

Remote ATtestation Procedures
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An EAT-based Key Attestation Token
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Abstract

This document defines an evidence format for key attestation based on the Entity Attestation Token (EAT).

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Discussion of this document takes place on the Remote ATtestation Procedures Working Group mailing list (rats@ietf.org), which is archived at <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/rats/>.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/thomas-fossati/draft-kat>.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

This document defines an evidence format for key attestation based on EAT [I-D.ietf-rats-eat].

2. Terminology

The following terms are used in this document:

Root of Trust (RoT):

A set of software and/or hardware components that need to be trusted to act as a security foundation required for accomplishing the security goals of a system. In our case, the RoT is expected to offer the functionality for attesting to the state of the platform, and indirectly also to attest the integrity of the IK (public as well as private key) and the confidentiality of the IK private key.

Attestation Key (AK):

Cryptographic key belonging to the RoT that is only used to sign attestation tokens.

Platform Attestation Key (PAK):

An AK used specifically for signing attestation tokens relating to the state of the platform.

Key Attestation:

Evidence containing properties of the environment(s) in which the private keys are stored. For example, a Relying Party may want to know whether a private key is stored in a hardware security module and cannot be exported in unencrypted fashion.

Key Attestation Key (KAK):

An AK used specifically for signing KATs. In some systems only a single AK is used. In that case the AK is used as a PAK and a KAK.

Identity Key (IK):

The IK consists of a private and a public key. The private key is used by the usage protocol. The public key is included in the Key Attestation Token. The IK is protected by the RoT.

Usage Protocol:

A (security) protocol that requires demonstrating possession of the private IK.

Attestation Token (AT):

A collection of claims that a RoT assembles (and signs) with the purpose of informing - in a verifiable way - relying parties about the identity and state of the platform. Essentially a type of Evidence as per the RATS architecture terminology [RFC9334].

Platform Attestation Token (PAT):

An AT containing claims relating to the security state of the platform, including software constituting the platform trusted computing base (TCB). The process of generating a PAT typically involves gathering data during measured boot.

Key Attestation Token (KAT):

An AT containing a claim with a public key. The KAT may also contain other claims, such as those indicating its validity. The KAT is signed by the KAK. The key attestation service, which is part of the platform root of trust (RoT), conceptually acts as a local certification authority since the KAT behaves like a certificate.

Combined Attestation Bundle (CAB):

A structure used to bundle a KAT and a PAT together for transport in the usage protocol. If the KAT already includes a PAT, in form of a nested token, then it already corresponds to a CAB. A CAB is equivalent to a certificate that binds the identity of the platform's TCB with the IK public key.

Presenter:

Party that proves possession of a private key to a recipient of a KAT.

Recipient:

Party that receives the KAT containing the proof-of-possession key information from the presenter.

Key Attestation Service (KAS):

The issuer that creates the KAT and bundles a KAT together with a PAT in a CAB.

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the vocabulary and concepts defined in [RFC9334].

CDDL [RFC8610] [RFC9165] is used to describe the data formats and the examples in Section 6 use CBOR diagnostic notation defined in Section 8 of [STD94] and Appendix G of [RFC8610].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Architecture

Key attestation is an extension to the attestation functionality described in [RFC9334]. We describe this conceptually by splitting the internals of the attester into two parts, platform attestation and key attestation. This is shown in Figure 1. These are logical roles and implementations may combine them into a single physical entity.

Security-sensitive functionality, like attestation, has to be placed into the trusted computing base. Since the trusted computing base itself may support different isolation layers, the design allows platform attestation to be separated from key attestation whereby platform attestation requires more privilege than the key attestation code. Cryptographic services, used by key attestation and by platform attestation, are separated although not shown in the figure.

The protocol used for communication between the Presenter and the Recipient is referred as usage protocol. The usage protocol, which is outside the scope of this specification, needs to support proof-of-possession of the private key (explained further below). An example usage protocol is TLS with the extension defined in [I-D.fossati-tls-attestation].




Figure 1: Architecture

The Presenter triggers the generation of the IK. The IK consists of a public key (pIK) and a private key (sIK). The Presenter may, for example, use the following API call to trigger the generation of the key pair for a given algorithm and to obtain a key handle (key_id).

```
key_id = GenerateKeyPair(alg_id)
```

The private key is created and stored such that it is only accessible to the KAS rather than to the Presenter.

