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Secure Shell (SSH) Key Exchange Method Using Hybrid Streamlined NTRU
Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512: sntrup761x25519-sha512
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Abstract

This document describes a widely deployed hybrid key exchange method in the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol that is based on Streamlined NTRU Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512.

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1. Introduction

Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC4251] is a secure remote login protocol. The key exchange protocol described in SSH transport layer [RFC4253] supports an extensible set of methods. Elliptic Curve Algorithms in SSH [RFC5656] defines how elliptic curves are integrated into the extensible SSH framework, and SSH KEX Using Curve25519 and Curve448 [RFC8731] adds curve25519-sha256 to support the pre-quantum elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman X25519 function [RFC7748].

Streamlined NTRU Prime [NTRUPrimePQCS] [NTRUPrime] [NTRUPrimeWeb] provides post-quantum small lattice-based key-encapsulation mechanisms. The variant sntrup761 instance has been implemented widely.

This document specifies a hybrid construction using both sntrup761 and X25519, in the intention that a hybrid would be secure if either algorithms is secure.

This document describes how to implement key exchange based on a hybrid between Streamlined NTRU Prime sntrup761 and X25519 with SHA-512 [RFC6234] in SSH.

This document was derived from SSH KEX Using Curve25519 and Curve448 [RFC8731].

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Key Exchange Method: sntrup761x25519-sha512

The key-agreement is done by the X25519 Diffie-Hellman protocol as described in section 3 (Key Exchange Methods) of [RFC8731], and the key encapsulation method described in [NTRUPrimePQCS].

The key exchange procedure re-use the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange defined in section 4 (ECDH Key Exchange) and section 7.1 (ECDH Message Numbers) of [RFC5656].

The protocol flow and the `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT` and `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY` messages are identical, except that we use different ephemeral public values `Q_C` and `Q_S` and shared secret `K` as described below.

Implementations MAY use names `SSH_MSG_KEX_HYBRID_INIT` where `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT` is used, and `SSH_MSG_KEX_HYBRID_REPLY` where `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY` is used, as long as the encoding on the wire is identical. These symbolic names do not appear on the wire, they are merely used in specifications to refer to particular byte values. For consistency with ECC in SSH [RFC5656], which define the packet syntax, we use those names in the rest of this document.

The `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT`'s value `Q_C` that holds the client's ephemeral public key MUST be constructed by concatenating the 1158 byte public key output from the key generator of sntrup761 with the 32 byte `K_A = X25519(a, 9)` as described in [NTRUPrimePQCS] and [RFC8731]. The `Q_C` value is thus 1190 bytes.

The `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY`'s value `Q_S` that holds the server's ephemeral public key MUST be constructed by concatenating the 1039 byte ciphertext output from the key encapsulation mechanism of sntrup761 with the 32 byte `K_B = X25519(b, 9)` as described in [NTRUPrimePQCS] and [RFC8731]. The `Q_S` value is thus 1071 bytes.

Clients and servers MUST abort if the length of the received public keys `Q_C` or `Q_S` are not the expected lengths. An abort for these purposes is defined as a disconnect (`SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT`) of the session and SHOULD use the `SSH_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED` reason for the message, see section 11.1 (Disconnection Message) of [RFC4253]. No further validation is required beyond what is described in [RFC7748], [RFC8731] and [NTRUPrimePQCS].

The `SSH_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY`'s signature value is computed as described in ECC for SSH [RFC5656] with the following changes. Instead of encoding the shared secret `K` as 'mpint', it MUST be encoded as 'string'. The shared secret `K` value MUST be the 64-byte output octet string of the SHA-512 hash computed with the input as the 32-byte

octet string key output from the key encapsulation mechanism of `sntrup761` concatenated with the 32-byte octet string of `X25519(a, X25519(b, 9)) = X25519(b, X25519(a, 9))`.

