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The AEGIS Family of Authenticated Encryption Algorithms  
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## Abstract

This document describes the AEGIS-128L, AEGIS-256, AEGIS-128X, and AEGIS-256X AES-based authenticated encryption algorithms designed for high-performance applications.

The document is a product of the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). It is not an IETF product and is not a standard.

## Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead>.

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## 1. Introduction

This document describes the AEGIS family of Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms [AEGIS], which were chosen for high-performance applications in the CAESAR (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness) competition.

Among the finalists, AEGIS-128 was chosen as the winner for this category. However, AEGIS-128L, another finalist, offers enhanced performance and a stronger security margin [ENP20] [JLD22] [LIMS21] [STSI23]. Additionally, AEGIS-256, which also reached the final round, provides 256-bit security and supports higher usage limits.

Therefore, this document specifies the following variants:

- \* AEGIS-128L, which has a 128-bit key, a 128-bit nonce, a 1024-bit state, a 128- or 256-bit authentication tag, and processes 256-bit input blocks.

- \* AEGIS-256, which has a 256-bit key, a 256-bit nonce, a 768-bit state, a 128- or 256-bit authentication tag, and processes 128-bit input blocks.
- \* AEGIS-128X, which is a mode based on AEGIS-128L, specialized for CPUs with large vector registers and vector AES instructions.
- \* AEGIS-256X, which is a mode based on AEGIS-256, specialized for CPUs with large vector registers and vector AES instructions.

All variants are inverse-free and constructed from the AES encryption round function [FIPS-AES].

The AEGIS cipher family offers performance that significantly exceeds AES-GCM on CPUs with AES instructions. Similarly, software implementations not using AES instructions can also be faster, although to a lesser extent.

Unlike with AES-GCM, nonces can be safely chosen at random with no practical limit when using AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-256X. AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-128X also allow for more messages to be safely encrypted when using random nonces.

With some existing AEAD schemes, such as AES-GCM, an attacker can generate a ciphertext that successfully decrypts under multiple different keys (a partitioning oracle attack) [LGR21]. This ability to craft a (ciphertext, authentication tag) pair that verifies under multiple keys significantly reduces the number of required interactions with the oracle to perform an exhaustive search, making it practical if the key space is small. For example, with password-based encryption, an attacker can guess a large number of passwords at a time by recursively submitting such a ciphertext to an oracle, which speeds up a password search by reducing it to a binary search.

With AEGIS, finding distinct (key, nonce) pairs that successfully decrypt a given (associated data, ciphertext, authentication tag) tuple is believed to have a complexity that depends on the tag size. A 128-bit tag provides 64-bit committing security, which is generally acceptable for interactive protocols. With a 256-bit tag, finding a collision becomes impractical.

Unlike most other AES-based AEAD constructions, leaking a state does not leak the key or previous states.

Finally, an AEGIS key is not required after the initialization function, and there is no key schedule. Thus, ephemeral keys can be erased from memory before any data has been encrypted or decrypted, mitigating cold boot attacks.

Note that an earlier version of Hongjun Wu and Bart Preneel's paper introducing AEGIS specified AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-256 with a different Finalize function. We follow the specification of [AEGIS], which can be found in the References section of this document.

## 2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Throughout this document, "byte" is used interchangeably with "octet" and refers to an 8-bit sequence.

Primitives:

- \* {}: an empty bit array.
- \*  $|x|$ : the length of  $x$  in bits.
- \*  $a \wedge b$ : the bitwise exclusive OR operation between  $a$  and  $b$ .
- \*  $a \& b$ : the bitwise AND operation between  $a$  and  $b$ .
- \*  $a || b$ : the concatenation of  $a$  and  $b$ .
- \*  $a \bmod b$ : the remainder of the Euclidean division between  $a$  as the dividend and  $b$  as the divisor.
- \*  $\text{LE64}(x)$ : returns the little-endian encoding of unsigned 64-bit integer  $x$ .
- \*  $\text{ZeroPad}(x, n)$ : returns  $x$  after appending zeros until its length is a multiple of  $n$  bits. No padding is added if the length of  $x$  is already a multiple of  $n$ , including when  $x$  is empty.
- \*  $\text{Truncate}(x, n)$ : returns the first  $n$  bits of  $x$ .
- \*  $\text{Split}(x, n)$ : returns  $x$  split into  $n$ -bit blocks, ignoring partial blocks.
- \*  $\text{Tail}(x, n)$ : returns the last  $n$  bits of  $x$ .

- \* AESRound(in, rk): a single round of the AES encryption round function, which is the composition of the SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey transformations, as defined in Section 5 of [FIPS-AES]. Here, in is the 128-bit AES input state, and rk is the 128-bit round key.
- \* Repeat(n, F): n sequential evaluations of the function F.
- \* CtEq(a, b): compares a and b in constant-time, returning True for an exact match and False otherwise.

AEGIS internal functions:

- \* Update(M0, M1) or Update(M): the state update function.
- \* Init(key, nonce): the initialization function.
- \* Absorb(ai): the input block absorption function.
- \* Enc(xi): the input block encryption function.
- \* Dec(ci): the input block decryption function.
- \* DecPartial(cn): the input block decryption function for the last ciphertext bits when they do not fill an entire block.
- \* Finalize(ad\_len\_bits, msg\_len\_bits): the authentication tag generation function.

Input blocks are 256 bits for AEGIS-128L and 128 bits for AEGIS-256.

AES blocks:

- \* Si: the i-th AES block of the current state.
- \* S'i: the i-th AES block of the next state.
- \* {Si, ...Sj}: the vector of the i-th AES block of the current state to the j-th block of the current state.
- \* C0: an AES block built from the following bytes in hexadecimal format: { 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x08, 0x0d, 0x15, 0x22, 0x37, 0x59, 0x90, 0xe9, 0x79, 0x62 }.
- \* C1: an AES block built from the following bytes in hexadecimal format: { 0xdb, 0x3d, 0x18, 0x55, 0x6d, 0xc2, 0x2f, 0xf1, 0x20, 0x11, 0x31, 0x42, 0x73, 0xb5, 0x28, 0xdd }.

AES blocks are always 128 bits in length.

Input and output values:

- \* key: the encryption key (128 bits for AEGIS-128L, 256 bits for AEGIS-256).
- \* nonce: the public nonce (128 bits for AEGIS-128L, 256 bits for AEGIS-256).
- \* ad: the associated data.
- \* msg: the plaintext.
- \* ct: the ciphertext.
- \* tag: the authentication tag (128 or 256 bits).

### 3. The AEGIS-128L Algorithm

AEGIS-128L has a 1024-bit state, made of eight 128-bit blocks  $\{S_0, \dots, S_7\}$ .

The parameters for this algorithm, whose meaning is defined in [RFC5116], Section 4, are:

- \* K\_LEN (key length) is 16 bytes (128 bits).
- \* P\_MAX (maximum length of the plaintext) is  $2^{61} - 1$  bytes ( $2^{64} - 8$  bits).
- \* A\_MAX (maximum length of the associated data) is  $2^{61} - 1$  bytes ( $2^{64} - 8$  bits).
- \* N\_MIN (minimum nonce length) = N\_MAX (maximum nonce length) = 16 bytes (128 bits).
- \* C\_MAX (maximum ciphertext length) = P\_MAX + tag length =  $(2^{61} - 1) + 16$  or 32 bytes (in bits:  $(2^{64} - 8) + 128$  or 256 bits).

Distinct associated data inputs, as described in [RFC5116], Section 3, MUST be unambiguously encoded as a single input. It is up to the application to create a structure in the associated data input if needed.



### 3.1. Authenticated Encryption

Encrypt(msg, ad, key, nonce)

The Encrypt function encrypts a message and returns the ciphertext along with an authentication tag that verifies the authenticity of the message and associated data, if provided.

Security:

- \* For a given key, the nonce MUST NOT be reused under any circumstances; doing so allows an attacker to recover the internal state.
- \* The key MUST be randomly chosen from a uniform distribution.

Inputs:

- \* msg: the message to be encrypted (length MUST be less than or equal to P\_MAX).
- \* ad: the associated data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A\_MAX).
- \* key: the encryption key.
- \* nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

- \* ct: the ciphertext.
- \* tag: the authentication tag.

Steps:

```

Init(key, nonce)

ct = {}

ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, 256), 256)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)

msg_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(msg, 256), 256)
for xi in msg_blocks:
    ct = ct || Enc(xi)

tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)
ct = Truncate(ct, |msg|)

return ct and tag

```

### 3.2. Authenticated Decryption

```
Decrypt(ct, tag, ad, key, nonce)
```

The Decrypt function decrypts a ciphertext, verifies that the authentication tag is correct, and returns the message on success or an error if tag verification failed.

Security:

- \* If tag verification fails, the decrypted message and wrong authentication tag MUST NOT be given as output. The decrypted message MUST be overwritten with zeros before the function returns.
- \* The comparison of the input tag with the expected\_tag MUST be done in constant time.

