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Updates to OAuth 2.0 JSON Web Token (JWT) Client Authentication and
Assertion-Based Authorization Grants
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Abstract

This document updates RFC7521, RFC7522, RFC7523 and RFC9126 with respect to the treatment of audience values in OAuth 2.0 Client Assertion Authentication and Assertion-based Authorization Grants to address a security vulnerability identified in the previous requirements for those audience values in multiple OAuth 2.0 specifications.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Multiple OAuth 2.0 specifications use tokens (also known as "assertions") that are sent to authorization servers. These tokens contain audience value(s) that identify the intended recipient(s). When the token is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT], the audience value(s) are contained in the aud (audience) claim.

When performing a security analysis of a pre-final version of the OpenID Federation specification [OpenID.Federation], University of Stuttgart security researchers Pedram Hosseini, Dr. Ralf K端sters, and Tim W端rtele discovered a vulnerability affecting multiple OpenID and OAuth specifications caused by ambiguities in the audience values of tokens sent to authorization servers. The vulnerability was

disclosed to the OAuth working group in an interim meeting in January 2025 called for that purpose, including providing a description of the vulnerability [private_key_jwt.Disclosure]. A paper they published describing the attack is [Audience.Injection].

This specification updates the affected OAuth specifications to address the security vulnerability identified. Specifically, it eliminates former choices in the audience values of tokens sent to OAuth 2.0 authorization servers. [RFC8414] section 3.3 requires that the client having retrieved the metadata validates the returned issuer value. Other endpoint values of the metadata cannot be directly validated and, if used as audience when sent to a different endpoint, can open an attack vector.

A general description of the updates made is to require that the issuer identifier URL of the authorization server, as defined in [RFC8414], be used as the sole value of the audience of the JWT client authentication assertion. Furthermore, the authorization server rejects any JWT client authentication assertion that does not contain its own issuer identifier as the sole audience value. An explicit type for the JWT client authentication assertion, as defined in [RFC8725], is also defined to facilitate distinguishing between tokens produced in accordance with specifications published prior to these updates and those incorporating them. Specific updates made to each affected specification follow.

1.1. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.2. Terminology

All terms are as defined in the following specifications: "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749], "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7521], and "JSON Web Token (JWT)" [JWT].

2. Updates to RFC 7521

This section updates "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7521] to tighten its audience requirements.

The description of the Audience parameter in Section 5.1 of [RFC7521] (Assertion Metamodel) is replaced by:

Audience

A value that identifies the party intended to process the assertion. The issuer identifier of the authorization server, as defined in [RFC8414], can be used to indicate that the authorization server is a valid intended audience of the assertion.

3. Updates to RFC 7522

This section updates "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7522]. It tightens its audience requirements for SAML authorization grants and it deprecates the use of SAML assertions for client authentication.

The text and example in Section 2.2 of [RFC7522] (Using SAML Assertions for Client Authentication) is replaced by:

SAML Bearer Assertions MUST NOT be used for client authentication for any new applications. Should any applications already be doing this in the manner described in Section 2.2 of [RFC7522], it is left to the discretion of their implementers and deployers whether to migrate away from this feature and/or potentially tighten the audience values used in a manner parallel to the changes being made to RFC 7523 by this specification.

The description of the Audience element in Item 2 of Section 3 of [RFC7522] (Assertion Format and Processing Requirements) is replaced by:

The Assertion MUST contain a <Conditions> element with an <AudienceRestriction> element with an <Audience> element that identifies the authorization server as the intended audience. The client is responsible for ensuring that the audience of the Assertion is appropriate for the authorization server to which it is sent. This MAY be the issuer identifier of the authorization server, the token endpoint URL of the authorization server, or a SAML Entity ID. Section 2.5.1.4 of "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0" [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] defines the <AudienceRestriction> and <Audience> elements. The authorization server MUST reject any assertion that does not contain its own identity as the intended audience.

