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CBOR Encoded X.509 Certificates (C509 Certificates)  
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## Abstract

This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates. The resulting certificates are called C509 certificates. The CBOR encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280, common certificate profiles and is extensible.

Two types of C509 certificates are defined. One type is an invertible CBOR re-encoding of DER encoded X.509 certificates with the signature field copied from the DER encoding. The other type is identical except that the signature is over the CBOR encoding instead of the DER encoding, avoiding the use of ASN.1. Both types of certificates have the same semantics as X.509 and the same reduced size compared to X.509.

The document also specifies CBOR encoded data structures for certificate (signing) requests and certificate request templates, new COSE headers, as well as a TLS certificate type and a file format for C509. This document updates RFC 6698; the TLSA selectors registry is extended to include C509 certificates.

## About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at  
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert/>.

Discussion of this document takes place on the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption Working Group mailing list (<mailto:cose@ietf.org>), which is archived at <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/cose/>.  
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Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at  
<https://github.com/cose-wg/CBOR-certificates>.

## Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

One of the challenges with deploying a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for the Internet of Things (IoT) is the size and parsing of X.509 public key certificates [RFC5280], since those are not optimized for constrained environments [RFC7228]. Large certificate chains are also problematic in non-constrained protocols such as EAP-TLS [RFC9190] [RFC9191] where authenticators typically drop an EAP session after only 4050 round-trips, QUIC [RFC9000] where the latency increases significantly unless the server sends less than



three times as many bytes as received prior to validating the client address, and RPKI [RFC6487] where a single certificate can be very large. More compact certificate representations are therefore desirable in many use cases. Due to the current PKI usage of DER encoded X.509 certificates, keeping compatibility with DER encoded X.509 is necessary at least for a transition period. However, the use of a more compact encoding with the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949] reduces the certificate size significantly, which has known performance benefits in terms of decreased communication overhead, power consumption, latency, storage, etc. The use of CBOR also reduces code complexity, code size, memory usage, and CPU usage.

CBOR is a data format designed for small code size and small message size. CBOR builds on the JSON data model but extends it by, e.g., encoding binary data directly without base64 conversion. In addition to the binary CBOR encoding, CBOR also has a diagnostic notation that is readable and editable by humans. The Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) [RFC8610] provides a way to express structures for protocol messages and APIs that use CBOR. RFC 8610 also extends the diagnostic notation.

CBOR data items are encoded to or decoded from byte strings using a type-length-value encoding scheme, where the three highest order bits of the initial byte contain information about the major type. CBOR supports several different types of data items, in addition to integers (int, uint), simple values (e.g. null, undefined), byte strings (bytes), and text strings (text), CBOR also supports arrays [] of data items, maps {} of pairs of data items, and sequences of data items. For a complete specification and examples, see [RFC8949], [RFC8610], and [RFC8742]. We recommend implementors to get used to CBOR by using the CBOR playground [CborMe].

CAB Baseline Requirements [CAB-TLS], RFC 7925 [RFC7925], IEEE 802.1AR [IEEE-802.1AR], and CNSA 1.0 [RFC8603] specify certificate profiles which can be applied to certificate based authentication with, e.g., TLS [RFC8446], QUIC [RFC9000], DTLS [RFC9147], COSE [RFC9052], EDHOC [RFC9528], or Compact TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-ctls]. RFC 7925 [RFC7925], RFC7925bis [I-D.ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile], and IEEE 802.1AR [IEEE-802.1AR] specifically target Internet of Things deployments.

This document specifies a CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates based on [X.509-IoT]. The resulting certificates are called C509 certificates. The CBOR encoding supports a large subset of RFC 5280 and all certificates compatible with the RFC 7925, IEEE 802.1AR (DevID), CAB Baseline [CAB-TLS], [CAB-Code], RPKI [RFC6487], eUICC [GSMA-eUICC] profiled X.509 certificates, and is designed to render a



compact encoding of certificates used in constrained environments. C509 is deployed in, e.g., in-vehicle and vehicle-to-cloud communication, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). When used to re-encode DER encoded X.509 certificates, the CBOR encoding can in many cases reduce the size of RFC 7925 profiled certificates by over 50% while also significantly reducing memory and code size compared to ASN.1. C509 is not a general CBOR encoding for Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) data structures.

C509 is designed to be extensible to additional features of X.509, for example support for new algorithms, including new post-quantum algorithms, which can be registered in the IANA registry as they become specified, see Section 9.12.

This document does not specify a certificate profile. Two variants are defined using the same CBOR encoding and differing only in what is being signed:

1. An invertible CBOR re-encoding of DER encoded X.509 certificates [RFC5280], which can be reversed to obtain the original DER encoded X.509 certificate.
2. Natively signed C509 certificates, where the signature is calculated over the CBOR encoding instead of over the DER encoding as in the first variant. This removes the need for ASN.1 and DER parsing and the associated complexity but they are not backwards compatible with implementations requiring DER encoded X.509.

Natively signed C509 certificates can be applied in devices that are only required to authenticate to natively signed C509 certificate compatible servers, which is not a major restriction for many IoT deployments where the parties issuing and verifying certificates can be a restricted ecosystem.

This document also specifies C509 Certificate Requests, see Section 4; COSE headers for use of the C509 certificates with COSE, see Section 9.14; a TLS certificate type for use of the C509 certificates with TLS and QUIC (with or without additional TLS certificate compression), see Section 9.17; and a C509 file format. The TLSA selectors registry is extended to include C509 certificates, thus this document updates [RFC6698].



## 2. Notational Conventions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

This specification makes use of the terminology in [RFC2986], [RFC5280], [RFC7228], [RFC8610], and [RFC8949]. When referring to CBOR, this specification always refers to Deterministically Encoded CBOR as specified in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 of [RFC8949].

## 3. C509 Certificate

This section specifies the content and encoding for C509 certificates, with the overall objective to produce a very compact representation supporting large parts of [RFC5280], and everything in [RFC7925], [IEEE-802.1AR], RPKI [RFC6487], GSMA eUICC [GSMA-eUICC], and CAB Baseline [CAB-TLS] [CAB-Code]. In the CBOR encoding, static fields are elided, elliptic curve points and time values are compressed, OID are replaced with short integers or complemented with CBOR OID encoding [RFC9090], and redundant encoding is removed. Combining these different components reduces the certificate size significantly, which is not possible with general purpose compression algorithms, see Figure 6.

The C509 certificate can be either a CBOR re-encoding of a DER encoded X.509 certificate, in which case the signature is calculated on the DER encoded ASN.1 data in the X.509 certificate, or a natively signed C509 certificate, in which case the signature is calculated directly on the CBOR encoded data. In both cases the certificate content is adhering to the restrictions given by [RFC5280]. The re-encoding is known to work with DER encoded certificates but might work with other canonical encodings. The re-encoding does not work for BER encoded certificates.

In the encoding described below, the elements in arrays are always encoded in the same order as elements of the corresponding SEQUENCE or SET in the DER encoding.

### 3.1. Message Fields

The X.509 fields and their CBOR encodings are described in this section, and used in the definition of C509 certificates, see Figure 1.



The following Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL) defines the CBOR array C509Certificate and the CBOR sequence [RFC8742] TBSCertificate. The member names therefore only have documentary value. Applications not requiring a CBOR item MAY represent C509 certificates with the CBOR sequence ~C509Certificate (unwrapped C509Certificate). Examples are given in the appendices, e.g., Appendix A.1.

```
C509Certificate = [
    TBSCertificate,
    issuerSignatureValue : any,
]

; The elements of the following group are used in a CBOR Sequence:
TBSCertificate = (
    c509CertificateType: int,
    certificateSerialNumber: CertificateSerialNumber,
    issuerSignatureAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,
    issuer: Name / null,
    validityNotBefore: ~time,
    validityNotAfter: ~time / null,
    subject: Name,
    subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,
    subjectPublicKey: Defined,
    extensions: Extensions,
)

CertificateSerialNumber = ~biguint

Name = [ * Attribute ] / SpecialText

Attribute = (( attributeType: int, attributeValue: SpecialText ) //
    ( attributeType: ~oid, attributeValue: bytes ))

AlgorithmIdentifier = int / ~oid /
    [ algorithm: ~oid, parameters: bytes ]

Extensions = [ * Extension ] / int

Extension = (( extensionID: int, extensionValue: Defined ) //
    ( extensionID: ~oid, ? critical: true,
    extensionValue: bytes ))

SpecialText = text / bytes / tag

Defined = any .ne undefined

tag = #6
```



Figure 1: CDDL for C509Certificate.

C509 certificates are defined in terms of DER encoded [RFC5280] X.509 certificates as detailed in the following subsections.

#### 3.1.1. version

The 'version' field is encoded in the 'c509CertificateType' CBOR int. The field 'c509CertificateType' also indicates the type of the C509 certificate. Two types are defined in this document: natively signed C509 certificates, following X.509 v3 (c509CertificateType = 2); and CBOR re-encoded X.509 v3 DER certificate (c509CertificateType = 3), see Section 9.1. The number of elements in TBSCertificate is fixed and determined by the type. Additional types may be added in the future.

#### 3.1.2. serialNumber

The 'serialNumber' INTEGER value field is encoded as the unwrapped CBOR unsigned bignum (~biguint) 'certificateSerialNumber'. Any leading 0x00 byte (to indicate that the number is not negative) is therefore omitted.

#### 3.1.3. signature

The 'signature' field, containing the signature algorithm including parameters, is encoded as a CBOR int (see Section 9.12) or as an array with an unwrapped CBOR OID tag [RFC9090] optionally followed by the parameters encoded as a CBOR byte string.

#### 3.1.4. issuer

In the general case, the sequence of 'Attribute' is encoded as a CBOR array consisting of Attribute elements. RelativeDistinguishedName with more than one AttributeTypeAndValue is not supported. Each Attribute is CBOR encoded as (type, value) either as a (int, SpecialText) pair, or a (~oid, bytes) tuple.

In the former case, the absolute value of the int encodes the attribute type (see Figure 11) and the sign is used to represent the character string type in the X.509 certificate; positive for utf8String, negative for printableString. Attribute values which are always of type IA5String are unambiguously represented using a non-negative int. Examples include emailAddress and domainComponent (see [RFC5280]). In CBOR, all text strings are UTF-8 encoded and in natively signed C509 certificates all CBOR ints SHALL be non-negative. Text strings SHALL still adhere to any X.509 restrictions, i.e., serialNumber SHALL only contain the 74-character subset of



ASCII allowed by printableString and countryName SHALL have length 2. CBOR encoding is allowed for IA5String (if this is the only allowed type, e.g., emailAddress), printableString and utf8String, whereas the string types teletexString, universalString, and bmpString are not supported.

The text strings are further optimized as follows:

- \* If the text string has an even length 2 and contains only the symbols '0'-'9' or 'a'-'f', it is encoded as a CBOR byte string.
- \* If the text string contains an EUI-64 of the form "HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH" where each 'H' is one of the symbols '0'-'9' or 'A'-'F', it is encoded as a CBOR tagged MAC address using the CBOR tag 48, see Section 2.4 of [RFC9542]. If of the form "HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH-HH", it is encoded as a 48-bit MAC address, otherwise as a 64-bit MAC address. See example in Appendix A.1.
- \* Otherwise it is encoded as a CBOR text string.

The final encoding of the extension value may therefore be text, bytes, or tag, i.e., SpecialText. If Name contains a single 'common name' attribute with attributeType = +1, it is for compactness encoded as just the SpecialText containing the single attribute value.

In natively signed C509 certificates, bytes and tag 48 do not correspond to any predefined text string encoding and may also be used for other attribute types.

If the 'issuer' field is identical to the 'subject' field, e.g., in case of self-signed certificates, then the 'issuer' field MUST be encoded as the CBOR simple value null (0xf6).

### 3.1.5. validity

The 'notBefore' and 'notAfter' fields are encoded as unwrapped CBOR epoch-based date/time (~time) where the tag content is an unsigned integer. In POSIX time, leap seconds are ignored, with a leap second having the same POSIX time as the second before it. Compression of X.509 certificates with the time 23:59:60 UTC is therefore not supported. Note that RFC 5280 mandates encoding of dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime, and later dates as GeneralizedTime. The value "99991231235959Z" (no expiration date) is encoded as the CBOR simple value null.



### 3.1.6. subject

The 'subject' field is encoded exactly like issuer, except that the CBOR simple value is not a valid value.

### 3.1.7. subjectPublicKeyInfo

The 'AlgorithmIdentifier' field including parameters is encoded as the CBOR int 'subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm' (see Section 9.13) or as an array with an unwrapped CBOR OID tag [RFC9090] optionally followed by the parameters encoded as a CBOR byte string.

In general, the 'subjectPublicKey' BIT STRING value field is encoded as a CBOR byte string, but may be encoded as a CBOR item of any type except undefined (see Section 4.4). This specification assumes the BIT STRING has zero unused bits, and the unused bits byte is omitted. For rsaEncryption and id-ecPublicKey, the encoding of subjectPublicKey is further optimized as described in Section 3.2.

### 3.1.8. issuerUniqueID

Not supported.

### 3.1.9. subjectUniqueID

Not supported.

### 3.1.10. extensions

The 'extensions' field is encoded either as a CBOR array or as a CBOR int. An omitted 'extensions' field is encoded as an empty CBOR array.

Each 'extensionID' in the CBOR array is encoded either as a CBOR int (see Section 9.6) or as an unwrapped CBOR OID tag [RFC9090].

- \* If 'extensionID' is encoded as a CBOR int, it is followed by a CBOR item of any type except undefined (see Section 4.4), and the sign of the int is used to encode if the extension is critical: Critical extensions are encoded with a negative sign and non-critical extensions are encoded with a positive sign. If the CBOR array contains exactly two ints and the absolute value of the first int is 2 (corresponding to keyUsage, see Section 3.3), the CBOR array is omitted and the extensions is encoded as a single CBOR int with the absolute value of the second int and the sign of the first int.



- \* If extensionID is encoded as an unwrapped CBOR OID tag, then it is followed by an optional CBOR simple value true (0xf5) 'critical', and the DER-encoded value of the extnValue. The presence of the CBOR true value in the array indicates that the extension is critical; its absence means that the extension is non-critical (see Figure 1). The extnValue OCTET STRING value field is encoded as the CBOR byte string 'extensionValue'.

The processing of critical and non-critical extensions is specified in Section 4.2 of [RFC5280].

The currently defined extension values for which there is CBOR int encoded 'extensionID' are specified in Section 3.3. The extensions mandated to be supported by [RFC7925] and [IEEE-802.1AR] are given special treatment.

More details about extensions in Section 3.3.

#### 3.1.11. signatureAlgorithm

The 'signatureAlgorithm' field is always the same as the 'signature' field and therefore omitted from the CBOR encoding.

