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The DNS Stamps Specification
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Abstract

This document specifies DNS Stamps, a compact format that encodes the information needed to connect to DNS resolvers. DNS Stamps encode all necessary parameters including addresses, hostnames, cryptographic keys, and protocol-specific configuration into a single string using a standard URI format. The specification supports multiple secure DNS protocols including DNSCrypt, DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), DNS-over-TLS (DoT), DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ), and Oblivious DoH.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Domain Name System Working Group mailing list (namedroppers@nic.ddn.mil), which is archived at nicfs.nic.ddn.mil:~/namedroppers/*.Z.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/DNSCrypt/draft-denis-dns-stamps>.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Table of Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. Introduction | 4 |
| 2. Conventions and Definitions | 5 |
| 2.1. Terminology | 5 |
| 2.2. Encoding Primitives | 5 |
| 3. DNS Stamps Format Overview | 6 |
| 3.1. URI Structure | 6 |
| 3.2. Payload Structure | 6 |
| 3.3. Protocol Identifiers | 6 |
| 3.4. Properties Field | 7 |
| 4. Protocol-Specific Stamp Formats | 8 |
| 4.1. Plain DNS Stamps | 8 |
| 4.1.1. Format | 8 |
| 4.1.2. Fields | 8 |
| 4.1.3. Address Format | 8 |
| 4.2. DNSCrypt Stamps | 8 |
| 4.2.1. Format | 8 |
| 4.2.2. Fields | 8 |
| 4.2.3. Requirements | 9 |
| 4.3. DNS-over-HTTPS Stamps | 9 |
| 4.3.1. Format | 9 |
| 4.3.2. Fields | 9 |
| 4.3.3. Requirements | 10 |
| 4.4. DNS-over-TLS Stamps | 10 |
| 4.4.1. Format | 10 |
| 4.4.2. Fields | 10 |
| 4.5. DNS-over-QUIC Stamps | 10 |
| 4.5.1. Format | 10 |
| 4.5.2. Fields | 10 |
| 4.6. Oblivious DoH Target Stamps | 10 |
| 4.6.1. Format | 11 |
| 4.6.2. Fields | 11 |
| 4.7. Anonymized DNSCrypt Relay Stamps | 11 |

| | |
|---|----|
| 4.7.1. Format | 11 |
| 4.7.2. Fields | 11 |
| 4.8. Oblivious DoH Relay Stamps | 11 |
| 4.8.1. Format | 11 |
| 4.8.2. Fields | 11 |
| 5. Usage and Operations | 11 |
| 5.1. Generating DNS Stamps | 12 |
| 5.1.1. Implementation Requirements | 12 |
| 5.2. Parsing DNS Stamps | 12 |
| 5.2.1. Error Handling | 12 |
| 5.3. Validation Requirements | 13 |
| 5.3.1. Length Validation | 13 |
| 5.3.2. Format Validation | 13 |
| 5.3.3. Semantic Validation | 13 |
| 5.4. Internationalization | 14 |
| 6. Security Considerations | 14 |
| 6.1. Stamp Integrity | 14 |
| 6.1.1. Threats | 14 |
| 6.1.2. Mitigations | 14 |
| 6.2. Certificate Validation | 15 |
| 6.2.1. Security Requirements | 15 |
| 6.2.2. Operational Considerations | 15 |
| 6.3. Privacy Considerations | 15 |
| 6.4. Implementation Security | 15 |
| 6.4.1. Parsing Safety | 16 |
| 6.4.2. Cryptographic Safety | 16 |
| 6.5. Downgrade Prevention | 16 |
| 7. Implementation Considerations | 16 |
| 7.1. Platform Integration | 16 |
| 7.1.1. Operating System Level | 16 |
| 7.1.2. Application Level | 17 |
| 7.1.3. Library Level | 17 |
| 7.2. Performance Optimization | 17 |
| 7.2.1. Caching | 17 |
| 7.2.2. Connection Management | 17 |
| 7.3. User Interface Considerations | 17 |
| 7.4. Debugging Support | 18 |
| 8. IANA Considerations | 18 |
| 8.1. DNS Stamps URI Scheme Registration | 18 |
| 9. References | 18 |
| 9.1. Normative References | 18 |
| 9.2. Informative References | 19 |
| Appendix A. Complete Examples | 20 |
| A.1. Example 1: Plain DNS | 20 |
| A.2. Example 2: DNSCrypt | 21 |
| A.3. Example 3: DNS-over-HTTPS | 21 |
| Appendix B. Test Vectors | 22 |
| B.1. Test Vector 1: Plain DNS with IPv6 | 22 |