4. Updates to RFC 7523

This section updates "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7523] to tighten its audience requirements.

In Section 3 of [RFC7523] (JWT Format and Processing Requirements), Item 3, which describes the audience value, is replaced by:

The JWT MUST contain an aud (audience) claim containing a value that identifies the authorization server as the intended audience. Two cases are differentiated:

- a. For the authorization grant, the client is responsible for ensuring that the audience of the JWT assertion is appropriate for the authorization server to which it is sent. An authorization server MAY be identified by either its issuer identifier or its token endpoint URL.
- b. For client authentication, the aud (audience) claim value MUST use the issuer identifier [RFC8414] of the authorization server as its sole value. The authorization server MUST have an issuer identifier to be used with this specification. The aud claim value MUST indicate only the issuer identifier of the intended authorization server as the audience of the JWT; this includes that the token endpoint URL of the authorization server MUST NOT be used as an audience value. The authorization server MUST reject any JWT that does not contain its issuer identifier as its sole audience value.

In the absence of an application profile specifying otherwise, applications MUST compare the audience values using the Simple String Comparison method defined in Section 6.2.1 of RFC 3986 [RFC3986].

In Section 3.2 of [RFC7523] (Client Authentication Processing), the following requirement is added:

Client authentication JWTs SHOULD be explicitly typed by using the typ header parameter value client-authentication+jwt or another more specific explicit type value defined by a specification profiling this specification.

The introduction of strong typing for JWTs (using explicit typ values) serves as a signal to distinguish between tokens produced in accordance with specifications published prior to these updates and those incorporating them. However, the primary security protection comes from the tightened audience requirements. The

use of explicit typing is REQUIRED for clients, enabling them to signal their intention of sending a JWT conforming to the requirements herein. However, since strong typing alone does not prevent the attacks described in [private_key_jwt.Disclosure] and [Audience.Injection], it is NOT RECOMMENDED for servers to reject JWTs that do not have explicit types. Such rejection would cause interoperability issues with clients that already conform to the tightened audience requirements but have not yet adopted explicit typing. This approach balances security signaling with practical deployment considerations, avoiding disruption to client deployments that already conform to the tightened audience requirements but have not yet adopted explicit typing.

In Section 4 of [RFC7523] (Authorization Grant Example), the sentence:

The intended audience of the JWT is https://jwt-rp.example.net, which is an identifier with which the authorization server identifies itself.

is replaced by:

The intended audience of the JWT is https://authz.example.net, which is the authorization server's issuer identifier.

In the same section, the JWT Claims Set example is replaced by:

```
{
  "aud": "https://authz.example.net",
  "iss": "https://jwt-idp.example.com",
  "sub": "mailto:mike@example.com",
  "iat": 1731721541,
  "exp": 1731725141,
  "http://claims.example.com/member": true
}
```

Figure 1: Example JWT Claims Set

In the list of agreements required by participants in Section 5 of [RFC7523] (Interoperability Considerations), an agreement on "audience identifiers" is no longer needed for client authentication JWTs.

The additional example in the following subsection is added after Section 4 of [RFC7523]

4.1. Client Authentication JWT Example

The following example illustrates what a client authentication JWT and token request using it would look like.

The example shows a JWT issued and signed by the OAuth client identified as `https://client.example`. The intended audience of the JWT is `https://authz.example.net`, which is the authorization server's issuer identifier. The JWT is sent as part of a token request to the authorization server's token endpoint at `https://authz.example.net/token.oauth2`.

