

IDR Working Group
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 23 October 2026

J. Haas
HPE
W. Henderickx
A. Simpson
Nokia
21 April 2026

BGP Flow-Spec Redirect-to-IP Action
draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-redirect-ip-09

Abstract

Flow-spec is an extension to BGP that allows for the dissemination of traffic flow specification rules. This has many possible applications, but the primary one for many network operators is the distribution of traffic filtering actions for distributed denial of service (DDoS) mitigation. The flow-spec standard, RFC 8955, defines a redirect-to-VRF action for policy-based forwarding. This mechanism can be difficult to use, particularly in networks without L3 VPN infrastructure.

This draft defines a new redirect-to-IP flow-spec action that provides a simpler method of policy-based forwarding. The details of the action, including the IPv4 or IPv6 target address, are encoded in newly defined BGP extended communities.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 October 2026.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	2
1.1. Requirements Language	3
2. Redirect-to-IP Extended Communities	3
2.1. Validation Procedures	4
2.1.1. Redirect-to-IP Extended Community Validation Procedure	4
2.2. Redirecting Matching Flowspec Traffic	5
2.2.1. Interactions with Redirect to VRF Extended Community	6
2.2.2. Interactions with Other Flowspec Traffic Filtering Actions	7
3. Security Considerations	8
4. Operational Considerations	9
5. IANA Considerations	9
6. References	10
6.1. Normative References	10
6.2. Informative References	11
Appendix A. Implementation Status	11
A.1. HPE / Juniper Networks	12
A.2. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.	13
A.3. Arrcus	14
A.4. Nokia	15
Acknowledgements	16
Contributors	16
Authors' Addresses	17

1. Introduction

BGP flow-spec [RFC8955] is an extension to BGP that allows for the dissemination of traffic flow specification rules. This has many possible applications, but the primary one for many network operators is the distribution of traffic filtering actions for distributed denial of service (DDoS) mitigation.

Every flow-spec route is a rule, consisting of a matching part encoded in the BGP Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) field, and an action part encoded in one or more BGP extended

communities. Flow-spec defines filter actions such as discard and rate limit. It also defines a redirect-to-VRF action for policy-based forwarding. Using the redirect-to-VRF action for redirecting traffic towards an alternate destination is useful for DDoS mitigation, but it can be complex and cumbersome, particularly in networks without L3 VPN infrastructure.

This draft proposes a new redirect-to-IP flow-spec action that provides a method for policy-based forwarding to redirect or copy matching traffic toward a specific IP address. This method of redirection and copying is simpler than the existing methods in [RFC8955] and [RFC8956] to redirect traffic to a VRF. The details of the action, including the IPv4 or IPv6 target address, are encoded in newly defined BGP extended communities.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.


2. Redirect-to-IP Extended Communities

This document defines two new BGP extended communities. The extended communities have a type indicating they are transitive and IPv4-address-specific or IPv6-address-specific, depending on whether the redirection target address is IPv4 or IPv6.

For the IPv4 address-specific extended community [RFC4360], the IANA-assigned sub-type value 0x0c indicates that the Global Administrator and Local Administrator fields encode a flow-spec "redirect-to-IPv4" action. In the encoding of this action, the 4-octet Global Administrator field encodes the IPv4 address that is the redirection target address and the 2-octet local administrator field is formatted as shown in Figure 1.

For the IPv6 address-specific extended community [RFC5701], the IANA-assigned type 0x000c indicates that the Global Administrator and Local Administrator fields encode a flow-spec "redirect-to-IPv6" action. In this encoding, the 16-octet Global Administrator field contains the IPv6 address that is the redirection target address and the 2-octet local administrator field is again formatted as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 : Local Administrator sub-field



In the local administrator field the least-significant bit is defined as the "C" (or copy) bit. When the "C" bit is set the redirection applies to copies of the matching packets and not to the original traffic stream.

All bits other than the "C" bit in the local administrator field MUST be set to 0 by the originating BGP speaker and ignored by receiving BGP speakers.

2.1. Validation Procedures

Additional validation checks apply to flow-spec routes using the procedures defined in this document. It MUST be possible to disable these additional validation checks on a per-EBGP session basis.

The validation check described in [RFC8955] and [RFC8956], and revised in [RFC9117], SHOULD be applied by default to received flow-spec routes with a "redirect-to-IP" extended community, as it is to all types of flow-spec routes. When this check is applied, a flow-spec route with a Destination Prefix subcomponent that originated outside the local AS is considered valid only if the neighbor AS implied in the AS_PATH attribute is the neighbor AS of the unicast IP route that is the best match of the destination prefix, and it is also the neighbor AS of all unicast IP routes that are longer matches of the destination prefix.