Inputs:

- \* ct: the ciphertext to decrypt (length MUST be less than or equal to C\_MAX).
- \* tag: the authentication tag.
- \* ad: the associated data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A\_MAX).
- \* key: the encryption key.
- \* nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

- \* Either the decrypted message msg or an error indicating that the authentication tag is invalid for the given inputs.

Steps:

```
Init(key, nonce)
```

```
msg = {}
```

```
ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, 256), 256)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)
```

```
ct_blocks = Split(ct, 256)
cn = Tail(ct, |ct| mod 256)
```

```
for ci in ct_blocks:
    msg = msg || Dec(ci)
```

```
if cn is not empty:
    msg = msg || DecPartial(cn)
```

```
expected_tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)
```

```
if CtEq(tag, expected_tag) is False:
    erase msg
    erase expected_tag
    return "verification failed" error
else:
    return msg
```

### 3.3. The Update Function

```
Update(M0, M1)
```

The Update function is the core of the AEGIS-128L algorithm. It updates the state  $\{S_0, \dots S_7\}$  using two 128-bit values.

Inputs:

- \* M0: the first 128-bit block to be absorbed.
- \* M1: the second 128-bit block to be absorbed.

Modifies:

\*  $\{S_0, \dots S_7\}$ : the state.

Steps:

```
S'0 = AESRound(S7, S0 ^ M0)
S'1 = AESRound(S0, S1)
S'2 = AESRound(S1, S2)
S'3 = AESRound(S2, S3)
S'4 = AESRound(S3, S4 ^ M1)
S'5 = AESRound(S4, S5)
S'6 = AESRound(S5, S6)
S'7 = AESRound(S6, S7)
```

```
S0 = S'0
S1 = S'1
S2 = S'2
S3 = S'3
S4 = S'4
S5 = S'5
S6 = S'6
S7 = S'7
```

### 3.4. The Init Function

Init(key, nonce)

The Init function constructs the initial state  $\{S_0, \dots S_7\}$  using the given key and nonce.

Inputs:

\* key: the encryption key.

\* nonce: the public nonce.

Defines:

\*  $\{S_0, \dots S_7\}$ : the initial state.

Steps:

```
S0 = key ^ nonce
S1 = C1
S2 = C0
S3 = C1
S4 = key ^ nonce
S5 = key ^ C0
S6 = key ^ C1
S7 = key ^ C0
```

```
Repeat(10, Update(nonce, key))
```

### 3.5. The Absorb Function

```
Absorb(ai)
```

The Absorb function absorbs a 256-bit input block *ai* into the state  $\{S0, \dots S7\}$ .

Inputs:

- \* *ai*: the 256-bit input block.

Steps:

```
t0, t1 = Split(ai, 128)
Update(t0, t1)
```

### 3.6. The Enc Function

```
Enc(xi)
```

The Enc function encrypts a 256-bit input block *xi* using the state  $\{S0, \dots S7\}$ .

Inputs:

- \* *xi*: the 256-bit input block.

Outputs:

- \* *ci*: the 256-bit encrypted block.

Steps:

```

z0 = S1 ^ S6 ^ (S2 & S3)
z1 = S2 ^ S5 ^ (S6 & S7)

t0, t1 = Split(xi, 128)
out0 = t0 ^ z0
out1 = t1 ^ z1

Update(t0, t1)
ci = out0 || out1

return ci

```

### 3.7. The Dec Function

Dec(ci)

The Dec function decrypts a 256-bit input block ci using the state {S0, ...S7}.

Inputs:

- \* ci: the 256-bit encrypted block.

Outputs:

- \* xi: the 256-bit decrypted block.

Steps:

```

z0 = S1 ^ S6 ^ (S2 & S3)
z1 = S2 ^ S5 ^ (S6 & S7)

t0, t1 = Split(ci, 128)
out0 = t0 ^ z0
out1 = t1 ^ z1

Update(out0, out1)
xi = out0 || out1

return xi

```

### 3.8. The DecPartial Function

DecPartial(cn)

The DecPartial function decrypts the last ciphertext bits cn using the state {S0, ...S7} when they do not fill an entire block.

Inputs:

\* `cn`: the encrypted input.

Outputs:

\* `xn`: the decryption of `cn`.

Steps:

```
z0 = S1 ^ S6 ^ (S2 & S3)
```

```
z1 = S2 ^ S5 ^ (S6 & S7)
```

```
t0, t1 = Split(ZeroPad(cn, 256), 128)
```

```
out0 = t0 ^ z0
```

```
out1 = t1 ^ z1
```

```
xn = Truncate(out0 || out1, |cn|)
```

```
v0, v1 = Split(ZeroPad(xn, 256), 128)
```

```
Update(v0, v1)
```

```
return xn
```

### 3.9. The Finalize Function

```
Finalize(ad_len_bits, msg_len_bits)
```

The `Finalize` function computes a 128- or 256-bit tag that authenticates the message and associated data.

Inputs:

\* `ad_len_bits`: the length of the associated data in bits.

\* `msg_len_bits`: the length of the message in bits.

Outputs:

\* `tag`: the authentication tag.

Steps:

```

t = S2 ^ (LE64(ad_len_bits) || LE64(msg_len_bits))

Repeat(7, Update(t, t))

if tag_len_bits == 128:
    tag = S0 ^ S1 ^ S2 ^ S3 ^ S4 ^ S5 ^ S6
else:
    # 256 bits
    tag = (S0 ^ S1 ^ S2 ^ S3) || (S4 ^ S5 ^ S6 ^ S7)

return tag

```

#### 4. The AEGIS-256 Algorithm

AEGIS-256 has a 768-bit state, made of six 128-bit blocks {S0, ...S5}.

The parameters for this algorithm, whose meaning is defined in [RFC5116], Section 4, are:

- \* K\_LEN (key length) is 32 bytes (256 bits).
- \* P\_MAX (maximum length of the plaintext) is  $2^{61} - 1$  bytes ( $2^{64} - 8$  bits).
- \* A\_MAX (maximum length of the associated data) is  $2^{61} - 1$  bytes ( $2^{64} - 8$  bits).
- \* N\_MIN (minimum nonce length) = N\_MAX (maximum nonce length) = 32 bytes (256 bits).
- \* C\_MAX (maximum ciphertext length) = P\_MAX + tag length =  $(2^{61} - 1) + 16$  or 32 bytes (in bits:  $(2^{64} - 8) + 128$  or 256 bits).

Distinct associated data inputs, as described in [RFC5116], Section 3, MUST be unambiguously encoded as a single input. It is up to the application to create a structure in the associated data input if needed.

##### 4.1. Authenticated Encryption

```
Encrypt(msg, ad, key, nonce)
```

The Encrypt function encrypts a message and returns the ciphertext along with an authentication tag that verifies the authenticity of the message and associated data, if provided.

Security:



- \* For a given key, the nonce MUST NOT be reused under any circumstances; doing so allows an attacker to recover the internal state.
- \* The key MUST be randomly chosen from a uniform distribution.

Inputs:

- \* msg: the message to be encrypted (length MUST be less than or equal to P\_MAX).
- \* ad: the associated data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A\_MAX).
- \* key: the encryption key.
- \* nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

- \* ct: the ciphertext.
- \* tag: the authentication tag.

Steps:

Init(key, nonce)

ct = {}

```
ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, 128), 128)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)
```

```
msg_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(msg, 128), 128)
for xi in msg_blocks:
    ct = ct || Enc(xi)
```

```
tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)
ct = Truncate(ct, |msg|)
```

return ct and tag

#### 4.2. Authenticated Decryption

Decrypt(ct, tag, ad, key, nonce)

The Decrypt function decrypts a ciphertext, verifies that the authentication tag is correct, and returns the message on success or an error if tag verification failed.

Security:

- \* If tag verification fails, the decrypted message and wrong authentication tag MUST NOT be given as output. The decrypted message MUST be overwritten with zeros before the function returns.
- \* The comparison of the input tag with the expected\_tag MUST be done in constant time.

Inputs:

- \* ct: the ciphertext to decrypt (length MUST be less than or equal to C\_MAX).
- \* tag: the authentication tag.
- \* ad: the associated data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A\_MAX).
- \* key: the encryption key.
- \* nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

- \* Either the decrypted message msg or an error indicating that the authentication tag is invalid for the given inputs.

Steps:

```
Init(key, nonce)

msg = {}

ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, 128), 128)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)

ct_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ct, 128), 128)
cn = Tail(ct, |ct| mod 128)

for ci in ct_blocks:
    msg = msg || Dec(ci)

if cn is not empty:
    msg = msg || DecPartial(cn)

expected_tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)

if CtEq(tag, expected_tag) is False:
    erase msg
    erase expected_tag
    return "verification failed" error
else:
    return msg
```

#### 4.3. The Update Function

Update(M)

The Update function is the core of the AEGIS-256 algorithm. It updates the state  $\{S_0, \dots S_5\}$  using a 128-bit value.