Next, the KAS needs to trigger the creation of the Platform Attestation Token (PAT) by the Platform Attestation Service. The PAT needs to be linked to the Key Attestation Token (KAT) and this linkage can occur in a number of ways. One approach is described in this specification in Section 5.1. The Key Attestation Token (KAT) includes the public key of the IK (pIK) and is then signed with the Key Attestation Key (KAK).

To ensure freshness of the PAT and the KAT a nonce is used, as suggested by the RATS architecture [RFC9334]. Here is the symbolic API call to request a KAT and a PAT, which are concatenated together as the CAB.

```
cab = createCAB(key_id, nonce)
```

Once the CAB has been sent by the Presenter to the Recipient, the Presenter has to demonstrate possession of the private key. The signature operation uses the private key of the IK (sIK). How this proof-of-possession of the private key is accomplished depends on the details of the usage protocol and is outside the scope of this specification.

The Recipient of the CAB and the proof-of-possession data (such as a digital signature) first extracts the PAT and the KAT. The PAT and the KAT may need to be conveyed to a Verifier. If the PAT is in the form of attestation results the checks can be performed locally at the Recipient, whereby the following checks are made:

- * The signature protecting the PAT MUST pass verification when using available trust anchor(s).
- * The chaining of PAT and KAT MUST be verified. The detailed verification procedure depends on the chaining mechanism utilized.
- * The claims in the PAT MUST be matched against stored reference values.
- * The signature protecting the KAT MUST pass verification.
- * The KAT MUST be checked for replays using the nonce included in the KAT definition (see Figure 2).

Once all these steps are completed, the verifier produces the attestation result and includes (if needed) the IK public key (pIK).

4. Key Attestation Token Format

4.1. Proof-of-Possession

The KAT utilizes the proof-of-possession functionality defined in [RFC8747] to encode the public key of the IK (pIK).

```
import rfc9052

kat = {
  &(eat_nonce: 10) => bstr .size (8..64)
  &(cnf: 8) => ak-pub
  &(kak-pub: 2500) => COSE_Key
}

ak-pub = cnf-map

cnf-map = {
  &(cose-key: 1) => COSE_Key
}
```

Figure 2: KAT Definition

The claims in the KAT are as follows:

- * eat_nonce: challenge from the relying party
- * cnf: the key confirmation [RFC8747] of the pIK, encoded as COSE_Key [STD96]
- * kak-pub: the public part of the KAK (used for verification of the KAT), encoded as COSE_Key

5. Platform Attestation Token Format

There are no strict requirements regarding the composition of the platform attestation token's claims-set, except for the presence of the eat_nonce claim used for binding (Section 5.1.1).

An example of PAT could be the PSA Token [I-D.tschofenig-rats-psa-token].

5.1. KAT-PAT Bundle

The KAT and PAT tokens are combined in a CMW "collection" [I-D.ietf-rats-msg-wrap] as shown in Figure 3.

```

cab = {
  "kat": [ "application/eat+cwt", bytes .cbor cose_sign1<kat> ]
  "pat": [ "application/eat+cwt", bytes .cbor cose_sign1<pat> ]

  "__cmwc_t": "tag:ietf.org,2024-02-29:rats/kat"
}

```

Figure 3: KAT Bundle Definition

5.1.1. KAT-PAT linkage

KAT and PAT are a form of layered attestation (Section 3.2 of [RFC9334]). For the scheme to be secure, it is crucial that their linkage is captured in their combined wire image. The way this is achieved is by hashing the CBOR-encoded COSE_Key corresponding to the KAK (i.e., the kak-pub claim in the KAT) and using it to populate the eat_nonce claim in the PAT. The signature on the PAT seals the image of the used KAK and therefore the linkage between the two layers.

6. Examples

```

{
  / nonce / 10: h'B91B03129222973C214E42BF31D6872A3EF2DBDDA401FBD1
F725D48D6BF9C817',
  / kak-pub / 2500: {
    / kty / 1: 2, / EC2 /
    / crv / -1: 1, / P-256 /
    / x / -2: h'F0FFFA7BA35E76E44CA1F5446D327C8382A5A40E5F2974
5DF948346C7C88A5D3',
    / y / -3: h'7CB4C4873CBB6F097562F61D5280768CD2CFE35FBA97E9
97280DBAAAE3AF92FE'
  },
  / cnf / 8: {
    / COSE_Key / 1: {
      / kty / 1: 2, / EC2 /
      / crv / -1: 1, / P-256 /
      / x / -2: h'D7CC072DE2205BDC1537A543D53C60A6ACB62ECCD8
90C7FA27C9E354089BBE13',
      / y / -3: h'F95E1D4B851A2CC80FFF87D8E23F22AFB725D535E5
15D020731E79A3B4E47120'
    }
  }
}