If the flow-spec route has a non-empty AS_PATH and any AS_PATH path segment is of the type AS_SET or AS_CONFED_SET, then the extended community is considered "invalid". Compare similarly to Section 4 of [RFC9774].

2.1.1. Redirect-to-IP Extended Community Validation Procedure

BGP speakers that support the extended communities defined in this draft MUST also, by default, apply additional validation rules when receiving a flow-spec with these extended communities:

If the flow-spec route has a null/empty AS_PATH, or an AS_PATH with only local confederation elements, and the resolving route of the "target-address" is a non-BGP route, then the extended community is considered "valid".

When the best-match unicast route for the "target-address" is BGP, the router must consider a "redirect-to-IPv4" or "redirect-to-IPv6" extended community to be invalid if the origin AS of the flow-spec route does not match the origin AS of the best-match unicast route for the "target-address". For example:

- * If the flow-spec route has a non-empty AS_PATH indicating origin AS = X, and the resolving route of the "target-address" is a BGP route with a non-empty AS_PATH indicating origin AS = X, then the extended community is considered "valid".
- * If the flow-spec route has a null/empty AS_PATH, or an AS_PATH with only local confederation elements, and the resolving route of the "target-address" is a BGP route with a null/empty AS_PATH or an AS_PATH with only local confederation elements then the extended community is considered "valid".
- * If the flow-spec route has a null/empty AS_PATH or an AS_PATH with only local confederation elements, and the resolving route of the "target-address" is a BGP route that originated outside the local AS or confederation, then the extended community is considered "invalid".
- * If the flow-spec route has a non-empty AS_PATH indicating origin AS = X, and the resolving route of the "target-address" is a BGP route with a null/empty AS_PATH or an AS_PATH with only local confederation elements, or it is a non-BGP route then the extended community is considered "invalid".

If any of the above checks determine that a "redirect-to-IP" extended community is invalid, the extended community SHOULD be ignored.

2.2. Redirecting Matching Flowspec Traffic

Traffic that is to be redirected/copied for a "redirect-to-IP" extended community SHOULD only be redirected or copied if the community type matches the flow-spec AFI.

When a BGP speaker receives a flow-spec route with a "redirect-to-IP" extended community and this route represents the one and only best path, it installs a traffic filtering rule that matches the packets described by the NLRI field and redirects them (C=0) or copies them (C=1) towards the IPv4 or IPv6 address in the extended community's

Global Administrator field (the "target address"). The BGP speaker is expected to do a longest-prefix-match lookup of the "target address" in the database it uses to resolve next-hop addresses and then forward the redirected/copied packets based on the resulting route (the "target route").

If the "target route" has multiple ECMP next-hops, the redirected/copied packets SHOULD be load-shared across these next-hops according to the router's ECMP configuration. If the "target route" has one or more tunnel next-hops then the appropriate encapsulations SHOULD be added to the redirected/copied packets. If the "target address" is invalid or unreachable then the extended community SHOULD be ignored.

If a BGP speaker receives a flow-spec route with multiple "redirect-to-IP" extended communities and this route represents the one and only best path, it SHOULD load-share the redirected/copied packets across all the "target addresses" according to its ECMP configuration.

If the BGP speaker is not capable of redirecting and copying the same packet as part of load-sharing it SHOULD ignore the extended communities with C=0. If the BGP speaker is not capable of redirecting/copying a packet towards multiple "target addresses" it SHOULD deterministically select one "target address" and ignore the others.

If a BGP speaker receives multiple flow-spec routes for the same flow-spec NLRI and all of them are considered best and usable paths according to the BGP speaker's multipath configuration and each one carries one or more "redirect-to-IP" extended communities, the BGP speaker SHOULD load-share the redirected/copied packets across all the "target addresses", with the same fallback rules as discussed in the previous paragraph. Note that this situation does not require the BGP speaker to have multiple peers. (For example, BGP Add-Paths [RFC7911] could be used for the flow-spec address family.)