4. Acknowledgements

Jan Mojzisz added "`sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org`" to TinySSH [TinySSH] in 2018 and Markus Friedl implemented it for OpenSSH [OpenSSH] during 2019. During 2020 Damien Miller replaced `sntrup4591761` with `sntrup761` in OpenSSH, to create "`sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com`". TinySSH added support for it during 2021. It became the default key exchange algorithm in OpenSSH during 2022. That is identical to the "`sntrup761x25519-sha512`" mechanism described in this document.

We wish to thank the following people who contributed to this document: Roman Danyliw, Loganaden Velvindron, Panos Kampanakis, Mark Baushke, Theo de Raadt, Tero Kivinen, and Deb Cooley.

5. Security Considerations

The security considerations of the SSH Protocol [RFC4251], ECC for SSH [RFC5656], Elliptic Curves for Security [RFC7748], and SSH KEX Using Curve25519 and Curve448 [RFC8731] are inherited.

Streamlined NTRU Prime `sntrup761` is aiming for the standard goal of IND-CCA2 security, is widely implemented with good performance on a wide range of architectures, and has been studied by researchers for several years. However new cryptographic primitives should be introduced and trusted conservatively, and new research findings may be published at any time that may warrant implementation reconsiderations. The method described here to combine Curve25519 with `sntrup761` (i.e., SHA-512 hashing the concatenated outputs) is also available for the same kind of cryptographic scrutiny.

The increase in communication size and computational requirements may be a concern for restricted computational devices, which would then not be able to take advantage of the improved security properties offered by this work.

Since `sntrup761x25519-sha512` is expected to offer no reduction of security compared to `curve25519-sha256`, it is recommended that it is used and preferred whenever `curve25519-sha256` is used today, when the extra communication size and computational requirements are acceptable.

As discussed in the security considerations of Curve25519-sha256 [RFC8731], the X25519 shared secret K is used bignum-encoded in that document, and this raise a potential for a hash-processing time side-channel that could leak one bit of the secret due to different length of the bignum sign pad. This document resolve that problem by using string-encoding instead of bignum-encoding.

The security properties of the protocol in this document, SSH itself, and the cryptographic algorithms used (including Streamlined NTRU Prime), all depends on the availability and proper use of cryptographically secure random data.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to add a new "Method Name" of "sntrup761x25519-sha512" to the "Key Exchange Method Names" registry for Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters [IANA-KEX] with a "reference" field to this RFC and the "OK to implement" field of "SHOULD".

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[NTRUPrimePQCS]

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- [RFC8731] Adamantiadis, A., Josefsson, S., and M. Baushke, "Secure Shell (SSH) Key Exchange Method Using Curve25519 and Curve448", RFC 8731, DOI 10.17487/RFC8731, February 2020, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8731>>.

7.2. Informative References

- [IANA-KEX] IANA, "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters: Key Exchange Method Names", <<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/#ssh-parameters-16>>.
- [NTRUPrime] Bernstein, D.J., Chuengsatiansup, C., Lange, T., and C. van Vredendaal, "NTRU Prime: reducing attack surface at low cost", WWW <https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/ntruprime-20170816.pdf>, August 2017.
- [NTRUPrimeWeb] NTRU Prime, "Webpage of NTRU Prime project", <<https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/>>.
- [OpenSSH] OpenSSH, "OpenSSH", <<https://www.openssh.com/>>.
- [TinySSH] TinySSH, "TinySSH", <<https://www.tinyssh.org/>>.