Inputs:

- \* M: the 128-bit block to be absorbed.

Modifies:

- \*  $\{S_0, \dots S_5\}$ : the state.

Steps:

```
S'0 = AESRound(S5, S0 ^ M)
S'1 = AESRound(S0, S1)
S'2 = AESRound(S1, S2)
S'3 = AESRound(S2, S3)
S'4 = AESRound(S3, S4)
S'5 = AESRound(S4, S5)
```

```
S0 = S'0
S1 = S'1
S2 = S'2
S3 = S'3
S4 = S'4
S5 = S'5
```

#### 4.4. The Init Function

```
Init(key, nonce)
```

The Init function constructs the initial state  $\{S_0, \dots, S_5\}$  using the given key and nonce.

Inputs:

- \* key: the encryption key.
- \* nonce: the public nonce.

Defines:

- \*  $\{S_0, \dots, S_5\}$ : the initial state.

Steps:

```

k0, k1 = Split(key, 128)
n0, n1 = Split(nonce, 128)

```

```

S0 = k0 ^ n0
S1 = k1 ^ n1
S2 = C1
S3 = C0
S4 = k0 ^ C0
S5 = k1 ^ C1

```

```

Repeat(4,
  Update(k0)
  Update(k1)
  Update(k0 ^ n0)
  Update(k1 ^ n1)
)

```

#### 4.5. The Absorb Function

```
Absorb(ai)
```

The Absorb function absorbs a 128-bit input block *ai* into the state {*S0*, ...*S5*}.

Inputs:

- \* *ai*: the 128-bit input block.

Steps:

```
Update(ai)
```

#### 4.6. The Enc Function

```
Enc(xi)
```

The Enc function encrypts a 128-bit input block *xi* using the state {*S0*, ...*S5*}.

Inputs:

- \* *xi*: the 128-bit input block.

Outputs:

- \* *ci*: the 128-bit encrypted block.

Steps:

```
z = S1 ^ S4 ^ S5 ^ (S2 & S3)
```

```
Update(xi)
```

```
ci = xi ^ z
```

```
return ci
```

#### 4.7. The Dec Function

```
Dec(ci)
```

The Dec function decrypts a 128-bit input block ci using the state {S0, ...S5}.

Inputs:

- \* ci: the 128-bit encrypted block.

Outputs:

- \* xi: the 128-bit decrypted block.

Steps:

```
z = S1 ^ S4 ^ S5 ^ (S2 & S3)
```

```
xi = ci ^ z
```

```
Update(xi)
```

```
return xi
```

#### 4.8. The DecPartial Function

```
DecPartial(cn)
```

The DecPartial function decrypts the last ciphertext bits cn using the state {S0, ...S5} when they do not fill an entire block.

Inputs:

- \* cn: the encrypted input.

Outputs:

- \* xn: the decryption of cn.

Steps:

```
z = S1 ^ S4 ^ S5 ^ (S2 & S3)
```

```
t = ZeroPad(cn, 128)
out = t ^ z
```

```
xn = Truncate(out, |cn|)
```

```
v = ZeroPad(xn, 128)
Update(v)
```

```
return xn
```

#### 4.9. The Finalize Function

```
Finalize(ad_len_bits, msg_len_bits)
```

The Finalize function computes a 128- or 256-bit tag that authenticates the message and associated data.

Inputs:

- \* `ad_len_bits`: the length of the associated data in bits.
- \* `msg_len_bits`: the length of the message in bits.

Outputs:

- \* `tag`: the authentication tag.

Steps:

```
t = S3 ^ (LE64(ad_len_bits) || LE64(msg_len_bits))
```

```
Repeat(7, Update(t))
```

```
if tag_len_bits == 128:
    tag = S0 ^ S1 ^ S2 ^ S3 ^ S4 ^ S5
else:
    # 256 bits
    tag = (S0 ^ S1 ^ S2) || (S3 ^ S4 ^ S5)
```

```
return tag
```

## 5. Parallel Modes

Some CPUs, such as Intel and Intel-compatible CPUs with the VAES extensions, include instructions to efficiently apply the AES round function to a vector of AES blocks.

AEGIS-128X and AEGIS-256X are optional, specialized modes designed to take advantage of these instructions. They share the same properties as the ciphers they are based on but can be significantly faster on these platforms, even for short messages.

AEGIS-128X and AEGIS-256X are parallel evaluations of multiple AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-256 instances, respectively, with distinct initial states. On CPUs with wide vector registers, different states can be stored in different 128-bit lanes of the same vector register, allowing parallel updates using vector instructions.

The modes are parameterized by the parallelism degree. With 256-bit registers, 2 parallel operations can be applied to 128-bit AES blocks. With 512-bit registers, the number of instances can be raised to 4.

The state of a parallel mode is represented as a vector of AEGIS-128L or AEGIS-256 states.

### 5.1. Additional Conventions and Definitions

- \*  $D$ : the degree of parallelism.
- \*  $R$ : the absorption and output rate of the mode. With AEGIS-128X, the rate is  $256 * D$  bits. With AEGIS-256X, the rate is  $128 * D$  bits.
- \*  $V[j,i]$ : the  $j$ -th AES block of the  $i$ -th state.  $i$  is in the  $[0..D)$  range. For AEGIS-128X,  $j$  is in the  $[0..8)$  range, while for AEGIS-256X,  $j$  is in the  $[0..6)$  range.
- \*  $V'[j,i]$ : the  $j$ -th AES block of the next  $i$ -th state.
- \*  $ctx[i]$ : the  $i$ -th context separator. This is a 128-bit mask made of a byte representing the state index, followed by a byte representing the highest index and 112 all-zero bits.
- \*  $Byte(x)$ : the value  $x$  encoded as 8 bits.



## 5.2. Authenticated Encryption

```
Encrypt(msg, ad, key, nonce)
```

The Encrypt function of AEGIS-128X resembles that of AEGIS-128L, and similarly, the Encrypt function of AEGIS-256X mirrors that of AEGIS-256, but processes R-bit input blocks per update.

Steps:

```
Init(key, nonce)
```

```
ct = {}
```

```
ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, R), R)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)
```

```
msg_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(msg, R), R)
for xi in msg_blocks:
    ct = ct || Enc(xi)
```

```
tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)
ct = Truncate(ct, |msg|)
```

```
return ct and tag
```

## 5.3. Authenticated Decryption

```
Decrypt(ct, tag, ad, key, nonce)
```

The Decrypt function of AEGIS-128X resembles that of AEGIS-128L, and similarly, the Decrypt function of AEGIS-256X mirrors that of AEGIS-256, but processes R-bit input blocks per update.

Steps:

```

Init(key, nonce)

msg = {}

ad_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(ad, R), R)
for ai in ad_blocks:
    Absorb(ai)

ct_blocks = Split(ct, R)
cn = Tail(ct, |ct| mod R)

for ci in ct_blocks:
    msg = msg || Dec(ci)

if cn is not empty:
    msg = msg || DecPartial(cn)

expected_tag = Finalize(|ad|, |msg|)

if CtEq(tag, expected_tag) is False:
    erase msg
    erase expected_tag
    return "verification failed" error
else:
    return msg

```

#### 5.4. AEGIS-128X

##### 5.4.1. The Update Function

```
Update(M0, M1)
```

The AEGIS-128X Update function is similar to the AEGIS-128L Update function, but absorbs  $R$  ( $= 256 * D$ ) bits at once.  $M0$  and  $M1$  are  $128 * D$  bits instead of 128 bits, but are split into 128-bit blocks, each of them updating a different AEGIS-128L state.

Steps:

```
m0 = Split(M0, 128)
m1 = Split(M1, 128)

for i in 0..D:
    V'[0,i] = AESRound(V[7,i], V[0,i] ^ m0[i])
    V'[1,i] = AESRound(V[0,i], V[1,i])
    V'[2,i] = AESRound(V[1,i], V[2,i])
    V'[3,i] = AESRound(V[2,i], V[3,i])
    V'[4,i] = AESRound(V[3,i], V[4,i] ^ m1[i])
    V'[5,i] = AESRound(V[4,i], V[5,i])
    V'[6,i] = AESRound(V[5,i], V[6,i])
    V'[7,i] = AESRound(V[6,i], V[7,i])

    V[0,i] = V'[0,i]
    V[1,i] = V'[1,i]
    V[2,i] = V'[2,i]
    V[3,i] = V'[3,i]
    V[4,i] = V'[4,i]
    V[5,i] = V'[5,i]
    V[6,i] = V'[6,i]
    V[7,i] = V'[7,i]
```

#### 5.4.2. The Init Function

Init(key, nonce)

The Init function initializes a vector of  $D$  AEGIS-128L states with the same key and nonce but a different context  $ctx[i]$ . The context is added to the state before every update.