| | |
|--|----|
| B.2. Test Vector 2: DoH with Multiple Certificate Hashes . . . | 22 |
| B.3. Test Vector 3: DoT with Bootstrap | 23 |
| Appendix C. Acknowledgments | 24 |
| Author's Address | 24 |

1. Introduction

The Domain Name System (DNS) has evolved significantly from its original design as specified in [RFC1035]. While traditional DNS operates over unencrypted UDP and TCP connections on port 53, modern DNS deployments increasingly use encrypted transports to provide confidentiality and integrity. These secure protocols include DNSCrypt [I-D.denis-dprive-dnscrypt], DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [RFC7858], DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484], DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) [RFC9250], and Oblivious DNS-over-HTTPS [RFC9230].

Each secure DNS protocol requires different configuration parameters. DNSCrypt needs a provider public key and provider name in addition to server addresses. DoH requires HTTPS endpoints and paths. DoT and DoQ need TLS configuration including certificate validation parameters. This diversity in configuration requirements creates significant challenges for both users and applications attempting to configure secure DNS resolvers.

Current approaches to DNS configuration suffer from several limitations. Operating system interfaces typically support only IP addresses for DNS servers, providing no mechanism to specify encryption protocols or authentication parameters. Application-specific configuration files lack standardization, making it difficult to share configurations across different DNS client implementations. Manual configuration is error-prone, particularly when dealing with cryptographic parameters like public keys or certificate hashes. There is no standard way to distribute complete resolver configurations that would enable users to easily switch between different secure DNS providers.

DNS Stamps address these challenges by encoding all parameters required to connect to a DNS resolver into a single, compact string using a URI format. This approach enables simple sharing of resolver configurations through copy-paste, QR codes, or URLs. It provides a consistent format across different client implementations, reduces configuration errors through format validation, and supports multiple protocols through a unified specification. DNS Stamps have been implemented in numerous DNS client applications and are used by several public DNS resolver operators to publish their server configurations.

The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes conventions and defines the encoding primitives used throughout the specification. Section 3 provides a high-level overview of the DNS Stamps format. Section 4 details the specific format for each supported protocol. Section 5 covers operational aspects including generation, parsing, and validation. Section 6 analyzes security considerations. Section 7 discusses implementation considerations. Section 8 specifies IANA registrations. The appendices provide test vectors and examples.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words “MUST” , “MUST NOT” , “REQUIRED” , “SHALL” , “SHALL NOT” , “SHOULD” , “SHOULD NOT” , “RECOMMENDED” , “NOT RECOMMENDED” , “MAY” , and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2.1. Terminology

This document uses the following terminology:

DNS Stamp A URI-formatted string that encodes all parameters needed to connect to a DNS resolver.

Protocol Identifier A single byte value that identifies the DNS protocol type encoded in the stamp.

Properties A 64-bit little-endian integer encoding informal properties about the DNS resolver.

2.2. Encoding Primitives

The following encoding primitives are used throughout this specification:

`||` Denotes concatenation of byte sequences.

`|` Denotes the bitwise OR operation.

`len(x)` A single byte (unsigned 8-bit integer) representing the length of `x` in bytes, where `x` is a byte sequence of maximum length 255.

`vlen(x)` Variable length encoding. Equal to `len(x)` if `x` is the last element of a set. Otherwise equal to `(0x80 | len(x))`, indicating more elements follow.

LP(x) Length-prefixed encoding, defined as $\text{len}(x) \parallel x$.

VLP(x1, x2, ...xn) Variable-length-prefixed set encoding, defined as $\text{vlen}(x1) \parallel x1 \parallel \text{vlen}(x2) \parallel x2 \dots \parallel \text{vlen}(xn) \parallel xn$. For a single-element set, $\text{VLP}(x) == \text{LP}(x)$.