Appendix A. Test vectors

SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT

client public key sntrup761:

```
0000: 5d b3 a9 d3 93 30 31 76 0e 8a f5 87 f7 b2 8c 4f  ]....0lv.....O
0016: 97 a1 74 0e 6b 6f cf 1a d9 d9 99 8a 32 a5 61 e5  ..t.ko.....2.a.
0032: 9e 4d 93 67 e2 66 18 f0 0a f5 54 f4 48 65 0c 60  .M.g.f....T.He.`
0048: d1 12 92 c2 aa a9 e4 7c ea 32 a3 f5 86 cb c4 c3  ....|.2.....
0064: d5 c2 6f 34 5e 7f d3 57 51 d3 e3 d9 cc 1c e4 49  ..o4^..WQ.....I
```

```
0080: bb ea 3e 2e 58 5e ac ba 0a b8 22 00 7c 77 a4 e0  ..>.X^....".|w..
0096: bd 16 5c 3a f7 b3 25 08 c1 81 fd 0d 9f 99 a3 be  ..\:%.....
0112: ae e3 38 84 13 ff f0 b4 0f cb ab 76 1e 95 3e 1e  ..8.....v..>.
0128: 7c 74 1e 58 46 f6 81 f0 f2 f2 56 5b f3 be ce c9  |t.XF.....V[....
0144: c8 99 9f 03 88 81 db 17 75 1d fb f5 b1 e2 f3 5d  .....u.....]
0160: 32 ce 19 75 49 e7 e1 17 bf 35 0d 97 7c ac 0a cf  2..uI....5..|...
0176: 6c 8a 0f fc 07 4b a7 8b c5 93 f7 47 7c b6 d5 bf  1....K.....G|...
0192: 02 f0 96 80 e8 dc f3 87 c9 f0 b2 91 e7 37 70 82  .....7p.
0208: 3e 47 b7 18 72 be 5a da b1 85 d3 6e 56 5d 8a a3  >G..r.Z.....nV]..
0224: 62 fa 3e d0 ea 6e b9 fa 69 ec 96 86 94 81 2e 88  b.>..n..i.....
0240: 2b ba e5 af 70 1e ae ba 5f cb ea 82 e5 ba 67 0e  +...p...._.....g.
0256: 4d f6 2a ec 13 a9 19 b4 08 9c b7 32 bb 40 de c3  M.*.....2.@..
0272: e9 33 e1 c4 0d 5b 72 00 06 c4 3b 7f 57 d4 85 76  .3...[r...;W..v
0288: 4c 4c 3d ab 8e 1b 00 00 ac d9 8c 05 b3 18 24 85  LL=.....$.
0304: 77 28 74 71 0d 68 8b 02 2c 59 55 a7 4d a4 6e 37  w(tq.h.,YU.M.n7
0320: 85 6c 77 68 f5 b7 a7 52 61 af 37 b4 09 07 34 68  .lwh...Ra.7...4h
0336: b6 83 ca f2 03 25 47 f9 09 e6 da bd 82 07 7e d1  ....%G.....~.
0352: 78 16 74 1a a5 4c 5b ac 78 d8 0f 1a 44 08 44 a7  x.t..L[.x...D.D.
0368: ef 85 00 43 19 c3 3e b4 54 e6 3f f1 ac 83 03 ce  ...C..>.T.?.....
0384: 7c bd ef 3c fd eb 47 6f f7 f9 e0 1f 13 9f cb 77  |..<..Go.....w
0400: 52 40 9d 3a d7 8b ad bf cc f1 06 ec 93 32 48 be  R@:.....2H.
0416: 0a 53 99 5c dd 9e 96 3b 84 21 8f b2 b4 fd b8 97  .S.\...;!......
0432: 8b 7a 8f 71 aa e6 af 4e 22 53 18 f0 a2 30 a0 53  .z.q...N"S...0.S
0448: 30 c9 d8 a9 d7 67 08 a5 ad 81 64 7b 3a 02 ae ff  0....g....d{:...
0464: e7 fa 41 68 d0 54 e3 42 86 da f7 f0 98 31 38 e5  ..Ah.T.B.....18.
0480: 8c fa 86 5c 5c f9 82 f8 a2 09 91 91 96 72 12 e5  ...\\.....r..
0496: 8f 8b 8e 9b e8 5d bd 66 4b 6e ec a3 b3 03 c5 4e  ....].fKn.....N
0512: 0f 7e a5 15 ef ab 01 8c 6d 02 52 77 bc 9a 02 f2  .~.....m.Rw....
0528: 2e bf 03 40 fe 5a 80 5a c0 78 1e 95 21 10 9d dd  ...@.Z.Z.x.!...
0544: 37 87 00 ae 13 c5 9d 9c 81 87 37 3e 7d e0 40 bc  7.....7>}.@.
0560: 83 76 69 4f 9f c4 08 fd aa a1 7e aa 88 0e 4c 56  .viO.....~...LV
