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DNS Configuration for Proxying IP in HTTP
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Abstract

Proxying IP in HTTP allows building a VPN through HTTP load balancers. However, at the time of writing, that mechanism doesn't offer a mechanism for communicating DNS configuration information inline. In contrast, most existing VPN protocols provide a mechanism to exchange DNS configuration information. This document describes an extension that exchanges this information using HTTP capsules. This mechanism supports encrypted DNS transports.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

The latest revision of this draft can be found at <https://ietf-wg-masque.github.io/draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-dns/draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-dns.html>. Status information for this document may be found at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-dns/>.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Multiplexed Application Substrate over QUIC Encryption Working Group mailing list (<mailto:masque@ietf.org>), which is archived at <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/masque/>. Subscribe at <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/masque/>.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/ietf-wg-masque/draft-ietf-masque-connect-ip-dns>.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

Proxying IP in HTTP ([CONNECT-IP]) allows building a VPN through HTTP load balancers. However, at the time of writing, that mechanism doesn't offer a mechanism for communicating DNS configuration information inline. In contrast, most existing VPN protocols provide a mechanism to exchange DNS configuration information (e.g., [IKEv2]). This document describes an extension that exchanges this information using HTTP capsules ([HTTP-DGRAM]). This document does not define any new ways to convey DNS queries or responses, only a mechanism to exchange DNS configuration information.

Note that this extension is meant for cases where connect-ip is used like a Remote Access VPN (see Section 8.1 of [CONNECT-IP]) or Site-to-Site VPN (see Section 8.2 of [CONNECT-IP]), but not for cases like IP Flow Forwarding (see Section 8.3 of [CONNECT-IP]).

This specification uses Service Bindings ([SVCB]) to exchange information about nameservers, such as which encrypted DNS transport is supported. This allows support for DNS over HTTPS ([DoH]), DNS over QUIC ([DoQ]), DNS over TLS ([DoT]), unencrypted DNS over UDP port 53 and TCP port 53 ([DNS]), as well as potential future DNS transports.

1.1. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This document uses terminology from [QUIC]. Where this document defines protocol types, the definition format uses the notation from Section 1.3 of [QUIC]. This specification uses the variable-length integer encoding from Section 16 of [QUIC]. Variable-length integer values do not need to be encoded in the minimum number of bytes necessary.

In this document, we use the term "nameserver" to refer to a DNS recursive resolver as defined in Section 6 of [DNS-TERMS], and the term "domain name" is used as defined in Section 2 of [DNS-TERMS].

2. Mechanism

Similar to how Proxying IP in HTTP exchanges IP address configuration information (Section 4.7 of [CONNECT-IP]), this mechanism leverages capsules to signal DNS configuration information. Similarly, this mechanism is bidirectional: either endpoint can send DNS configuration information in a DNS_ASSIGN capsule. The capsule format is defined below.

2.1. Domain Structure

```
Domain {  
    Domain Length (i),  
    Domain Name (...),  
}
```

Figure 1: Domain Format

Each Domain contains the following fields:

Domain Length: Length of the following Domain field, encoded as a variable-length integer.

Domain Name: Fully Qualified Domain Name in DNS presentation format and using an Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA) A-label ([IDNA]).

2.2. Nameserver Structure

```
Nameserver {  
    Service Priority (16),  
    IPv4 Address Count (i),  
    IPv4 Address (32) ...,  
    IPv6 Address Count (i),  
    IPv6 Address (128) ...,  
    Authentication Domain Name (...),  
    Service Parameters Length (i),  
    Service Parameters (...),  
}
```

Figure 2: Nameserver Format

Each Nameserver structure contains the following fields:

Service Priority: The priority of this attribute compared to other nameservers, as specified in Section 2.4.1 of [SVCB]. Since this specification relies on using Service Bindings in ServiceMode (Section 2.4.3 of [SVCB]), this field MUST NOT be set to 0.

IPv4 Address Count: The number of IPv4 Address fields following this field. Encoded as a variable-length integer.

IPv4 Address: Sequence of IPv4 Addresses that can be used to reach this nameserver. Encoded in network byte order.

IPv6 Address Count: The number of IPv6 Address fields following this field. Encoded as a variable-length integer.

IPv6 Address: Sequence of IPv6 Addresses that can be used to reach this nameserver. Encoded in network byte order.

Authentication Domain Name: A Domain structure (see Section 2.2) representing the domain name of the nameserver. This MAY be empty if the nameserver only supports unencrypted DNS (as traditionally sent over UDP port 53 and TCP port 53).

Service Parameters Length: Length of the following Service Parameters field, encoded as a variable-length integer.

Service Parameters: Set of service parameters that apply to this nameserver. Encoded using the wire format specified in Section 2.2 of [SVCB].

