RFC and referencing, without being limited to, values established through section 2. of [RFC7591], section 2.1 of [RFC8693], and section 4 of [OpenID.CIBA].

cxt: REQUIRED - defines the list of extensions the client used in

conjunction with the OAuth2 authorization grant type used for the issuance of the access token. For example but not limited to: Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients (or PKCE) as defined in [RFC7636], Demonstrating Proof of Possession (or DPOP) as defined in [RFC9449]. JSON array of strings that are identifiers for extensions used. Values used in the cxt Claim MUST be from those registered in the IANA Client Context Reference Values registry TODO established by this RFC and referencing, without being limited to, values established through section 2 of [RFC8414], and Section 5.1 of [RFC9449].

3.2. Client Authentication Information Claims

The claims listed in this section MAY be issued and reflect the types and strength of client authentication in the access token that the authentication server enforced prior to returning the authorization response to the client. Their values are fixed and remain the same across all access tokens that derive from a given authorization response, whether the access token was obtained directly in the response (e.g., via the implicit flow) or after obtaining a fresh access token using a refresh token. Those values may change if an access token is exchanged for another via an [RFC8693] procedure in order to reflect the specificities of this request.

ccr: OPTIONAL - defines the authentication context class reference the client satisfied when authenticating to the authorization server. An absolute URI or registered name from future RFC SHOULD be used as the ccr value; registered names MUST NOT be used with a different meaning than that which is registered. Parties using this claim will need to agree upon the meanings of the values used, which may be context specific.

cmr: OPTIONAL - defines the authentication methods the client used when authenticating to the authorization server. String that is an identifier for an authentication method used in the authentication of the client. For instance, a value might indicate the usage of private JWT as defined in [RFC7521] and [RFC7523] or HTTP message signature as defined in [RFC9421]. The cmr value is a case-sensitive string. Values used in the cmr Claim SHOULD be from those registered in the IANA OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Values registry [IANA.oauth-parameters_token-endpoint-auth-method] defined by [RFC7591]; parties using this claim will need to agree upon the meanings of any unregistered values used, which may be context specific.

4. Authorization Server Metadata

The following authorization server metadata parameters are introduced as an extension of [RFC8414], in order to describe the server's capabilities.

`support_client_extensions_claims`: Boolean parameter indicating to clients and resource servers whether the authorization server will return the extension claims described in this document.

Note: that the non presence of `support_client_extensions_claims` is sufficient for the client to determine that the server is not capable and therefore will not return the extension claims described in this RFC.

5. Requesting a JWT Access Token with Client Extensions

This specification does not change how clients interacts with authorization servers.

An authorization server supporting this specification MUST issue a JWT access token with client extensions claims described in this RFC in response to any authorization grant defined by [RFC6749] and subsequent extensions meant to result in an access token and as along as the authorization server support this capability.

6. Validating JWT Access Tokens with Client Extensions

This specification follows the requirements of the section 4 of [RFC9068].

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Validation Of Token

The JWT access token data format described here is the same as JWT access token defined by [RFC9068].

7.2. Processing Of Claims Defined By This Document

Any processor, client or resource server, MUST only process claims described in this document that it understands.

If a processor does not understand a claim described in this document or its value, it SHOULD ignore it.

7.3. Security Best Practice

The security current best practices described in [RFC9700] MUST be applied.

8. IANA Considerations

The following registration procedure is used for the registry established by this specification.

Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC8126] basis after a two-week review period on the `oauth-ext-review@ietf.org` mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication of the final version of a specification, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that the specification will be completed and published. However, if the specification is not completed and published in a timely manner, as determined by the Designated Experts, the Designated Experts may request that IANA withdraw the registration.

Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register JWT profiled OAuth2 Access Token client extensions: example").

Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. The IANA escalation process is followed when the Designated Experts are not responsive within 14 days.

Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, and whether the registration makes sense.

IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list.

It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are able to represent the perspectives of different applications using this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.