Steps:

```

for i in 0..D:
    V[0,i] = key ^ nonce
    V[1,i] = C1
    V[2,i] = C0
    V[3,i] = C1
    V[4,i] = key ^ nonce
    V[5,i] = key ^ C0
    V[6,i] = key ^ C1
    V[7,i] = key ^ C0

nonce_v = {}
key_v = {}
for i in 0..D:
    nonce_v = nonce_v || nonce
    key_v = key_v || key

for i in 0..D:
    ctx[i] = ZeroPad(Byte(i) || Byte(D - 1), 128)

Repeat(10,
    for i in 0..D:
        V[3,i] = V[3,i] ^ ctx[i]
        V[7,i] = V[7,i] ^ ctx[i]

    Update(nonce_v, key_v)
)

```

#### 5.4.3. The Absorb Function

Absorb(ai)

The Absorb function is similar to the AEGIS-128L Absorb function but absorbs R bits instead of 256 bits.

Steps:

```

t0, t1 = Split(ai, R)
Update(t0, t1)

```

#### 5.4.4. The Enc Function

Enc(xi)

The Enc function is similar to the AEGIS-128L Enc function but encrypts R bits instead of 256 bits.

Steps:

```

z0 = {}
z1 = {}
for i in 0..D:
    z0 = z0 || (V[6,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ (V[2,i] & V[3,i]))
    z1 = z1 || (V[2,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ (V[6,i] & V[7,i]))

t0, t1 = Split(xi, R)
out0 = t0 ^ z0
out1 = t1 ^ z1

Update(t0, t1)
ci = out0 || out1

return ci

```

#### 5.4.5. The Dec Function

Dec(ci)

The Dec function is similar to the AEGIS-128L Dec function but decrypts R bits instead of 256 bits.

Steps:

```

z0 = {}
z1 = {}
for i in 0..D:
    z0 = z0 || (V[6,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ (V[2,i] & V[3,i]))
    z1 = z1 || (V[2,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ (V[6,i] & V[7,i]))

t0, t1 = Split(ci, R)
out0 = t0 ^ z0
out1 = t1 ^ z1

Update(out0, out1)
xi = out0 || out1

return xi

```

#### 5.4.6. The DecPartial Function

DecPartial(cn)

The DecPartial function is similar to the AEGIS-128L DecPartial function but decrypts up to R bits instead of 256 bits.

Steps:

```
z0 = {}
z1 = {}
for i in 0..D:
    z0 = z0 || (V[6,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ (V[2,i] & V[3,i]))
    z1 = z1 || (V[2,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ (V[6,i] & V[7,i]))

t0, t1 = Split(ZeroPad(cn, R), 128 * D)
out0 = t0 ^ z0
out1 = t1 ^ z1

xn = Truncate(out0 || out1, |cn|)

v0, v1 = Split(ZeroPad(xn, R), 128 * D)
Update(v0, v1)

return xn
```

#### 5.4.7. The Finalize Function

```
Finalize(ad_len_bits, msg_len_bits)
```

The Finalize function finalizes every AEGIS-128L instance and combines the resulting authentication tags using the bitwise exclusive OR operation.

Steps:

```

t = {}
u = LE64(ad_len_bits) || LE64(msg_len_bits)
for i in 0..D:
    t = t || (V[2,i] ^ u)

Repeat(7, Update(t, t))

if tag_len_bits == 128:
    tag = ZeroPad({}, 128)
    for i in 0..D:
        ti = V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i] ^ V[3,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ V[6,i]
        tag = tag ^ ti
else:
    # 256 bits
    ti0 = ZeroPad({}, 128)
    ti1 = ZeroPad({}, 128)
    for i in 0..D:
        ti0 = ti0 ^ V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i] ^ V[3,i]
        ti1 = ti1 ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ V[6,i] ^ V[7,i]
    tag = ti0 || ti1

return tag

```

## 5.5. AEGIS-256X

### 5.5.1. The Update Function

Update(M)

The AEGIS-256X Update function is similar to the AEGIS-256 Update function but absorbs  $R$  ( $128 * D$ ) bits at once.  $M$  is  $128 * D$  bits instead of 128 bits and is split into 128-bit blocks, each of them updating a different AEGIS-256 state.

Steps:

```
m = Split(M, 128)

for i in 0..D:
    V'[0,i] = AESRound(V[5,i], V[0,i] ^ m[i])
    V'[1,i] = AESRound(V[0,i], V[1,i])
    V'[2,i] = AESRound(V[1,i], V[2,i])
    V'[3,i] = AESRound(V[2,i], V[3,i])
    V'[4,i] = AESRound(V[3,i], V[4,i])
    V'[5,i] = AESRound(V[4,i], V[5,i])

    V[0,i] = V'[0,i]
    V[1,i] = V'[1,i]
    V[2,i] = V'[2,i]
    V[3,i] = V'[3,i]
    V[4,i] = V'[4,i]
    V[5,i] = V'[5,i]
```

#### 5.5.2. The Init Function

Init(key, nonce)

The Init function initializes a vector of D AEGIS-256 states with the same key and nonce but a different context `ctx[i]`. The context is added to the state before every update.

Steps:



```
k0, k1 = Split(key, 128)
n0, n1 = Split(nonce, 128)

for i in 0..D:
    V[0,i] = k0 ^ n0
    V[1,i] = k1 ^ n1
    V[2,i] = C1
    V[3,i] = C0
    V[4,i] = k0 ^ C0
    V[5,i] = k1 ^ C1

k0_v, k1_v = {}, {}
k0n0_v, k1n1_v = {}, {}
for i in 0..D:
    k0_v = k0_v || k0
    k1_v = k1_v || k1
    k0n0_v = k0n0_v || (k0 ^ n0)
    k1n1_v = k1n1_v || (k1 ^ n1)

for i in 0..D:
    ctx[i] = ZeroPad(Byte(i) || Byte(D - 1), 128)

Repeat(4,
    for i in 0..D:
        V[3,i] = V[3,i] ^ ctx[i]
        V[5,i] = V[5,i] ^ ctx[i]

    Update(k0_v)
    for i in 0..D:
        V[3,i] = V[3,i] ^ ctx[i]
        V[5,i] = V[5,i] ^ ctx[i]

    Update(k1_v)
    for i in 0..D:
        V[3,i] = V[3,i] ^ ctx[i]
        V[5,i] = V[5,i] ^ ctx[i]

    Update(k0n0_v)
    for i in 0..D:
        V[3,i] = V[3,i] ^ ctx[i]
        V[5,i] = V[5,i] ^ ctx[i]

    Update(k1n1_v)
)
```

## 5.5.3. The Absorb Function

Absorb(ai)

The Absorb function is similar to the AEGIS-256 Absorb function but absorbs R bits instead of 128 bits.

Steps:

Update(ai)

## 5.5.4. The Enc Function

Enc(xi)

The Enc function is similar to the AEGIS-256 Enc function but encrypts R bits instead of 128 bits.

Steps:

```
z = {}
for i in 0..D:
    z = z || (V[1,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ (V[2,i] & V[3,i]))
```

Update(xi)

ci = xi ^ z

return ci

## 5.5.5. The Dec Function

Dec(ci)

The Dec function is similar to the AEGIS-256 Dec function but decrypts R bits instead of 128 bits.

Steps:

```
z = {}
for i in 0..D:
    z = z || (V[1,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ (V[2,i] & V[3,i]))
```

xi = ci ^ z

Update(xi)

return xi

## 5.5.6.    The DecPartial Function

```
DecPartial(cn)
```

The DecPartial function is similar to the AEGIS-256 DecPartial function but decrypts up to R bits instead of 128 bits.

Steps:

```
z = {}
for i in 0..D:
    z = z || (V[1,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ (V[2,i] & V[3,i]))

t = ZeroPad(cn, R)
out = t ^ z

xn = Truncate(out, |cn|)

v = ZeroPad(xn, 128 * D)
Update(v)

return xn
```

## 5.5.7.    The Finalize Function

```
Finalize(ad_len_bits, msg_len_bits)
```

The Finalize function finalizes every AEGIS-256 instance and combines the resulting authentication tags using the bitwise exclusive OR operation.

Steps:

```

t = {}
u = LE64(ad_len_bits) || LE64(msg_len_bits)
for i in 0..D:
    t = t || (V[3,i] ^ u)

Repeat(7, Update(t))

if tag_len_bits == 128:
    tag = ZeroPad({}, 128)
    for i in 0..D:
        ti = V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i] ^ V[3,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i]
        tag = tag ^ ti

else:
    # 256 bits
    ti0 = ZeroPad({}, 128)
    ti1 = ZeroPad({}, 128)
    for i in 0..D:
        ti0 = ti0 ^ V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i]
        ti1 = ti1 ^ V[3,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i]
    tag = ti0 || ti1

return tag

```

## 5.6. Implementation Considerations

AEGIS-128X and AEGIS-256X with a degree of 1 are identical to AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-256, respectively. This property can be used to reduce the size of a generic implementation.