```

Figure 4: KAT


```
{
  / eat_nonce / 10: h'FAF2BCA754DFD3F309FCED20791DC1173B1BF61CF5
49145A6EDD4AD4CE2DC4F2'
}
```

Figure 5: Minimal PAT

```
{
  "kat": [
    "application/eat+cwt",
    << [
      / protected / h'A10126',
      / unprotected / {},
      / payload (KAT Claims-Set) / << {
        / nonce / 10: h'B91B03129222973C214E42BF31D6872A3EF2DBDD
A401FBD1F725D48D6BF9C817',
        / kak-pub / 2500: {
          / kty / 1: 2, / EC2 /
          / crv / -1: 1, / P-256 /
          / x / -2: h'F0FFFA7BA35E76E44CA1F5446D327C8382A5A40E
5F29745DF948346C7C88A5D3',
          / y / -3: h'7CB4C4873CBB6F097562F61D5280768CD2CFE35F
BA97E997280DBAAAE3AF92FE'
        },
        / cnf / 8: {
          / COSE_Key / 1: {
            / kty / 1: 2, / EC2 /
            / crv / -1: 1, / P-256 /
            / x / -2: h'D7CC072DE2205BDC1537A543D53C60A6ACB62E
CCD890C7FA27C9E354089BBE13',
            / y / -3: h'F95E1D4B851A2CC80FFF87D8E23F22AFB725D5
35E515D020731E79A3B4E47120'
          }
        }
      } >>,
      / signature / h'56F50D131FA83979AE064E76E70DC75C070B6D991A
EC08ADF9F41CAB7F1B7E2C47F67DACA8BB49E3119B7BAE77AEC6C89162713E0C
C6D0E7327831E67F32841A'
    ] >>
  ],

  "pat": [
    "application/eat+cwt",
    << [
      / protected / h'A10126',
      / unprotected / {},
      / payload (PAT Claims-Set) / << {
        / eat_nonce / 10: h'5CA3750DAF829C30C20797EDDB7949B1FD028C
```

```

5408F2DD8650AD732327E3FB64'
  / further platform specific claims /
  } >>,
  / signature / h'F9F41CAB7F1B7E2C47F67DACA8BB49E3119B7BAE77AE
C6C89162713E0CC6D0E7327831E67F32841A56F50D131FA83979AE064E76E70D
C75C070B6D991AEC08AD'
  ] >>
],

  "__cmwc_t": "tag:ietf.org,2024-02-29:rats/kat"
}

```

Figure 6: CMW Collection combining KAT and PAT

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Semantics of Key Attestation

The semantics of the KAT, i.e. what exact properties are attested, is highly implementation dependent. At the very least, the platform MUST NOT sign the KAT unless the IK's private key is generated by the Trusted Computing Base and is never exported in the clear.

The Identity Key, when it is ephemeral, is used to secure specific protocol sessions. However in general, protocol security depends on much more than the key's security. A vulnerable protocol stack (e.g. an insecure TLS library) may leak sensitive network traffic or may not protect its integrity. As a result, the Verifier's policy must take system-level security considerations into account when deciding whether or not to accept the CAB for a particular use case. In practice this means that in order to trust the Attester, the Verifier must have some knowledge about its internal architecture and the security threats it is subject to.

8. IANA Considerations

TODO IANA

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Appendix A. Amalgamated CDDL

```
cab = {  
  "kat": [ "application/eat+cwt", bytes .cbor cose_sign1<kat> ]  
  "pat": [ "application/eat+cwt", bytes .cbor cose_sign1<pat> ]  
  
  "__cmwc_t": "tag:ietf.org,2024-02-29:rats/kat"  
}  
  
;# import rfc9052  
  
kat = {  
  &(eat_nonce: 10) => bstr .size (8..64)  
  &(cnf: 8) => ak-pub  
  &(kak-pub: 2500) => COSE_Key  
}  
  
ak-pub = cnf-map  
  
cnf-map = {  
  &(cose-key: 1) => COSE_Key  
}  
  
pat = {  
  &(eat_nonce: 10) => bstr .size (8..64)  
  * (int / text) => any  
}  
  
cose_sign1<C> = [  
  Headers  
  payload: bytes .cbor C  
  signature: bytes  
]
```

Acknowledgments

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