#### 3.1.12. signatureValue

In general, the 'signatureValue' BIT STRING value field is encoded as the CBOR byte string issuerSignatureValue. This specification assumes that the BIT STRING has zero unused bits, and the unused bits byte is omitted. For natively signed C509 certificates, the signatureValue is calculated over the CBOR sequence TBSCertificate. For ECDSA, the encoding of issuerSignatureValue is further optimized as described in Section 3.2

### 3.2. Encoding of subjectPublicKey and issuerSignatureValue

#### 3.2.1. Encoding of subjectPublicKey

For RSA public keys (rsaEncryption), the SEQUENCE and INTEGER type and length fields are omitted, and the two INTEGER value fields (modulus, exponent) are encoded as an array of two unwrapped CBOR unsigned bignum (~biguint), i.e., [ modulus : ~biguint, exponent : ~biguint ]. If the exponent is 65537, the array and the exponent are omitted and subjectPublicKey consists of only the modulus encoded as an unwrapped CBOR unsigned bignum (~biguint).

For elliptic curve public keys in Weierstra form (id-ecPublicKey), keys may be point compressed as defined in Section 2.3.3 of [SECG]. Native C509 certificates with Weierstra form keys use the octets



0x02, 0x03, and 0x04 as defined in [SECG]. If a DER encoded certificate with an uncompressed public key of type `id-ecPublicKey` is CBOR encoded with point compression, then the octet 0xfe is used instead of 0x02 to represent an even y-coordinate, and the octet 0xfd is used instead of 0x03 to represent an odd y-coordinate.

### 3.2.2. Encoding of `issuerSignatureValue`

For ECDSA signatures, the SEQUENCE and INTEGER type and length fields as well as any leading 0x00 byte (to indicate that the number is not negative) are omitted. Each of the two INTEGER value fields are then padded with leading zeroes to the same fixed length, given by the number of bytes needed to represent the order *n* of the cyclic subgroup used with the algorithm. For example, for P-256, the number of bytes for each integer is 32. The resulting byte string is encoded as a CBOR byte string.

### 3.3. Encoding of Extensions

The 'extensions' field is encoded as specified in Section 3.1.10 with further details provided in this section.

For some extensions, the CBOR int encoded `extensionID` is only supported for commonly used values of the extension. In case of extension values for which the CBOR int encoded `extensionID` is not supported, the extension MUST be encoded using the unwrapped CBOR OID tag encoded `extensionID`.

A note on `extensionID` naming: in existing OID databases, most IDs can be found in versions with and without an 'id-pe' or 'id-ce' prefix. We have excluded the prefix for the commonly used extensions defined in [RFC5280] and included them for extensions defined elsewhere.

CBOR encoding of the following extension values is fully supported:

- \* Subject Key Identifier (`subjectKeyIdentifier`). In natively signed certificates, `KeyIdentifier` SHOULD be composed of the leftmost 160-bits of the SHA-256 hash of the CBOR encoded `subjectPublicKey`. Other methods of generating unique numbers can be used. The `extensionValue` is encoded as follows:

```
KeyIdentifier = bytes
SubjectKeyIdentifier = KeyIdentifier
```

- \* Key Usage (`keyUsage`). The 'KeyUsage' BIT STRING is interpreted as an unsigned integer in network byte order and encoded as a CBOR int. See Section 3.1.10 for special encoding in case `keyUsage` is the only extension present.



KeyUsage = uint

- \* Policy Mappings (policyMappings). extensionValue is encoded as follows:

```
PolicyMappings = [  
  + (issuerDomainPolicy: ~oid, subjectDomainPolicy: ~oid)  
]
```

- \* Basic Constraints (basicConstraints). If 'cA' = false then extensionValue = -2, if 'cA' = true and 'pathLenConstraint' is not present then extensionValue = -1, and if 'cA' = true and 'pathLenConstraint' is present then extensionValue = pathLenConstraint.

BasicConstraints = int

- \* Policy Constraints (policyConstraints). extensionValue is encoded as follows:

```
PolicyConstraints = [  
  requireExplicitPolicy: uint / null,  
  inhibitPolicyMapping: uint / null,  
]
```

- \* Extended Key Usage (extKeyUsage). extensionValue is encoded as an array of CBOR ints (see Section 9.10), or unwrapped CBOR OID tags [RFC9090], where each int or OID encodes a key usage purpose. If the array contains a single KeyPurposeId, the array is omitted.

```
KeyPurposeId = int / ~oid  
ExtKeyUsageSyntax = [ 2* KeyPurposeId ] / KeyPurposeId
```

- \* Inhibit anyPolicy (inhibitAnyPolicy). extensionValue is encoded as follows:

InhibitAnyPolicy = uint

CBOR encoding of the following extension values are partly supported:

- \* Subject Alternative Name (subjectAltName). If the subject alternative name only contains general names registered in Section 9.11 the extension value can be CBOR encoded. extensionValue is encoded as an array of (int, any) pairs where each pair encodes a general name (see Section 9.11). If subjectAltName contains exactly one dNSName, the array and the int are omitted and extensionValue is the dNSName encoded as a CBOR text string. In addition to the general names defined in



[RFC5280], the hardwareModuleName type of otherName has been given its own int due to its mandatory use in IEEE 802.1AR. When 'otherName + hardwareModuleName' is used, then [ ~oid, bytes ] is used to contain the pair ( hwType, hwSerialNum ) directly as specified in [RFC4108]. Only the general names in Section 9.11 are supported.

```
GeneralName = ( GeneralNameType : int, GeneralNameValue : any )
GeneralNames = [ + GeneralName ]
SubjectAltName = GeneralNames / text
```

- \* Issuer Alternative Name (issuerAltName). extensionValue is encoded exactly like subjectAltName.

```
IssuerAltName = GeneralNames / text
```

- \* CRL Distribution Points (cRLDistributionPoints). If the CRL Distribution Points is a sequence of DistributionPointName, where each DistributionPointName only contains uniformResourceIdentifiers, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. extensionValue is encoded as follows:

```
DistributionPointName = [ 2* text ] / text
CRLDistributionPoints = [ + DistributionPointName ]
```

- \* Freshest CRL (freshestCRL). extensionValue is encoded exactly like cRLDistributionPoints.

```
FreshestCRL = CRLDistributionPoints
```

- \* Authority Information Access (authorityInfoAccess). If all the GeneralNames in authorityInfoAccess are of type uniformResourceIdentifier, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. Each accessMethod is encoded as a CBOR int (see Section 9.9) or an unwrapped CBOR OID tag [RFC9090]. The uniformResourceIdentifiers are encoded as CBOR text strings.

```
AccessDescription = ( accessMethod: int / ~oid , uri: text )
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax = [ + AccessDescription ]
```

- \* Subject Information Access (subjectInfoAccess). Encoded exactly like authorityInfoAccess.

```
SubjectInfoAccessSyntax = AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax
```

- \* Authority Key Identifier (authorityKeyIdentifier). If the authority key identifier contains all of keyIdentifier, certIssuer, and certSerialNumber or if only keyIdentifier is



present the extension value can be CBOR encoded. If all three are present a CBOR array is used, if only keyIdentifier is present, the array is omitted:

```
KeyIdentifierArray = [  
  keyIdentifier: KeyIdentifier,  
  authorityCertIssuer: GeneralNames,  
  authorityCertSerialNumber: CertificateSerialNumber  
]
```

```
AuthorityKeyIdentifier = KeyIdentifierArray / KeyIdentifier
```

- \* Certificate Policies (certificatePolicies). If noticeRef is not used and any explicitText are encoded as UTF8String, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. OIDs registered in Section 9.7 are encoded as an int. The policyQualifierId is encoded as an CBOR int (see Section 9.8) or an unwrapped CBOR OID tag [RFC9090].

```
PolicyIdentifier = int / ~oid  
PolicyQualifierInfo = (  
  policyQualifierId: int / ~oid,  
  qualifier: text,  
)  
CertificatePolicies = [  
  + ( PolicyIdentifier, ? [ + PolicyQualifierInfo ] )  
]
```

- \* Name Constraints (nameConstraints). If the name constraints only contain general names registered in Section 9.11 the extension value can be CBOR encoded. C509 uses the same additions and restrictions as defined in Section 4.2.1.10 of [RFC5280]. Note that the minimum and maximum fields are not used and therefore omitted. For IPv4 addresses, the ipAddress field MUST contain five octets and for IPv6 addresses, the field MUST contain 17 octets, where the last octet indicates the number of bits in the netmask. As an example, the address block 192.0.2.0/24 is encoded as C0 00 02 00 18 instead of C0 00 02 00 FF FF FF 00 as in the DER encoding.

```
GeneralSubtrees = [ + GeneralName ]  
NameConstraints = [  
  permittedSubtrees: GeneralSubtrees / null,  
  excludedSubtrees: GeneralSubtrees / null,  
]
```

- \* Subject Directory Attributes (subjectDirectoryAttributes). Encoded as attributes in issuer and subject with the difference that there can be more than one attributeValue.



```
Attributes = (( attributeType: int,  
                 attributeValue: [+ SpecialText] ) //  
               ( attributeType: ~oid, attributeValue: [+ bytes] ))  
SubjectDirectoryAttributes = [+Attributes]
```

- \* AS Resources (id-pe-autonomousSysIds). If rdi is not present, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. Each ASId is encoded as an uint. With the exception of the first ASId, the ASId is encoded as the difference to the previous ASId.

```
ASIdOrRange = uint / [min:uint, max:uint]  
ASIdentifiers = [ + ASIdOrRange ] / null
```

- \* AS Resources v2 (id-pe-autonomousSysIds-v2). Encoded exactly like autonomousSysIds.

- \* IP Resources (id-pe-ipAddrBlocks). If rdi and SAFI are not present, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. Each AddressPrefix is encoded as a CBOR bytes string (without the unused bits octet) followed by the number of unused bits encoded as a CBOR uint. Each AddressRange is encoded as an array of two CBOR byte strings. The unused bits for min and max are omitted, but the unused bits in max IPAddress are set to one. With the exception of the first Address, if the byte string has the same length as the previous Address, the Address is encoded as a uint with the difference to the previous Address. It should be noted that using address differences for compactness prevents encoding an address range larger than  $2^{64} - 1$  corresponding to the CBOR integer max value.

```
Address = bytes  
AddressPrefix = (Address, unusedBits: uint)  
AddressRange = [min: Address, max: Address]  
IPAddressOrRange = AddressPrefix / AddressRange  
IPAddressChoice = [ + IPAddressOrRange ] / null  
IPAddressFamily = (AFI: uint, IPAddressChoice)  
IPAddrBlocks = [ + IPAddressFamily ]
```

- \* IP Resources v2 (id-pe-ipAddrBlocks-v2). Encoded exactly like id-pe-ipAddrBlocks.



- \* Signed Certificate Timestamp (Certificate Transparency). If all the SCTs are version v1 [RFC6962], and there are no SCT extensions, the extension value can be CBOR encoded. Other versions of SCT are out of scope for this document. LogIDs are encoded as CBOR byte strings, the timestamp is encoded as a CBOR uint (milliseconds since validityNotBefore), and the signature is encoded with an (AlgorithmIdentifier, any) pair in the same way as issuerSignatureAlgorithm and issuerSignatureValue.

```
SignedCertificateTimestamp = (  
  logID: bytes,  
  timestamp: int,  
  sigAlg: AlgorithmIdentifier,  
  sigValue: any,  
)  
SignedCertificateTimestamps = [ + SignedCertificateTimestamp ]
```

- \* OCSP No Check (id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck). If the extension value is NULL, it can be CBOR encoded. The CBOR encoded extensionValue is the value null.
- \* Precertificate Signing Certificate. The CBOR encoded extensionValue is the value null.
- \* TLS Features (id-pe-tlsfeature). The extensionValue is encoded as an array of integers, where each integer represents a TLS extension.

```
TLSFeatures = [* feature: uint]
```

### 3.3.1. Example Encoding of Extensions

The examples below use values from Section 9.6, Section 9.10, and Section 9.11:

- \* A critical basicConstraints ('cA' = true) without pathLenConstraint is encoded as the two CBOR ints -4, -1.
- \* A non-critical keyUsage with digitalSignature (0), nonRepudiation (1), keyEncipherment (2) and keyAgreement (4) asserted is encoded as the two CBOR ints 2, 23 ( $2^0 + 2^1 + 2^2 + 2^4 = 23$ ).
- \* A non-critical extKeyUsage containing id-kp-codeSigning and id-kp-OCSPSigning is encoded as the CBOR int 8 followed by the CBOR array [ 3, 9 ].



- \* A non-critical subjectAltName containing only the `dnsName` `example.com` is encoded as the CBOR int 3 followed by the CBOR text string `"example.com"`.

Thus, the extension field of a certificate containing all of the above extensions in the given order would be encoded as the CBOR array `[ -4, -1, 2, 23, 8, [ 3, 9 ], 3, "example.com" ]`.

### 3.4. COSE Header Parameters

The formatting and processing for `c5b`, `c5c`, `c5t`, and `c5u`, defined in Table 1 below, are similar to `x5bag`, `x5chain`, `x5t`, `x5u` defined in [RFC9360] except that the certificates are C509 instead of DER encoded X.509 and use a `COSE_C509` structure instead of `COSE_X509`.

The `COSE_C509` structure used in `c5b`, `c5c`, and `c5u` is defined as:

```
COSE_C509 = C509CertData / [ 2* C509CertData ]
C509CertData = bytes .cborseq C509Certificate
```

`C509CertData` thus includes the unwrapped CBOR sequence, `~C509Certificate`. The byte string encoding includes the length of each certificate which simplifies parsing. See Appendix A.1.5 for an example.

The `COSE_C509` item has media type `application/cose-c509-cert`, see Section 9.15.1. Different CoAP Content-Formats are defined depending on `"usage" = "chain"` or not, see Section 9.16. Stored file formats are defined for the cases with/without (`"usage" = "chain"`) with "magic numbers" TBD8/TBD6 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the corresponding Content-Formats TBD15/TBD3, enveloped as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC9277].

The value type of `c5t` is the `COSE_CertHash` structure defined in [RFC9360], which contains the hash value of the C509 certificate calculated over `~C509Certificate`. Thus `C509CertData` contains all data necessary to calculate the thumbprint `c5t`.

`c5u` provides an alternative way to identify an untrusted certificate chain by reference with a URI [RFC3986], encoded as a CBOR text string (media type `application/cbor` and CoAP Content-Format 60). The referenced resource is a `COSE_C509` item served with the `application/cose-c509-cert` media type (`"usage" = "chain"`), as described above.



As the contents of c5b, c5c, c5t, and c5u are untrusted input, the header parameters can be in either the protected or unprotected header bucket. The trust mechanism MUST process any certificates in the c5b, c5c, and c5u parameters as untrusted input. The presence of a self-signed certificate in the parameter MUST NOT cause the update of the set of trust anchors without appropriate authorization.

Name	Label	Value Type	Description
c5b	24	COSE_C509	An unordered bag of C509 certificates
c5c	25	COSE_C509	An ordered chain of C509 certificates
c5t	22	COSE_CertHash	Hash of a ~C509Certificate
c5u	23	uri	URI pointing to a COSE_C509 containing an ordered chain of certificates

Table 1: COSE Header Parameters

Note that certificates can also be identified with a 'kid' header parameter by storing 'kid' and the associated bag or chain in a dictionary.