0576: a0 47 c5 d6 94 fb 52 67 f3 36 de b2 7e bf d1 33  .G....Rg.6...~.3
0592: 41 fd 05 20 66 60 f4 91 96 5f 19 33 2d 17 ec e0  A.. f'...._3-...
0608: 3e 93 7a 66 3b b0 de f4 ad 51 90 a4 a1 94 f3 37  >.zfi;....Q....7
0624: 9a 77 11 02 67 45 6d 4d 19 80 33 58 56 2c b8 11  .w..gEmM...3XV,..
0640: 51 7b bc ec 43 fe 3d 96 ac f7 f0 8b 8d c6 2c 02  Q{...C.=.....,.
0656: 2f c0 67 21 56 49 ee bf 07 17 48 f9 30 0b 18 2c  /.g!VI....H.0...
0672: fa 7b 57 93 be f7 12 99 57 be 98 e7 55 84 da ed  .{W.....W...U...
0688: 5c 94 71 fa 48 0f ed 97 ab e4 a5 d6 b6 26 3a e4  \.q.H.....&:.
0704: cb fe f9 ed 07 4b 42 bf e5 a1 d1 34 4d 7b 67 b9  ....KB....4M{g.
0720: b7 06 7b d2 c7 ae 57 15 21 58 55 70 70 93 f1 87  ..{...W.!XUpp...
0736: 31 bf 85 74 fe 36 0d 08 c8 07 a2 14 fc d5 96 8b  1..t.6.....
0752: 59 62 97 30 43 75 c2 a9 4f ec f9 e9 33 a9 38 cb  Yb.0Cu..O...3.8.
0768: ae ee 63 34 8c 65 54 e7 9d d4 23 a2 4f b9 00 ed  ..c4.eT....#.O...
0784: b4 be 0b 1c df d4 97 c0 89 ab dd 5f 75 13 ce 37  ....._u...7
0800: f3 d2 26 55 72 39 61 f0 d2 11 e8 e7 5f 93 5b 79  ..&Ur9a.....[y
0816: e5 6c 28 f3 0a f9 5e 99 b8 a0 e6 4a 22 88 e5 28  .l(...^....J"..(
0832: 82 0c 6f 72 1d dd 80 84 57 04 72 f4 26 56 71 f3  ..or....W.r.&Vq.
```

```
0848: 92 23 ff 9e a9 fd 05 0b 51 99 72 32 98 a5 02 87 .#.....Q.r2....
0864: fe bb 99 18 5a b3 ec ab f9 26 7b 97 79 da 5f 19 ....Z....&{.y._.
0880: 4e e7 7d a5 2d 53 40 2a 1f 1b 62 df 3b 11 82 e6 N.}.-S@*..b.;...
0896: 90 7f 0f 56 0c 75 14 03 e7 6f aa f0 0e 0a 17 13 ...V.u...o.....
0912: 54 f5 ea d7 21 31 2c 7a c5 7f a3 ae 14 f3 05 42 T...!1,z.....B
0928: e9 c9 6c 6d d1 0a cb 19 35 7f 01 8a 8c e2 a1 09 ..lm....5.....
0944: b5 c6 e5 e8 2b 4f 1e a2 e9 ce 5b e4 76 f7 53 4f ....+O....[.v.SO
0960: 52 d4 75 22 4b aa 1e cd 42 0e be d7 dc 76 6f 94 R.u"K...B....vo.
0976: 0a 37 47 ca 44 bd e6 9e c1 2a 0d 57 f3 c2 47 40 .7G.D....*.W..G@
0992: 23 db a8 45 c7 9b 4a 96 13 6a 73 ad 6a a2 a8 e4 #..E..J..js.j...
1008: df 92 34 76 f9 47 8d b9 21 63 46 c2 d7 f2 64 e6 ..4v.G...!cF...d.
1024: 17 27 9f cf f3 ae cd 3a 7d ed 5e 46 7c 33 71 f6 .'.....:}.^F|3q.
1040: 71 c8 92 dc ae e6 a0 c8 05 0c e0 37 fb ea 15 ed q.....7....
1056: b0 78 a5 bf b1 48 8b 46 64 1e c8 81 00 55 82 89 .x...H.Fd....U..
1072: 25 f8 b1 8b 1c e4 96 54 f8 be 97 b1 d3 20 f3 a0 %.....T.....
1088: b5 c1 dd d5 27 d0 61 d9 96 2a 74 76 a8 33 10 78 ....'.a...*tv.3.x
1104: ff b2 86 ee 4f 0b 78 73 dd 7f 7c b5 02 e9 12 35 ....O.xs..|....5
1120: d3 9e ab 81 cd 9b 61 fb 2b 33 72 ee c6 bb 8a bc .....a.+3r.....
1136: bd 4f e5 9b c2 55 8f a0 b1 e7 1a 6a c1 e3 f1 5c .O...U.....j...\
1152: 83 8f f0 9c 5b 04 .....[.
```