2.2.1. Interactions with Redirect to VRF Extended Community

If a BGP speaker receives a flow-spec route with the following:

- * One or more "redirect-to-IP" extended communities and,
- * One or more "redirect-to-VRF" ([RFC8955], Section 7.4) extended communities and,
- * This route represents the "one and only" best path,

then the "redirect-to-IP" actions described above should be applied in the context of the "target VRF" matching the "redirect-to- VRF" extended community. I.e., the "target addresses" should be looked up in the FIB of the "target VRF".

If there are multiple "redirect-to-VRF" extended communities in the route, the "target VRF" SHOULD be the one that matches the "redirect-to-VRF" extended community with the highest numerical value treating the extended communities as an unsigned 64-bit number in network byte order. If the BGP speaker is not capable of "redirect-to-VRF" followed by "redirect-to-IP" then it SHOULD give preference to performing the "redirect-to-VRF" action and doing only longest-prefix-match forwarding in the "target VRF".

If a BGP speaker receives multiple flow-spec routes for the same flow-spec NLRI, and all of them are considered best and usable paths according to the BGP speaker's multipath configuration, and they carry a combination of "redirect-to-IP" and "redirect-to-VRF" extended communities, the BGP speaker SHOULD apply the "redirect-to-IP" actions in the context of the "target VRF" as described above. Note that this situation does not require the BGP speaker to have multiple peers - i.e. BGP Add-Paths [RFC7911] could be used for the flow-spec address family.

2.2.2. Interactions with Other Flowspec Traffic Filtering Actions

Traffic redirection or copying leverages the result of the lookup operation in the database used to resolve next hop addresses of the target address carried in the redirect-to-IP Extended Communities. The forwarding result of this operation typically is implemented as an IP forwarding operation, or results in the matching traffic being encapsulated in a tunnel. This operation will generally short-circuit other traffic filtering options for the redirected or copied traffic. As a result, the expected behaviors when redirect-to-IP is implemented and the following other traffic filtering actions are carried with the flowspec route are:

Traffic Rate in bytes (Section 7.1 of [RFC8955]):

Redirected and copied traffic are subject to the traffic policing mechanisms resulting from the lookup vs. the next hop database. This traffic filtering action is thus IGNORED for traffic that is redirected or copied.

Traffic Rate in packets (Section 7.2 of [RFC8955]):

Redirected and copied traffic are subject to the traffic policing mechanisms resulting from the lookup vs. the next hop database. This traffic filtering action is thus IGNORED for traffic that is redirected or copied.

Terminal action (Section 7.3 of [RFC8955]):

Redirection of matching traffic is considered a terminating action and the non-terminal action ($T == 1$) is IGNORED. Copying of matching traffic is considered a non-terminating action and the terminal action bit's behavior is respected in implementations that support copying.

Sampling (Section 7.3 of [RFC8955]):

Sampling MAY be done as part of the redirection/copy.

Traffic marking (Section 7.5 of [RFC8955]):

Redirected and copied traffic are subject to the traffic policing mechanisms resulting from the lookup vs. the next hop database. This traffic filtering action is thus IGNORED for traffic that is redirected or copied.

SFC classifier (Section 7.4 of [RFC9015]):

Redirected and copied traffic are subject to the traffic policing mechanisms resulting from the lookup vs. the next hop database. This traffic filtering action is thus IGNORED for traffic that is redirected or copied.

Redirect to indirection-id (Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-idr-flowspec-path-redirect]):

In general, multiple operations supporting redirection or copying SHOULD NOT be present in the same BGP flowspec route. When both redirect-to-IP and redirect to indirection-id are both present on the same route, redirect-to-IP SHALL have higher precedence for redirection and copying.

SRv6 Redirect to indirection-id (Section 2 of [I-D.ietf0-idr-srv6-flowspec-path-redirect]):

In general, multiple operations supporting redirection or copying SHOULD NOT be present in the same BGP flowspec route. When both redirect-to-IP and SRv6 redirect to indirection-id are both present on the same route, redirect-to-IP SHALL have higher precedence for redirection and copying.

3. Security Considerations

A system that originates a flow-spec route with a "redirect-to-IP" extended community can cause many receivers of the flow-spec route to send traffic to a single next-hop, overwhelming that next-hop and resulting in inadvertent or deliberate denial of service. This is particularly a concern when the "redirect-to-IP" extended community is allowed to cross AS boundaries. The validation check described in Section 2.1 significantly reduces this risk.