### 3.5. Private Key Structures

Certificate management also makes use of data structures including private keys, see, e.g., [RFC7468]. This section defines the following CBOR encoded structures:

```
C509PrivateKey = [
  C509PrivateKeyType: int,
  subjectPrivateKeyAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,
  subjectPrivateKey: any,
]
```



The field 'C509PrivateKeyType' indicates the type of the C509 private key. Different types of C509 Private Key Structures can be defined, see Section 9.3. Currently, two types are defined. When C509PrivateKeyType = 0, the subjectPrivateKey is the CBOR byte string encoding of the PrivateKey OCTET STRING value field defined in [RFC5958]. When C509PrivateKeyType = 1, the subjectPrivateKey is a COSE\_KEY structure containing a private key as defined in [RFC9052]. Note that COSE\_KEY might not be possible to use with all algorithms that have a C509 AlgorithmIdentifier defined.

The C509PrivateKey item is served with the application/cose-c509-privkey media type, see Section 9.15.4, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined in Section 9.16. A stored file format is defined with "magic number" TBD12 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the Content-Format TBD10, enveloped as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC9277].

```
C509PEM = [  
    C509PrivateKey,  
    COSE_C509 / null,  
]
```

The C509PEM item is served with the application/cose-c509-pem media type, see Section 9.15.5, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined in Section 9.16. A stored file format is defined with "magic number" TBD13 using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the Content-Format TBD11, enveloped as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC9277].

### 3.6. Deterministic Encoding

In some use cases it is desirable to be able to specify a unique C509 representation of a given X.509 certificate.

While this specification requires the use of Deterministically Encoded CBOR (see Section 2), it is still possible to represent certain X.509 certificate fields in different ways. This is a consequence of the extensibility of the C509 format where new encodings can be defined, for example to optimize extensions for which no special CBOR encoding have been previously defined.

Where there is support for a specific and a generic CBOR encoding, the specific CBOR encoding MUST be used. For example, when there is support for specific CBOR encoding of an extension, as specified in Section 3.3 and the C509 Extensions Registry, it MUST be used. In particular, when there is support for a specific otherName encoding (negative integer value in C509 General Names Registry) it MUST be used.



Native C509 certificates MUST only use specific CBOR encoded fields. However, when decoding a non-native C509 certificates, the decoder may need to support, for example, (extensionID:~oid, ? critical: true, extensionValue:bytes)-encoding of an extension for which there is an (extensionID:int, extensionValue:Defined)-encoding. One reason is that the certificate was issued before the specific CBOR extension was registered.

#### 4. C509 Certificate (Signing) Request

This section defines the format of a C509 Certificate Request, also known as a C509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR), based on and compatible with RFC 2986 [RFC2986], and reusing the formatting of C509 certificates defined in Section 3.

The CDDL for the C509 Certificate Request is shown in Figure 2. The fields have the same encoding as the corresponding fields of the C509 Certificate, see Section 3.1.

```
C509CertificateRequest = [  
    TBSCertificateRequest,  
    subjectSignatureValue: any,  
]  
  
; The elements of the following group are used in a CBOR Sequence:  
TBSCertificateRequest = (  
    c509CertificateRequestType: int,  
    subjectSignatureAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,  
    subject: Name,  
    subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm: AlgorithmIdentifier,  
    subjectPublicKey: Defined,  
    extensionsRequest: Extensions,  
)
```

Figure 2: CDDL for C509CertificateRequest.

After verifying the subjectSignatureValue, the CA MAY transform the C509CertificateRequest into a [RFC2986] CertificationRequestInfo for compatibility with existing procedures and code.

The media type of C509CertificateRequest is application/cose-c509-pkcs10, see Section 9.15.2, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined in Section 9.16. The "magic number" TBD9 is defined using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the Content-Format TBD4, enveloped as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC9277].



#### 4.1. Certificate Request Types

Different types of C509 Certificate Requests are defined, see Section 9.2, all using the same CBOR encoding and differing only in what is being signed and what type of C509 certificate is being requested:

- \* The C509 Certificate Request can either be an invertible CBOR re-encoding of a DER encoded RFC 2986 certification request, or it can be natively signed where the signature is calculated over the CBOR encoding instead of the DER encoding.
- \* The requested C509 certificate in the C509 Certificate Request can either be of type 2 or of type 3, see Section 9.1.

Combining these options enables the four instances of `c509CertificateRequestType` defined in Section 9.2 and illustrated in Figure 3.

	Signed object	
	CBOR encoded C509 Certificate Request	DER encoded C509 Certificate Request
Requested certificate		
<code>c509CertificateType = 2</code>	0	1
<code>c509CertificateType = 3</code>	2	3

Figure 3: C509 Certificate Request Types 0, 1, 2 and 3.

An implementation MAY only support certain values of `c509CertificateRequestType`. The most common values are expected to be:

- \* `c509CertificateRequestType = 0`. This type indicates that the C509 Certificate Request is natively signed, and that the requested certificate format has `c509CertificateType = 2`. This encoding removes the need for ASN.1 and DER parsing and re-encoding in the requesting party.



- \* `c509CertificateRequestType = 3`. This type indicates that the C509 Certificate Request is CBOR re-encoded RFC 2986 certification requests, and that the requested certificate format has `c509CertificateType = 3`. This encoding is backwards compatible with legacy RFC 2986 certification requests and X.509 certificates, but enables a reduced transport overhead.

## 4.2. Subject Signature Algorithm

`subjectSignatureAlgorithm` can be a signature algorithm or a non-signature proof-of-possession algorithm, e.g., as defined in [RFC6955]. In the case of [RFC6955], the signature is replaced by a MAC and requires a public Diffie-Hellman key of the verifier distributed out-of-band. Both signature algorithms and non-signature proof-of-possession algorithms are listed in the C509 Signature Algorithms Registry, see Section 9.12. The non-signature proof-of-possession algorithms with SHA-2 and HMAC-SHA2 (see values 14-16 in Section 9.12) requires a signature value with syntax `DhSigStatic` defined as follows:

`DhSigStatic = MessageDigest / DhSigStaticType`

`MessageDigest = bytes`

```
DhSigStaticType = [  
  issuer: Name,  
  serialNumber: CertificateSerialNumber  
  hashValue: MessageDigest  
]
```

Note that a key agreement key pair may be used with a signature algorithm in a certificate request, see Appendix A.1.3.

## 4.3. Certificate Request Attributes

Section 5.4 of [RFC2985] specifies two attribute types that may be included in the certificate request: extension request and challenge password.

### 4.3.1. Extensions Request

The `extensionRequest` field is used to carry information about certificate extensions the entity requesting certification wishes to be included in the certificate, encoded as Extensions in Section 3.1. An empty CBOR array indicates no extensions.



#### 4.3.2. Challenge Password

Other certificate request attributes are included using the Extensions structure and the extensionRequest field. The only other certificate request attribute specified in this document is challengePassword, listed in the C509 Extensions Registry, see Figure 12. The extensionValue is encoded as follows:

```
challengePassword = SpecialText
```

In natively signed requests (types 0 and 2), a positive extensionID is used. In CBOR re-encoding of a DER encoded request (types 1 and 3), the sign of extensionID of challengePassword indicates the string type in the DER encoded challengePassword (instead of the criticalness in extensions): positive for utf8String and negative for printableString. The same text string encoding optimizations applies as in Section 3.1.4.

#### 4.4. Certificate Request Template

Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST, [RFC7030]) defines, and [I-D.ietf-lamps-rfc7030-csrattrs] clarifies, how an EST server can specify what it expects the EST client to include in a subsequent Certificate Signing Request (CSR). Alternatively to the unstructured mechanism specified in [RFC7030], Appendix B of [RFC8295] describes an approach using a Certificate Request Template in response to a GET /csrattrs request by the EST client. The EST server thus returns an Certificate Request-like object with various fields filled out, and other fields waiting to be filled in and a signature to be added by the EST client.

For C509 we follow the approach of [RFC8295]. The C509CertificateRequestTemplate is based on TBSCertificateRequest of the C509CertificateRequest, see Figure 2, but excludes the subjectSignatureValue field from the template since that needs no further specification.

The C509 Certificate Request Template is shown in Figure 4.



```
C509CertificateRequestTemplate = [  
  c509CertificateRequestTemplateType: int,  
  c509CertificateRequestType: [+ int] / undefined,  
  subjectSignatureAlgorithm: [+ AlgorithmIdentifier] / undefined,  
  subject: NameTemplate,  
  subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm: [+ AlgorithmIdentifier] / undefined,  
  subjectPublicKey: undefined  
  extensionsRequest: ExtensionsTemplate,  
]  
  
NameTemplate = [ * AttributeTemplate ] / SpecialText  
  
AttributeTemplate = (( attributeType: int,  
  attributeValue: SpecialText / undefined ) //  
  ( attributeType: ~oid,  
    attributeValue: bytes / undefined ))  
  
ExtensionsTemplate = [ * ExtensionTemplate ] / int  
  
ExtensionTemplate = (( extensionID: int, extensionValue: any ) //  
  ( extensionID: ~oid, ? critical: true,  
    extensionValue: bytes / undefined ))
```

Figure 4: CDDL for C509CertificateRequestTemplate.

Except as specified in this section, the fields have the same encoding as the corresponding fields of the TBSCertificateRequest, see Figure 2. The specification of the template makes use of the CBOR simple value undefined (0xf7) to indicate fields to fill in. Consistent with this rule, note that the subjectPublicKey field always has the value undefined in the template.

Different types of Certificate Request Templates can be defined (see Section 9.4), distinguished by the c509CertificateRequestTemplateType integer. Each type may have its own CDDL structure.

The presence of a Defined (non-undefined) value in a C509CertificateRequestTemplate indicates that the EST server expects the EST client to use that value in the certificate request. If multiple AlgorithmIdentifier or c509CertificateRequestType values are present, the EST server expects the EST client to select one of them for use in the Certificate Request. The presence of an undefined value indicates that the EST client is expected to provide an appropriate value for that field. For example, if the EST server includes a subjectAltName with a GeneralNameType ipAddress and a GeneralNameValue empty byte string, this means that the client SHOULD fill in a corresponding GeneralNameValue.



The media type of `C509CertificateRequestTemplate` is `application/cose-c509-crtemplate`, see Section 9.15.3, with corresponding CoAP Content-Format defined in Section 9.16. The "magic number" TBD18 is defined using the reserved CBOR tag 55799 and the Content-Format TBD19, enveloped as described in Section 2.2 of [RFC9277].

## 5. C509 Processing and Certificate Issuance

It is straightforward to integrate the C509 format into legacy X.509 processing during certificate issuance. C509 processing can be performed as an isolated function of the CA, or as a separate function trusted by the CA.

The Certificate Request format defined in Section 4 follows the PKCS#10 format to enable a direct mapping to the certification request information, see Section 4.1 of [RFC2986]. The CA can make use of a Certificate Request Template defined in Section 4.4, for simplified configuration.

When a certificate request is received, the CA, or function trusted by the CA, needs to perform some limited C509 processing and verify the proof-of-possession corresponding to the public key, before normal certificate generation can take place.

In the reverse direction, in case `c509CertificateType = 3` was requested, a separate C509 processing function can perform the conversion from a generated X.509 certificate to C509 as a bump-in-the-wire. In case `c509CertificateType = 2` was requested, the C509 processing needs to be performed before signing the certificate, in which case a tighter integration with the CA may be needed.

## 6. Legacy Considerations

C509 certificates can be deployed with legacy X.509 certificates and CA infrastructure. An existing CA can continue to use its existing procedures and code for PKCS#10, and DER encoded X.509 and only implement C509 as a thin processing layer on top. When receiving a C509 CSR, the CA transforms it into a DER encoded RFC 2986 `CertificationRequestInfo` and uses that with existing processes and code to produce an RFC 5280 DER encoded X.509 certificate. The DER encoded X.509 is then transformed into a C509 certificate. At any later point, the C509 certificate can be used to recreate the original X.509 data structure needed to verify the signature.

For protocols like TLS/DTLS 1.2, where certificates are sent unencrypted, the actual encoding and compression can be done at different locations depending on the deployment setting. For example, the mapping between C509 certificate and standard X.509



certificate can take place in a 6LoWPAN border gateway, which allows the server side to stay unmodified. This case gives the advantage of the low overhead of a C509 certificate over constrained wireless links. The conversion to X.509 within a constrained IoT device will incur a computational overhead. However, measured in energy, this is likely to be negligible compared to the reduced communication overhead.

For the setting with constrained server and server-only authentication, the server only needs to be provisioned with the C509 certificate and does not perform the conversion to X.509. This option is viable when client authentication can be asserted by other means.

For protocols like IKEv2, TLS/DTLS 1.3, and EDHOC, where certificates are encrypted, the proposed encoding needs to be done fully end-to-end, through adding the encoding/decoding functionality to the server.

## 7. Expected Certificate Sizes

The CBOR encoding of the sample certificate chains given in Appendix A results in the numbers shown in Figures 5 and 6. COSE\_X509 is defined in [RFC9360] and COSE\_C509 is defined in Section 9.14. After RFC 7925 profiling, most duplicated information has been removed, and the remaining text strings are minimal in size. Therefore, the further size reduction reached with general compression mechanisms such as Brotli [RFC7932] will be small, mainly corresponding to making the ASN.1 encoding more compact. CBOR encoding can however significantly compress RFC 7925 profiled certificates. In the examples with HTTPS certificate chains ([www.ietf.org](http://www.ietf.org) and [tools.ietf.org](http://tools.ietf.org)) both C509 and Brotli perform well complementing each other. C509 uses dedicated information to compress individual certificates, while Brotli can compress duplicate information in the entire chain. Note that C509 certificates of type 2 and 3 have the same size. For Brotli, the Rust crate Brotli 3.3.0 was used with compression level 11 and window size 22.

	COSE_X509	COSE_C509
RFC 7925 profiled IoT Certificate (1)	317	142
ECDSA HTTPS Certificate Chain (2)	2193	1397
RSA HTTPS Certificate Chain (4)	5175	3937



Figure 5: Comparing Sizes of Certificate Chains in COSE. Number of bytes (length of certificate chain).

	X.509	X.509 + Brotli	C509	C509 + Brotli
RFC 7925 Cert (1)	327	324	152	170
RPKI Cert (1)	20991	9134	8663	5671
HTTPS Chain (2)	2204	1455	1417	1066
HTTPS Chain (4)	5190	3244	3961	2848
HTTPS Bag (8)	11578	3979	8885	3522

Figure 6: Comparing Sizes of Certificate Chains with TLS. Number of bytes (length of certificate chain). X.509 and C509 are Certificate messages. X.509 + Brotli and C509 + Brotli are CompressedCertificate messages.