client public key c25519:

```
0000: be f9 23 79 d7 fd 4e 8a 10 55 9b dc e5 3e 62 13 ..#y..N..U...>b.
0016: eb 9b 6a 6f ca de ed 90 04 db b1 30 f6 ff ef 4f ..jo.....0...0
```

SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY

server cipher text:

```
0000: 71 67 00 55 f8 ac 87 1a af 7c ef cf 1c b4 7d b9 qg.U.....|....}.
0016: 4f b6 22 5e 4d 77 81 73 4f 1d b9 82 79 ff e9 34 O."^Mw.sO...y..4
0032: 26 9f d2 2e 4e c6 a3 5f 79 9c 26 68 99 3a 0f 40 &...N...y.&h.:.@
0048: 33 2a 7d dd fa 7a e7 6b 1e e7 9d 50 b7 48 0f aa 3*}...z.k...P.H..
0064: aa 97 ff e7 8c 6c ac 5d 10 df 2b e3 cc 93 ea dc .....l.]...+....
0080: 18 17 b3 34 42 70 7a 27 85 58 2a ae c2 e6 b9 26 ...4Bpz'.X*....&
0096: 93 fd 23 a9 ae ac 4a 35 8b 57 c1 5c 95 cb 23 fb ..#...J5.W.\..#.
0112: e5 93 0f 7c f5 63 6b 5b a1 53 b5 55 d0 75 16 21 ...|.ck[.S.U.u.!
0128: 8a db 95 ff c8 58 ac f4 7e 46 69 0a 4c a9 c8 cc .....X...~Fi.L...
0144: eb e8 66 7c c4 fb fd 98 2c 0c 7f 41 8c 34 89 49 ..f|....,..A.4.I
0160: a0 25 59 eb 63 a1 e6 8f 37 bf bc b3 ce 0a da 53 .%Y.c...7.....S
0176: 54 7f c2 41 52 eb 6c 9e 6e d0 ea af 6a 82 5d 17 T..AR.l.n...j.].
0192: 6f 17 8d 06 8a 86 55 60 28 31 12 4a 0c de 6b be o.....U'(1.J..k.
0208: eb fd 38 13 6c 56 69 ad 0e 72 c8 bd b4 69 9d 32 ..8.lVi..r...i.2
0224: b4 1c 8e 6f f4 25 e1 9b c5 6f 8b 02 77 52 ae 72 ...o.%...o...wR.r
0240: eb 9b 03 c8 9f de 15 bd f6 5a e8 9d 83 81 7b 48 .....Z....{H
0256: 7a 69 9a d0 91 41 aa 07 5a fa ad d6 e8 55 39 d9 zi...A..Z....U9.
0272: d1 0f d2 18 dc a0 9d 1c f1 e4 1c 0d f8 88 85 6b .....k
0288: 6d 11 24 3e 61 de 48 95 5f 2a d1 c9 ad 3f b8 41 m.$>a.H._*...?.A
0304: 49 6d 9f 7c 3c bf 20 fe 37 7f 8c 8c 8f 72 ca f4 Im.|<. .7....r..
```



```
0320: 19 e4 cc a1 d8 08 cb 69 ec da 2b 88 e8 98 e9 1e .....i...+....
0336: 29 af 86 6f 19 a8 67 56 ef b4 33 e4 2b b8 fe 61 )...o...gV...3.+...a
0352: ad 36 4c 42 f8 ec 04 38 09 62 02 66 b5 54 fc 69 .6LB...8.b.f.T.i
0368: 46 29 05 27 d8 32 fd 37 4c d4 62 55 e1 ae e9 62 F).'.2.7L.bU...b
0384: 66 a0 f4 cb 4b 01 af 6b ea 09 80 00 a2 2b ff 0e f...K..k.....+..
0400: 85 2c 92 b2 5c f9 f3 eb 44 a3 9a e8 55 bb e3 2f ,...\\...D...U../
0416: 2d 20 5a 77 67 97 57 90 7f 4b b3 08 92 41 1a c0 - ZwG.W..K...A..
0432: f6 1b e9 a4 06 29 ea 31 eb 81 f0 94 96 aa 26 95 .....).1.....&.
0448: 06 ed 4b f0 d3 9f aa 73 89 fa 6e f7 8f 4b f5 fa ..K....s...n..K..
0464: e4 5f 7c b6 08 e9 b2 18 77 99 9c ac 7b fb ec 41 ._|.....w...{..A
0480: 41 1e 29 c2 d0 a5 de bc 59 2f 14 45 6d af b1 e0 A.).....Y/.Em...