[x] Denotes that x is optional and may be omitted.

base64url(x) The URL-safe base64 encoding of x as specified in Section 5 of [RFC4648], without padding characters.

3. DNS Stamps Format Overview

This section provides a high-level overview of the DNS Stamps format before detailing specific protocol encodings.

3.1. URI Structure

A DNS Stamp is a URI [RFC3986] with the following format:

`sdns://base64url(payload)`

The stamp begins with the scheme `sdns://` followed by a `base64url`-encoded payload. The payload is a byte sequence that encodes all parameters needed to connect to the DNS resolver.

3.2. Payload Structure

The general structure of the payload is:

`protocol_identifier` \parallel `protocol_specific_data`

The payload always begins with a single-byte protocol identifier that determines how to interpret the remaining bytes. The `base64url` encoding is applied to the entire payload as a single operation after concatenating all components.

3.3. Protocol Identifiers

The following protocol identifiers are defined:

| Value | Protocol | Description |
|-------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 0x00 | Plain DNS | Traditional unencrypted DNS |
| 0x01 | DNSCrypt | DNSCrypt protocol |
| 0x02 | DNS-over-HTTPS | DNS queries over HTTPS |
| 0x03 | DNS-over-TLS | DNS queries over TLS |
| 0x04 | DNS-over-QUIC | DNS queries over QUIC |
| 0x05 | Oblivious DoH Target | Target server for Oblivious DoH |
| 0x81 | Anonymized DNSCrypt Relay | Relay for DNSCrypt anonymization |
| 0x85 | Oblivious DoH Relay | Relay for Oblivious DoH |

Table 1

Protocol identifiers in the range 0x80-0xFF are reserved for relay/proxy protocols that forward queries to other servers.

3.4. Properties Field

Several stamp types include a properties field, which is a 64-bit little-endian integer. Each bit in this field represents a property of the resolver:

| Bit | Property | Description |
|------|-----------|---|
| 0 | DNSSEC | The server validates DNSSEC signatures |
| 1 | No Logs | The server does not keep query logs |
| 2 | No Filter | The server does not filter or block domains |
| 3-63 | Reserved | Must be set to zero |

Table 2

When encoding, undefined property bits MUST be set to zero. When decoding, undefined property bits MUST be ignored to allow future extensions.

4. Protocol-Specific Stamp Formats

This section specifies the exact format for each supported protocol type. Each format is presented with its structure, field descriptions, and encoding requirements.

4.1. Plain DNS Stamps

Plain DNS stamps encode parameters for traditional unencrypted DNS resolvers.

4.1.1. Format

payload = 0x00 || props || LP(addr)

4.1.2. Fields

0x00 Protocol identifier for plain DNS.

props Properties field (8 bytes, little-endian).

addr IP address and optional port as a string. IPv6 addresses MUST be enclosed in square brackets. Default port is 53.

4.1.3. Address Format

* IPv4: 192.0.2.1 or 192.0.2.1:5353

* IPv6: [2001:db8::1] or [2001:db8::1]:5353

4.2. DNSCrypt Stamps

DNSCrypt stamps encode parameters for DNSCrypt servers.

4.2.1. Format

payload = 0x01 || props || LP(addr) || LP(pk) || LP(provider_name)

4.2.2. Fields

0x01 Protocol identifier for DNSCrypt.

props Properties field (8 bytes, little-endian).

addr IP address and optional port. IPv6 addresses MUST be enclosed in square brackets. Default port is 443.

pk Provider's Ed25519 public key (exactly 32 bytes, raw binary format).

provider_name DNSCrypt provider name (e.g., 2.dnscrypt-cert.example.com).

4.2.3. Requirements

- * The public key MUST be exactly 32 bytes.
- * The provider name MUST be a valid DNS name.
- * The provider name MUST NOT include a terminating period.

4.3. DNS-over-HTTPS Stamps

DoH stamps encode parameters for DNS-over-HTTPS servers.