## 8. Security Considerations

The CBOR encoding of X.509 certificates does not change the security assumptions needed when deploying standard X.509 certificates but decreases the number of fields transmitted, which reduces the risk for implementation errors. The security considerations of [RFC5280] apply.

The use of natively signed C509 certificates removes the need for ASN.1 encoding, which is a rich source of security vulnerabilities.

Conversion between the certificate formats can be made in constant time to reduce risk of information leakage through side channels.

The mechanism in this document does not reveal any additional information compared to X.509. Because of the difference in size, it will be possible to detect that this profile is used. The gateway solution described in Section 6 requires unencrypted certificates and is not recommended.

Any issues with decoding or parsing a C509 certificate should be handled exactly as how such errors would be handled for the corresponding X.509 certificate. For example, a non-critical extension MAY be ignored if it is not recognized, see Section 4.2 of [RFC5280].



As stated in Section 3.4, the contents of the COSE Header Parameters c5b, c5c, c5t, c5u is untrusted input that potentially may be verified using existing trust anchors or other trust establishment mechanism out of scope of this document. Similar security considerations as x5bag, x5chain, x5t and x5u applies, see [RFC9360]. Security considerations of the COSE protected and unprotected headers is discussed in [RFC9052].

## 9. IANA Considerations

This document creates several new registries under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". For all items, the 'Reference' field points to this document.

The expert reviewers for the registries defined in this document are expected to ensure that the usage solves a valid use case that could not be solved better in a different way, that it is not going to duplicate an entry that is already registered, and that the registered point is likely to be used in deployments. They are furthermore expected to check the clarity of purpose and use of the requested code points. Experts should take into account the expected usage of entries when approving point assignment, and the length of the encoded value should be weighed against the number of code points left that encode to that size and how constrained the systems it will be used on are. Values in the interval [-24, 23] have a 1-byte encoding, other values in the interval [-256, 255] have a 2-byte encoding, and the remaining values in the interval [-65536, 65535] have a 3-byte encoding.

All assignments according to "IETF Review with Expert Review" are made on a "IETF Review" basis per Section 4.8 of [RFC8126] with "Expert Review" additionally required per Section 4.5 of [RFC8126]. The procedure for early IANA allocation of "standards track code points" defined in [RFC7120] also applies. When such a procedure is used, IANA will ask the designated expert(s) to approve the early allocation before registration. In addition, working group chairs are encouraged to consult the expert(s) early during the process outlined in Section 3.1 of [RFC7120].

### 9.1. C509 Certificate Types Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Certificate Types" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. It is mandatory to specify content in all columns. For values in the interval [-24, 23], the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". For all other values, the registration procedure is "Expert Review".



The initial contents of the registry are (see Section 3.1.1):

Value	Description
0	Reserved
1	Reserved
2	Natively Signed C509 Certificate
3	CBOR Re-encoded X.509 v3 Certificate

Figure 7: C509 Certificate Types

## 9.2. C509 Certificate Request Types Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Certificate Request Types" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. All columns are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Description
0	Requested certificate is C509 Type 2. Natively Signed C509 Certificate Request.
1	Requested certificate is C509 Type 2. CBOR re-encoding of RFC 2986 certification request.
2	Requested certificate is C509 Type 3. Natively Signed C509 Certificate Request.
3	Requested certificate is C509 Type 3. CBOR re-encoding of RFC 2986 certification request.

Figure 8: C509 Certificate Request Types



### 9.3. C509 Private Key Types Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Private Key Types" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Comments, and subjectPrivateKey, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. All columns are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Private Key Types
0	Comments: Asymmetric Key Package (RFC 5958) subjectPrivateKey: bytes
1	Comments: COSE Key Object (RFC 9052) subjectPrivateKey: COSE_Key

Figure 9: C509 Private Key Types

### 9.4. C509 Certificate Request Templates Types Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Certificate Request Templates Types" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The columns of the registry are Value, Description, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. All columns are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review" and "Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Description
0	Simple C509 Certificate Request Template

Figure 10: C509 Certificate Request Templates Types



### 9.5. C509 Attributes Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Attributes" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is a non-negative integer, and the other columns are text strings. Name and Identifiers are informal descriptions. The fields Name, OID, and DER are mandatory. For values in the interval [0, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". Values 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". Name and Identifiers are informal descriptions. The OID is given in dotted decimal representation. The DER column contains the hex string of the DER-encoded OID [X.690].

The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Attribute
0	Name: Email Address Identifiers: emailAddress, e-mailAddress OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 DER: 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 01 Comments:
1	Name: Common Name Identifiers: commonName, cn OID: 2.5.4.3 DER: 06 03 55 04 03 Comments:
2	Name: Surname Identifiers: surname, sn OID: 2.5.4.4 DER: 06 03 55 04 04 Comments:
3	Name: Serial Number Identifiers: serialNumber OID: 2.5.4.5 DER: 06 03 55 04 05 Comments:
4	Name: Country Identifiers: countryName, c OID: 2.5.4.6 DER: 06 03 55 04 06 Comments:



	Comments:
5	Name: Locality Identifiers: localityName, locality, 1 OID: 2.5.4.7 DER: 06 03 55 04 07 Comments:
6	Name: State or Province Identifiers: stateOrProvinceName, st OID: 2.5.4.8 DER: 06 03 55 04 08 Comments:
7	Name: Street Address Identifiers: streetAddress, street OID: 2.5.4.9 DER: 06 03 55 04 09 Comments:
8	Name: Organization Identifiers: organizationName, o OID: 2.5.4.10 DER: 06 03 55 04 0A Comments:
9	Name: Organizational Unit Identifiers: organizationalUnitName, ou OID: 2.5.4.11 DER: 06 03 55 04 0B Comments:
10	Name: Title Identifiers: title OID: 2.5.4.12 DER: 06 03 55 04 0C Comments:
11	Name: Business Category Identifiers: businessCategory OID: 2.5.4.15 DER: 06 03 55 04 0F Comments:
12	Name: Postal Code Identifiers: postalCode OID: 2.5.4.17 DER: 06 03 55 04 11



	Comments:	
13	Name: Given Name Identifiers: givenName OID: 2.5.4.42 DER: 06 03 55 04 2A Comments:	
14	Name: Initials Identifiers: initials OID: 2.5.4.43 DER: 06 03 55 04 2B Comments:	
15	Name: Generation Qualifier Identifiers: generationQualifier OID: 2.5.4.44 DER: 06 03 55 04 2C Comments:	
16	Name: DN Qualifier Identifiers: dnQualifier OID: 2.5.4.46 DER: 06 03 55 04 2E Comments:	
17	Name: Pseudonym Identifiers: pseudonym OID: 2.5.4.65 DER: 06 03 55 04 41 Comments:	
18	Name: Organization Identifier Identifiers: organizationIdentifier OID: 2.5.4.97 DER: 06 03 55 04 61 Comments:	
19	Name: Inc. Locality Identifiers: jurisdictionOfIncorporationLocalityName OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.1 DER: 06 0B 2B 06 01 04 01 82 37 3C 02 01 01 Comments:	
20	Name: Inc. State or Province Identifiers: jurisdictionOfIncorporation StateOrProvinceName OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.2	



	DER:	06 0B 2B 06 01 04 01 82 37 3C 02 01 02
	Comments:	
21	Name:	Inc. Country
	Identifiers:	jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName
	OID:	1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3
	DER:	06 0B 2B 06 01 04 01 82 37 3C 02 01 03
	Comments:	
22	Name:	Domain Component
	Identifiers:	domainComponent, dc
	OID:	0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25
	DER:	06 0A 09 92 26 89 93 F2 2C 64 01 19
	Comments:	
25	Name:	Name
	Identifiers:	name
	OID:	2.5.4.41
	DER:	06 03 55 04 29
	Comments:	
26	Name:	Telephone Number
	Identifiers:	telephoneNumber
	OID:	2.5.4.20
	DER:	06 03 55 04 14
	Comments:	
27	Name:	Directory Management Domain Name
	Identifiers:	dmdName
	OID:	2.5.4.54
	DER:	06 03 55 04 36
	Comments:	
28	Name:	userid
	Identifiers:	uid
	OID:	0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1
	DER:	06 0A 09 92 26 89 93 F2 2C 64 01 01
	Comments:	
29	Name:	Unstructured Name
	Identifiers:	unstructuredName
	OID:	1.2.840.113549.1.9.2
	DER:	06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 02
	Comments:	
30	Name:	Unstructured Address
	Identifiers:	unstructuredAddress
	OID:	1.2.840.113549.1.9.8



DER:	06 0A 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 08 00
Comments:	

Figure 11: C509 Attributes

## 9.6. C509 Extensions Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Extensions Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, extensionValue, and Reference, where Value is a positive integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name, OID, DER, and extensionValue are mandatory. The registry also contains certificate request attributes for use in Certificate Requests, see Section 4. For values in the interval [1, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". Values 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Extension
1	Name: Subject Key Identifier Identifiers: subjectKeyIdentifier OID: 2.5.29.14 DER: 06 03 55 1D 0E Comments: extensionValue: SubjectKeyIdentifier
2	Name: Key Usage Identifiers: keyUsage OID: 2.5.29.15 DER: 06 03 55 1D 0F Comments: AttributeValue: KeyUsage
3	Name: Subject Alternative Name Identifiers: subjectAltName OID: 2.5.29.17 DER: 06 03 55 1D 11 Comments: extensionValue: SubjectAltName
4	Name: Basic Constraints Identifiers: basicConstraints OID: 2.5.29.19



	DER:	06 03 55 1D 13
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	BasicConstraints
5	Name:	CRL Distribution Points
	Identifiers:	cRLDistributionPoints
	OID:	2.5.29.31
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 1F
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	CRLDistributionPoints
6	Name:	Certificate Policies
	Identifiers:	certificatePolicies
	OID:	2.5.29.32
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 20
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	CertificatePolicies
7	Name:	Authority Key Identifier
	Identifiers:	authorityKeyIdentifier
	OID:	2.5.29.35
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 23
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	AuthorityKeyIdentifier
8	Name:	Extended Key Usage
	Identifiers:	extKeyUsage
	OID:	2.5.29.37
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 25
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	ExtKeyUsageSyntax
9	Name:	Authority Information Access
	Identifiers:	authorityInfoAccess
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 01
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax
10	Name:	Signed Certificate Timestamp List
	Identifiers:	
	OID:	1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2
	DER:	06 0A 2B 06 01 04 01 D6 79 02 04 02
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	SignedCertificateTimestamps
24	Name:	Subject Directory Attributes
	Identifiers:	subjectDirectoryAttributes



	OID:	2.5.29.9
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 09
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	SubjectDirectoryAttributes
25	Name:	Issuer Alternative Name
	Identifiers:	issuerAltName
	OID:	2.5.29.18
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 12
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	IssuerAltName
26	Name:	Name Constraints
	Identifiers:	nameConstraints
	OID:	2.5.29.30
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 1E
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	NameConstraints
27	Name:	Policy Mappings
	Identifiers:	policyMappings
	OID:	2.5.29.33
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 21
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	PolicyMappings
28	Name:	Policy Constraints
	Identifiers:	policyConstraints
	OID:	2.5.29.36
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 24
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	PolicyConstraints
29	Name:	Freshest CRL
	Identifiers:	freshestCRL
	OID:	2.5.29.46
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 2E
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	FreshestCRL
30	Name:	Inhibit anyPolicy
	Identifiers:	inhibitAnyPolicy
	OID:	2.5.29.54
	DER:	06 03 55 1D 36
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	InhibitAnyPolicy
31	Name:	Subject Information Access



	Identifiers:	subjectInfoAccess
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 0B
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	SubjectInfoAccessSyntax
32	Name:	IP Resources
	Identifiers:	id-pe-ipAddrBlocks
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.7
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 07
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	IPAddrBlocks
33	Name:	AS Resources
	Identifiers:	id-pe-autonomousSysIds
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.8
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 08
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	ASIdentifiers
34	Name:	IP Resources v2
	Identifiers:	id-pe-ipAddrBlocks-v2
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.28
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 1C
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	IPAddrBlocks
35	Name:	AS Resources v2
	Identifiers:	id-pe-autonomousSysIds-v2
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.29
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 1D
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	ASIdentifiers
36	Name:	OCSF No Check
	Identifiers:	id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1.5
	DER:	06 09 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 05
	Comments:	
	extensionValue:	null
37	Name:	Precertificate Signing Certificate
	Identifiers:	
	OID:	1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.3
	DER:	06 0A 2B 06 01 04 01 D6 79 02 04 03
	Comments:	RFC 6962
	extensionValue:	null



38	Name:	TLS Features
	Identifiers:	id-pe-tlsfeature
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 01 18
	Comments:	RFC 7633
	extensionValue:	TLSFeatures
+-----+		
255	Name:	Challenge Password
	Identifiers:	challengePassword
	OID:	1.2.840.113549.1.9.7
	DER:	06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 09 07
	Comments:	Certificate Request Attributes
	extensionValue:	ChallengePassword
+-----+		

Figure 12: C509 Extensions and Certificate Request Attributes

### 9.7. C509 Certificate Policies Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Certificate Policies Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name, OID, and DER are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". Values 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Certificate Policy	
0	Name:	Any Policy
	Identifiers:	anyPolicy
	OID:	2.5.29.32.0
	DER:	06 04 55 1D 20 00
	Comments:	
1	Name:	Domain Validation (DV)
	Identifiers:	domain-validated
	OID:	2.23.140.1.2.1
	DER:	06 06 67 81 0C 01 02 01
	Comments:	
2	Name:	Organization Validation (OV)
	Identifiers:	organization-validated
	OID:	2.23.140.1.2.2



	DER:	06 06 67 81 0C 01 02 02
	Comments:	
3	Name:	Individual Validation (IV)
	Identifiers:	individual-validated
	OID:	2.23.140.1.2.3
	DER:	06 06 67 81 0C 01 02 03
	Comments:	
4	Name:	Extended Validation (EV)
	Identifiers:	ev-guidelines
	OID:	2.23.140.1.1
	DER:	06 05 67 81 0C 01 01
	Comments:	
7	Name:	Resource PKI (RPKI)
	Identifiers:	id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 0E 02
	Comments:	
8	Name:	Resource PKI (RPKI) (Alternative)
	Identifiers:	id-cp-ipAddr-asNumber-v2
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.3
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 0E 03
	Comments:	
10	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role Certificate Issuer
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-ci
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.0
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 00
	Comments:	
11	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role eUICC
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-euicc
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.1
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 01
	Comments:	
12	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role eUICC Manufacturer
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-eum
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.2
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 02
	Comments:	



13	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role SM-DP+ TLS
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-dp-tls
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.3
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 03
	Comments:	
14	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role SM-DP+ Authentication
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-dp-auth
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.4
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 04
	Comments:	
15	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role SM-DP+ Profile Binding
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-dp-pb
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.5
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 05
	Comments:	
16	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role SM-DS TLS
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-ds-tls
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.6
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 06
	Comments:	
17	Name:	Remote SIM Provisioning Role SM-DS Authentication
	Identifiers:	id-rspRole-ds-auth
	OID:	2.23.146.1.2.1.7
	DER:	06 07 67 81 12 01 02 01 07
	Comments:	