In AEGIS-128X, V can be represented as eight 256-bit registers (when  $D = 2$ ) or eight 512-bit registers (when  $D = 4$ ). In AEGIS-256X, V can be represented as six 256-bit registers (when  $D = 2$ ) or six 512-bit registers (when  $D = 4$ ). With this representation, loops over  $0..D$  in the above pseudocode can be replaced by vector instructions.

## 5.7. Operational Considerations

The AEGIS parallel modes are specialized and can only improve performance on specific CPUs.

The degrees of parallelism that implementations are encouraged to support are 2 (for CPUs with 256-bit registers) and 4 (for CPUs with 512-bit registers). The resulting algorithms are called AEGIS-128X2, AEGIS-128X4, AEGIS-256X2, and AEGIS-256X4.

The following table summarizes how many bits are processed in parallel (rate), the memory requirements (state size), and the minimum vector register size a CPU should support for optimal performance.

Algorithm	Rate (bits)	Optimal Register Size	State Size (bits)
AEGIS-128L	256	128 bits	1024
AEGIS-128X2	512	256 bits	2048
AEGIS-128X4	1024	512 bits	4096
AEGIS-256	128	128 bits	768
AEGIS-256X2	256	256 bits	1536
AEGIS-256X4	512	512 bits	3072

Table 1

Note that architectures with smaller vector registers, but with many registers and large pipelines, may still benefit from the parallel modes.

Protocols SHOULD opt for a parallel mode only when all the involved parties agree on a specific variant. AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-256 SHOULD remain the default choices.

Implementations MAY choose not to include the parallel AEGIS modes.

## 6. Encoding (ct, tag) Tuples

Applications MAY keep the ciphertext and the authentication tag in distinct structures or encode both as a single string.

In the latter case, the tag MUST immediately follow the ciphertext:

```
combined_ct = ct || tag
```

## 7. AEGIS as a Stream Cipher

All AEGIS variants can also be used as stream ciphers.

```
Stream(len, key, nonce)
```

The Stream function expands a key and an optional nonce into a variable-length keystream.

Inputs:

- \* len: the length of the keystream to generate in bits.
- \* key: the AEGIS key.
- \* nonce: the AEGIS nonce. If unspecified, it is set to N\_MAX zero bytes.

Outputs:

- \* stream: the keystream.

Steps:

```
if len == 0:
    return {}
else:
    stream, tag = Encrypt(ZeroPad({ 0 }, len), {}, key, nonce)
    return stream
```

This is equivalent to encrypting a len all-zero bits message without associated data and discarding the authentication tag.

Instead of relying on the generic Encrypt function, implementations can omit the Finalize function.

After initialization, the Update function is called with constant parameters, allowing further optimizations.

## 8. AEGIS as a Message Authentication Code

All AEGIS variants can be used to construct a Message Authentication Code (MAC).

For all the variants, the Mac function takes a key, a nonce, and data as input and produces a 128- or 256-bit tag as output.

Mac(data, key, nonce)

Security:

- \* This is the only function that allows the reuse of (key, nonce) pairs with different inputs.

- \* AEGIS-based MAC functions MUST NOT be used as hash functions: if the key is known, inputs causing state collisions can easily be crafted.
- \* Unlike hash-based MACs, tags MUST NOT be used for key derivation as there is no guarantee that they are uniformly random.

Inputs:

- \* data: the input data to authenticate (length MUST be less than or equal to A\_MAX).
- \* key: the secret key.
- \* nonce: the public nonce.

Outputs:

- \* tag: the authentication tag.

#### 8.1. AEGISMAC-128L

AEGISMAC-128L refers to the Mac function based on the building blocks of AEGIS-128L.

Steps:

```
Init(key, nonce)
data_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(data, 256), 256)
for di in data_blocks:
    Absorb(di)
tag = Finalize(|data|, tag_len_bits)
return tag
```

#### 8.2. AEGISMAC-256

AEGISMAC-256 refers to the Mac function based on the building blocks of AEGIS-256.

Steps:

```
Init(key, nonce)
data_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(data, 128), 128)
for di in data_blocks:
    Absorb(di)
tag = Finalize(|data|, tag_len_bits)
return tag
```

### 8.3.    AEGISMAC-128X

AEGISMAC-128X is based on the building blocks of AEGIS-128X but replaces the Finalize function with a dedicated FinalizeMac function.

#### 8.3.1.    The Mac Function

Steps:

```
Init(key, nonce)
data_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(data, R), R)
for di in data_blocks:
    Absorb(di)
tag = FinalizeMac(|data|)
return tag
```

#### 8.3.2.    The FinalizeMac Function

FinalizeMac(data\_len\_bits)

The FinalizeMac function computes a 128- or 256-bit tag that authenticates the input data.

It finalizes all the instances, absorbs the resulting tags into the first state, and computes the final tag using that single state, as done in AEGIS-128L.

Steps:



```

t = {}
u = LE64(data_len_bits) || LE64(tag_len_bits)
for i in 0..D:
    t = t || (V[2,i] ^ u)

Repeat(7, Update(t, t))

tags = {}
if tag_len_bits == 128:
    for i in 0..D: # tag from state 0 is included
        ti = V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i] ^ V[3,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ V[6,i]
        tags = tags || ti
else:
    # 256 bits
    for i in 1..D: # tag from state 0 is skipped
        ti0 = V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i] ^ V[3,i]
        ti1 = V[4,i] ^ V[5,i] ^ V[6,i] ^ V[7,i]
        tags = tags || (ti0 || ti1)

if D > 1:
    # Absorb tags into state 0; other states are not used anymore
    for v in Split(tags, 256):
        x0, x1 = Split(v, 128)
        Absorb(ZeroPad(x0, R / 2) || ZeroPad(x1, R / 2))

    u = LE64(D) || LE64(tag_len_bits)
    t = ZeroPad(V[2,0] ^ u, R)
    Repeat(7, Update(t, t))

if tag_len_bits == 128:
    tag = V[0,0] ^ V[1,0] ^ V[2,0] ^ V[3,0] ^ V[4,0] ^ V[5,0] ^ V[6,0]
else:
    # 256 bits
    t0 = V[0,0] ^ V[1,0] ^ V[2,0] ^ V[3,0]
    t1 = V[4,0] ^ V[5,0] ^ V[6,0] ^ V[7,0]
    tag = t0 || t1

return tag

```

#### 8.4. AEGISMAC-256X

AEGISMAC-256X is based on the building blocks of AEGIS-256X, but replaces the Finalize function with a dedicated FinalizeMac function.

##### 8.4.1. The Mac Function

Steps:

```
Init(key, nonce)
data_blocks = Split(ZeroPad(data, R), R)
for di in data_blocks:
    Absorb(di)
tag = FinalizeMac(|data|)
return tag
```

#### 8.4.2. The FinalizeMac Function

```
FinalizeMac(data_len_bits)
```

The FinalizeMac function computes a 128- or 256-bit tag that authenticates the input data.

It finalizes all the instances, absorbs the resulting tags into the first state, and computes the final tag using that single state, as done in AEGIS-256.

```

t = {}
u = LE64(data_len_bits) || LE64(tag_len_bits)
for i in 0..D:
    t = t || (V[3,i] ^ u)

Repeat(7, Update(t))

tags = {}
if tag_len_bits == 128:
    for i in 1..D: # tag from state 0 is skipped
        ti = V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i] ^ V[3,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i]
        tags = tags || ti
else:
    # 256 bits
    for i in 1..D: # tag from state 0 is skipped
        ti0 = V[0,i] ^ V[1,i] ^ V[2,i]
        ti1 = V[3,i] ^ V[4,i] ^ V[5,i]
        tags = tags || (ti0 || ti1)

if D > 1:
    # Absorb tags into state 0; other states are not used anymore
    for v in Split(tags, 128):
        Absorb(ZeroPad(v, R))

    u = LE64(D) || LE64(tag_len_bits)
    t = ZeroPad(V[3,0] ^ u, R)
    Repeat(7, Update(t))

if tag_len_bits == 128:
    tag = V[0,0] ^ V[1,0] ^ V[2,0] ^ V[3,0] ^ V[4,0] ^ V[5,0]
else:
    # 256 bits
    t0 = V[0,0] ^ V[1,0] ^ V[2,0]
    t1 = V[3,0] ^ V[4,0] ^ V[5,0]
    tag = t0 || t1

return tag

```

## 9. Implementation Status

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Multiple implementations of the schemes described in this document have been developed and verified for interoperability.

A comprehensive list of known implementations and integrations can be found at <https://github.com/cfrg/draft-irtf-cfrg-aegis-aead>, which includes reference implementations closely aligned with the pseudocode provided in this document.

## 10. Security Considerations

### 10.1. Usage Guidelines

#### 10.1.1. Key and Nonce Selection

All AEGIS variants MUST be used in a nonce-respecting setting: for a given key, a nonce MUST only be used once, even with different tag lengths. Failure to do so would immediately reveal the bitwise difference between two messages.