4.3.1. Format

```
payload = 0x02 || props || LP(addr) || VLP(hash1, ..., hashn) ||  
          LP(hostname) || LP(path) [ || VLP(bootstrap1, ..., bootstrapn) ]
```

4.3.2. Fields

0x02 Protocol identifier for DNS-over-HTTPS.

props Properties field (8 bytes, little-endian).

addr IP address of the server. May be empty string if hostname resolution is required.

hash1, ..., hashn SHA256 digests of certificates in the validation chain (each exactly 32 bytes).

hostname Server hostname with optional port. Default port is 443.

path Absolute URI path (e.g., /dns-query).

bootstrap1, ..., bootstrapn Optional IP addresses for resolving hostname.

4.3.3. Requirements

- * Certificate hashes MUST be exactly 32 bytes each.
- * The hostname MUST NOT be percent-encoded or punycode-encoded.
- * The path MUST start with “/” .
- * Bootstrap addresses follow the same format as addr.

4.4. DNS-over-TLS Stamps

DoT stamps encode parameters for DNS-over-TLS servers.

4.4.1. Format

```
payload = 0x03 || props || LP(addr) || VLP(hash1, ..., hashn) ||  
          LP(hostname) [ || VLP(bootstrap1, ..., bootstrapn) ]
```

4.4.2. Fields

0x03 Protocol identifier for DNS-over-TLS.

Other fields have the same meaning as DoH stamps, except:

- * Default port is 853.
- * No path field is included.

4.5. DNS-over-QUIC Stamps

DoQ stamps encode parameters for DNS-over-QUIC servers.

4.5.1. Format

```
payload = 0x04 || props || LP(addr) || VLP(hash1, ..., hashn) ||  
          LP(hostname) [ || VLP(bootstrap1, ..., bootstrapn) ]
```

4.5.2. Fields

0x04 Protocol identifier for DNS-over-QUIC.

Other fields have the same meaning as DoT stamps.

4.6. Oblivious DoH Target Stamps

ODOH target stamps encode parameters for Oblivious DoH target servers.

4.6.1. Format

payload = 0x05 || props || LP(hostname) || LP(path)

4.6.2. Fields

0x05 Protocol identifier for Oblivious DoH targets.

props Properties field (8 bytes, little-endian).

hostname Server hostname with optional port. Default port is 443.

path Absolute URI path.

4.7. Anonymized DNSCrypt Relay Stamps

DNSCrypt relay stamps encode parameters for anonymization relays.

4.7.1. Format

payload = 0x81 || LP(addr)

4.7.2. Fields

0x81 Protocol identifier for DNSCrypt relays.

addr IP address and port. Port specification is mandatory.

4.8. Oblivious DoH Relay Stamps

ODoH relay stamps encode parameters for Oblivious DoH relays.

4.8.1. Format

payload = 0x85 || props || LP(addr) || VLP(hash1, ..., hashn) ||
LP(hostname) || LP(path) [|| VLP(bootstrap1, ..., bootstrapn)]

4.8.2. Fields

0x85 Protocol identifier for ODoH relays.

Other fields have the same meaning as DoH stamps.

5. Usage and Operations

This section describes how to generate, parse, and validate DNS stamps in practice.

5.1. Generating DNS Stamps

To generate a DNS stamp:

1. Select the appropriate protocol identifier.
2. Encode the properties field as 8 bytes in little-endian format.
3. Encode each parameter using the specified length-prefixing.
4. Concatenate all components in the specified order.
5. Apply base64url encoding to the complete payload.
6. Prepend "sdns://" to create the final stamp.

5.1.1. Implementation Requirements

Implementations generating DNS stamps MUST:

- * Validate that all parameters meet format requirements.
- * Ensure strings are valid UTF-8.
- * Set undefined property bits to zero.
- * Include all mandatory fields for the protocol type.
- * Generate stamps that can be parsed by compliant implementations.

5.2. Parsing DNS Stamps

To parse a DNS stamp:

1. Verify the stamp begins with "sdns://".
2. Extract and base64url-decode the payload.
3. Read the first byte as the protocol identifier.
4. Parse remaining fields according to the protocol format.
5. Validate all fields meet requirements.

5.2.1. Error Handling

Implementations MUST detect and handle these error conditions:

- * Invalid base64url encoding
- * Unknown protocol identifier
- * Truncated payload
- * Invalid length prefixes
- * Malformed fields

Implementations SHOULD provide descriptive error messages indicating the specific validation failure.