Figure 13: C509 Certificate Policies

### 9.8. C509 Policies Qualifiers Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Policies Qualifiers Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name, OID, and DER are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". Values 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the



registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Certificate Policy
1	Name: Certification Practice Statement Identifiers: id-qt-cps, cps OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.1 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 02 01 Comments:
2	Name: User Notice Identifiers: id-qt-unotice, unotice OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.2 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 02 02 Comments:

Figure 14: C509 Policies Qualifiers

#### 9.9. C509 Information Access Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Information Access Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name, OID, and DER are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:



Value	Information Access
1	Name: OCSF Identifiers: id-ad-ocsp, id-pkix-ocsp OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 Comments:
2	Name: CA Issuers Identifiers: id-ad-caIssuers, caIssuers OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 Comments:
3	Name: Time Stamping Identifiers: id-ad-timeStamping, timeStamping OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.3 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 03 Comments:
5	Name: CA Repository Identifiers: id-ad-caRepository OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.5 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 05 Comments:
10	Name: RPKI Manifest Identifiers: id-ad-rpkiManifest OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.10 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 0A Comments: RFC 6487
11	Name: Signed Object Identifiers: id-ad-signedObject OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.11 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 0B Comments: RFC 6487
13	Name: RPKI Notify Identifiers: id-ad-rpkiNotify OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.13 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 0D Comments: RFC 8182

Figure 15: C509 Information Accesses



## 9.10. C509 Extended Key Usages Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Extended Key Usages Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name, OID, and DER are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". Values 32768 are reserved for Private Use. For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	Extended Key Usage
0	Name: Any Extended Key Usage Identifiers: anyExtendedKeyUsage OID: 2.5.29.37.0 DER: 06 04 55 1D 25 00 Comments: RFC 5280
1	Name: TLS Server authentication Identifiers: id-kp-serverAuth OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 01 Comments: RFC 5280
2	Name: TLS Client Authentication Identifiers: id-kp-clientAuth OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 Comments: RFC 5280
3	Name: Code Signing Identifiers: id-kp-codeSigning OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 03 Comments: RFC 5280
4	Name: Email protection (S/MIME) Identifiers: id-kp-emailProtection OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4 DER: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 04 Comments: RFC 5280
8	Name: Time Stamping Identifiers: id-kp-timeStamping, timestamping



	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 08
	Comments:	
9	Name:	OCSP Signing
	Identifiers:	id-kp-OCSPSigning
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 09
	Comments:	RFC 5280
10	Name:	Kerberos PKINIT Client Auth
	Identifiers:	id-pkinit-KPClientAuth
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4
	DER:	06 07 2B 06 01 05 02 03 04
	Comments:	RFC 4556
11	Name:	Kerberos PKINIT KDC
	Identifiers:	id-pkinit-KPKdc
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.2.3.5
	DER:	06 07 2B 06 01 05 02 03 05
	Comments:	RFC 4556
12	Name:	SSH Client
	Identifiers:	id-kp-secureShellClient
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.21
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 15
	Comments:	RFC 6187
13	Name:	SSH Server
	Identifiers:	id-kp-secureShellServer
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.22
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 16
	Comments:	RFC 6187
14	Name:	Bundle Security
	Identifiers:	id-kp-bundleSecurity
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.35
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 23
	Comments:	RFC 9174
15	Name:	CMC Certification Authority
	Identifiers:	id-kp-cmcCA
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.27
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 1B
	Comments:	RFC 6402
16	Name:	CMC Registration Authority
	Identifiers:	id-kp-cmcRA



	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 1C
	Comments:	RFC 6402
-----		
17	Name:	CMC Archive Server
	Identifiers:	id-kp-cmcArchive
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.29
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 1D
	Comments:	RFC 6402
-----		
18	Name:	CMC Key Generation Authority
	Identifiers:	id-kp-cmKGA
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.32
	DER:	06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 03 20
	Comments:	RFC 9480
-----		
19	Name:	Certificate Transparency
	Identifiers:	
	OID:	1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.4
	DER:	06 0A 2B 06 01 04 01 D6 79 02 04 04
	Comments:	RFC 6962
-----		

Figure 16: C509 Extended Key Usages

#### 9.11. C509 General Names Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 General Names Registry" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, General Name, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name and Value are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:



Value	General Names
-2	Name: otherName with Smtputf8Mailbox Comments: id-on-Smtputf8Mailbox (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.9) Value: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 08 09 text
-1	Name: otherName with hardwareModuleName Comments: id-on-hardwareModuleName (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4) Value: 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 08 04 [ ~oid, bytes ]
0	Name: otherName Comments: Value: [ ~oid, bytes ]
1	Name: rfc822Name Comments: Value: text
2	Name: dNSName Comments: Value: text
4	Name: directoryName Comments: Value: Name
6	Name: uniformResourceIdentifier Comments: Value: text
7	Name: iPAddress Comments: Value: bytes
8	Name: registeredID Comments: Value: ~oid

Figure 17: C509 General Names



## 9.12. C509 Signature Algorithms Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Signature Algorithms" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The registry includes both signature algorithms and non-signature proof-of-possession algorithms. The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, Parameters, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name, OID, Parameters, and DER are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	X.509 Signature Algorithms
-256	Name: RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-1 Identifiers: sha1-with-rsa-signature, sha1WithRSAEncryption, sha-1WithRSAEncryption OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 Parameters: NULL DER: 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 05 05 00 Comments: Don't use
-255	Name: ECDSA with SHA-1 Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA1 OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.1 Parameters: Absent DER: 30 09 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 01 Comments: Don't use. Compressed signature value
0	Name: ECDSA with SHA-256 Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2 Parameters: Absent DER: 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 Comments: Compressed signature value
1	Name: ECDSA with SHA-384 Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA384 OID: 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3 Parameters: Absent DER: 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 03 Comments: Compressed signature value
2	Name: ECDSA with SHA-512 Identifiers: ecdsa-with-SHA512



	OID:	1.2.840.10045.4.3.4
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 04
	Comments:	Compressed signature value
3	Name:	ECDSA with SHAKE128
	Identifiers:	id-ecdsa-with-shake128
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.32
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 20
	Comments:	Compressed signature value
4	Name:	ECDSA with SHAKE256
	Identifiers:	id-ecdsa-with-shake256
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.33
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 21
	Comments:	Compressed signature value
12	Name:	Ed25519
	Identifiers:	id-Ed25519, id-EdDSA25519
	OID:	1.3.101.112
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 05 06 03 2B 65 70
	Comments:	
13	Name:	Ed448
	Identifiers:	id-Ed448, id-EdDSA448
	OID:	1.3.101.113
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 05 06 03 2B 65 71
	Comments:	
14	Name:	PoP with SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA256
	Identifiers:	sa-ecdhPop-sha256-hmac-sha256
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.26
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1A
	Comments:	Proof-of-possession algorithm, indexed with KDF and MAC, see RFC 6955. Requires recipient's public static Diffie-Hellman key
15	Name:	PoP with SHA-384 and HMAC-SHA384
	Identifiers:	sa-ecdhPop-sha384-hmac-sha384
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.27
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1B
	Comments:	Proof-of-possession algorithm, indexed with



		KDF and MAC, see RFC 6955. Requires recipient's public static Diffie-Hellman key
16	Name: Identifiers: OID: Parameters: DER: Comments:	PoP with SHA-512 and HMAC-SHA512 sa-ecdhPop-sha512-hmac-sha512 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.28 Absent 30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1C Proof-of-possession algorithm, indexed with KDF and MAC, see RFC 6955. Requires recipient's public static Diffie-Hellman key
23	Name: Identifiers: OID: Parameters: DER: Comments:	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256 sha256WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 NULL 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0B 05 00
24	Name: Identifiers: OID: Parameters: DER: Comments:	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-384 sha384WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 NULL 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0C 05 00
25	Name: Identifiers: OID: Parameters: DER: Comments:	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-512 sha512WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 NULL 30 0B 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0D 05 00
26	Name: Identifiers: OID: Parameters: DER: Comments:	RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256 rsassa-pss, id-RSASSA-PSS 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 SHA-256, MGF-1 with SHA-256, saltLength = 32 30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 A0 0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 a2 03 02 01 20
27	Name: Identifiers: OID: Parameters:	RSASSA-PSS with SHA-384 rsassa-pss, id-RSASSA-PSS 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 SHA-384, MGF-1 with SHA-384, saltLength = 48



	DER:	30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 A0 0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00 A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00 A2 03 02 01 30
	Comments:	
28	Name:	RSASSA-PSS with SHA-512
	Identifiers:	rsassa-pss, id-RSASSA-PSS
	OID:	1.2.840.113549.1.1.10
	Parameters:	SHA-512, MGF-1 with SHA-512, saltLength = 64
	DER:	30 41 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 0A 30 34 A0 0F 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 A1 1C 30 1A 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 A2 03 02 01 40
	Comments:	
29	Name:	RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE128
	Identifiers:	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE128
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.30
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1E
	Comments:	
30	Name:	RSASSA-PSS with SHAKE256
	Identifiers:	id-RSASSA-PSS-SHAKE256
	OID:	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.31
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 06 1F
	Comments:	
45	Name:	SM2 with SM3
	Identifiers:	sm2-with-sm3
	OID:	1.2.156.10197.1.501
	Parameters:	Absent
	DER:	30 0A 06 08 2A 81 1C CF 55 01 83 75
	Comments:	Compressed signature value

Figure 18: C509 Signature Algorithms



## 9.13. C509 Public Key Algorithms Registry

IANA has created a new registry titled "C509 Public Key Algorithms" under the new heading "CBOR Encoded X.509 (C509) Parameters". The fields of the registry are Value, Name, Identifiers, OID, Parameters, DER, Comments, and Reference, where Value is an integer, and the other columns are text strings. The fields Name, OID, Parameters, and DER are mandatory. For values in the interval [-24, 23] the registration procedure is "IETF Review with Expert Review". For all other values the registration procedure is "Expert Review". The initial contents of the registry are:

Value	X.509 Public Key Algorithms
0	Name: RSA Identifiers: rsaEncryption OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 Parameters: NULL DER: 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 Comments: Compressed subjectPublicKey
1	Name: EC Public Key (Weierstra) with secp256r1 Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 Parameters: namedCurve = secp256r1 (1.2.840.10045.3.1.7) DER: 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 03 01 07 Comments: Compressed subjectPublicKey Also known as P-256, ansip256r1, prime256v1
2	Name: EC Public Key (Weierstra) with secp384r1 Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 Parameters: namedCurve = secp384r1 (1.3.132.0.34) DER: 30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 04 00 22 Comments: Compressed subjectPublicKey Also known as P-384, ansip384r1
3	Name: EC Public Key (Weierstra) with secp521r1 Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 Parameters: namedCurve = secp521r1 (1.3.132.0.35) DER: 30 10 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 05 2B 81 04 00 23 Comments: Compressed subjectPublicKey Also known as P-521, ansip521r1



8	Name: X25519 (Montgomery) Identifiers: id-X25519 OID: 1.3.101.110 Parameters: Absent DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 6E Comments:
9	Name: X448 (Montgomery) Identifiers: id-X448 OID: 1.3.101.111 Parameters: Absent DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 6F Comments:
10	Name: Ed25519 (Twisted Edwards) Identifiers: id-Ed25519, id-EdDSA25519 OID: 1.3.101.112 Parameters: Absent DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 70 Comments:
11	Name: Ed448 (Edwards) Identifiers: id-Ed448, id-EdDSA448 OID: 1.3.101.113 Parameters: Absent DER: 30 05 06 03 2B 65 71 Comments:
24	Name: EC Public Key (Weierstra) with brainpoolP256r1 Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 Parameters: namedCurve = brainpoolP256r1 (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.7) DER: 30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 03 03 02 08 01 01 07 Comments: Compressed subjectPublicKey
25	Name: EC Public Key (Weierstra) with brainpoolP384r1 Identifiers: ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey OID: 1.2.840.10045.2.1 Parameters: namedCurve = brainpoolP384r1 (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.11) DER: 30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 03 03 02 08 01 01 0B Comments: Compressed subjectPublicKey



26	Name:	EC Public Key (Weierstra) with brainpoolP512r1
	Identifiers:	ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey
	OID:	1.2.840.10045.2.1
	Parameters:	namedCurve = brainpoolP512r1 (1.3.36.3.3.2.8.1.1.13)
	DER:	30 14 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 09 2B 24 03 03 02 08 01 01 0D
	Comments:	Compressed subjectPublicKey
27	Name:	EC Public Key (Weierstra) with FRP256v1
	Identifiers:	ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey
	OID:	1.2.840.10045.2.1
	Parameters:	namedCurve = FRP256v1 (1.2.250.1.223.101.256.1)
	DER:	30 15 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 0A 2A 81 7A 01 81 5F 65 82 00 01
	Comments:	Compressed subjectPublicKey
28	Name:	EC Public Key (Weierstra) with sm2p256v1
	Identifiers:	ecPublicKey, id-ecPublicKey
	OID:	1.2.840.10045.2.1
	Parameters:	namedCurve = sm2p256v1 (1.2.156.10197.1.301)
	DER:	30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 81 1C CF 55 01 82 2D
	Comments:	Compressed subjectPublicKey

Figure 19: C509 Public Key Algorithms

#### 9.13.1. Suitability of different public key algorithms for use within IoT scenarios

The public key algorithms registry Section 9.13 specifies a number of algorithms, not all which are suitable for usage with constrained devices. RSA requires large keys and large signature sizes compared to elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which together with resource-efficient implementations of named elliptic curves (Montgomery, Edwards and Weierstra curves) make them suitable candidates for IoT public key usage. These curves are represented by ids 111 and 2428 in Section 9.13.



#### 9.14. COSE Header Parameters Registry

IANA is requested to assign the entries in Table 1 to the "COSE Header Parameters" registry under the "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)" heading with this document as reference.

#### 9.15. Media Type Application Registry

IANA is requested to assign the following entries in to the "application" registry under the "Media Types" heading with this document as reference.

##### 9.15.1. Media Type application/cose-c509-cert

When the application/cose-c509-cert media type is used, the data is a COSE\_C509 structure. If the parameter "usage" is set to "chain", this sequence indicates a certificate chain.

Type name: application

Subtype name: cose-c509-cert

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: usage

- \* Can be absent to provide no further information about the intended meaning of the order in the CBOR sequence of certificates.
- \* Can be set to "chain" to indicate that the sequence of data items is to be interpreted as a certificate chain.

Encoding considerations: binary

Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [[this document]]

Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and use C509 as a certificate type.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:



- \* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

- \* Magic number(s): TBD8, TBD6

- \* File extension(s): .c509

- \* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:  
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: COSE WG

Change controller: IETF

#### 9.15.2. Media Type application/cose-c509-pkcs10

When the application/cose-c509-pkcs10 media type is used, the data is a C509CertificateRequest structure.