Below is an example JSON object that could be encoded to produce the JWT Claims Set for a client authentication JWT:

```
{
  "aud": "https://authz.example.net",
  "iss": "https://client.example",
  "sub": "https://client.example",
  "iat": 1752702206,
  "exp": 1752705806
}
```

The following example JSON object, used as the header parameters of a JWT, declares that the JWT is a client authentication JWT, is signed with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) P-256 with SHA-256, and was signed with a key identified by the kid value 16.

```
{
  "typ": "client-authentication+jwt",
  "alg": "ES256",
  "kid": "16"
}
```

To present the JWT with the claims and header parameters shown above as part of an access token request, for example, the client might make the following HTTPS request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):

```
POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: authz.example.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=authorization_code&
code=n0esc3NRze7LTCu7iYzS6a5acc3f0ogp4&
client_assertion_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3A
  client-assertion-type%3Ajwt-bearer&
client_assertion=eyJ0eXAiOiJjbGllbnQtYXV0aGVudGljYXRpb24rand0IiwiYWx
  nIjoirVMYNTYiLCJraWQiOiIxNiJ9.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL2FldGh6LmV4YW1w
  bGUubmV0IiwiaXNzIjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9jbGllbnQuZXhhbXBsZSIsInN1YiI6Imh0dH
  BzOi8vY2xpZW50LmV4YW1wbGUiLCJpYXQiOjE3NTI3MDIyMDYsImV4cCI6MTclMjcw
  NTgwNn0.6KrSQUxd19ehs[...omitted for brevity...]bwc0ZOJw
```

5. Updates to RFC 9126

This section updates "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests" [RFC9126] to tighten its audience requirements.

The last paragraph in Section 2 of [RFC9126] (Pushed Authorization Request Endpoint), which describes the audience value is replaced by:

Due to historical reasons, there is potential ambiguity regarding the appropriate audience value to use when employing JWT client assertion-based authentication (as defined in Section 2.2 of [RFC7523] and as updated by Section 4 with the `private_key_jwt` or `client_secret_jwt` authentication method names per Section 9 of [OpenID.Core]). To address that ambiguity, the issuer identifier URL of the authorization server according to [RFC8414] MUST be used as the sole value of the audience. The authorization server MUST reject any such JWT that does not contain its own issuer identifier as the sole audience value.

Client authentication JWTs SHOULD be explicitly typed by using the `typ` header parameter value `client-authentication+jwt` or another more specific explicit type value defined by a specification profiling this specification.

The introduction of strong typing for JWTs (using explicit `typ` values) serves as a signal to distinguish between tokens produced in accordance with specifications published prior to these updates and those incorporating them. However, the primary security protection comes from the tightened audience requirements. The use of explicit typing is REQUIRED for clients, enabling them to signal their intention of sending a JWT conforming to the requirements herein. However, since strong typing alone does not prevent the attacks described in [private_key_jwt.Disclosure] and [Audience.Injection], it is NOT RECOMMENDED for servers to reject

JWTs that do not have explicit types. Such rejection would cause interoperability issues with clients that already conform to the tightened audience requirements but have not yet adopted explicit typing. This approach balances security signaling with practical deployment considerations, avoiding disruption to client deployments that already conform to the tightened audience requirements but have not yet adopted explicit typing.

6. Operational Considerations

Changes in this specification affect interoperability between clients and authorization servers that implement different versions. In particular, the resulting compatibility is not entirely symmetric. A client implementing this specification will interoperate with both authorization servers conforming to the updates herein as well as authorization servers implementing earlier versions. However, some clients implementing earlier versions may not interoperate with authorization servers that strictly enforce the updated requirements in this specification. Deployments upgrading to this specification should consider this asymmetry when planning rollouts or migrations, as it may be necessary to ensure that clients are updated before, or in coordination with, authorization servers that enforce the updated behavior.

7. Security Considerations

The security considerations described within the following specifications are all applicable to this document: "Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7521], "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7522], "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants" [RFC7523], "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests" [RFC9126], "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework" [RFC6749], and "JSON Web Token (JWT)" [JWT].

This specification tightens token audience requirements to prevent attacks that could result from exploiting audience ambiguities previously allowed by [RFC7521], [RFC7522], [RFC7523], and [RFC9126]. These attacks are described in [private_key_jwt.Disclosure] and [Audience.Injection].