5.3. Validation Requirements

5.3.1. Length Validation

- * Length prefixes MUST NOT exceed remaining payload size.
- * Certificate hashes MUST be exactly 32 bytes.
- * Ed25519 public keys MUST be exactly 32 bytes.
- * Properties field MUST be exactly 8 bytes.

5.3.2. Format Validation

- * IP addresses MUST be valid IPv4 or IPv6 addresses.
- * Hostnames MUST be valid DNS names.
- * Ports MUST be in the range 1-65535.
- * Paths MUST begin with /.

5.3.3. Semantic Validation

- * Certificate hashes SHOULD be validated against actual certificates.
- * Provider names SHOULD be verified to exist in DNS.
- * Bootstrap resolvers SHOULD be reachable.

5.4. Internationalization

Hostnames in DNS stamps MUST be represented in their Unicode form within the stamp payload. Implementations MUST NOT apply punycode encoding before storing hostnames in stamps. When using the hostname for actual DNS queries or TLS connections, implementations MUST apply the appropriate encoding for the protocol being used.

This approach:

- * Preserves readability when stamps are decoded for display
- * Avoids double-encoding issues
- * Allows implementations to apply protocol-specific encoding rules

6. Security Considerations

6.1. Stamp Integrity

DNS stamps contain security-critical configuration including server addresses, cryptographic keys, and certificate hashes. The integrity of stamps is essential - a modified stamp could redirect users to malicious resolvers.

6.1.1. Threats

- * Substitution: Replacing legitimate stamps with malicious ones
- * Modification: Altering addresses, keys, or certificate hashes
- * Downgrade: Replacing secure protocol stamps with insecure ones

6.1.2. Mitigations

Implementations SHOULD:

- * Obtain stamps over authenticated channels (HTTPS with certificate validation)
- * Verify stamps against known-good values when available
- * Warn users when importing stamps from untrusted sources
- * Validate all cryptographic parameters before use

6.2. Certificate Validation

For protocols using TLS (DoH, DoT, DoQ), stamps may include SHA256 hashes of certificates in the validation chain. These provide certificate pinning but require careful management.

6.2.1. Security Requirements

Implementations MUST:

- * Verify at least one certificate in the chain matches a provided hash
- * Follow standard certificate validation per [RFC5280]
- * Check certificate validity periods and signatures
- * Verify the certificate matches the specified hostname

6.2.2. Operational Considerations

Implementations SHOULD:

- * Support multiple certificate hashes to enable rotation
- * Provide clear errors for validation failures
- * Allow optional fallback to standard WebPKI validation
- * Cache certificate validation results appropriately

6.3. Privacy Considerations

DNS stamps may reveal information about resolver configuration:

- * Server Locations: IP addresses indicate geographic regions
- * Logging Policies: Properties flags indicate data retention
- * Query Privacy: Bootstrap resolvers may see some queries

Users should understand the privacy implications of their chosen resolvers. Applications SHOULD display relevant properties clearly.

6.4. Implementation Security

6.4.1. Parsing Safety

Malformed stamps could trigger implementation vulnerabilities:

- * Buffer Overflows: Validate all lengths before allocation
- * Integer Overflows: Check length calculations
- * Resource Exhaustion: Limit maximum stamp size

6.4.2. Cryptographic Safety

- * Validate Ed25519 public keys are valid points
- * Ensure certificate hashes are compared in constant time
- * Use cryptographically secure random numbers where needed

6.5. Downgrade Prevention

Applications supporting multiple protocols MUST NOT automatically downgrade from secure to less secure protocols. For example:

- * Never downgrade from DoH to plain DNS
- * Never ignore certificate validation failures
- * Never bypass authentication requirements

If a secure connection fails, the implementation SHOULD report the error rather than attempting insecure alternatives.