Type name: application

Subtype name: cose-c509-pkcs10

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: N/A

Encoding considerations: binary

Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [[this document]]

Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and C509 Certificate Request.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:



- \* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

- \* Magic number(s): TBD9

- \* File extension(s): .c509

- \* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:  
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: COSE WG

Change controller: IETF

#### 9.15.3. Media Type application/cose-c509-crtemplate

When the application/cose-c509-crtemplate media type is used, the data is a C509CertificateRequestTemplate structure.

Type name: application

Subtype name: cose-c509-crtemplate

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: N/A

Encoding considerations: binary

Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [[this document]]

Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and C509 Certificate Request.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:



\* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

\* Magic number(s): TBD18

\* File extension(s): .c509

\* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:  
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: COSE WG

Change controller: IETF

#### 9.15.4. Media Type application/cose-c509-privkey

When the application/cose-c509-privkey media type is used, the data is a C509PrivateKey structure.

Type name: application

Subtype name: cose-c509-privkey

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: usage

Encoding considerations: binary

Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [[this document]]

Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and use C509 as a certificate type.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:



- \* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

- \* Magic number(s): TBD12

- \* File extension(s): .c509

- \* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:  
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: COSE WG

Change controller: IETF

#### 9.15.5. Media Type application/cose-c509-pem

When the application/cose-c509-pem media type is used, the data is a C509PEM structure.

Type name: application

Subtype name: cose-c509-pem

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: usage

Encoding considerations: binary

Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [[this document]].

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [[this document]]

Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and use C509 as a certificate type.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:



- \* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

- \* Magic number(s): TBD13

- \* File extension(s): .c509

- \* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:  
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: COSE WG

Change controller: IETF

#### 9.15.6. Media Type application/cose-certhash

When the application/cose-certhash media type is used, the data is a COSE\_CertHash structure, see [RFC9360].

Type name: application

Subtype name: cose-certhash

Required parameters: N/A

Optional parameters: usage

- \* Can be absent to provide no further information about what the hash value is calculated over.
- \* Can be set to "c509" to indicate that the hash value is calculated over a C509 certificate, see Section 3.4.

Encoding considerations: binary

Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [RFC9360].

Interoperability considerations: N/A

Published specification: [[this document]]



Applications that use this media type: Applications that employ COSE and use X.509 or C509 as certificate type.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Additional information:

- \* Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A

- \* Magic number(s): N/A

- \* File extension(s): N/A

- \* Macintosh file type code(s): N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:  
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: N/A

Author: COSE WG

Change controller: IETF

#### 9.16. CoAP Content-Formats Registry

IANA is requested to add entries for "application/cose-c509-cert", "application/cose-c509-pkcs10", "application/cose-c509-crtemplate", "application/cose-c509-privkey" and "application/cose-c509-pem" to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters". A dedicated Content-Format ID is requested for the "application/cose-c509-cert" media type in the case when the parameter "usage" is set to "chain", see Section 9.15.1.

IANA is requested to add entries for "application/cose-certhash" to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters". A dedicated Content-Format ID is requested in the case when the parameter "usage" is set to "c509", see Section 9.15.1.

IANA is requested to add entries for "application/cbor" to the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry under the registry group "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters", in the case when the encoding is a CBOR text string containing a URI, see [RFC3986].



Content Format	Content Coding	Media Type	ID	Reference
application/cose-c509-cert	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD3	[[this document]]
application/cose-c509-cert; usage = chain	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD15	[[this document]]
application/cose-c509-pkcs10	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD4	[[this document]]
application/cose-c509-crtemplate	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD19	[[this document]]
application/cose-c509-privkey	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD10	[[this document]]
application/cose-c509-pem	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD11	[[this document]]
application/cose-certhash	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD16	[[this document]]
application/cose-certhash; usage = c509	-	[[link to 9.15]]	TBD17	[[this document]]

Figure 20: CoAP Content-Format IDs

### 9.17. TLS Certificate Types Registry

This document registers the following entry in the "TLS Certificate Types" registry under the "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions" heading. The new certificate type can be used with additional TLS certificate compression [RFC8879]. C509 is defined in the same way as X.509, but uses a different value and instead of the DER-encoded X.509 certificate, opaque cert\_data<1..2<sup>24</sup>-1> in TLS 1.3 and opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2<sup>24</sup>-1> in TLS 1.2, contains the CBOR sequence ~C509Certificate (an unwrapped C509Certificate). Similar to COSE\_C509, the TLS handshake contains the length of each certificate. The TLS extensions client\_certificate\_type and server\_certificate\_type [RFC7250] are used to negotiate the use of C509.



Value	Name	Recommended	Comment
TBD5	C509 Certificate	N	

### 9.18. TLSA Selectors Registry

This document registers the following entries in the "TLSA Selectors" registry under the "DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Parameters" heading.

Value	Acronym	Short Description	Reference
TBD7	C509	CBOR encoded PKIX certificates	[[this document]]

The TLSA selectors registry defined in [RFC6698] originally only applied to PKIX [RFC5280] certificates in DER encoding. This specification updates [RFC6698] to accept the use of C509 certificates, which are essentially CBOR encoded PKIX certificates.

### 9.19. EDHOC Authentication Credential Types Registry

This document registers the following entry in the "EDHOC Authentication Credential Types" registry under the "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)" heading. This is used to identify supported authentication credential type, for example, during discovery of EDHOC resources, see [RFC9668].

Value	Description	Reference
TBD14	C509 certificate	[[this document]]

## 10. References

### 10.1. Normative References

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## Appendix A. C509 Certificate Examples

### A.1. Example: RFC 7925 profiled X.509 Certificate

Example of [RFC7925] profiled X.509 certificate parsed with OpenSSL.



## Certificate:

## Data:

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 128269 (0x1f50d)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: CN=RFC test CA
Validity
  Not Before: Jan  1 00:00:00 2023 GMT
  Not After : Jan  1 00:00:00 2026 GMT
Subject: CN=01-23-45-FF-FE-67-89-AB
Subject Public Key Info:
  Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
  Public-Key: (256 bit)
  pub:
    04:b1:21:6a:b9:6e:5b:3b:33:40:f5:bd:f0:2e:69:
    3f:16:21:3a:04:52:5e:d4:44:50:b1:01:9c:2d:fd:
    38:38:ab:ac:4e:14:d8:6c:09:83:ed:5e:9e:ef:24:
    48:c6:86:1c:c4:06:54:71:77:e6:02:60:30:d0:51:
    f7:79:2a:c2:06
  ASN1 OID: prime256v1
  NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Key Usage:
    Digital Signature
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:46:02:21:00:d4:32:0b:1d:68:49:e3:09:21:9d:30:03:7e:
13:81:66:f2:50:82:47:dd:da:e7:6c:ce:ea:55:05:3c:10:8e:
90:02:21:00:d5:51:f6:d6:01:06:f1:ab:b4:84:cf:be:62:56:
c1:78:e4:ac:33:14:ea:19:19:1e:8b:60:7d:a5:ae:3b:da:16
```

The DER encoding of the above certificate is 316 bytes.

```
30 82 01 38 30 81 de a0 03 02 01 02 02 03 01 f5 0d 30 0a 06 08 2a 86
48 ce 3d 04 03 02 30 16 31 14 30 12 06 03 55 04 03 0c 0b 52 46 43 20
74 65 73 74 20 43 41 30 1e 17 0d 32 33 30 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 5a 30 22 31 20 30 1e 06
5a 17 0d 32 36 30 31 30 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 5a 30 22 31 20 30 1e 06
03 55 04 03 0c 17 30 31 2d 32 33 2d 34 35 2d 46 46 2d 46 45 2d 36 37
2d 38 39 2d 41 42 30 59 30 13 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 02 01 06 08 2a 86
48 ce 3d 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 b1 21 6a b9 6e 5b 3b 33 40 f5 bd f0 2e
69 3f 16 21 3a 04 52 5e d4 44 50 b1 01 9c 2d fd 38 38 ab ac 4e 14 d8
6c 09 83 ed 5e 9e ef 24 48 c6 86 1c c4 06 54 71 77 e6 02 60 30 d0 51
f7 79 2a c2 06 a3 0f 30 0d 30 0b 06 03 55 1d 0f 04 04 03 02 07 80 30
0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 03 49 00 30 46 02 21 00 d4 32 0b 1d
68 49 e3 09 21 9d 30 03 7e 13 81 66 f2 50 82 47 dd da e7 6c ce ea 55
05 3c 10 8e 90 02 21 00 d5 51 f6 d6 01 06 f1 ab b4 84 cf be 62 56 c1
78 e4 ac 33 14 ea 19 19 1e 8b 60 7d a5 ae 3b da 16
```



## A.1.1.1. Example: C509 Certificate Encoding

This section shows the C509 encoding of the X.509 certificate in the previous section. The point compressed public key is represented as described in Section 3.2.1.

Figure 21 shows the diagnostic notation of the unwrapped CBOR sequence, ~C509Certificate, see Section 3.1.

```
/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/

3,                / version and certificate type /
h'01f50d',        / serialNumber /
0,                / signatureAlgorithm /
"RFC test CA",    / issuer /
1672531200,       / notBefore /
1767225600,       / notAfter /
48(h'0123456789AB'), / subject, EUI-64 /
1,                / subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm /
h'FEB1216AB96E5B3B3340F5BDF02E693F16213A04525ED44450
  B1019C2DFD3838AB',
1,                / single extension:
                    non-critical keyUsage
                    digitalSignature /
h'D4320B1D6849E309219D30037E138166F2508247DDDAE76CCE
  EA55053C108E90D551F6D60106F1ABB484CFBE6256C178E4AC
  3314EA19191E8B607DA5AE3BDA16'
```

Figure 21: CBOR diagnostic notation of ~C509Certificate

Figure 22 shows the plain hex format of the unwrapped CBOR sequence, the size is 140 bytes.

```
03
43 01 F5 0D
00
6B 52 46 43 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41
1A 63 B0 CD 00
1A 69 55 B9 00
D8 30 46 01 23 45 67 89 AB
01
58 21 FE B1 21 6A B9 6E 5B 3B 33 40 F5 BD F0 2E 69 3F 16 21 3A 04 52
5E D4 44 50 B1 01 9C 2D FD 38 38 AB
01
58 40 D4 32 0B 1D 68 49 E3 09 21 9D 30 03 7E 13 81 66 F2 50 82 47 DD
DA E7 6C CE EA 55 05 3C 10 8E 90 D5 51 F6 D6 01 06 F1 AB B4 84 CF BE
62 56 C1 78 E4 AC 33 14 EA 19 19 1E 8B 60 7D A5 AE 3B DA 16
```



Figure 22: CBOR plain hex format of ~C509Certificate.

## A.1.2. Example: Natively Signed C509 Certificate

This section shows the natively signed C509 certificate corresponding to that of the previous section, which is identical except for c509CertificateType, encoding of point compression (see Section 3.2.1), and signatureValue.

Figure 23 shows the diagnostic notation of the natively signed unwrapped CBOR sequence, ~C509Certificate.

/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/

```
2,
h'01f50d',
0,
"RFC test CA",
1672531200,
1767225600,
48(h'0123456789AB'),
1,
h'02B1216AB96E5B3B3340F5BDF02E693F16213A04525ED44450
  B1019C2DFD3838AB',
1,
h'EB0D472731F689BC00F5880B12C68B3F9FD38B23FADFCA2095
  0F3F241B60A202579CAC28CD3B7494D5FA5D8BBAB4600357E5
  50AB9FA9A65D9BA2B3B82E668CC6'
```

Figure 23: CBOR diagnostic notation of ~C509Certificate

Figure 24 shows the plain hex format of the natively signed unwrapped CBOR sequence, the size is 140 bytes.

```
02
43 01 F5 0D
00
6B 52 46 43 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41
1A 63 B0 CD 00
1A 69 55 B9 00
D8 30 46 01 23 45 67 89 AB
01
58 21 02 B1 21 6A B9 6E 5B 3B 33 40 F5 BD F0 2E 69 3F 16 21 3A 04 52
5E D4 44 50 B1 01 9C 2D FD 38 38 AB
01
58 40 EB 0D 47 27 31 F6 89 BC 00 F5 88 0B 12 C6 8B 3F 9F D3 8B 23 FA
DF CA 20 95 0F 3F 24 1B 60 A2 02 57 9C AC 28 CD 3B 74 94 D5 FA 5D 8B
BA B4 60 03 57 E5 50 AB 9F A9 A6 5D 9B A2 B3 B8 2E 66 8C C6
```



Figure 24: CBOR plain hex format of ~C509Certificate.

#### A.1.3. C509 for Diffie-Hellman keys

The two previous examples illustrate keyUsage digitalSignature. A C509 certificate for a public Diffie-Hellman key would instead have key usage keyAgreement encoded according to Section 3.3 (in this case of single extension encoded as integer 16 instead of 1 for digital signature) but otherwise identical in format. Note that Section 5.6.3.2 of [SP-800-56A] allows a key agreement key pair to be used to sign a certificate request.

#### A.1.4. Example: Additional Keys for the Example Certificates

Below are the issuer key pair and the subject private key belonging to the above example certificates. The private keys are encoded as in COSE [RFC9052]. These issuer key pair can be used to sign or verify the example certificates and the subject private key allows the example certificates to be used in test vectors for other protocols like EDHOC.

issuerPublicKeyAlgorithm :

1 (EC Public Key (Weierstra) with secp256r1)

issuerPublicKey :

h'02AE4CDB01F614DEFC7121285FDC7F5C6D1D42C95647F061BA0080DF678867845E'

issuerPrivateKey :

h'DC66B3415456D649429B53223DF7532B942D6B0E0842C30BCA4C0ACF91547BB2'

subjectPrivateKey :

h'D718111F3F9BD91B92FF6877F386BDBFCEA7154268FD7F2FB56EE17D99EA16D4'

#### A.1.5. Examples: C509Certificate and C509CertData

This section exemplifies other CBOR objects defined in this specification, based on the natively signed C509 certificate in Appendix A.1.2.

Figure 25 shows the encoding of the corresponding C509Certificate, i.e., the CBOR array wrapping of the CBOR sequence ~C509Certificate, see Section 3.1.



```

8B
02
43 01 F5 0D
00
6B 52 46 43 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41
1A 63 B0 CD 00
1A 69 55 B9 00
D8 30 46 01 23 45 67 89 AB
01
58 21 02 B1 21 6A B9 6E 5B 3B 33 40 F5 BD F0 2E 69 3F 16 21 3A 04 52
5E D4 44 50 B1 01 9C 2D FD 38 38 AB
01
58 40 EB 0D 47 27 31 F6 89 BC 00 F5 88 0B 12 C6 8B 3F 9F D3 8B 23 FA
DF CA 20 95 0F 3F 24 1B 60 A2 02 57 9C AC 28 CD 3B 74 94 D5 FA 5D 8B
BA B4 60 03 57 E5 50 AB 9F A9 A6 5D 9B A2 B3 B8 2E 66 8C C6

```

Figure 25: C509Certificate: The CBOR array wrapping of  
~C509Certificate

Note that C509Certificate is identical to ~C509Certificate in Appendix A.1.2 except for the prefix 8B (which indicates that it is a CBOR array with 11 elements).

Figure 26 shows the encoding of the corresponding C509CertData, i.e., the CBOR byte string wrapping of the CBOR sequence ~C509Certificate, see Section 3.4.