0496: 9c 77 73 0e ac 52 23 73 11 35 27 17 8c a3 ff 0e .ws..R#s.5'.....
0512: 52 5d b7 c8 06 c5 05 43 15 53 e8 fc 83 64 df 10 R].....C.S...d..
0528: 8b 9c 74 5c 0e d9 54 5e 9a 49 cf 13 e4 1d 86 35 ..t\\.T^.I.....5
0544: 24 a3 27 75 d3 d6 b4 95 78 8f 0d 81 3b 80 6b 26 $. 'u....x...; .k&
0560: 25 9f 14 b1 65 73 e8 ce fa 95 6d b1 15 0c 76 3c %...es....m...v<
0576: b1 75 a9 96 78 c8 4b 91 06 a9 94 bc ec fa 44 eb .u..x.K.....D.
0592: 39 77 4d ee df ae eb 0e 90 61 eb ab 6a 17 1b 24 9wM.....a..j..$
0608: 3c 3a 6e c4 bb 6f 72 46 3d 9a b8 8c 6a e7 45 c7 <:n..orF=...j.E.
0624: 0f 81 db 19 6e ce 65 74 ca db 73 ec 1e ce 5f d7 ....n.et...s...._
0640: 43 6b fe ff c0 e1 61 26 aa b7 6f e0 dc 7f d1 de Ck....a&...o....
0656: 95 f0 28 fd 24 9c 73 1c cf ef 3e fe 21 a1 e5 4e ..(.$s...>...!..N
0672: 77 da db 12 01 7a e4 2c b5 f3 9d 30 e6 49 99 d6 w....z.,...0.I..
0688: 21 58 cc 5b 5b d5 ff ca ea df 9a fd d6 73 be cd !X.[[.....s..
0704: ae 7c 0d ea 78 e4 dd 74 f9 93 53 21 70 b7 cd 16 .|.x..t..S!p...
0720: ea c7 e9 5d 01 e0 e3 e6 53 46 7f fa a0 48 3e 5b ...]....SF...H>[
0736: af 64 46 ff 0f 0c b5 c9 92 48 e8 20 35 1d c8 ae .dF.....H. 5...
0752: d8 c4 38 31 aa 2c b5 91 6b eb 86 ac 2b fa 86 f2 ..81.,..k...+...
0768: d1 bd 7d 51 4c be f3 bf 4b d0 f0 78 0e 20 d3 30 ..}QL...K..x. .0
0784: fc f8 00 53 2a 6a 9b d9 e4 0e 08 d1 ad 52 7a ca ...S*j.....Rz.
0800: f3 8b 0e a8 fb 45 3c 66 03 66 b4 54 a5 3d 8e df .....E<f.f.T=..
0816: 4a 8f 66 f0 16 44 3b a9 f1 b3 db bb 7e d6 38 e5 J.f..D;.....~.8.
0832: 5f 62 27 bb ba 34 0a 6f 9b 78 dd ae 54 ab 54 53 _b'..4.o.x..T.TS
0848: 3a e1 d2 f1 d8 1e 8b 31 61 cd 69 8a 63 fb 7c 24 :.....1a.i.c.|$
0864: 75 5f e6 6d 64 3d e4 12 cb 2d b3 6f 0f 5a 19 28 u_.md=...-.o.Z.(
0880: 1f d6 f6 9c ee 44 11 1a c5 84 d6 e3 a2 05 5d d4 .....D.....].
0896: 85 db f1 8f e4 17 df bc 4c 78 98 d1 70 3b 63 d6 .....Lx..p;c.
0912: a4 91 db f1 9e 16 23 fa e0 54 f6 64 d1 0b d0 d6 .....#.T.d....
0928: a6 fd f1 66 72 8c 65 d8 17 af c9 33 49 c8 e9 4d ...fr.e....3I..M
0944: 1c 0a 77 2b 96 86 f2 16 55 3a e3 f6 00 bb b6 5a ..w+....U:.....Z
0960: 86 f6 fc 3f d6 f9 a4 1d fd 29 1d 5b 65 dc b3 14 ...?.....).[e...
0976: 96 10 3e c1 9a 90 23 e8 88 81 24 42 68 7a aa 25 ..>...#...$Bhz.%
0992: ba f3 50 bd b9 ae be dc b3 ff 39 81 44 89 00 9d ..P.....9.D...
1008: 4e 26 d6 ef df 7c e0 53 d3 ed 34 07 3d f2 1e 42 N&...|.S..4.=..B
1024: 28 af 1d 12 ce 98 c7 b0 7b 90 81 b5 ea f3 2c (.....{.....,
```