Every key MUST be randomly chosen from a uniform distribution.

The nonce MAY be public or predictable. It can be a counter, the output of a permutation, or a generator with a long period.

With AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-128X, random nonces can safely encrypt up to  $2^{48}$  messages using the same key with negligible ( $\sim 2^{-33}$ , to align with NIST guidelines) collision probability.

With AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-256X, random nonces can be used with no practical limits.

#### 10.1.2. Committing Security

An authentication tag may verify under multiple keys, nonces, or associated data, but AEGIS is assumed to be key committing in the receiver-binding game. This mitigates common attacks when used with low-entropy keys such as passwords. Finding distinct keys and/or nonces that successfully verify the same (ad, ct, tag) tuple is expected to require  $\sim 2^{64}$  attempts with a 128-bit authentication tag and  $\sim 2^{128}$  attempts with a 256-bit tag.

AEGIS is fully committing in the restricted setting where an adversary cannot control the associated data. As shown in [IR23], with the ability to alter the associated data, it is possible to efficiently find multiple keys that will verify the same authenticated ciphertext.

Protocols mandating a fully committing scheme without that restriction can provide the associated data as input to a cryptographic hash function and use the output as the ad parameter of the Encrypt and Decrypt functions. The selected hash function must ensure a minimum of 128-bit collision and preimage resistance. An instance of such a function is SHA-256 [RFC6234].

Alternatively, the associated data can be fed into a collision-resistant KDF, such as HKDF [RFC5869], via the info input to derive the key parameter. The ad parameter can then be left empty. Note that the salt input MUST NOT be used since large salts get hashed, which affects commitment. Furthermore, this requires values concatenated to form the info input to be unambiguously encoded, like by appending their lengths.

#### 10.1.3. Multi-User Security

AEGIS nonces match the size of the key. AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-128X feature 128-bit nonces, offering an extra 32 bits compared to the commonly used AEADs in IETF protocols at the time of writing. The AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-256X variants provide even larger nonces. With 192 random bits, 64 bits remain available to optionally encode additional information.

In all these variants, unused nonce bits can encode a key identifier, enhancing multi-user security. If every key has a unique identifier, multi-target attacks do not provide any advantage over single-target attacks.

#### 10.2. Implementation Security

If tag verification fails, the unverified plaintext and computed authentication tag MUST NOT be released. As shown in [VV18], even a partial leak of the plaintext without verification facilitates chosen ciphertext attacks.

The security of AEGIS against timing and physical attacks is limited by the implementation of the underlying AESRound function. Failure to implement AESRound in a fashion safe against timing and physical attacks, such as differential power analysis, timing analysis, or fault injection attacks, may lead to leakage of secret key material or state information. The exact mitigations required for timing and physical attacks depend on the threat model in question.

Regardless of the variant, the key and nonce are only required by the Init function; other functions only depend on the resulting state. Therefore, implementations can overwrite ephemeral keys with zeros right after the last Update call of the initialization function.

#### 10.3. Security Guarantees

AEGIS-256 offers 256-bit security against plaintext and state recovery, whereas AEGIS-128L offers 128-bit security.

Under the assumption that the secret key is unknown to the attacker, all AEGIS variants offer at least 128-bit security against forgery attacks.

Encrypting the same message with the same key and nonce but different associated data generates distinct ciphertexts that do not reveal any additional information about the message. However, (key, nonce) pairs MUST NOT be reused, even if the associated data differs.

AEGIS has been shown to have reforgeability resilience in [FLLW17]. Without the ability to set the associated data, a successful forgery does not increase the probability of subsequent forgeries.

AEGIS-128X and AEGIS-256X share the same security properties and requirements as AEGIS-128L and AEGIS-256, respectively. In particular, the security level and usage limits remain the same [D23].

AEGIS is considered secure against guess-and-determine attacks aimed at recovering the state from observed ciphertexts.

This resilience extends to quantum adversaries operating within the Q1 model, where the attacker has access to a quantum computer but is restricted to classical (non-quantum) communications with the systems under attack. In this model, quantum attacks offer no practical advantage in decrypting previously recorded ciphertexts or in recovering the encryption key.

This document extends the original specification by introducing optional support for 256-bit authentication tags, which are constructed similarly to the 128-bit tags. As shown in [SSI24], with 256-bit tags, all AEGIS variants achieve more than 128-bit security against forgery by differential attacks.

Security analyses of AEGIS can be found in [AEGIS], [M14], [FLLW17], [ENP20], [LIMS21], [JLD22], [STSI23], [IR23], [BS23], [AIKRS24], and [SSI24].

## 11. IANA Considerations

IANA has assigned the following identifiers in the AEAD Algorithms Registry:

Algorithm Name	ID
AEAD_AEGIS128L	32
AEAD_AEGIS256	33
AEAD_AEGIS128X2	34
AEAD_AEGIS128X4	35
AEAD_AEGIS256X2	36
AEAD_AEGIS256X4	37

Table 2: AEGIS entries  
in the AEAD Algorithms  
Registry

IANA is requested to update the references of these entries to refer to the final version of this document.

## 12. References

### 12.1. Normative References

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## 12.2. Informative References

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## Appendix A. Test Vectors

The following test vectors are also available in JSON format at [TEST-VECTORS]. In this format, byte strings are represented as JSON strings containing their hexadecimal encoding.

### A.1. AESRound Test Vector

```
in   : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
rk   : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
out  : 7a7b4e5638782546a8c0477a3b813f43
```

### A.2. AEGIS-128L Test Vectors

#### A.2.1. Update Test Vector

```
S0   : 9b7e60b24cc873ea894ecc07911049a3
S1   : 330be08f35300faa2ebf9a7b0d274658
S2   : 7bbd5bd2b049f7b9b515cf26fbe7756c
S3   : c35a00f55ea86c3886ec5e928f87db18
S4   : 9ebccafce87cab446396c4334592c91f
S5   : 58d83e31f256371e60fc6bb257114601
S6   : 1639b56ea322c88568a176585bc915de
S7   : 640818ffb57dc0fbc2e72ae93457e39a

M0   : 033e6975b94816879e42917650955aa0
M1   : fcc1968a46b7e97861bd6e89af6aa55f
```

After Update:

```
S0   : 596ab773e4433ca0127c73f60536769d
S1   : 790394041a3d26ab697bde865014652d
S2   : 38cf49e4b65248acd533041b64dd0611
S3   : 16d8e58748f437bfff1797f780337cee
S4   : 9689ecdf08228c74d7e3360cca53d0a5
S5   : a21746bb193a569e331e1aa985d0d729
S6   : 09d714e6fcf9177a8ed1cde7e3d259a6
S7   : 61279ba73167f0ab76f0a11bf203bdf
```

#### A.2.2. Test Vector 1









## A.3. AEGIS-256 Test Vectors

## A.3.1. Update Test Vector

```
S0 : 1fa1207ed76c86f2c4bb40e8b395b43e
S1 : b44c375e6c1e1978db64bcd12e9e332f
S2 : 0dab84bfa9f0226432ff630f233d4e5b
S3 : d7ef65c9b93e8ee60c75161407b066e7
S4 : a760bb3da073fbd92bdc24734b1f56fb
S5 : a828a18d6a964497ac6e7e53c5f55c73
```

```
M : b165617ed04ab738afb2612c6d18a1ec
```

After Update:

```
S0 : e6bc643bae82dfa3d991b1b323839dcd
S1 : 648578232ba0f2f0a3677f617dc052c3
S2 : ea788e0e572044a46059212dd007a789
S3 : 2f1498ae19b80da13fba698f088a8590
S4 : a54c2ee95e8c2a2c3dae2ec743ae6b86
S5 : a3240fceb68e32d5d114df1b5363ab67
```

## A.3.2. Test Vector 1

```
key : 10010000000000000000000000000000
      00000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
nonce : 10000200000000000000000000000000
         00000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
ad :
```

```
msg : 0000000000000000000000000000000000
```

```
ct : 754fc3d8c973246dcc6d741412a4b236
```

```
tag128: 3fe91994768b332ed7f570a19ec5896e
```

```
tag256: 1181a1d18091082bf0266f66297d167d
         2e68b845f61a3b0527d31fc7b7b89f13
```

## A.3.3. Test Vector 2

key : 10010000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000

nonce : 10000200000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000

ad :

msg :

ct :

tag128: e3def978a0f054afd1e761d7553afba3

tag256: 6a348c930adbd654896e1666aad67de9  
89ea75ebaa2b82fb588977b1ffec864a

#### A.3.4. Test Vector 3

key : 10010000000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000

nonce : 10000200000000000000000000000000  
00000000000000000000000000000000

ad : 0001020304050607

msg : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

ct : f373079ed84b2709faee373584585d60  
accd191db310ef5d8b11833df9dec711

tag128: 8d86f91ee606e9ff26a01b64ccbdd91d

tag256: b7d28d0c3c0ebd409fd22b4416050307  
3a547412da0854bf9723020dab8d1a

#### A.3.5. Test Vector 4







```
key      : 10010000000000000000000000000000
          00000000000000000000000000000000

nonce    : 10000200000000000000000000000000
          00000000000000000000000000000000

ad       : 0001020304050608

ct       : f373079ed84b2709faee37358458

tag128   : c60b9c2d33ceb058f96e6dd03c215652

tag256   : 8c1cc703c81281bee3f6d9966e14948b
          4a175b2efbdc31e61a98b4465235c2d9
```