```

58 8C
02
43 01 F5 0D
00
6B 52 46 43 20 74 65 73 74 20 43 41
1A 63 B0 CD 00
1A 69 55 B9 00
D8 30 46 01 23 45 67 89 AB
01
58 21 02 B1 21 6A B9 6E 5B 3B 33 40 F5 BD F0 2E 69 3F 16 21 3A 04 52
5E D4 44 50 B1 01 9C 2D FD 38 38 AB
01
58 40 EB 0D 47 27 31 F6 89 BC 00 F5 88 0B 12 C6 8B 3F 9F D3 8B 23 FA
DF CA 20 95 0F 3F 24 1B 60 A2 02 57 9C AC 28 CD 3B 74 94 D5 FA 5D 8B
BA B4 60 03 57 E5 50 AB 9F A9 A6 5D 9B A2 B3 B8 2E 66 8C C6

```

Figure 26: C509CertData: CBOR byte string wrapping of  
~C509Certificate.



Note that C509CertData is identical to ~C509Certificate in Appendix A.1.2 except for the prefix 58 8C (which indicates that it is a CBOR byte string of 140 bytes).

#### A.2. Example: IEEE 802.1AR profiled X.509 Certificate

An example of an IEEE 802.1AR profiled X.509 certificate (Secure Device Identifier, DevID) is provided in Appendix C.2 of [RFC9148]. The certificate is shown below including details of the hardwareModuleName type of otherName in subjectAltName, see Section 3.3.



## Certificate:

## Data:

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 9112578475118446130 (0x7e7661d7b54e4632)
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Issuer: C=US, ST=CA, O=Example Inc, OU=certification, CN=802.1AR CA
Validity
  Not Before: Jan 31 11:29:16 2019 GMT
  Not After : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=LA, O=example Inc, OU=IoT/serialNumber=Wt1234
Subject Public Key Info:
  Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
  Public-Key: (256 bit)
  pub:
    04:c8:b4:21:f1:1c:25:e4:7e:3a:c5:71:23:bf:2d:
    9f:dc:49:4f:02:8b:c3:51:cc:80:c0:3f:15:0b:f5:
    0c:ff:95:8d:75:41:9d:81:a6:a2:45:df:fa:e7:90:
    be:95:cf:75:f6:02:f9:15:26:18:f8:16:a2:b2:3b:
    56:38:e5:9f:d9
  ASN1 OID: prime256v1
  NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Basic Constraints:
    CA:FALSE
  X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
    96:60:0D:87:16:BF:7F:D0:E7:52:D0:AC:76:07:77:AD:66:5D:02:A0
  X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
    68:D1:65:51:F9:51:BF:C8:2A:43:1D:0D:9F:08:BC:2D:20:5B:11:60
  X509v3 Key Usage: critical
    Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
  X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
    otherName:
      type-id: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.4 (id-on-hardwareModuleName)
      value:
        hwType: 1.3.6.1.4.1.6715.10.1
        hwSerialNum: 01:02:03:04
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
Signature Value:
  30:46:02:21:00:c0:d8:19:96:d2:50:7d:69:3f:3c:48:ea:a5:
  ee:94:91:bd:a6:db:21:40:99:d9:81:17:c6:3b:36:13:74:cd:
  86:02:21:00:a7:74:98:9f:4c:32:1a:5c:f2:5d:83:2a:4d:33:
  6a:08:ad:67:df:20:f1:50:64:21:18:8a:0a:de:6d:34:92:36
```

The DER encoding of the certificate is 577 bytes:



```
30 82 02 3D 30 82 01 E2 A0 03 02 01 02 02 08 7E 76 61 D7 B5 4E 46 32
30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 30 5D 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06
13 02 55 53 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 08 0C 02 43 41 31 14 30 12 06 03
55 04 0A 0C 0B 45 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63 31 16 30 14 06 03 55
04 0B 0C 0D 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69 6F 6E 31 13 30 11 06 03
55 04 03 0C 0A 38 30 32 2E 31 41 52 20 43 41 30 20 17 0D 31 39 30 31
33 31 31 31 32 39 31 36 5A 18 0F 39 39 39 39 31 32 33 31 32 33 35 39
35 39 5A 30 5C 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 0B 30 09 06
03 55 04 08 0C 02 43 41 31 0B 30 09 06 03 55 04 07 0C 02 4C 41 31 14
30 12 06 03 55 04 0A 0C 0B 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63 31 0C 30
0A 06 03 55 04 0B 0C 03 49 6F 54 31 0F 30 0D 06 03 55 04 05 13 06 57
74 31 32 33 34 30 59 30 13 06 07 2A 86 48 CE 3D 02 01 06 08 2A 86 48
CE 3D 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 C8 B4 21 F1 1C 25 E4 7E 3A C5 71 23 BF 2D
9F DC 49 4F 02 8B C3 51 CC 80 C0 3F 15 0B F5 0C FF 95 8D 75 41 9D 81
A6 A2 45 DF FA E7 90 BE 95 CF 75 F6 02 F9 15 26 18 F8 16 A2 B2 3B 56
38 E5 9F D9 A3 81 8A 30 81 87 30 09 06 03 55 1D 13 04 02 30 00 30 1D
06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 96 60 0D 87 16 BF 7F D0 E7 52 D0 AC 76 07
77 AD 66 5D 02 A0 30 1F 06 03 55 1D 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 68 D1 65 51
F9 51 BF C8 2A 43 1D 0D 9F 08 BC 2D 20 5B 11 60 30 0E 06 03 55 1D 0F
01 01 FF 04 04 03 02 05 A0 30 2A 06 03 55 1D 11 04 23 30 21 A0 1F 06
08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 08 04 A0 13 30 11 06 09 2B 06 01 04 01 B4 3B 0A
01 04 04 01 02 03 04 30 0A 06 08 2A 86 48 CE 3D 04 03 02 03 49 00 30
46 02 21 00 C0 D8 19 96 D2 50 7D 69 3F 3C 48 EA A5 EE 94 91 BD A6 DB
21 40 99 D9 81 17 C6 3B 36 13 74 CD 86 02 21 00 A7 74 98 9F 4C 32 1A
5C F2 5D 83 2A 4D 33 6A 08 AD 67 DF 20 F1 50 64 21 18 8A 0A DE 6D 34
92 36
```

#### A.2.1. Example: C509 Certificate Encoding

The CBOR encoding (~C509Certificate) of the same X.509 certificate is shown below in CBOR diagnostic format.



/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/

```
3,
h'7E7661D7B54E4632',
0,
[
  -4, "US",
  6, "CA",
  8, "Example Inc",
  9, "certification",
  1, "802.1AR CA"
],
1548934156,
null,
[
  -4, "US",
  6, "CA",
  5, "LA",
  8, "example Inc",
  9, "IoT",
  -3, "Wt1234"
],
1,
h'FDC8B421F11C25E47E3AC57123BF2D9FDC494F028BC351CC80C03F150BF50CFF95',
[
  4, -2,
  1, h'96600D8716BF7FD0E752D0AC760777AD665D02A0',
  7, h'68D16551F951BFC82A431D0D9F08BC2D205B1160',
  -2, 5,
  3, [-1, [h'2B06010401B43B0A01', h'01020304']]
  / subjectAltName with hardwareModuleName /
],
h'C0D81996D2507D693F3C48EAA5EE9491BDA6DB214099D98117C63B361374CD86A7
74989F4C321A5CF25D832A4D336A08AD67DF20F1506421188A0ADE6D349236'
```

The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 275 bytes:



```
03 48 7E 76 61 D7 B5 4E 46 32 00 8A 23 62 55 53 06 62 43 41 08 6B 45
78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63 09 6D 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 69
6F 6E 01 6A 38 30 32 2E 31 41 52 20 43 41 1A 5C 52 DC 0C F6 8C 23 62
55 53 06 62 43 41 05 62 4C 41 08 6B 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 20 49 6E 63
09 63 49 6F 54 22 66 57 74 31 32 33 34 01 58 21 FD C8 B4 21 F1 1C 25
E4 7E 3A C5 71 23 BF 2D 9F DC 49 4F 02 8B C3 51 CC 80 C0 3F 15 0B F5
0C FF 95 8A 04 21 01 54 96 60 0D 87 16 BF 7F D0 E7 52 D0 AC 76 07 77
AD 66 5D 02 A0 07 54 68 D1 65 51 F9 51 BF C8 2A 43 1D 0D 9F 08 BC 2D
20 5B 11 60 21 05 03 82 20 82 49 2B 06 01 04 01 B4 3B 0A 01 44 01 02
03 04 58 40 C0 D8 19 96 D2 50 7D 69 3F 3C 48 EA A5 EE 94 91 BD A6 DB
21 40 99 D9 81 17 C6 3B 36 13 74 CD 86 A7 74 98 9F 4C 32 1A 5C F2 5D
83 2A 4D 33 6A 08 AD 67 DF 20 F1 50 64 21 18 8A 0A DE 6D 34 92 36
```

### A.3. Example: CAB Baseline ECDSA HTTPS X.509 Certificate

The [www.ietf.org](https://www.ietf.org) HTTPS server replies with a certificate message with 2 certificates. The DER encoding of the first certificate is 1209 bytes.

```
30 82 04 b5 30 82 04 5a a0 03 02 01 02 02 10 04 7f a1 e3 19 28 ee 40
3b a0 b8 3a 39 56 73 fc 30 0a 06 08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 30 4a 31
0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 0a 13 10
43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e 31 20 30 1e 06 03 55
04 03 13 17 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 20 49 6e 63 20 45 43 43 20
43 41 2d 33 30 1e 17 0d 32 30 30 37 32 39 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 5a 17 0d
32 31 30 37 32 39 31 32 30 30 30 30 5a 30 6d 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04
06 13 02 55 53 31 0b 30 09 06 03 55 04 08 13 02 43 41 31 16 30 14 06
03 55 04 07 13 0d 53 61 6e 20 46 72 61 6e 63 69 73 63 6f 31 19 30 17
06 03 55 04 0a 13 10 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e
31 1e 30 1c 06 03 55 04 03 13 15 73 6e 69 2e 63 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61
72 65 73 73 6c 2e 63 6f 6d 30 59 30 13 06 07 2a 86 48 ce 3d 02 01 06
08 2a 86 48 ce 3d 03 01 07 03 42 00 04 96 3e cd d8 4d cd 1b 93 a1 cf
43 2d 1a 72 17 d6 c6 3b de 33 55 a0 2f 8c fb 5a d8 99 4c d4 4e 20 5f
15 f6 e3 d2 3b 38 2b a6 49 9b b1 7f 34 1f a5 92 fa 21 86 1f 16 d3 12
06 63 24 05 fd 70 42 bd a3 82 02 fd 30 82 02 f9 30 1f 06 03 55 1d 23
04 18 30 16 80 14 a5 ce 37 ea eb b0 75 0e 94 67 88 b4 45 fa d9 24 10
87 96 1f 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e 04 16 04 14 cc 0b 50 e7 d8 37 db f2 43
f3 85 3d 48 60 f5 3b 39 be 9b 2a 30 2e 06 03 55 1d 11 04 27 30 25 82
15 73 6e 69 2e 63 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 73 73 6c 2e 63 6f 6d 82
0c 77 77 77 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 67 30 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f 01 01 ff
04 04 03 02 07 80 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06 01 05
05 07 03 01 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 7b 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 74
30 72 30 37 a0 35 a0 33 86 31 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 72 6c 33 2e 64
69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 49
6e 63 45 43 43 43 41 2d 33 2e 63 72 6c 30 37 a0 35 a0 33 86 31 68 74
74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 72 6c 34 2e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f
43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72 65 49 6e 63 45 43 43 43 41 2d 33 2e 63 72
6c 30 4c 06 03 55 1d 20 04 45 30 43 30 37 06 09 60 86 48 01 86 fd 6c
```



```

01 01 30 2a 30 28 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 02 01 16 1c 68 74 74 70 73
3a 2f 2f 77 77 77 2e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 43 50 53
30 08 06 06 67 81 0c 01 02 02 30 76 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 01 01 04
6a 30 68 30 24 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 18 68 74 74 70 3a 2f
2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 30 40 06 08 2b
06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 34 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 61 63 65 72 74 73
2e 64 69 67 69 63 65 72 74 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 43 6c 6f 75 64 66 6c 61 72
65 49 6e 63 45 43 43 43 41 2d 33 2e 63 72 74 30 0c 06 03 55 1d 13 01
01 ff 04 02 30 00 30 82 01 05 06 0a 2b 06 01 04 01 d6 79 02 04 02 04
81 f6 04 81 f3 00 f1 00 76 00 f6 5c 94 2f d1 77 30 22 14 54 18 08 30
94 56 8e e3 4d 13 19 33 bf df 0c 2f 20 0b cc 4e f1 64 e3 00 00 01 73
9c 83 5f 8e 00 00 04 03 00 47 30 45 02 21 00 f8 d1 b4 a9 3d 2f 0d 4c
41 76 df b4 88 bc c7 3b 86 44 3d 7d e0 0e 6a c8 17 4d 89 48 a8 84 36
68 02 20 29 ff 5a 34 06 8a 24 0c 69 50 27 88 e8 ee 25 ab 7e d2 cb cf
68 6e ce 7b 5f 96 b4 31 a9 07 02 fa 00 77 00 5c dc 43 92 fe e6 ab 45
44 b1 5e 9a d4 56 e6 10 37 fb d5 fa 47 dc a1 73 94 b2 5e e6 f6 c7 0e
ca 00 00 01 73 9c 83 5f be 00 00 04 03 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 e8 91 c1
97 bf b0 e3 d3 0c b6 ce e6 0d 94 c3 c7 5f d1 17 53 36 93 11 08 d8 98
12 d4 d2 9d 81 d0 02 21 00 a1 59 d1 6c 46 47 d1 48 37 57 fc d6 ce 4e
75 ec 7b 5e f6 57 ef e0 28 f8 e5 cc 47 92 68 2d ac 43 30 0a 06 08 2a
86 48 ce 3d 04 03 02 03 49 00 30 46 02 21 00 bd 63 cf 4f 7e 5c fe 6c
29 38 5e a7 1c fb fc 1e 3f 7b 1c d0 72 51 a2 21 f7 77 69 c0 f4 71 df
ea 02 21 00 b5 c0 6c c4 58 54 fa 30 b2 82 88 b1 d3 bb 9a 66 61 ed 50
31 72 5b 1a 82 02 e0 da 5b 59 f9 54 02

```

#### A.3.1. Example: C509 Certificate Encoding

The CBOR encoding (~C509Certificate) of the first X.509 certificate is shown below in CBOR diagnostic format.