Service parameters allow exchanging additional information about the nameserver:

- * The "port" service parameter is used to indicate which port the nameserver is reachable on. If no "port" service parameter is included, this indicates that default port numbers should be used.
- * The "alpn" service parameter is used to indicate which encrypted DNS transports are supported by this nameserver. If the "no-default-alpn" service parameter is omitted, that indicates that the nameserver supports unencrypted DNS, as is traditionally sent over UDP port 53 and TCP port 53. In that case, the sum of IPv4 Address Count and IPv6 Address Count MUST be nonzero. If Authentication Domain Name is empty, the "alpn" and "no-default-alpn" service parameter MUST be omitted.
- * The "dohpath" service parameter is used to convey a relative DNS over HTTPS URI Template, see Section 5 of [SVCB-DNS].
- * The service parameters MUST NOT include "ipv4hint" or "ipv6hint" SvcParams, as they are superseded by the included IP addresses.

2.3. DNS Configuration Structure

```
DNS Configuration {  
  Nameserver Count (i),  
  Nameserver (...) ...,  
  Internal Domain Count (i),  
  Internal Domain (...) ...,  
  Search Domain Count (i),  
  Search Domain (...) ...,  
}
```

Figure 3: Assigned Address Format

Each DNS Configuration contains the following fields:

Nameserver Count:

The number of Nameserver structures following this field. Encoded as a variable-length integer.

Nameserver:

A series of Nameserver structures representing nameservers.

Internal Domain Count:

The number of Domain structures following this field. Encoded as a variable-length integer.

Internal Domain:

A series of Domain structures representing internal domain names.

Search Domain Count:

The number of Domain structures following this field. Encoded as a variable-length integer.

Search Domain:

A series of Domain structures representing search domains.

2.4. DNS_ASSIGN Capsule

The DNS_ASSIGN capsule (see Section 6 for the value of the capsule type) allows an endpoint to send DNS configuration to its peer.

```
DNS_ASSIGN Capsule {  
  Type (i) = DNS_ASSIGN,  
  Length (i),  
  DNS Configuration (...) ...,  
}
```

Figure 4: DNS_ASSIGN Capsule Format

DNS_ASSIGN capsule MAY include multiple DNS configurations if different DNS servers are responsible for separate internal domains.

If multiple DNS_ASSIGN capsules are sent in one direction, each DNS_ASSIGN capsule supersedes prior ones.

3. Handling

Note that internal domains include subdomains. In other words, if the DNS configuration contains a domain, that indicates that the corresponding domain and all of its subdomains can be resolved by the nameservers exchanged in the same DNS configuration. Sending an empty string as an internal domain indicates the DNS root; i.e., that the corresponding nameserver can resolve all domain names.

As with other IP Proxying capsules, the receiver can decide whether to use or ignore the configuration information. For example, in the consumer VPN scenario, clients will trust the IP proxy and apply received DNS configuration, whereas IP proxies will ignore any DNS configuration sent by the client.

If the IP proxy sends a DNS_ASSIGN capsule containing a DNS over HTTPS nameserver, then the client can validate whether the IP proxy is authoritative for the origin of the URI template. If this validation succeeds, the client SHOULD send its DNS queries to that nameserver directly as independent HTTPS requests. When possible, those requests SHOULD be coalesced over the same HTTPS connection.

4. Examples

4.1. Full-Tunnel Consumer VPN

A full-tunnel consumer VPN hosted at `masque.example.org` could configure the client to use DNS over HTTPS to the IP proxy itself by sending the following configuration.

```
DNS Configuration = {
  Nameservers = [{
    Service Priority = 1,
    IPv4 Address = [],
    IPv6 Address = [],
    Authentication Domain Name = "masque.example.org",
    Service Parameters = {
      alpn=h2,h3
      dohpath=/dns-query{?dns}
    },
  ]],
  Internal Domains = [""],
  Search Domains = [],
}
```

Figure 5: Full Tunnel Example

4.2. Split-Tunnel Enterprise VPN

An enterprise switching their preexisting IKEv2/IPsec split-tunnel VPN to connect-ip could use the following configuration.

```
DNS Configuration = {
  Nameservers = [{
    Service Priority = 1,
    IPv4 Address = [192.0.2.33],
    IPv6 Address = [2001:db8::1],
    Authentication Domain Name = "",
    Service Parameters = {},
  ]],
  Internal Domains = ["internal.corp.example"],
  Search Domains = [
    "internal.corp.example",
    "corp.example",
  ],
}
```

Figure 6: Split Tunnel Example

5. Security Considerations

Acting on received DNS_ASSIGN capsules can have significant impact on endpoint security. Endpoints MUST ignore DNS_ASSIGN capsules unless it has reason to trust its peer and is expecting DNS configuration from it.

This mechanism can cause an endpoint to use a nameserver that is outside of the connect-ip tunnel. While this is acceptable in some scenarios, in others it could break the privacy properties provided by the tunnel. To avoid this, implementations need to ensure that DNS_ASSIGN capsules are not sent before the corresponding ROUTE_ADVERTISEMENT capsule.

6. IANA Considerations

This document, if approved, will request IANA add the following value to the "HTTP Capsule Types" registry maintained at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/masque>.

Value: 0x1ACE79EC (if this document is approved, this value will be replaced by a smaller one before publication)

Capsule Type: DNS_ASSIGN

Status: provisional (permanent if this document is approved)

Reference: This document

Change Controller: IETF

Contact: masque@ietf.org

Notes: None

7. References

7.1. Normative References

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7.2. Informative References

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