### A.3.10. Test Vector 9

This test MUST return a “verification failed” error.

```
key      : 10010000000000000000000000000000
           00000000000000000000000000000000

nonce    : 10000200000000000000000000000000
           00000000000000000000000000000000

ad       : 0001020304050607

ct       : f373079ed84b2709faee37358458

tag128   : c60b9c2d33ceb058f96e6dd03c215653

tag256   : 8c1cc703c81281bee3f6d9966e14948b
           4a175b2efbdc31e61a98b4465235c2da
```

#### A.4. AEGIS-128X2 Test Vectors

#### A.4.1. Initial State

```
key      : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
nonce    : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
  
ctx[0]: 00010000000000000000000000000000  
ctx[1]: 01010000000000000000000000000000
```

After initialization:

V[0,0]: a4fc1ad9a72942fb88bd2cabbba6509a  
V[0,1]: 80a40e392fc71084209b6c3319bdc6cc  
  
V[1,0]: 380f435cf801763b1f0c2a2f7212052d  
V[1,1]: 73796607b59b1b650ee91c152af1f18a  
  
V[2,0]: 6ee1de433ea877fa33bc0782abff2dcb  
V[2,1]: b9fab2ab496e16d1facaffd5453cbf14  
  
V[3,0]: 85f94b0d4263bfa86fdf45a603d8b6ac  
V[3,1]: 90356c8cadbaa2c969001da02e3feca0  
  
V[4,0]: 09bd69ad3730174bcd2ce9a27cd1357e  
V[4,1]: e610b45125796a4fcf1708cef5c4f718  
  
V[5,0]: fcdeb0cf0a87bf442fc82383ddb0f6d6  
V[5,1]: 61ad32a4694d6f3cca313a2d3f4687aa  
  
V[6,0]: 571c207988659e2cdfbdaae77f4f37e3  
V[6,1]: 32e6094e217573bf91fb28c145a3efa8  
  
V[7,0]: ca549badf8faa58222412478598651cf  
V[7,1]: 3407279a54ce76d2e2e8a90ec5d108eb

#### A.4.2. Test Vector 1

key : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
ad :  
msg :  
ct :  
tag128: 63117dc57756e402819a82e13eca8379  
tag256: b92c71fdbd358b8a4de70b27631ace90  
cffd9b9cfba82028412bac41b4f53759

#### A.4.3. Test Vector 2

```
key   : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

ad    : 0102030401020304

msg   : 04050607040506070405060704050607
        04050607040506070405060704050607
        04050607040506070405060704050607
        04050607040506070405060704050607
        04050607040506070405060704050607
        04050607040506070405060704050607
        04050607040506070405060704050607
        0405060704050607

ct     : 5795544301997f93621b278809d6331b
        3bfa6f18e90db12c4aa35965b5e98c5f
        c6fb4e54bcb6111842c20637252eff74
        7cb3a8f85b37de80919a589fe0f24872
        bc926360696739e05520647e390989e1
        eb5fd42f99678a0276a498f8c454761c
        9d6aacb647ad56be62b29c22cd4b5761
        b38f43d5a5ee062f

tag128: 1aebc200804f405cab637f2adebb6d77

tag256: c471876f9b4978c44f2ae1ce770cdb11
        a094ee3feca64e7afcd48bfe52c60eca
```

#### A.5. AEGIS-128X4 Test Vectors

##### A.5.1. Initial State

```
key   : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f

nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

ctx[0]: 00030000000000000000000000000000
ctx[1]: 01030000000000000000000000000000
ctx[2]: 02030000000000000000000000000000
ctx[3]: 03030000000000000000000000000000
```

After initialization:

V[0,0]: 924eb07635003a37e6c6575ba8ce1929  
V[0,1]: c8b6a5d91475445e936d48e794be0ce2  
V[0,2]: fcd37d050e24084befe3bbb219d64760  
V[0,3]: 2e9f58cfb893a8800220242c373a8b18

V[1,0]: 1a1f60c4fab64e5471dc72edfcf6fe6b  
V[1,1]: c1e525ebea2d6375a9edd045dce96381  
V[1,2]: 97a3e25abd228a44d4a14a6d3fe9185c  
V[1,3]: c2d4cf7f4287a98744645674265d4ca8

V[2,0]: 7bb50c534f6ec4780530ff1cce8a16e8  
V[2,1]: 7b08d57557da0b5ef7b5f7d98b0ba189  
V[2,2]: 6bfcac34ddb68404821a4d665303cb0f  
V[2,3]: d95626f6dfad1aed7467622c38529932

V[3,0]: af339fd2d50ee45fc47665c647cf6586  
V[3,1]: d0669b39d140f0e118a4a511efe2f95a  
V[3,2]: 7a94330f35c194fadda2a87e42cdeccc  
V[3,3]: 233b640d1f4d56e2757e72c1a9d8ecb1

V[4,0]: 9f93737d699ba05c11e94f2b201bef5e  
V[4,1]: 61caf387cf7cfd3f8300ac7680ccfd76  
V[4,2]: 5825a671ecef03b7a9c98a601ae32115  
V[4,3]: 87a1fe4d558161a8f4c38731f3223032

V[5,0]: 7a5aca78d636c05bbc702b2980196ab6  
V[5,1]: 915d868408495d07eb527789f282c575  
V[5,2]: d0947bfbcd1d3309cdffc9be1503aea62  
V[5,3]: 8834ea57a15b9fbdc0245464a4b8cbef

V[6,0]: e46f4cf71a95ac45b6f0823e3abala86  
V[6,1]: 8c4ecef682fc44a8eba911b3fc7d99f9  
V[6,2]: a4fb61e2c928a2ca760b8772f2ea5f2e  
V[6,3]: 3d34ea89da73caa3016c280500a155a3

V[7,0]: 85075f0080e9d618e7eb40f57c32d9f7  
V[7,1]: d2ab2b320c6e93b155a3787cb83e5281  
V[7,2]: 0b3af0250ae36831a1b072e499929bcb  
V[7,3]: 5cce4d00329d69f1aae36aa541347512

#### A.5.2. Test Vector 1

key : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
ad :  
msg :  
ct :  
tag128: 5bef762d0947c00455b97bb3af30dfa3  
tag256: a4b25437f4be93cfa856a2f27e4416b4  
2cac79fd4698f2cdbe6af25673e10a68

#### A.5.3. Test Vector 2

key : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
ad : 0102030401020304  
msg : 04050607040506070405060704050607  
04050607040506070405060704050607  
04050607040506070405060704050607  
04050607040506070405060704050607  
04050607040506070405060704050607  
04050607040506070405060704050607  
04050607040506070405060704050607  
0405060704050607  
ct : e836118562f4479c9d35c17356a83311  
4c21f9aa39e4dda5e5c87f4152a00fce  
9a7c38f832eafe8b1c12f8a7cf12a81a  
1ad8a9c24ba9dedfbdaa586ffea67ddc  
801ea97d9ab4a872f42d0e352e2713da  
cd609f9442c17517c5a29daf3e2a3fac  
4ff6b1380c4e46df7b086af6ce6bc1ed  
594b8dd64aed2a7e  
tag128: 0e56ab94e2e85db80f9d54010caabfb4  
tag256: 69abf0f64a137dd6e122478d777e98bc  
422823006cf57f5ee822dd78397230b2

#### A.6. AEGIS-256X2 Test Vectors

## A.6.1. Initial State

key : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f

ctx[0]: 00010000000000000000000000000000  
ctx[1]: 01010000000000000000000000000000

After initialization:

V[0,0]: eca2bf4538442e8712d4972595744039  
V[0,1]: 201405efa9264f07911db58101903087

V[1,0]: 3e536a998799408a97f3479a6f779d48  
V[1,1]: 0d79a7d822a5d215f78c3bf2feb33ae1

V[2,0]: cf8c63d6f2b4563cdd9231107c85950e  
V[2,1]: 78d17ed7d8d563ff11bd202c76864839

V[3,0]: d7e0707e6bfbbad913bc94b6993a9fa0  
V[3,1]: 097e4b1bfff40d4c19cb29dfd125d62f2

V[4,0]: a373cf6d537dd66bc0ef0f2f9285359f  
V[4,1]: c0d0ae0c48f9df3faaf0e7be7768c326

V[5,0]: 9f76560dcae1efacabdcce446ae283bc  
V[5,1]: bd52a6b9c8f976a26ec1409df19e8bfe