server public key c25519:

```
0000: 18 6c 55 03 db 1c 38 e3 40 d7 09 24 77 46 14 b8 .lU...8.@...$wF..
```

```

0016: 5e e4 7f 19 98 04 9b 90 1f f6 b9 7f b0 70 9e 32 ^.....p.2

shared secret
0000: 9b 73 7d 41 d6 cf bb 12 56 c5 8c ad 0a 6a e2 c9 .s}A....V....j..
0016: bf 84 a9 0a 72 91 eb 52 e4 c1 81 c8 d2 44 7b 56 ....r..R.....D{V

client kem key:
0000: 2c 0c 5a 36 e6 77 70 b4 d8 ab 38 9a 92 96 3a cd ,.Z6.wp...8....:
0016: 10 82 38 36 40 be 2d 66 08 02 b8 17 cf eb b9 be ..86@.-f.....

concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:
0000: 2c 0c 5a 36 e6 77 70 b4 d8 ab 38 9a 92 96 3a cd ,.Z6.wp...8....:
0016: 10 82 38 36 40 be 2d 66 08 02 b8 17 cf eb b9 be ..86@.-f.....
0032: 9b 73 7d 41 d6 cf bb 12 56 c5 8c ad 0a 6a e2 c9 .s}A....V....j..
0048: bf 84 a9 0a 72 91 eb 52 e4 c1 81 c8 d2 44 7b 56 ....r..R.....D{V

encoded shared secret:
0000: 00 00 00 40 42 54 58 44 6f 22 75 63 04 de d7 5a ...@BTXDo"uc...Z
0016: 1f 23 fe f9 b1 8b 36 eb e0 e6 e2 60 c3 00 12 63 .#....6....'....c
0032: b0 18 3f 42 49 07 e6 d8 22 b3 b7 6c 6c 38 37 b5 ..?BI..."..1187.
0048: b4 1f b0 d0 76 35 c7 57 e6 5e fb ef cb 5b c3 8a ....v5.W.^....[...
0064: 1a 15 a9 6d ....m

```

Figure 1

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