7. Implementation Considerations

7.1. Platform Integration

DNS stamp support can be integrated at various levels:

7.1.1. Operating System Level

- * System resolver configuration
- * Network configuration tools
- * VPN client integration

7.1.2. Application Level

- * Web browsers
- * DNS proxy software
- * Network diagnostic tools

7.1.3. Library Level

- * DNS client libraries
- * HTTP client libraries
- * Security frameworks

7.2. Performance Optimization

7.2.1. Caching

Implementations SHOULD cache:

- * Decoded stamp data structures
- * Certificate validation results
- * Bootstrap resolver results
- * Connection state for persistent protocols

7.2.2. Connection Management

- * Reuse connections for multiple queries
- * Implement appropriate timeout strategies
- * Handle connection failures gracefully
- * Support connection pooling for concurrent queries

7.3. User Interface Considerations

Applications SHOULD:

- * Display decoded stamp contents clearly
- * Allow copying stamps to clipboard

- * Support QR code generation/scanning
- * Provide stamp validation feedback
- * Show security properties prominently

7.4. Debugging Support

Implementations SHOULD provide:

- * Detailed logging of stamp parsing
- * Connection attempt diagnostics
- * Certificate validation details
- * Performance metrics
- * Error context for troubleshooting

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. DNS Stamps URI Scheme Registration

IANA is requested to register the “sdns” URI scheme in the “Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes” registry:

- * Scheme name: sdns
- * Status: Permanent
- * Applications/protocols: DNS client applications using DNS Stamps
- * Reference: This document

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Appendix A. Complete Examples

This appendix provides complete examples of DNS stamp encoding with step-by-step explanations.

A.1. Example 1: Plain DNS

Configuration:

- * Server: 192.0.2.53
- * Port: 53 (default)
- * Properties: DNSSEC (bit 0 set)

Step-by-step encoding:

1. Protocol identifier: 0x00
2. Properties: 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 (bit 0 set, little-endian)
3. LP("192.0.2.53"): 0x0A || "192.0.2.53" = 0x0A 0x31 0x39 0x32 0x2E 0x30 0x2E 0x32 0x2E 0x35 0x33
4. Concatenate: 0x00 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x0A 0x31 0x39 0x32 0x2E 0x30 0x2E 0x32 0x2E 0x35 0x33
5. Base64url encode: AAEEAAAAAAAAACjE5Mi4wLjIuNTM

6. Final stamp: `sdns://AAEAAAAAAAAACjE5Mi4wLjIuNTM`

A.2. Example 2: DNSCrypt

Configuration:

- * Server: 198.51.100.1
- * Port: 5553
- * Provider public key: e801...bf82 (32 bytes)
- * Provider name: 2.dnscrypt-cert.example.com
- * Properties: DNSSEC, No logs, No filter (bits 0, 1, 2 set)

Step-by-step encoding:

1. Protocol identifier: 0x01
2. Properties: 0x07 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
3. LP("198.51.100.1:5553"): 0x11 || address
4. LP(public key): 0x20 || 32 bytes of key
5. LP("2.dnscrypt-cert.example.com"): 0x1B || provider name
6. Concatenate all components
7. Base64url encode
8. Final stamp: `sdns://AQcAAAAAAAAAETE5OC4lMS4xMDAuMT0lNTUzIOgBsd...`

A.3. Example 3: DNS-over-HTTPS

Configuration:

- * Hostname: dns.example.com
- * Path: /dns-query
- * No specific IP address
- * Certificate hash: 3b7f...b663 (32 bytes)
- * Properties: No logs (bit 1 set)

Step-by-step encoding:

1. Protocol identifier: 0x02
2. Properties: 0x02 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
3. LP(""): 0x00 (empty address)
4. VLP(cert hash): Since it's the only hash, same as LP: 0x20 || 32 bytes
5. LP("dns.example.com"): 0x0F || hostname
6. LP("/dns-query"): 0x0A || path
7. No bootstrap IPs
8. Concatenate, base64url encode
9. Final stamp:
sdns://AgIAAAAAAAAAAAD2Rucy5leGFtcGxlLmNvbQovZG5zLXF1ZXJ5

Appendix B. Test Vectors

This appendix provides test vectors for validating DNS stamp implementations.

B.1. Test Vector 1: Plain DNS with IPv6

Input:

Protocol: Plain DNS
Address: [2001:db8::1]:53
Properties: DNSSEC

Encoded stamp:

sdns://AAEAAAAAAAAAADlsyMDAxOmRiODo6MV0

Decoded:

Protocol ID: 0x00
Properties: 0x0100000000000000
Address: "[2001:db8::1]"

B.2. Test Vector 2: DoH with Multiple Certificate Hashes

Appendix C. Acknowledgments

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