## A.6.2. Test Vector 1



key : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f

ad :

msg :

ct :

tag128: 62cdbab084c83dacdb945bb446f049c8

tag256: 25d7e799b49a80354c3f881ac2f1027f  
471a5d293052bd9997abd3ae84014bb7

#### A.6.3. Test Vector 2

```
key   : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
       101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
       202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f

ad    : 0102030401020304

msg   : 0405060704050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607

ct    : 72120c2ea8236180d67859001f472907
       7b7064c414384fe3a7b52f1571f4f8a7
       d0f01e18db4f3bc0adb150702e5d147a
       8d36522132761b994c1bd395589e2ccf
       0790dfe2a3d12d61cd666b2859827739
       db4037dd3124c78424459376f6cac08e
       1a7223a2a43e398ce6385cd654a19f48
       1cba3b8f25910b42

tag128: 635d391828520bf1512763f0c8f5cdbd

tag256: b5668d3317159e9cc5d46e4803c3a76a
       d63bb42b3f47956d94f30db8cb366ad7
```

## A.7. AEGIS-256X4 Test Vectors

### A.7.1. Initial State

```
key   : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
       101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
       202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f

ctx[0]: 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000
ctx[1]: 0103000000000000000000000000000000000000
ctx[2]: 0203000000000000000000000000000000000000
ctx[3]: 0303000000000000000000000000000000000000

After initialization:
```

V[0,0]: 482a86e8436cd2361063a4b2702769b9  
V[0,1]: d95a2be81c9245b22996f68eea0122f9  
V[0,2]: 0c2a3b348b1a5e256c6751377318c41e  
V[0,3]: f64436a21653fe7cf2e0829a177db383  
  
V[1,0]: e705e8866267717d96092e58e78b574c  
V[1,1]: d1dd412142df9806cc267af2fe1d830e  
V[1,2]: 30e7dfd3c9941b8394e95bdf5bac99d9  
V[1,3]: 9f27186f8a4fab86820689822c3c74d2  
  
V[2,0]: e1aa6af5d9e31dde8d94a48a0810fa89  
V[2,1]: 63555cdf0d98f18fb75b029ad80786c0  
V[2,2]: a3ee0e4a3429a9539e4fcec385475608  
V[2,3]: 28ea527d31ef61df498dc107fe02df99  
  
V[3,0]: 37f06808410c8f3954525ae44584d3be  
V[3,1]: 8fcc23bca2fe2209f93d34e2da35b33d  
V[3,2]: 33156347df89eaa69ab11096362daccf  
V[3,3]: bbe58d9dbe8c5b0469be5a87086db5d4  
  
V[4,0]: dl9eb37fecbc5ada7b351fa4f501f32  
V[4,1]: 0b9b803283c1538628b507c8f6432434  
V[4,2]: bfb8b6d4f87cce28825c7e92f54b8728  
V[4,3]: 8917bb5b09c32f900c6a5ald63c46264  
  
V[5,0]: 4f6110c2ef0c3c687e90c1e5532ddf8e  
V[5,1]: 031bd85d99f64684d23728a0453c72a1  
V[5,2]: 10bc7ec34d4119b5bdeb6c7dfc458247  
V[5,3]: 591ece530aeaa5c9867220156f5c25e3

#### A.7.2. Test Vector 1

key : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
  
nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f  
  
ad :  
  
msg :  
  
ct :  
  
tag128: 3b7fee6cee7bf17888ad11ed2397beb4  
  
tag256: 6093a1a8aab20ec635dc1ca71745b01b  
5bec4fc444c9ffbebd710d4a34d20eaf

## A.7.3. Test Vector 2

```
key   : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
       101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f

nonce : 101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
       202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f

ad    : 0102030401020304

msg   : 04050607040506070405060704050607
       04050607040506070405060704050607
       04050607040506070405060704050607
       04050607040506070405060704050607
       04050607040506070405060704050607
       04050607040506070405060704050607
       04050607040506070405060704050607
       0405060704050607

ct    : bfc2085b7e8017da99b0b6d646ae4d01
       f4ba8f2e7dfcald759ae48a135139b9a
       aac6b4f5db810d426be1fdaff4e14541
       53a34b11da78ed7e418ee2ee9853042e
       95536aecbb694cealb16a478eb0d4d1b
       f6509b1ce652a45af58e0e46ffccfa2d
       0426e702391d2ff5813808b81748a490
       dd656465fed61f09

tag128: b63b611b13975e2f3dc3cb6c2397bfcd

tag256: 7847eace74409ee56c8f4cf63a9c2841
       ce7c8bd567d7c0ca514c879a190b978c
```

## A.8. AEGISMAC Test Vectors

## A.8.1. AEGISMAC-128L Test Vector

```
key      : 10010000000000000000000000000000
nonce    : 10000200000000000000000000000000
data     : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
           101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
           202122
tag128   : d3f09b2842ad301687d6902c921d7818
tag256   : 9490e7c89d420c9f37417fa625eb38e8
           cad53c5cbec55285e8499ea48377f2a3
```

### A.8.2. AEGISMAC-128X2 Test Vector

```
key      : 1001000000000000000000000000000000
nonce    : 1000020000000000000000000000000000
data     : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
          101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
          202122

tags128: 9f5f69928fa481fa86e8a51e072a9b29
          eeea77a356f796b427f6a54f52ae0e20

tag128  : 6873ee34e6b5c59143b6d35c5e4f2c6e

tags256: 22cdcf558d0338b6ad8fbba4da7307d3
          0bd685fff23dc9d41f598c2a7ea44055

tag256  : afcba3fc2d63c8d6c7f2d63f3ec8fbbb
          af022e15ac120e78ffa7755abccd959c
```

### A.8.3. AEGISMAC-128X4 Test Vector

```
key      : 1001000000000000000000000000000000000000
nonce    : 1000020000000000000000000000000000000000
data     : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
          101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f
          202122

tags128: 7fecdd913a7cb0011b6c4c88e0c6f8578
          19a98fbeaf21d1092c32953fff82c8a9
          c7b5e6625a5765d04af26cf22adc1282
          4c8cf3b4dbb85f379e13b04a8d06bca7

tag128   : c45a98fd9ab8956ce616eb008cfe4e53

tags256: d595732bdf230a1441978414cd8cfa39
          ecef6ad0ee1e65ae530006ca5d5f4481
          f9ec5edfa64e9c3d76d3a5eda9fe5bd1
          fb9d842373f7c90bedb8bfe383740b23
          1264a15143eb8c3d9f17754099f147e3
          401c83c0d5afc70fd0d68bfd17f9280f

tag256   : 26fdc76f41b1da7aec7779f6e964beae
          8904e662f05aca8345ae3befb357412b
```

#### A.8.4. AEGISMAC-256 Test Vector

```
key      : 10010000000000000000000000000000  
          00000000000000000000000000000000  
  
nonce    : 10000200000000000000000000000000  
          00000000000000000000000000000000  
  
data     : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
          101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
          202122  
  
tag128   : c08e20cfc56f27195a46c9cef5c162d4  
  
tag256   : a5c906ede3d69545c11e20afa360b221  
          f936e946ed2dba3d7c75ad6dc2784126
```

#### A.8.5. AEGISMAC-256X2 Test Vector

```
key      : 1001000000000000000000000000000000  
          0000000000000000000000000000000000  
nonce    : 1000020000000000000000000000000000  
          0000000000000000000000000000000000  
data     : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
          101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
          202122  
  
tags128: db8852ea2c03f22b0d0694ea4e88e4b1  
tag128   : fb319cb6dd728a764606fb14d37f2a5e  
  
tags256: b4d124976b34b2aa8bc3fa0b55396cf7  
          fb83f4ef5ba607681cddf5ba3e925727  
  
tag256   : 0844b20ed5147ceae89c7a160263afd4  
          b1382d6b154ecf560ce8a342cb6a8fd1
```

#### A.8.6. AEGISMAC-256X4 Test Vector

```
key      : 1001000000000000000000000000000000000000  
          0000000000000000000000000000000000000000  
  
nonce    : 1000020000000000000000000000000000000000  
          0000000000000000000000000000000000000000  
  
data     : 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f  
          101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f  
          202122  
  
tags128: 702d595e74962d073a0d68c883d80deb  
          41ab207e43b16659d556d7467218a9ec  
          113406e7cb56e0f6b63c95c88421dfef  
  
tag128   : a51f9bc5beae60cce77f0dbc60761edd  
  
tags256: a46ebcd10939b42012a3f9b6147172af  
          3b74aec5d0070e8d6a81498ccbcdb41a  
          d57cd7a50fa8621dfea2e81cd941def5  
          57094251a24527a4d97fc4c825368180  
          3973129d07cc20811a8b3c34574f6ce0  
          10165dd0e856e797f70731e78e32f764  
  
tag256   : b36a16ef07c36d75a91f437502f24f54  
          5b8dfa88648ed116943c29fead3bf10c
```

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