The reason for the use of the mailing list is to enable public review of registration requests, enabling both Designated Experts and other interested parties to provide feedback on proposed registrations. The reason to allow the Designated Experts to allocate values prior to publication as a final specification is to enable giving authors of specifications proposing registrations the benefit of review by the Designated Experts before the specification is completely done, so that if problems are identified, the authors can iterate and fix them before publication of the final specification.

8.1. OAuth Grant Type Registration

This specification registers the following grant type in the [IANA.oauth-parameters] OAuth Grant Type registry.

8.1.1. authorization_code grant type

Type name: authorization_code

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2. of [RFC7591]

8.1.2. implicit grant type

Type name: implicit

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2. of [RFC7591]

8.1.3. password grant type

Type name: password

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2. of [RFC7591]

8.1.4. client_credentials grant type

Type name: client_credentials

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2. of [RFC7591]

8.1.5. refresh_token grant type

Type name: refresh_token

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2. of [RFC7591]

8.1.6. jwt-bearer grant type

Type name: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2. of [RFC7591] and section 6 of [I-D.parecki-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant]

8.1.7. saml2-bearer grant type

Type name: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2. of [RFC7591]

8.1.8. token-exchange grant type

Type name: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 2.1. of [RFC8693]

8.1.9. device_code grant type

Type name: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 3.4. of [RFC8628]

8.1.10. ciba grant type

Type name: urn:openid:params:grant-type:ciba

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): section 4. of [OpenID.CIBA]

8.2. OAuth Grant Extension Type Registration

This specification registers the following grant extension type in the [IANA.oauth-parameters] OAuth Grant Extension Type registry.

8.2.1. pkce grant extension type

Type name: pkce

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to [RFC7636]

8.2.2. dpop grant extension type

Type name: dpop

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to [RFC9449]

8.2.3. wpt grant extension type

Type name: wpt

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol]

8.2.4. rar grant extension type

Type name: rar

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to [RFC9396]

8.2.5. par grant extension type

Type name: par

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to [RFC9126]

8.2.6. jar grant extension type

Type name: jar

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to [RFC9101]

8.3. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods Registration

This specification registers additional token endpoint authentication methods in the [IANA.oauth-parameters] OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods registry.

8.3.1. jwt-bearer token endpoint authentication method

Type name: jwt-bearer

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to [RFC7591] and [I-D.parecki-oauth-identity-assertion-authz-grant]

8.3.2. jwt-svid token endpoint authentication method

Type name: jwt-svid

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to SPIFFE JWT-SVID (<https://github.com/spiffe/spiffe/blob/main/standards/JWT-SVID.md>)

8.3.3. wit token endpoint authentication method

Type name: wit

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to

[I-D.ietf-wimse-s2s-protocol]

8.3.4. txn_token token endpoint authentication method

Type name: txn_token

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC as a reference to
[I-D.ietf-oauth-transaction-tokens]

8.4. Claims Registration

Section X.Y of this specification refers to the attributes gty, cxt, ccr, and cmr to express client metadata JWT access tokens. This section registers those attributes as claims in the [IANA.jwt] registry introduced in [RFC7519].

8.4.1. gty claim definition

Claim Name: gty

Claim Description: OAuth2 Grant Type used

Change Controller: IETF

Specification Document(s): Section X.Y of this document

8.4.2. cxt claim definition

Claim Name: cxt

Claim Description: Client Extensions used on top of the OAuth2 Grant Type

Change Controller: IETF

Specification Document(s): Section X.Y of this document

8.4.3. ccr claim definition

Claim Name: ccr

Claim Description: Client Authentication Class Reference

Change Controller: IETF

Specification Document(s): Section X.Y of this document

8.4.4. cmr claim definition

Claim Name: cmr

Claim Description: Client Authentication Methods Reference

Change Controller: IETF

Specification Document(s): Section X.Y of this document

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Authors' Addresses

Jean-Francois Lombardo
AWS
Canada

Email: jeffsec@amazon.com

Alexandre Babeanu

IndyKite

Canada

Email: alex.babeanu@indykite.com