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Media Type Registration

This section registers the following media type [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described in [RFC6838].

8.1.1. Registry Contents

- * Type name: application
- * Subtype name: client-authentication+jwt
- * Required parameters: n/a
- * Optional parameters: n/a
- * Encoding considerations: binary; A client authentication JWT is a JWT; JWT values are encoded as a series of base64url-encoded values (some of which may be the empty string) separated by period ('.') characters.
- * Security considerations: See Section 7 of this specification
- * Interoperability considerations: n/a
- * Published specification: Section 4 of this specification
- * Applications that use this media type: Applications that use this specification
- * Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
- * Additional information:
 - Magic number(s): n/a
 - File extension(s): n/a
 - Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
- * Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF OAuth Working Group <oauth@ietf.org>
- * Intended usage: COMMON
- * Restrictions on usage: none
- * Author: Michael B. Jones, michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
- * Change controller: IETF
- * Provisional registration? No

8.2. OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods

This section updates entries in the "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry of [IANA.OAuthParameters]

8.2.1. Registry Contents

- * Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: private_key_jwt
- * Change Controller: IETF
- * Reference: Section 9 of [OpenID.Core], [[this specification]]

- * Token Endpoint Authentication Method Name: client_secret_jwt
- * Change Controller: IETF

- * Reference: Section 9 of [OpenID.Core], [[this specification]]

8.3. OAuth URI Registration Updates

This section requests updates to the following entries in the "OAuth URI" registry of [IANA.OAuthParameters] to add [[this specification]] as an additional reference.

- * urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer
- * urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer
- * urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:saml2-bearer
- * urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:saml2-bearer

9. References

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Appendix A. Document History

[[to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC]]

-10

* Few more edits Deb suggested on text that went in -09 and -10.

-09

* Few more items from Jim Fenton's ARTART review.

-08

* Added an Operational Considerations section based on SECDIR and
OPSDIR review comments from Rich Salz and Luigi Iannone.

* Addressed Jim Fenton's ARTART review comments.

-07

- * Address comments from AD review by Deb Cooley:
 - RFCs to be updated are now in the Abstract (per idnits's nits).
 - Improved clarity of the audience description in Section 1.
 - Removed parenthetical remark in Section 3 about SAML client authentication usage.
 - Changed IANA media type registration contact to the OAuth Working Group.

-06

- * Applied shepherd review comments by Rifaat Shekh-Yusef.

-05

- * Applied editorial suggestions by Axel Nennker.

-04

- * Applied editorial suggestions by Jamshid Khosravian.

-03

- * Update OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods IANA entries with reference to this specification
- * Relaxed client requirement to use strong typed JWTs. SHOULD instead of MUST.
- * Do not restrict the "aud" claim's type. Allow it to be an array with a single member.
- * Advise the client to ensure that the audience of an assertion authorization grant makes sense with respect to where it is being sent.
- * Updates to the abstract and introduction to (hopefully) better reflect the more targeted scope of the work.
- * Remove JWTs for Client Authentication example replacement (not worth it for including typ in the encoded JWT header).
- * Add request to update existing OAuth URI registrations to add reference to this specification for the four relevant URNs.

- * Fixup the new Client Authentication JWT Example.

-02

- * Added Filip Skokan as an author.
- * Applied Brian Campbell's suggestions made at IETF 122. Specifically:
 - Focused RFC 7523 updates on JWT client authentication case.
 - Described client responsibilities for the audience value of authorization grants. No longer mandate that the audience for authorization grants be the issuer identifier, so as to make a minimum of breaking changes.
 - Deprecated the use of SAML assertions for client authentication.

-01

- * Reworked to make updates to RFC 7523, rather than replacing it.
- * Removed updates to RFC 9101.
- * Added reference to the University of Stuttgart paper [Audience.Injection].

-00

- * Initial working group draft, replacing draft-jones-oauth-rfc7523bis-00.

Acknowledgements

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