4. Operational Considerations

Implementations supporting the redirect-to-IP feature will redirect or copy traffic to a target address based interactions with subsystems and may do so in a dynamic manner. These interactions SHOULD be made visible in management systems used by operators to ensure correct operations of this feature. These interactions include:

- * **Routing:** redirect-to-IP extended communities can change their validation status based on the presence or absence of routes. The implementation SHOULD provide the ability to diagnose why a given route does or does not validate vs. the routing table. Implementations MAY log such validation activity, but SHOULD be prepared to rate-limit this logging based on high rates of churn in the routing system.
- * **Target address resolution:** redirect-to-IP extended communities can change their installed redirection forwarding behavior based on the presence or absence of resolvability of the target address in the database used to resolve next-hop addresses on the local system. The implementation SHOULD provide the ability to determine what the resolved target address' forwarding behavior is and SHOULD be able to determine this for each redirect-to-IP extended community attached to the flow-spec route when more than one such extended community is present. Implementations MAY provide logging facilities for the success or failure of such resolution procedures for flow-spec routes, but SHOULD be prepared to rate-limit this logging based on high rates of churn in that database.
- * **Conflicting redirect-to-IP extended communities:** Operators are able to configure either outright conflicting redirect-to-IP extended communities, or can configure such extended communities that an implementation is unable to process. An example of this is simultaneously configuring extended communities with C=0 and C=1. Implementations SHOULD bring such conflicts to the operators attention through logging mechanisms.

5. IANA Considerations

IANA has allocated an extended community from the "Transitive IPv4-Address-Specific Extended Community Sub-Types" registry. The Sub-Type value is 0x0c. The Name shall be "Flow-spec Redirect-to-IPv4". The Reference shall be this document.

IANA has allocated an extended community from the "Transitive IPv6-Address-Specific Extended Community Types" registry. The Type value is 0x000c. The Name shall be "Flow-spec Redirect-to-IPv6". The Reference shall be this document.

In a previous draft of this document, IANA had allocated an extended community from the "BGP Transitive Extended Community Types" registry with Type Value 0x08 for "Flow spec redirect/mirror to IP next-hop". IANA is requested to deprecate this registration.

6. References

6.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, February 2006, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>>.
- [RFC5701] Rekhter, Y., "IPv6 Address Specific BGP Extended Community Attribute", RFC 5701, DOI 10.17487/RFC5701, November 2009, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5701>>.
- [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>>.
- [RFC8955] Loibl, C., Hares, S., Raszuk, R., McPherson, D., and M. Bacher, "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules", RFC 8955, DOI 10.17487/RFC8955, December 2020, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8955>>.
- [RFC8956] Loibl, C., Ed., Raszuk, R., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "Dissemination of Flow Specification Rules for IPv6", RFC 8956, DOI 10.17487/RFC8956, December 2020, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8956>>.
- [RFC9015] Farrel, A., Drake, J., Rosen, E., Uttaro, J., and L. Jalil, "BGP Control Plane for the Network Service Header in Service Function Chaining", RFC 9015, DOI 10.17487/RFC9015, June 2021, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9015>>.

- [RFC9117] Uttaro, J., Alcaide, J., Filsfils, C., Smith, D., and P. Mohapatra, "Revised Validation Procedure for BGP Flow Specifications", RFC 9117, DOI 10.17487/RFC9117, August 2021, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9117>>.
- [RFC9774] Kumari, W., Sriram, K., Hannachi, L., and J. Haas, "Deprecation of AS_SET and AS_CONFED_SET in BGP", RFC 9774, DOI 10.17487/RFC9774, May 2025, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9774>>.

6.2. Informative References

- [RFC7911] Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder, "Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", RFC 7911, DOI 10.17487/RFC7911, July 2016, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7911>>.
- [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>>.
- [I-D.ietf-idr-flowspec-path-redirect]
Van de Velde, G., Patel, K., and Z. Li, "Flowspec Indirection-id Redirect", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-path-redirect-12, 24 November 2022, <<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-path-redirect-12>>.
- [I-D.ietf0-idr-srv6-flowspec-path-redirect]
Van de Velde, G., Patel, K., Li, Z., Zhuang, S., and H. Chen, "Flowspec Indirection-id Redirect for SRv6", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf0-idr-srv6-flowspec-path-redirect-15, 19 March 2026, <<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf0-idr-srv6-flowspec-path-redirect-15>>.

Appendix A. Implementation Status

Note to the RFC Editor: This section may be removed upon publication as an RFC.

This section documents the [RFC7942] implementation status of this document.