/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/

```

3,
h'047FA1E31928EE403BA0B83A395673FC',
0,
[
  -4, "US",
  -8, "Cloudflare, Inc.",
  -1, "Cloudflare Inc ECC CA-3"
],
1595980800,
1627560000,
[
  -4, "US",
  -6, "CA",
  -5, "San Francisco",
  -8, "Cloudflare, Inc.",
  -1, "sni.cloudflaressl.com"
]

```



```

],
1,
h'FD963ECDD84DCD1B93A1CF432D1A7217D6C63BDE3355A02F8CFB5AD8994CD44E20',
[
  7, h'A5CE37EAE8B0750E946788B445FAD9241087961F',
  1, h'CC0B50E7D837DBF243F3853D4860F53B39BE9B2A',
  3, [2, "sni.cloudflaressl.com", 2, "www.ietf.org"],
-2, 1,
  8, [1, 2],
  5, ["http://crl3.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crl",
      "http://crl4.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crl"],
  6, [h'6086480186FD6C0101', [1, "https://www.digicert.com/CPS"], 2],
  9, [1, "http://ocsp.digicert.com",
      2, "http://cacerts.digicert.com/CloudflareIncECCCA-3.crt"],
-4, -2,
10, [
  h'F65C942FD1773022145418083094568EE34D131933BFDF0C2F200BCC4EF164E3',
  77922190,
  0,
  h'F8D1B4A93D2F0D4C4176DFB488BCC73B86443D7DE00E6AC8174D8948A8843668
  29FF5A34068A240C69502788E8EE25AB7ED2CBCF686ECE7B5F96B431A90702FA',
  h'5CDC4392FEE6AB4544B15E9AD456E61037FBD5FA47DCA17394B25EE6F6C70ECA',
  77922238,
  0,
  h'E891C197BFB0E3D30CB6CEE60D94C3C75FD1175336931108D89812D4D29D81D0
  A159D16C4647D1483757FCD6CE4E75EC7B5EF657EFE028F8E5CC4792682DAC43'
]
],
h'BD63CF4F7E5CFE6C29385EA71CFBFC1E3F7B1CD07251A221F77769C0F471DFEA
B5C06CC45854FA30B28288B1D3BB9A6661ED5031725B1A8202E0DA5B59F95402'

```

The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 783 bytes.

#### A.4. Example: CAB Baseline RSA HTTPS X.509 Certificate

The tools.ietf.org HTTPS server replies with a certificate message with 4 certificates. The DER encoding of the first certificate is 1647 bytes.

```

30 82 06 6b 30 82 05 53 a0 03 02 01 02 02 09 00 a6 a5 5c 87 0e 39 b4
0e 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 0b 05 00 30 81 c6 31 0b 30 09
06 03 55 04 06 13 02 55 53 31 10 30 0e 06 03 55 04 08 13 07 41 72 69
7a 6f 6e 61 31 13 30 11 06 03 55 04 07 13 0a 53 63 6f 74 74 73 64 61
6c 65 31 25 30 23 06 03 55 04 0a 13 1c 53 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c 64 20
54 65 63 68 6e 6f 6c 6f 67 69 65 73 2c 20 49 6e 63 2e 31 33 30 31 06
03 55 04 0b 13 2a 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 65 72 74 73 2e 73 74 61 72
66 69 65 6c 64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 72 65 70 6f 73 69 74 6f 72
79 2f 31 34 30 32 06 03 55 04 03 13 2b 53 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c 64 20

```



53 65 63 75 72 65 20 43 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 20 41 75 74 68  
6f 72 69 74 79 20 2d 20 47 32 30 1e 17 0d 32 30 31 30 30 31 31 39 33  
38 33 36 5a 17 0d 32 31 31 31 30 32 31 39 33 38 33 36 5a 30 3e 31 21  
30 1f 06 03 55 04 0b 13 18 44 6f 6d 61 69 6e 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 6f 6c  
20 56 61 6c 69 64 61 74 65 64 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 0c 10 2a 2e  
74 6f 6f 6c 73 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 67 30 82 01 22 30 0d 06 09 2a  
86 48 86 f7 0d 01 01 01 05 00 03 82 01 0f 00 30 82 01 0a 02 82 01 01  
00 b1 e1 37 e8 eb 82 d6 89 fa db f5 c2 4b 77 f0 2c 4a de 72 6e 3e 13  
60 d1 a8 66 1e c4 ad 3d 32 60 e5 f0 99 b5 f4 7a 7a 48 55 21 ee 0e 39  
12 f9 ce 0d ca f5 69 61 c7 04 ed 6e 0f 1d 3b 1e 50 88 79 3a 0e 31 41  
16 f1 b1 02 64 68 a5 cd f5 4a 0a ca 99 96 35 08 c3 7e 27 5d d0 a9 cf  
f3 e7 28 af 37 d8 b6 7b dd f3 7e ae 6e 97 7f f7 ca 69 4e cc d0 06 df  
5d 27 9b 3b 12 e7 e6 fe 08 6b 52 7b 82 11 7c 72 b3 46 eb c1 e8 78 b8  
0f cb e1 eb bd 06 44 58 dc 83 50 b2 a0 62 5b dc 81 b8 36 e3 9e 7c 79  
b2 a9 53 8a e0 0b c9 4a 2a 13 39 31 13 bd 2c cf a8 70 cf 8c 8d 3d 01  
a3 88 ae 12 00 36 1d 1e 24 2b dd 79 d8 53 01 26 ed 28 4f c9 86 94 83  
4e c8 e1 14 2e 85 b3 af d4 6e dd 69 46 af 41 25 0e 7a ad 8b f2 92 ca  
79 d9 7b 32 4f f7 77 e8 f9 b4 4f 23 5c d4 5c 03 ae d8 ab 3a ca 13 5f  
5d 5d 5d a1 02 03 01 00 01 a3 82 02 e1 30 82 02 dd 30 0c 06 03 55 1d  
13 01 01 ff 04 02 30 00 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 25 04 16 30 14 06 08 2b 06  
01 05 05 07 03 01 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 03 02 30 0e 06 03 55 1d 0f  
01 01 ff 04 04 03 02 05 a0 30 3d 06 03 55 1d 1f 04 36 30 34 30 32 a0  
30 a0 2e 86 2c 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 72 6c 2e 73 74 61 72 66 69 65  
6c 64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 73 66 69 67 32 73 31 2d 32 34 32 2e  
63 72 6c 30 63 06 03 55 1d 20 04 5c 30 5a 30 4e 06 0b 60 86 48 01 86  
fd 6e 01 07 17 01 30 3f 30 3d 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 02 01 16 31 68  
74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 73 2e 73 74 61 72  
66 69 65 6c 64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 72 65 70 6f 73 69 74 6f 72  
79 2f 30 08 06 06 67 81 0c 01 02 01 30 81 82 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07  
01 01 04 76 30 74 30 2a 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 1e 68 74 74  
70 3a 2f 2f 6f 63 73 70 2e 73 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c 64 74 65 63 68 2e  
63 6f 6d 2f 30 46 06 08 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 02 86 3a 68 74 74 70 3a  
2f 2f 63 65 72 74 69 66 69 63 61 74 65 73 2e 73 74 61 72 66 69 65 6c  
64 74 65 63 68 2e 63 6f 6d 2f 72 65 70 6f 73 69 74 6f 72 79 2f 73 66  
69 67 32 2e 63 72 74 30 1f 06 03 55 1d 23 04 18 30 16 80 14 25 45 81  
68 50 26 38 3d 3b 2d 2c be cd 6a d9 b6 3d b3 66 63 30 2b 06 03 55 1d  
11 04 24 30 22 82 10 2a 2e 74 6f 6f 6c 73 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 67  
82 0e 74 6f 6f 6c 73 2e 69 65 74 66 2e 6f 72 67 30 1d 06 03 55 1d 0e  
04 16 04 14 ad 8a b4 1c 07 51 d7 92 89 07 b0 b7 84 62 2f 36 55 7a 5f  
4d 30 82 01 06 06 0a 2b 06 01 04 01 d6 79 02 04 02 04 81 f7 04 81 f4  
00 f2 00 77 00 f6 5c 94 2f d1 77 30 22 14 54 18 08 30 94 56 8e e3 4d  
13 19 33 bf df 0c 2f 20 0b cc 4e f1 64 e3 00 00 01 74 e5 ac 71 13 00  
00 04 03 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 8c f5 48 52 ce 56 35 43 39 11 cf 10 cd  
b9 1f 52 b3 36 39 22 3a d1 38 a4 1d ec a6 fe de 1f e9 0f 02 21 00 bc  
a2 25 43 66 c1 9a 26 91 c4 7a 00 b5 b6 53 ab bd 44 c2 f8 ba ae f4 d2  
da f2 52 7c e6 45 49 95 00 77 00 5c dc 43 92 fe e6 ab 45 44 b1 5e 9a  
d4 56 e6 10 37 fb d5 fa 47 dc a1 73 94 b2 5e e6 f6 c7 0e ca 00 00 01  
74 e5 ac 72 3c 00 00 04 03 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 a5 e0 90 6e 63 e9 1d



```

4f dd ef ff 03 52 b9 1e 50 89 60 07 56 4b 44 8a 38 28 f5 96 dc 6b 28
72 6d 02 21 00 fc 91 ea ed 02 16 88 66 05 4e e1 8a 2e 53 46 c4 cc 51
fe b3 fa 10 a9 1d 2e db f9 91 25 f8 6c e6 30 0d 06 09 2a 86 48 86 f7
0d 01 01 0b 05 00 03 82 01 01 00 14 04 3f a0 be d2 ee 3f a8 6e 3a 1f
78 8e a0 4c 35 53 0f 11 06 1f ff 60 a1 6d 0b 83 e9 d9 2a db b3 3f 9d
b3 d7 e0 59 4c 19 a8 e4 19 a5 0c a7 70 72 77 63 d5 fe 64 51 0a d2 7a
d6 50 a5 8a 92 38 ec cb 2f 0f 5a c0 64 58 4d 5c 06 b9 73 63 68 27 8b
89 34 dc 79 c7 1d 3a fd 34 5f 83 14 41 58 49 80 68 29 80 39 8a 86 72
69 cc 79 37 ce e3 97 f7 dc f3 95 88 ed 81 03 29 00 d2 a2 c7 ba ab d6
3a 8e ca 09 0b d9 fb 39 26 4b ff 03 d8 8e 2d 3f 6b 21 ca 8a 7d d8 5f
fb 94 ba 83 de 9c fc 15 8d 61 fa 67 2d b0 c7 db 3d 25 0a 41 4a 85 d3
7f 49 46 37 3c f4 b1 75 d0 52 f3 dd c7 66 f1 4b fd aa 00 ed bf e4 7e
ed 01 ec 7b e4 f6 46 fc 31 fd 72 fe 03 d2 f2 65 af 4d 7e e2 81 9b 7a
fd 30 3c f5 52 f4 05 34 a0 8a 3e 19 41 58 c8 a8 e0 51 71 84 09 15 ae
ec a5 77 75 fa 18 f7 d5 77 d5 31 cc c7 2d

```

#### A.4.1. Example: C509 Certificate Encoding

The CBOR encoding (~C509Certificate) of the first X.509 certificate is shown below in CBOR diagnostic format.

/This defines a CBOR Sequence (RFC 8742):/

```

3,
h'A6A55C870E39B40E',
23,
[
  -4, "US",
  -6, "Arizona",
  -5, "Scottsdale",
  -8, "Starfield Technologies, Inc.",
  -9, "http://certs.starfieldtech.com/repository/",
  -1, "Starfield Secure Certificate Authority - G2"
],
1601581116,
1635881916,
[
  -9, "Domain Control Validated",
  1, "*.tools.ietf.org"
],
0,
h'B1E137E8EB82D689FADBF5C24B77F02C4ADE726E3E1360D1A8661EC4AD3D3260
E5F099B5F47A7A485521EE0E3912F9CE0DCAF56961C704ED6E0F1D3B1E508879
3A0E3141116F1B1026468A5CDF54A0ACA99963508C37E275DD0A9CFF3E728AF37
D8B67BDDF37EAE6E977FF7CA694ECCD006DF5D279B3B12E7E6FE086B527B8211
7C72B346EBC1E878B80FCBE1EBBD064458DC8350B2A0625BDC81B836E39E7C79
B2A9538AE00BC94A2A13393113BD2CCFA870CF8C8D3D01A388AE1200361D1E24
2BDD79D8530126ED284FC98694834EC8E1142E85B3AFD46EDD6946AF41250E7A

```



```

AD8BF292CA79D97B324FF777E8F9B44F235CD45C03AED8AB3ACA135F5D5D5DA1',
[
-4, -2,
8, [ 1, 2 ],
-2, 5,
5, ["http://crl.starfieldtech.com/sfig2s1-242.crl"],
6, [ h'6086480186fd6e01071701',
    [1, "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/"], 1 ],
9, [ 1, "http://ocsp.starfieldtech.com/",
    2, "http://certificates.starfieldtech.com/repository/sfig2.crt" ],
7, h'254581685026383D3B2D2CBECD6AD9B63DB36663',
3, [ 2, "tools.ietf.org", 2, "tools.ietf.org" ],
1, h'AD8AB41C0751D7928907B0B784622F36557A5F4D',
10, [
    h'F65C942FD1773022145418083094568EE34D131933BFDF0C2F200BCC4EF164E3',
    1715,
    0,
    h'8CF54852CE5635433911CF10CDB91F52B33639223AD138A41DECA6FEDE1FE90F
    BCA2254366C19A2691C47A00B5B653ABBD44C2F8BAAEF4D2DAF2527CE6454995',
    h'5CDC4392FEE6AB4544B15E9AD456E61037FBD5FA47DCA17394B25EE6F6C70ECA',
    2012,
    0,
    h'A5E0906E63E91D4FDDEFFF0352B91E50896007564B448A3828F596DC6B28726D
    FC91EAED02168866054EE18A2E5346C4CC51FEB3FA10A91D2EDBF99125F86CE6'
  ]
],
h'14043FA0BED2EE3FA86E3A1F788EA04C35530F11061FFF60A16D0B83E9D92ADB
B33F9DB3D7E0594C19A8E419A50CA770727763D5FE64510AD27AD650A58A9238
ECCB2F0F5AC064584D5C06B9736368278B8934DC79C71D3AFD345F8314415849
80682980398A867269CC7937CEE397F7DCF39588ED81032900D2A2C7BAABD63A
8ECA090BD9FB39264BFF03D88E2D3F6B21CA8A7DD85FFB94BA83DE9CFC158D61
FA672DB0C7DB3D250A414A85D37F4946373CF4B175D052F3DDC766F14BFDAA00
EDBF47EED01EC7BE4F646FC31FD72FE03D2F265AF4D7EE2819B7AFD303CF552
F40534A08A3E194158C8A8E05171840915AECA57775FA18F7D577D531CCC72D'

```

The size of the CBOR encoding (CBOR sequence) is 1245 bytes.

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