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Synchronizing caches of DNS resolvers  
draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-poisonlicious-02

## Abstract

Network of cooperating and mutually trusting DNS resolvers could benefit from cache sharing, where one resolver would distribute the result of a resolution to other resolvers. This document standardizes a protocol to do so.

## About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at  
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bortzmeyer-dnsop-poisonlicious/>.

Discussion of this document takes place on the dnsop Working Group mailing list (<mailto:dnsop@ietf.org>), which is archived at <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dnsop/>. Subscribe at <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop/>.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at  
<https://github.com/https://github.com/DNS-Hackathon/Poisonlicious>.

## Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

When an organisation operates a big network of DNS resolvers [RFC1034] [RFC1035], for instance for an important public resolver Section 6 of [RFC9499], it may be a performance improvement to distribute the result of the resolution process between the resolvers. This document standardizes how to do so, using blockchains (just kidding) and unicast messages to a set of pre-configured peers.

TODO data from Quad9 to show that there is a caching improvement to expect. Measuring the efficiency of caching optimizations is hard!

### 1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

### 1.2. Terminology

Network of resolvers (TODO or resolver set? Or resolver cluster?):

A set of resolvers working together under the same administration

Peer (or peer resolver):

One of the other resolvers in the network

Originating resolver:

A resolver sending data to its peers in the network

Receiving resolver (or receiving peer):

A resolver receiving data from one of its peers in the network

Resolver:

As used in Section 6 of [RFC9499]

## 2. The protocol

When completing a successful DNS resolution, the resolver transmits a DNS message (with the Q/R bit set, since it is a response) to the pre-configured peers, authenticating with TSIG [RFC8945]. TODO SIG0? DoT? No acknowledgment is sent or expected. To save work, the resolver MAY send the data only if the TTL is higher than some predefined value.

The resolver must send only data that it is sure of (for instance by DNSSEC validation or because it came with the AA bit from the queried server). Since all of the network of resolvers are in the same organizational domain, they MUST agree on the same policy for this assessment.

Messages of this protocol are distinguished from other DNS messages by the TSIG key they use (which must therefore be specific to this protocol). TODO or by a dedicated port?

This message MAY be the message received by the resolver from the authoritative name servers or it MAY be a new message with data composed from data already obtained by the resolver. TODO privacy risks when sending the question section? (See Section 5

The EDNS section MUST be a new one, created to fit the needs of successful transmission to the peer. TODO what about ECS [RFC7871]

Each peer then MAY store the data in its cache. The peer is not supposed to do DNSSEC validation (there is not always all the necessary data in the message). TODO cache only what is in the Answer section? See above about assessing the trustiness of the data. TODO Section 5.4.1 of [RFC2181] talks about the ranking of data. Should we describe it? Since it is supposed to be used inside an organisation, where all peers trust each other, and have a consistent policy, is it necessary? The idea is that the data is as trustworthy as if you validated it yourself.

### 3. IANA Considerations

None. [RFC-Editor: you may delete this section]

### 4. Security Considerations

The integrity and authenticity of the cached data is of course critical. DNSSEC would help but it is not yet universally deployed and, moreover, the peer resolvers should not have to redo the validation. So, trust between the peer resolvers is expected because it is the only way for the receiver to be sure of the data. One way to do so is to have all of the peers under the same organisational authority, as mandated here.

For the same reason, the channel between peers must be protected, preferably with cryptography (currently, TSIG is mandatory). ACL and other network techniques are of course useful.

Encryption is less important than authentication since we transmit only public data. Nevertheless, it is better to be sure that the channel between the peers is not open to snooping.

## 5. Privacy Considerations

Confidentiality is currently out of scope for this document. The communication between the originating resolver and its receiving peers could be encrypted, for instance with DoT but it is not otherwise specified.

If the originating resolver sends the original question section in its messages to receiving peers, it can have bad privacy consequences [RFC9076] TODO: delete this section? Replace it with dummy data?

## 6. Operational Considerations

It is reminded that all resolvers in the network need to trust each other, probably being in the same administrative domain. This specification is not meant to be deployed between unrelated resolvers.

The network of peer resolvers have to be configured out-of-band before. The way to do it is out-of-scope for this specification.

## 7. Related and future work

### 7.1. Related work

[I-D.hl-dnsop-cache-filling] describes a mechanism to fill DNS caches with data. The format is, like in this document, standard DNS as seen on the wire.

### 7.2. Future work

#### 7.2.1. Negative answers

TODO What to do about them? Transmit them? (Be careful of the risk of overloading receiving peers for instance when there is a dictionary attack.) Can a receiving peer use [RFC8020] and/or [RFC8198] to synthesize negative answers since it did not validate data itself?

#### 7.2.2. Transport of messages

Messages could be transmitted in long-lived TCP sessions, too.

If there are 1,000 servers, sending 1,000 messages, or having a full mesh of 1,000 TCP connections may be too much. It may be interesting to replace the unicast messages by multicast [RFC5110] (the issues of multicast on the public Internet do not apply here since we envision work under only one organisation).

Is the use of a DHT reasonable?

Why not MQTT [MQTT] which is well suited for publish-by-one/consume-by-many? What about protocols like protocol buffers? TODO What about dnstap?

#### 7.2.3. Packing of messages

It could be interesting to optimize by packing the data in a C-DNS [RFC8618] flow, sent with TCP (with TLS) or QUIC. (Of course, other formats/protocols are possible.)

#### 7.2.4. Different responses

When the authoritative servers send different replies depending on the client, the various peers may send different (and under-optimized) responses to a receiving peer.

### 8. References

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#### Appendix A. Acknowledgements

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