A.1. HPE / Juniper Networks

Organization:

HPE / Juniper Networks

Implementation Name:

Junos 18.4R1 and later

Description:

Juniper redirect-to-IP feature

Maturity:

Widely used.

Coverage:

- * Section 2 IPv4 Extended Community - Implemented.
- * Section 2 IPv6 Extended Community - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2 Redirect (C == 0) - Implemented.
- * Section 2 Copy (C == 1) - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.1 Validation - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Longest prefix match - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Best path ECMP - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Multiple communities ECMP load sharing - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Redirect-to-IP in Redirect-to-VRF - Not Implemented.

Version Compatibility:

draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-redirect-ip-02

Licensing:

Proprietary

Implementation Experience:

Contact Information:

Jeffrey Haas - jhaas@juniper.net

Last Updated:

August 2025

A.2. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

Organization:

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.

Implementation Name:

VRP V800R019C10 and later

Description:

Huawei redirect-to-IP feature

Maturity:

Widely used.

Coverage:

- * Section 2 IPv4 Extended Community - Implemented.
- * Section 2 IPv6 Extended Community - Implemented.
- * Section 2 Redirect (C == 0) - Implemented.
- * Section 2 Copy (C == 1) - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.1 Validation - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Longest prefix match - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Best path ECMP - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Multiple communities ECMP load sharing - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Redirect-to-IP in Redirect-to-VRF - Not Implemented.

Version Compatibility:

draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-redirect-ip-02

Licensing:

Proprietary

Implementation Experience:

Nothing specific

Contact Information:

Shunwan Zhuang - zhuangshunwan@huawei.com

Ming Shen - shenming2@huawei.com

Last Updated:
December 2025

A.3. Arrcus

Organization:
Arrcus

Implementation Name:
ArcOS (BGP Flow-Spec with redirect-to-IP)

Description:
ArcOS BGP Flow-Spec redirect-to-IPv4 extended community support.

Maturity:
In deployment

Coverage:

- * Section 2 IPv4 Extended Community - Implemented.
- * Section 2 IPv6 Extended Community - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2 Redirect (C == 0) - Implemented.
- * Section 2 Copy (C == 1) - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.1 Validation - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Longest prefix match - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Best path ECMP - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Multiple communities ECMP load sharing - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Redirect-to-IP in Redirect-to-VRF - Not Implemented.

Version Compatibility:
draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-redirect-ip-02

Licensing:
Proprietary

Implementation Experience:
Nothing specific

Contact Information:

Suresh Pasupula - sureshp@arrcus.com

Last Updated:

February 2026

A.4. Nokia

Organization:

Nokia

Implementation Name:

SROS 16.0 and later

Description:

BGP Flow-Spec Redirect to IP Support

Maturity:

Widely Used

Coverage:

- * Section 2 IPv4 Extended Community - Implemented.
- * Section 2 IPv6 Extended Community - Implemented.
- * Section 2 Redirect (C == 0) - Implemented.
- * Section 2 Copy (C == 1) - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.1 Validation - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Longest prefix match - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Best path ECMP - Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Multiple communities ECMP load sharing - Not Implemented.
- * Section 2.2 Redirect-to-IP in Redirect-to-VRF - Not Implemented.

Version Compatibility:

draft-ietf-idr-flowspec-redirect-ip-02

Licensing:

Proprietary

Implementation Experience:

Contact Information:

Adam Simpson - adam.1.simpson@nokia.com

Last Updated:

February 2026

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Han Nguyen and Robert Raszuk for their feedback and suggestions.

Ines Robles contributed to the quality of this document as part of review for the Routing Directorate.

Linda Dunbar contributed to the quality of this document as part of review for the Operations Directorate.

Contributors

James Uttaro
Individual Contributor
Email: juttaro@ieee.org

Andy Karch
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
United States of America
Email: akarch@cisco.com

Saikat Ray
Individual Contributor
Email: raysaikat@gmail.com

David Smith
Cisco
111 Wood Avenue South
Iselin, NJ 08830
United States of America
Email: djsmith@cisco.com

Pradosh Mohapatra
Individual Contributor
Email: pradosh@google.com

Matthieu Texier
Pragma Security
Email: matthieu@pragma-security.com

Authors' Addresses

Jeffrey Haas
HPE
Email: jeffrey.haas@hpe.com

Wim Henderickx
Nokia
copernicuslaan 50
2018 Antwerp
Belgium
Email: wim.henderickx@nokia.com

A. Simpson
Nokia
Email: adam.1.simpson@nokia.com